SĀMKHYA KĀRIKĀ
of
ĪŚVARA Kṛṣṇa

with
THE TATTVĀ KAUMUDĪ
of
Śrī Vācaspati Miśra

With Sanskrit text of the Kārikā, transliteration and word-for-word meaning, and a free rendering into English of the Tattva Kaumudi with Notes

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PUBLISHER'S NOTE

We have great pleasure in presenting to our thoughtful readers this English translation of Īśvara Kṛṣṇa's Sāṃkhya kārikā with the gloss of Vācaspati Miśra.

Sāṃkhya forms one of the most important pillars constituting the six systems (saddarśana) of Indian philosophy. Its contribution to our knowledge of Reality and the world is seminal. Today Vedanta rules the roost, and modern science is finding itself more and more in agreement with the intuitive perceptions of this sixth darśana; but it must be noted that Vedanta takes off to ethereal heights only from the granite platform provided by Sāṃkhya. Vedanta accepts most of the basic concepts of Sāṃkhya — like the nature of the misery-go-round called Samsāra; the triple sufferings we are heir to; the three gunas of Prakṛti in terms of which can be explained not only the manifold objects of the universe, but also the workings of the mind and the psyche and even the rationale of medical therapy (Ayurveda); the process of evolution, long before Western science began to think in terms of it; and the nature of Pure Consciousness in which the individual must merge for total liberation. Sāṃkhya reduces everything to two entities — Prakṛti and Puruṣa. What Vedanta does is to integrate these two further into one splendid all-comprehensive Unity.

Not only Vedanta, but also modern science, cannot be understood in all their nuances without a firm grasp of the Sāṃkhyan tenets. May this translation of the Sāṃkhya kārikā, therefore, offer rich pabulum to all interested in finding more about themselves and the mysterious universe they inhabit.

—Madras
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INTRODUCTION

Every being in this world without exception seeks happiness. Even an insignificant creature as an ant tries to avoid pain by crawling away from the railway track when the mighty railway engine crosses the track. But the true nature of happiness cannot be explained by any one who lacks the philosophical instinct. According to Sāṅkhya Philosophers, total isolation of the Puruṣa from Prakṛti that causes the threefold pain, is the way for true happiness. They further say that worldly enjoyments are like honey mixed with poison, the sip of a drop of which is enough to end all happiness. So, after they realise such a state of happiness by right cognition of the Manifest, the Unmanifest and the Cogniser, they are moved with sympathy for the worldly who quiver in the pit of worldly enjoyments. This in brief, is the origin of philosophical enquiry according to the Sāṅkhya system.

Of all the philosophical systems, the Sāṅkhya philosophy is considered to be the most ancient school of thought. Sāṅkhya philosophy maintains a prominent place in all the Śāstras since it is either contravened or supported by every other philosophical system. Śaṅkaraśārya says: “This doctrine, moreover, stands somewhat near to the Vedānta doctrine since like the latter, it admits the non-difference of cause and effect and if, moreover, has been accepted by some of the authors of the Dharma sūtras, such as Devala and so on. For all these reasons we have taken special trouble to refute the Pradhāna doctrine”.

In the Mahābhārata it is said that there is no knowledge such as Sāṅkhya and no power like that of Yoga. We should have no doubt as to Sāṅkhya being the highest knowledge. (Śanḍiparva 316-2).

Sāṅkhya is derived from the word ‘Sāṅkhya’, meaning a sense of thinking and counting. Here thinking is with reference to some basic principles of the knowledge of Puruṣa and counting refers to the twenty four Principles born out of Prakṛti. This double implication of the word has been set forth by Vaiśṇava Bhikṣu in his preface to the Sāṅkhya Pravacana Bhāṣya:

रेण्यां प्राकृति चैव प्रकृति च प्राप्तिे ||
तत्त्वानि च भक्तिविवेकान सांख्यं प्रकृतितं ||

So, Sāṅkhya means knowledge of Self through right discrimination. The references to Sāṅkhya Sūtras are found in the Vedas. For example, Tamas is described in the Rig Veda as:

“तम आराधे तपस्वा मुक्तम मित्रार्जनस (X-129-3)”,

which later assumed the form of the unmanifest. This very Rig Veda shows the dissolution of the elements of the elemental world in its cause, thus indicating Sāṅkārya Vāda to which philosophy Sāṅkhya belongs. Even the Pradhāna is referred to as Ajā and the Veda explains it as below: (Rig Veda X 82.6)

तत्त्वं प्राणं तद्वेष ज्ञेय ज्ञेय देवाः समायमन्य विभिः।
अवस्य नामधवैस्वहस्तति यथायत विभानि तुमानि तत्त्वः ||

Further, the Sattva, Rajas and Tamas of the Sāṅkhya Philosophy is explained in the Chāndogya Upaniṣad, and the Sāṅkhya categories are clearly mentioned in Kaṭha Upaniṣad (3.10,11). It is a well known fact that Śvetāsvatara Upaniṣad is essentially a Sāṅkhya Upaniṣad because it clearly mentions the Sāṅkhya categories. In the Śvetāsvatara Upaniṣad, the word ‘Sāṅkhya’ and ‘Kaṭṭa’ have been used for the first time (6.13). Again in the same Upaniṣad words like Vyakta, Avyakta and Jña also are found (1.8). Similarly the use of the words Pradhāna, Prakṛti and Guṇa is also found here (1st Chapter 10, 4th Chapter 10, 1st Chapter 13). The mention of such words as Sattva, Rajas and Tamas by name, the exposition of five subtle elements, the enunciation of the five gross elements, the reference to the Sāṅkhya categorises of Kṣetrajña, Sāṅkalpa, Adhyavasāya, Abhimāna and Ānga clearly show that these Upaniṣads were
formed after the formulation of the Sāṅkhya system of thought. In the Mahābhārata and Purāṇas we find the Sāṅkhya Philosophy fully explained. Those who want to know details of references to Sāṅkhya are requested to consult the elaborate introduction of Sāṅkhya by Mahā Mahopādhyāya Ganganath Jha.

Kapila is generally known as a founder of the Sāṅkhya Philosophy. As regards its historicity, many scholars hold different view points which have not been dealt with here. But, generally, it is believed that Kapila was the founder of the Sāṅkhya system of thought. He had a disciple by name Āsuri. Āsuri's disciple was Pañca Śīkhā. After him we hear the name Vindhyāvāsa. Next we find the name of Vārṣagānya as a teacher of Sāṅkhya. He is followed by Jaigīṣayya. According to some scholars, Jaigīṣayya was a classmate of Pañca Śīkhā. In the list of names next we find Vādhu after that of Āsuri and before that of Pañca Śīkhā. Then, the names of Devala and Sanaka appear. Then the name of Īśvara Kṛṣṇa as a teacher of Sāṅkhya appears. He was born in a Kauśika family. (For details see The Tattva Kaumudi of MM Ganganath Jha).

Of the standard works on Sāṅkhya only three are available at present, viz., Sāṅkhya Śāstra, Tattva Samāsa and Sāṅkhya Karikā. Īśvara Kṛṣṇa appears to be older than Vasubandhu and must have flourished somewhere in the 1st or 2nd century A.D. The work of Īśvara Kṛṣṇa had 70 verses in it.

A brief synopsis of the cardinal principles of Sāṅkhya philosophy is given here to facilitate the study of Sāṅkhya. The Sāṅkhya lays down four-fold divisions of categories based on their respective causal and productive efficiency. They are: 1) Productive 2) Productive and Produced 3) Produced and 4) Neither Productive nor Produced. This classification into a four-fold division includes twenty four tattvas also. The root product is called the Prakṛti or Nature, being purely productive. The second variety are the other principles like Buddhi etc. This partakes of the nature of the both, the productive and the produced, inasmuch as Buddhi evolves ahaṁkāra and the rest. The purely Non-productive but the Produced principles are the eleven sense organs and the five material substances. The Puruṣa is neither the Productive nor the Produced and also it is without any attributes. All the accessories that we see are the effects of the Guṇas, and the Spirit by its very nature is totally free from all these.

According to the Sāṅkhya Philosophy, a non-entity can never be made an entity, that is to say, that which has never existed can never be brought into existence. The cause only helps the operation of the manifestation of the effect, i.e., its manifestation has an effect of a particular cause, e.g., the production of oil from oil seeds in which they are lying latent. Thus we find the effect is always in one way or other related to the cause. But this is not possible if the effects were a non-entity because a non-entity can have no relation. If the effect is not related with the cause then every effect would be possible for every cause, thus creating an absurdity of causes and effects. The causal efficiency consists in the existence of the effect in the cause in a latent condition like oil subsisting only in the seeds but not in the sand. Further, the effect is non-different from the cause and the former being an entity, the latter must also be an entity. For example, the cloth is not different from the threads composing it because it is neither heavier nor lighter than the cause nor can the cloth ever exist apart from the threads.

Of all the Schools of Thought, Sāṅkhya school occupied an intermediate position between the Idealist Vedānta and the Realist Purva Mīmāṁsā group. The Sāṅkhya is both realistic and dualistic inasmuch as it holds Prakṛti to be an ultimate reality along with Puruṣa. A close study of Sāṅkhya reveals that it is only close to Vedānta.
Aum

Propitiatory Verse:

Our reverential salutations to the One Unborn, Red, White and Black, that produces many offsprings. We also bow to those Unborn Ones who, having recourse to Her, renounce Her after having enjoyed the pleasures bestowed by Her.

We salute the Great Muni Kapila, his disciple, the Muni Āsuri, as also Pāṇcaśikhā and Īśvara Kṛṣṇa.

In this world, the exposition (of a doctrine) by an expounder is listened to only by those who desire a knowledge of that doctrine. But one who expounds doctrines not desired is disregarded by men of critical wisdom like a mad man, as neither a man of the world nor a critical examiner expounds a doctrine which is neither related to secular things nor is worthy of critical study. People desire to listen to an exposition of only that doctrine which, when understood, leads to the attainment of the supreme aim of man. Since the knowledge of the subject matter to be expounded (hereafter) serves as a means to the realisation of the supreme goal of man, the Author introduces the inquiry into the subject-matter:

तुः:खऽम्बिप्रांतात् जिज्ञासा तदपघात्के हेतुः
हेत्तेसाध्याभारथा चेत्वैकानात्त्यत्तोतभावात् || १ ॥

Duḥkhatrayaḥbhiḥgatāt. From the torment by the three-fold (causes of) pain (there arises); jijñāśā, a desire for inquiry; tadapaghātakaḥ hetau, into the means of terminating it; Drṣte,
(there existing) visible means; sā, it (i.e. the inquiry); apāṛtha, superfluous; cē, if it be said; na, (we reply) not so; ekānta-atiṣṭhatah-ubhāvah, (since in them) there is the absence of certainty and permanency.

1. From the torment caused by the three kinds of pain, proceeds a desire for inquiry into the means of terminating them; if it be said that (the inquiry) is superfluous since visible means exist, (we reply), not so; because (in the visible means) there is the absence of certainty (in the case of the means) and permanency (of pain).

The subject matter of this study would not be inquired into if there existed no pain in this world; or, if existing, its removal were not desired; or, if desired, its removal were impossible. Impossibility of removal of pain is of two kinds: (a) from earthlyiy of pain; and (b) from the ignorance of the means of removing it. Even if there existed the possibility of its removal, the inadequacy of the means afforded by the knowledge of the subject-matter of the āśāstrā; or, because of the existence of some other easier means (than the one explained in the subject-matter).

It cannot be said that there is no pain or that its removal is not desired (as these are opposed to experienced facts); so it is said: From the torment, is by the impact of the three-fold pain. The three kinds of pain constitute "dubkatrayā - the triad of pain." These are Ādhāyāmiīka - intra-organic, Ādhābhautika, caused by external influences, and, Ādhādaivika - caused by supernatural agencies. Here, the intra-organic is two-fold; bodily and mental. Bodily pain is caused by the disorder of wind, bile and phlegm, and mental misery is caused by lust, anger, greed, infatuation, fear, envy, grief and non-perception of particular objects. All these are called "intra-organic" as they are amenable to internal remedies. Pains that are responsive to external remedies are of two-varieties; they are (a) Ādhābhautika, i.e. caused by external influences, and (b) Ādhādaivika, i.e. caused by supernatural influences. Ādhābhautika misery is caused by man, beasts, birds, reptiles and plants and inanimate things, and Ādhādaivika misery is caused by the evil influence of Yaksā (a class of demi-gods who are described as the attendants of Kubera), Rākṣasa (goblin, evil spirit), Vināyaka (Gaṇeśa) and (superhuman beings that cause obstacles) and planets etc. Thus, this pain which is a particular modification of the attribute of Rajas, is experienced by every soul individually and, as such, its existence cannot be denied. Ābhīghāta (torment, assault) is the contact of the 'Sentient Principle' with the three-fold pain subsisting in the mind (internal faculty) in a disagreeable manner. Thus, the disagreeable nature of the sensation is said to be the cause of the desire for alleviating it (i.e. the three-fold pain, as explained above).

Though pain cannot be absolutely root out, yet it can be overpowered, as will be explained subsequently. Quite appropriately, therefore, it is said: Tadapaghāṣe hetau. Removal of these three kinds of pain is tadapaghāṣaka. Though the triad of pain (duhkhathāya) forms the subordinate factor (in the compound duhkhatrayābhīghāṭi) yet, it is to be considered as proximate to Buddh and so it is referred to by 'tat' in 'tadapaghāṣaka.'

Here a doubt is raised: Drṣṭa sā apāṛtha cet - since visible means of remedy exist, such an inquiry is superfluous. This is the meaning: well, let there be the three kinds of pain, the desirability of their removal, and also the possibility of their removal; also granted that the means set forth in the scriptures are adequate to the removal of pain. Even then, the inquiry (into the subject matter) by men is not worthy of pursuing inasmuch as easier visible means capable of removing pain are available. Also because this knowledge of the Tatvās is attainable only with great difficulties after undergoing long and arduous course of traditional study through many generations. Says a popular
maxim: 'When honey is available in a nearby place, wherefore should one go to the mountains?' When easier means for the attainment of the object of desire exist, which wise man will exert himself further?

Hundreds of easy remedies for physical pain are prescribed by eminent physicians. For removal of mental sufferings also we have easy remedies in the form of attainment of objects of enjoyment like charming women, pleasing drinks, food, cosmetics, dress, ornaments and the like. Likewise, we have also easy remedies for the removal of extra-organic miseries such as proficiency in the science of ethics and politics, residence in safe places etc. In the same way, we have easy remedies to get rid of troubles caused by supernatural agencies, in the shape of gems, charms etc.

Rejects the aforesaid view: Not so; why?

'Because of the absence of certainty and permanency.'

Ekāhā is the certainty of the cessation of pain; Ayanta is the non-recurrence of the pain that has been removed. The absence of the above two is denoted by the expression ekāhāyāha tato abhāvā. Here, the Universal affix ātā has a genitive force. This is the purport: since the cessation of (the three-fold) pain like inorganic etc is not seen even after employing in prescribed manner, curatives such as medicinal herbs, charming women, study of ethics and political science and use of incantations etc there is the absence of certainty (of the removal of pain); also since we see the recurrence of pain that was once cured, (we infer that) there is also the absence of permanency (of the cure affected). Thus, though easily available, the obvious means do not bring about absolute and permanent cure. Therefore, the inquiry (into the doctrine) is certainly not superfluous.

Though the mention of the word duhkham (in the very beginning) is inauspicious, yet the means that lead to its termination are auspicious; as such, it is quite appropriate at the commencement of a treatise.

Accepted that there is no visible means (by which the triad of pain could be removed absolutely and finally). But we have means prescribed in the Vedas such as Svetasvatara etc lasting for a whole year, and host of other ritualistic rites which will certainly and permanently remove the three kinds of pain. The Śrutī also declares: 'One desiring heavenly enjoyments should perform sacrifices.' Svarga is explained (in Tātrika Vārtika) thus: 'Svarga (svāhā) is that happiness which is endless and continuous and unmixed with unhappiness, and is attained by intense longing for it.' 'Heaven is a special kind of happiness that counteracts unhappiness and is thus capable of extirpating misery by its own inherent power. Nor is this happiness perishable, for, the Śrutī declares: 'We drank the Soma juice and became immortal.' (Athaṅkṣ-Śiras-3). If it (happiness) were liable to destruction, where then is the possibility of immortality? Hence the Vedic means which are capable of removing the three-fold pain in a moment, in a few hours, in a day and night, in a month or in a year, are much easier than the Discriminative Knowledge which can be achieved only with great exertion extending over many lives. Thus, we say, the proposed enquiry (into the doctrine) is superfluous. The next Kārikā provides the answer to this doubt:

Hashwetāt: स हस्तवत्वदिक्षायतिसाधयते || २ ||

Ānusavikāh, the revealed, Vedic; drṣṭavat, (is) like the obvious means; hi, because; saḥ, it is (is the Vedic means); aviprakṛti-kṣaya-atiśaya yuktaḥ, attended with impurity, decay and excess; tadviparitāḥ, (the means) opposite to both (the visible and the Vedic means); (and proceeding from) vyāka-avyakta-jña-vidyānāt, the Discriminative Knowledge of the Manifest, the Unmanifest and the Cogniser (Spirit); sreyān, is preferable.
2. The scriptural means is like the obvious means since it is linked with impurity, decay and excess. The means contrary to both and proceeding from the Discriminative Knowledge of the Manifest, the Unmanifest and the Spirit, is superior.

Anusra is Veda because it is heard by the disciple following the Guru’s utterance; that is to say, it is only memorised (by the disciple) and not written down (ie created) by any one (like the Mahabharata). Thus Anusravika is that which is known (from the Guru in the class). Though it is Vedic, the host of ritualistic means prescribed therein are similar to the obvious remedies as both the means are equally incapable of removing the three-fold pain absolutely or permanently. Though anusravika is the common denotation (for both the Karma kanda and the Jaina kanda), it ought to be taken here as implying only the ritualistic section of the Vedas. The Sruti also declares: Atman ought to be known, realised and discriminated from the Prakriti (Br. Up.) He (the Atman) does not return, he does not return (to this world). (Ch.Up.8-15).

Reasons for the above declaration are given: It (the scriptural means) is attended with impurity, decay and excess. It is impure because sacrifices like soma yajna etc are perfomed by the sacrifice of animals and destruction of corn etc. Bhagavan Panchasikhsacarya says: It (the sacrifice of animals etc) is slightly mixed (with impurity), remediable and bearable. Svalpah sankarah means the admixture of the slight sin, productive of evil, caused by the slaughter of animals etc with the principal merit born of the performance of sacrifices like Jyotihsoma etc. By Saprakahara is meant that the evil is removable by certain expiatory rites. But, if due to inadvertance, expiatory rites are not observed, then, it (ie the demerit caused by the slaughter of animals) also bears fruit at the time of the fruition of the principal karma (ie merit). As long as these evil effects are produced so long they are borne with patience, hence it is qualified as saprathyavamarsa. Adepts who are immersed in the huge lakes of heavenly nectar obtained by the performance of virtuous deeds bear patiently the spark of the fire of misery brought about by sin (caused by animal slaughter etc).

It cannot be said that the general injunction, ‘One should not injure any living being,’ sets aside the specific injunction, ‘you should kill the animal dedicated to the Agni-soma sacrifice,’ because of the absence of mutual contradiction. It is only when there is mutual contradiction, the weaker gets superseded by the stronger. Here there is no such contradiction because they deal with two quite different subjects. For, the prohibitory injunction ‘do not kill’ only declares that killing produces sin (and causes pain); but it does not do away with the fact of its being necessary for the completion of the sacrifice. The sentence: ‘kill the animal meant for Agni-soma’ only declares the necessity of animal slaughter in the performance of sacrifice; it does not suggest the absence of evil consequences arising from killing of animals. If it did so, there will be a split in the sentence to the effect that (a) killing is helpful in performing sacrifice and (b) it does not produce sin. Nor is there any contradiction between its being the cause of sin (arising from the slaughter of the animal in the sacrifice) and its (of animal slaughter) being helpful in the performance of sacrifice. Animal slaughter causes sin in man while at the same time it also helps man in the performance of the sacrifice.

Though the terms decay and excess (used in the above Karikaa) really relate to the effect, here they are attributed to the means. This quality of decay in heaven is inferred as it is a positive entity and a product. Further, it is said that sacrifices like Jyotihsoma are the means of attaining more heaven, whereas sacrifices like Vajapeya etc lead one to self sovereignty. This inequality in the result is what constitutes excess spoken of
(in the Kārikā). Verily, the superior prosperity of one man makes another of lesser prosperity sad!

Immortality denoted in the passage 'We drank soma and became immortal' indicates long durability. It is said elsewhere: 'Verily, immortality is the durability extending till the final dissolution of all the elements (i.e. of the entire universe).’ Hence, the Śruti declares: 'Neither by deeds nor by progeny nor by wealth but by renunciation alone they attained immortality; that which the hermits enter is laid beyond the heavens and yet it shines brilliantly in the heart' (M.N.Up.12-14); and also, 'Sages with children and desiring wealth got only death (as reward) by actions while those other sages who were wise attained immortality which is beyond all actions.'

With all this in view, it is said: the means contrary to them (to both and proceeding from the Discriminative Knowledge of the Manifest, the Unmanifest, and the Spirit) is preferable. Therefore, that which is contrary to the Vedic means of alleviating pain, such as drinking of soma etc which are impure and which bring about results that lack permanency and equality, is the pure means which, unmixed with evil (on account of animal slaughter) etc brings about permanent and most superior (unsurpassed) results. (This is clear from) the often repeated declarations of the Śruti that a person of Discriminative Knowledge never returns to metempsychosis. Now, it is not proper to say that this result (of knowledge) is impermanent inasmuch as it is a caused entity; because, such arguments hold good only if the effect is a positive entity; in the present case, however, removal of pain which though an effect, is a negative entity and is therefore otherwise. Nor can it produce some other pain, because no effect can take place when the cause itself becomes defunct, for, causal activity lasts only till such time as the attainment of Discriminative Knowledge. And this will be explained later on (in Kārikā No.66).

The literal meaning of the words of the Kārikā is this: The means of destroying pain in the form of immediate Discriminative Knowledge of the Spirit as different from Matter, is contrary to the Vedic means that are capable of removing pain, and hence it is preferable. The Vedic means also are good inasmuch as they are prescribed by the Veda and as such capable of alleviating pain to a certain extent. The Discriminative Knowledge of the Spirit as distinct from Matter is also good; of these two excellent means, the Discriminative Knowledge of the Spirit that is quite distinct from Matter, is superior.

Question: When indeed does this (knowledge) arise?

Answer: From the right knowledge of the Manifested, the Unmanifested and the Cogniser. The knowledge of the Manifested precedes the knowledge of the Unmanifested which is the cause of the former; and from the fact of these existing for another's purpose, the knowledge of Puruṣa is gained. Thus it is seen that these three are mentioned in the order of precedence of the knowledge thereof. The meaning of all this is that the knowledge of the Spirit as distinct from Matter is gained first by having heard with discrimination the real nature of the Manifested etc from the Śruti (Vedas), Smṛti (Canonical texts), Itihāsa (historical accounts) and Purāṇas (mythology); then, by duly having established the same through scientific reasoning, and finally by absorbing that knowledge into oneself by earnest and uninterrupted contemplation for a long time. It is explained thus (in Kārikā-64): 'Thus, from the practice of Truth, is produced the wisdom in the form: 'I am not, naught is mine, and not 'I', which is complete and pure on account of the absence of error and which is absolute.'

Having thus first established the fact of the usefulness of the scientific enquiry to the enquirer, the author, with a view to commence the work, sets down briefly the import of the system with a view to focusing the attention of the enquirer:
The Primal Nature is non-evolute. That which procreates or evolves (ie brings into existence other Tatwas) is Prakriti; it is also called Pradhana, the Primordial, representing the state of equipoise of (the attributes of) Sattwa, Rajas and Tamas and is non-evolute, that is to say, it is only an Evolvent. It is explained: Mula. It is the Root-evolvent (Mula-Prakriti) because it is the root (of all other evolutes) while also being at the same time the Primal Matter. It is the root of the aggregate of all products (ie the universe), while it has no root of its own (ie it is uncleavable). (If a cause to Prakriti also is posited) it would land us in unwarranted regressus ad infinitum, because, a further cause of that cause would also have to be postulated and this would lead to an endless series of causes which is irrational and not consistent with valid reason.

Question: How many are the objects which are both evolvents and evolutes? And which are those?

Answer: Evolvent-evolutes are seven beginning with Mahat, ie they are both evolvent and evolutes. The Great Principle (Mahat or Buddhi) is the cause of Ahankara. (I-Principle), while it is itself (being) the product of the Root evolvent. Similarly, the Principle of Ahankara is the cause of the five Primary elements (Tanmattas) and (eleven) sense-organs (Jharayas), itself being the effect of Buddhi. In the same way, the five Primary elements are the causes of gross elements like the ether (aka) etc while they are themselves the evolutes of Ahankara, the I-Principle.

Question: How many are the evolutes and what are they?

Answer: Evolutes are 'sixteen' in number; 'Sixteen' because they are limited by that number; they are: five gross elements and eleven sense organs; these are merely evolutes (modifications) and not evolvent. The particle tu (in the text) is used to emphasise this. (Though tu is placed before vikara in the text) it should be taken as coming after vikara. Cow, jar, tree, etc are the modifications of 'earth' element; similarly, curb and sprout are of milk and seed respectively, milk and seed being modification of cow and tree. This difference does not affect the above position because tree etc are not different from earth in their essence. It is the productiveness of something different in essence for which the term Prakriti stands and cow tree, etc do not differ from each other in essence. This is proved by the fact that they all have the common property of being gross and are perceptible by the senses.

Now, that which is neither of the above two, is described thus: 'The Spirit is neither an evolute nor an evolvent.' All this will be explained later on.

In order to establish the above proposition, the different kinds of proof (valid means of cognition) ought to be described.
A special definition cannot be framed without first framing the general definition. Therefore, common definitions of the means of right cognition follow:

1. Drṣṭam, perception; anumānām, inference; ca, and; āptavaca-
nām, statement of trust-worthy persons; sarvapramāṇa-
siddhatvāt, because (by these three) all (other) proofs are (also) established; trividham, three fold; pramāṇam, proof; iṣṭam, intended; pramanāti hi, through the means of cognition alone; prameyasiddhiḥ, establishment of things to be proved.

4. Perception, Inference and Valid Testimony are the means; (by these) all other means of right cognition too are established (as they are included in the above three); proof is intended to be of three kinds. It is through the proofs that the provables are established.

Here, the term pramāṇa (means of cognition) indicates the things to be defined; the explanation of the term is definition; pramāṇa is that by which things are rightly cognised; because of this (explanation) pramāṇa comes to be recognised as the instrument of right cognition. And this is a modification of the mind (cittavṛtti) in relation to an object, which is free from (such defects as) ambiguity, perversion, and non-apprehension. Right cognition is the result brought about by this instrument in the form of apprehension by a human agent, and its means is pramāṇa. By this the definition of pramāṇa does not apply to all other means which lead to doubt, wrong apprehension and recollection.

The author rejects conflicting views with regard to the number of pramāṇas by declaring that they are of three kinds, that is to say, of the common means of Right Cognition there are only three kinds, neither more nor less. This we shall explain after first explaining special definitions (of the means of Right Cognition).

Question: Which are the three kinds of proofs?

Answer: Perception, Inference and Valid Testimony are the three kinds of proofs. These three are the generally accepted popular forms of proofs. A philosophical system is expounded for the benefit of common mass of people because they alone benefit from it. The intuitive knowledge of yogins who have transcended earthly things, is not in any way helpful to the understanding of ordinary man; hence it is not treated here though it truly exists.

Objection: Let it be so. The number of proofs may not be less than three; but why should it not be more than three? Others (like Gautama) indeed speak of more pramāṇas such as Analogy (upamāna) and the rest.

Reply: Because in these three, all other proofs are included, i.e. all other forms of proofs are included in these three, viz, Perception, Inference and Valid Testimony. This will be explained later on.

Question: The express purpose of the Scripture is to establish the provables. Then, why should the scripture define the proofs as common and Special?

Answer: ‘Because apprehension of provables is possible only through proofs.’ Here siddhiḥ (in the text) means apprehension.

The explanation of the Kārika follows the order of sense ignoring the sequence of words (following the practise by respectable elders).

Now, while defining the special proof, the author first of all defines Perception because, a) it is superior among proofs; b) other proofs like inference etc are dependent on it; and c) all parties are agreed with regard to its primacy.
Drṣṭam perception; Pratītiṣṭhāṇyādyavasāyay, is the ascertain-
ment of each respective object (by the senses); anumānam,
Inference; trividham-akhyātām, is declared to be of three kinds;
tat, that (ie inference) liṅga-liṅgi-plāvyakam, is preceded by
a knowledge of the mark and of that of which it is the
mark; āptavacanam tu, while valid testimony; āptā śrutiḥ, is the
statement of trustworthy persons and the Vedas.

5. Perception is the ascertainement of each respective object
by the senses. Inference is declared to be of three kinds and it is
preceded by a knowledge of the middle term (liṅgi) and major
term (liṅgi) while valid testimony is the statement of trustworthy
persons and the Veda.

In the sentence Pratītiṣṭhāṇyādyavasāyay drṣṭam, the word
drṣṭam (perception) indicates the thing defined (laksya); the rest
of the sentence is the definition (laksana). The word laksana
means the differentiation (of the thing defined) from things of
the same class as well as from those of other class. The literal
meaning may be explained as follows: Viśaya (objects) are those
which impinge on the cognition by impressing their own form
upon cognition. Earth and other substances and pleasure and
other feelings (like pain etc) are objects to us. But, in their subtle
forms (tanmātras) they are not objects to us though they are
objects to the Yogins and ascetics. Pratītiṣṭhāṇyam denotes that
which impinges upon each particular object, ie the sense organ.
Vṛtti is contact with the object. Thus it stands for the sense which
is in contact with each object; knowledge depending on that
is adhyavāsyā. It is cognition resulting from the operation of
Buddhi. On the modification of the senses apprehending objects,
when there takes place the subdual of the tamas of Buddhi, there
takes place predominance of sattva - this is variously known as
cognition, sense modification, and knowledge (adhyavāsyā, Vṛtti
and jñāna). This much is pramāna. The favour that is
rendered unto the sentient faculty (cetanā) is the fruit known as
Right Cognition; (Pramā) it is bodha, awareness.

Indeed, the buddhītattva is unintelligent as it is derived
from prakṛti; hence, its cognition (which is a function of the
Buddhi) is also unintelligent, like a jar etc. Similarly, (other
modifications) of the Buddhi Tattva, such as pleasure etc, also are
unintelligent. But the Purusā unassociated with pleasure etc is
the Sentient Principle. (Yet) He (ie Purusa) appears to possess
cognition, pleasure etc by virtue of their shadows falling therein
by the reflection of cognition, pleasure etc which really subsist in
the Buddhi Tattva. This is how the intelligent principle (Cetanā)
comes to be favoured (by Buddhi). Buddhi and its adhyavāsyā,
though unintelligent in themselves, appear as though intelligent
due to their being reflected in the intelligence (of the Spirit). This
will be described in Kārikā.-20

By using the term adhyavāsyā (in the text), doubtful
cognition (Samśaya) is excluded, as doubt is of the nature of
uncertainty and is, therefore, never definite whereas adhyavāsyā
is a definite cognition. The use of the term Viśaya (object)
obviates perverse cognition (Viṣayārthya) of things that do not
exist. By using the term pratti (in the text) the contact of the
sense organ with an object is indicated; by this, inference,
remembrance, etc get excluded. Thus, ascertainment of each
respective object through the contact of the senses is the
complete definition of perception as it excludes all things of the
same kind as well as things of other kind. Definitions provided
by philosophers belonging to other systems have not been either
defended or criticised for fear of prolixity.

The Lokāyata (materialist) says that Inference is not a
means of cognition (Pramāṇa). If it is so, how does one know if
the person (he was addressing) was ignorant, or in doubt, or
pervasive? Certainly, it is not possible to an ordinary person whose perception is gross, to perceive the ignorance, doubt and perversity of another person; nor can it be known by any other means, because the materialist does not accept any other means (except direct perception). Thus, if, without knowing whether the person addressed is ignorant, or in doubt or perverse, the materialist were to go about addressing any and every person at random, certainly, such a person would be ignored as his expression is not fit to be heeded by all intelligent persons, as if he were mad. The ignorance, etc of another person has to be inferred only from such signs as the difference in his intention or words. Thus, he has to accept inference as a pramāṇa though he is unwilling.

It is just right that inference should be defined after first defining perception as inference results from perception. Also, inasmuch as the general definition must precede special definition, the author provides general definition of inference by saying: 'It is preceded by a knowledge of the middle term and the major term.' The middle term (linga) indicates the pervaded (vyāpya is less extensive) while the major term (lingi) implies pervasiveness (vyāpaka - more extensive). Vyāpya is that whose natural concomitance (with lingi) has been duly established after all suspected and assumed (casual) adjuncts have been rejected. That with which the līnga is concomitant is the Vyāpaka (the more extensive, major term). The words middle term and major term though are denotive of objects (of cognition), yet, here they stand for cognition of those objects. (Inference is preceded by the cognition of smoke etc as vyāpya (in the inference 'Hit is fiery because of the presence of smoke') and fire etc as the vyāpaka. The term līnga has to be repeated and taken in the sense of that in which the līnga is present, that is, by this the cognition that the līnga (which is smoke here, the middle term) is present in the minor term (pāka which is hill in the above inference) arises.

(This is pāka-dharmatājñāna). Thus, the general definition of inference is as follows: 'Inference is that cognition which is preceded (a) by the cognition of invariable concomitance between the major term and the middle term (ie vyāpya-vyāpaka between līnga and līnga) and (b) by the cognition of the presence of the middle term (līnga) in the minor term (pākṣadharmanātajñāna).

The author by saying inference is declared to be of three kinds, recalls the special forms of inference described by another philosophical system (Nyāya). Inference which has just been defined in its general form, has three special forms, known as (a) Apriorti-pūrvavat; (b) Aposteriori - śeṣavat; (c) based on general observation - sāmānyatodrśa.

First of all, inference is of two kinds: Vīta, positive and Avīta, negative. Positively postulating inference cognised through the method of agreement is the vīta while the negative inference got through the method of difference is avīta.

Of these two, the avīta inference is called śeṣavat (aposteriori, ie inferring the cause - kāraṇa through the effect, kārya); śeṣa is that which remains, the residue; hence the inference which has the residue for its subject matter is the śeṣavat inference. It has thus been described (in the Nyāyākhyā 1.15): 'The śeṣavat inference is that in which, with regard to an object, some of the likely properties being denied and eliminated, and there being no likelihood of their belonging to some others, we have the cognition of that which remains (undenied and uneliminated). An example of avīta inference got through the negative method will be cited later on (under Kārikā - 9).

Vīta inference is two fold (a) Apriorti - Pūrvavat and (b) Sāmānyatodrśa - based on general observation. Of these, Pūrvavat has for its object that Universal of which a particular individual has previously been seen; Pūrv (in Pūrvavat) means
well known is that universal of which the particular individual has previously been seen; thus, the Inferential Cognition of which such a universal is the object is called Purvavat; for example, the presence of the particular universal fire in the mountain is inferred from the presence of smoke (in the mountain). Here, the universal fire is one of which a particular individual in the form of a specific fire has previously been seen in the hearth. The second form of vita inference is the Sāmānyatodṛśta, which has for its object universal instances of which some kind have not previously been seen, e.g the inferential cognition which has senses as its object (i.e cognition of the sense organ). What is inferred in this case is the instrumentality of an organ bringing about by its action the cognition of colour and such things. (Inference of cause - Karana through the Kārya - effect). Though instrumentality (Karana the capability of effecting an act) as a genus (sāmānyā) is a known thing, because the specific individual is seen in the axe which is an instrument of cutting, that particular instrument (Indriya) which brings about the cognition of colour, etc is only inferred because the particular individual of that instrument (which brings about the cognition of colour etc) has never been perceived: That (particular form) of instrument (Karana) is that which is regarded as belonging to the universal sense organ and any specific individual of that universal sense organ (indriyatva-sāmānyāsya) is not perceptible to persons of ordinary vision as in the case of the specific individual fire being seen of the universal fire. This is what distinguishes the Purvavat inference from the Sāmānyatodṛśta inference, though both are equally Vīta inference. In the term Sāmānyatodṛśta the word dṛśta signifies cognition (darsana) of the universal (sāmānyāsya); the tāśī affix is capable of signifying the sense of all case-endings; thus the term Sāmānyatodṛśta stands for the inferential cognition of that particular universal of which a specific individual has not been perceived. All this has been fully described by us in the Nyāyavārttika-tātparyatākā and as such is not repeated here for fear of being prolix.¹

The disciple, immediately after hearing his teacher utter some words, (such as bring a cow etc) acts in a certain manner (brings the cow). The person witnessing this infers from the above that the understanding of the sense of words uttered by the teacher is the cause of action by the student. From this he recognizes the connection between the words used and their meaning. Further, this recognition of connection between the word and its meaning is the thing that helps a word in expressing its meaning. From this it follows the Verbal Testimony is preceded by inference; consequently, Valid Verbal Testimony is defined after Inference. It is defined as ‘Statements made by trustworthy persons and the Vedas.’ Here āptavacana indicates the thing to be defined while the rest of the sentence indicates its definition. The word āpta means that which is right; that which is right and also a revelation (sruti) is āptanirūṭh thus, Sruti stands for that cognition of meaning of a sentence which is brought about by that sentence.

Valid Testimony is self-authoritative, i.e it is always right inasmuch as it is brought about by the words of the Vedas which are not authored by any human being and because it is therefore free from all defects (such as falsehood which render words unreliable). It is for this same reason that the knowledge derived from the smṛti, tīthaya and purāṇa (canonical work, historical narrations and myths) is also regarded as right because they have

¹ A sense-organ does not belong to the same class as an axe, the instrumentality of which is seen in cutting etc. Further, a sense organ is also not an object of perception. Now, cognition and action are acts, the act of cutting cannot be effected without an instrument; similarly, the act of cognition and action too cannot be effected without some instrument. Thus is inferred the existence of the Indriyar as the instruments of cognition and action.
the Vedas as their source. As regards the Primeval sage Kapila, (the founder of the Sankhya philosophical system) it is probable that he remembered the Vedic texts that he had studied during the previous Kalpas (time cycles), just as the knowledge of things gained on the previous day is remembered the next day on waking up from sleep. And this is evident from the statement made by the venerable Jaigisavaya in the text: 'While I was evolvi- ing during ten Kalpas' etc where he speaks of his past lives extending over a period of ten kalpas, (time cycles) during a conversation between him and Avaya. By using the word Apta, (in aitavacana) all such pseudo-revelations as the improper scriptures of the Buddhists, (Sakyabhiksu), Jains (njirgranthaka) and materialists (Samsaranocaka) are excluded. All these (above mentioned scriptures) are just not worthy (ayuktatvam) because of (a) inconsistency, (b) being devoid of sound basis, (c) contradictory to reason and (d) as they are accepted only by a few low and beastlike persons such as Mlecchas etc. By the particle av in the text the author distinguishes Valid Verbal Testimony from Inference. The meaning of a sentence is verily the object cognised (by means of that very sentence); but it does not become its property (dharma) by which it could become its tika (ie inferential indication, as smoke is of fire). Nor is there any need to have a prior knowledge of connection (between the sentence and its meaning) in order to express the meaning of that sentence. (This is seen) In the work of a new poet where though the sentence used by the poet was never heard before, yet it expresses a meaning that was never cognised as having been expressed before.

Thus, this (as described above) being the nature of definitions of both the general and special forms of proofs, all other proofs such as Analogy and the rest which have been posited by the opponents (ie other philosophical systems) are included in the very proofs defined above.

For instance, the statements As is the cow, so is Gavaya is cited as an example of Analogy. The notion brought about by this means is verily a verbal cognition. Also the notion arising (from the above statement) that the word Gavaya denotes all animal similar to a cow, is only a case of inferential cognition. Here, the inference takes the following form: 'When a particular word is used by (knowledgeable) elderly persons (with reference to a particular thing) it should be regarded as denoting it when there is no other function (than direct denotation), as found in the example of the word cow denoting its generic attribute cowness as well. In a similar way, the elders use the word Gavaya to denote an animal similar to the cow. Therefore, the word Gavaya must be considered as denotative of that animal. This cognition is thus purely inferential. Further, the notion that the animal Gavaya which is before our eyes is similar to the Cow is purely a perceptual cognition. That is why when the cow is remembered, the cognition of its similarity to Gavaya arises and this is nothing but pure perception. Certainly, the resemblance in the cow is not something different from that in the Gavaya. Again, that is known as resemblance when the aggregate of the component parts of the body of one animal (like tails, hooves etc found in the genus of cow) is found to a great extent to be similar to that in the body of another animal. This resemblance of aggregates (of certain characteristics in the two animals of that genus) is one only; So, when it has been perceived in the Gavaya it must be so in cow also. Thus, there is nothing left to be the object of a different means of cognition in the form of Analogy. (Because, as proved above, every cognition arising from analogy is found to be either Perceptual or Inferential or Verbal) Thus we affirm that Analogy is not a distinct means of cognition.

Similarly, Presumption (Arthapatti) also is not a separate pramāṇa. In support of Presumption as a distinct pramāṇa, the ancients have put forward the following example: 'Chaitra who is
alive is not seen in the house.' Here, the existence of Chaitra
somewhere else is recognised by means of *presumption* though he
is not seen in the house (according to ancients). As a matter of
fact, this too is a case of inference. With regard to one's own
body, the concomitant is easily recognised as when we know
that an existing finite object which is not present in one place is
present in another place, and also that when a finite object is
present in one place, it is not present in another place. Therefore,
with the help of the minor premise that the living Chaitra is not
at home we get the understanding (or we infer) that he must be
somewhere outside the house. So, this is a clear case of inference.
The presence of Chaitra somewhere in the world cannot set
aside the fact of his absence in the house; inasmuch as the
unestablished absence in the house cannot be a valid reason for
his presence outside the house. Nor does Chaitra's absence in his
house negate his very existence. It is only if his existence itself
were denied, that it is not possible to establish his existence out-
side the house.

**Doubt:** Is Chaitra's *non-existence in the house* inconsistent
with his *existence itself* or only with his *existence in the
house?*

**Answer:** It cannot be the former, because there can be no
inconsistency between *existence somewhere else* and *non-exis-
tence in the house*; because, the two things are quite independent
of each other.

**Objection:** House is also included in *space in general.* (The
contention that there is no inconsistency between *non-existence
in the house* and *existence somewhere else* as they are two
different things is being contradicted). Therefore, (Chaitra's
existence somewhere else) implies his *existence in the house*
also; here, the subject matter being the same, there would
be inconsistency between *existence somewhere else* and *non-
existence in the house.*

**Answer:** This is not so. *Non-existence in the house* which is
determined by *Pramāṇa* (means of right cognition) cannot be
negated by doubtful and implied notion of *existence in the house*
(by such dubious arguments as *house also is included in space in
general*). Though, the definitely determined *non-existence in the
house* sets aside the dubious and implied notion of *existence in
the house*, it cannot deny man's existence; nor can it remove the
doubt (regarding the possibility of *existence in the house* implied
by the opponent). What is negated is only his *existence in the
house* by Chaitra's *non-existence as delimited by the house
because of incompatibility (of existence with non-existence);
his existence in general is not negated because of neutrality
(i.e. there is no incompatibility). Therefore, an inference of *Man's
existence outside* is drawn from the ascertained reason (līga or
middle term) in the form of his *non-existence in the house.* The
above reason also removes another definition of *Presumption
as consisting in the removal of contrariness between two valid
concepts by restricting them to distinct subject matters;* because
in reality there is no inconsistency between *what is delimited* and
what is *not delimited* (i.e between *non-existence in the house
and existence somewhere else*). Other examples of *presumption
ought to be similarly included in *inference.* By this it is estab-
lished that *Presumption* is not a separate *pramāṇa* distinct from
*Inference.*

Similarly, *Non-existence* (*abhāva*) also is only a form of
*Perception.* The non-existence of a jar (at a certain place) is
nothing but a particular modification of the place (where the
existence of the jar is denied) as characterised by *absoluteness.
Except the Sentient Principle, all other entities undergo modifica-
tions every moment and all these diverse modifications are
perceptible to the senses. Hence there can be no object which
could be the subject of a distinct means of cognition like *abhāva
(non-existence).*
Sanbhava (equivalence) which leads to the cognition of lesser weights such as Drona, adhaka, and Prastha (as included) in (the greater weight) khāri, is also a form of inference only (and not a separate praśmaṇa). In fact, the notion that the greater weight of khāri is inclusive of Drona etc leads to the cognition of presence of lesser weight like Drona in khāri. (Khāri is a measure equal to 16 Dronas).

Legend—ātihya is merely a continuity of a vague statement originating from (a dubious) unnamed source, generally appearing in the form, ‘ancients have said so and so.’ An example of this is found in the statement: On this banyan tree there lives a ghost. Now, this cannot be a distinct praśmaṇa because the statement is dubious as the source of its origin is undetermined. If the source of its origin is determined to be the statement of trustworthy persons, then it is simply a case of Verbal Cognition. Thus, it is but fit and proper to say that praśmaṇas are of three kinds only.

Thus have been defined the praśmaṇas (proofs or means of cognition) in order to establish the existence of the vyakta (manifested), avyakta (unmanifested) and the jīva (Puruṣa - Spirit). Of these, the manifested in the form of earth and the rest, is known by means of direct perception even by a dusty-footed ploughman (ie even by an unlettered person). He also knows such things as Fire (in the hill) by means of a priori inference (pūravat anumāna) based upon the perception of such indicative marks as smoke etc. Therefore, the scripture would not be rendering any worth while help if it were to deal with only such things. The scriptures, therefore, should deal with things that are very difficult to know by ordinary means of knowledge. Accordingly, the author highlights (in the following verse) as to what praśmaṇas among those mentioned earlier are capable of bringing about the knowledge of what things:

Tu, But; atiśuddhānāṁ pratīti, the knowledge of super-sensible things; sāmānyato dhṛṣṭa anumāna, (is obtained) through inference based on general observations; Parokṣaṁ, super-sensible things; tasmād api ca atīśuddhaṁ, not established even by it; āpta-āgaṁat siddham, is established by Testimony and Revelation.

6. But the knowledge of supersensible things is obtained through Inference based on general observation; and the knowledge of supersensible things not established even by that is established through Testimony and Revelation.

The particle tu (in the text) distinguishes Inference based on general observation from perception and a priori inference (pūravat). The knowledge of supersensible things such as Pradhāna (Primordial Matter) and Puruṣa (Spirit) and the rest is obtained through Sāmānyato-dhṛṣṭa inference, that is to say, this knowledge is obtained due to certain operation of Buddhī in the form of its reflection in the cognitive Spirit. The mention of this particular inference is only illustrative; it should be regarded as inclusive of āpta-āgaṁat (a posteriori) inference also.

Objection: Is it then that cognition of all supersensible things is obtained only through the inference based on general observation? If it were so, then it would mean that things like Heaven, Unseen forces, Divinities, etc and also the order of evolution of Mahat and other principles, do not exist as in these cases the above inference is not applicable.

Answer: In answer to this, the text says: tasmādapi...etc. The use of the term tasmāt is enough to indicate the intention of their establishment; the additional use of particle ca is meant to include a posteriori inference also.

Objection: Let it be so. Now, the non-perception of such things as skyflower (gagana-kusuma), tortoise hair (kārma-roma)
hare’s horn (śaśa-viṣāṇa) etc leads to their being considered as non-existent. Similar is the case with regard to Primordial Nature etc. Then, how is it that their existence is established through inference such as sāmāyata draṣṭa and others?

The following verse is in answer to this:

अतिदृष्टि भ्रमाभिव्रिस्यञ्ज्ञायात् न अनवस्थानात्
सौक्ष्य्यात् भ्रमाभिव्रिस्यञ्ज्ञायात् भ्रमाभिव्रिस्यञ्ज्ञायात्।

Atidṛṣṭi, from excessive distance; sāmipyā, from proximity; indriyaghātā, from impairment of the senses; mano’navasthānā, from absent mindedness; saukṣmyā, from subtlety; vyava-dhānā, from intervention; abhibhavā, from suppression (by others); samānābhīharā, and from internixture with other similar objects; ca and others.

7. (Apprehension of even existing things does not arise) through excessive distance, proximity, impairment of senses, absentmindedness, subtlety, intervention, suppression by other objects, internixture with other similar objects, and other causes.

Anupalabdhīḥ - (non-perception) occurring in the next kārikā should be read retrospectively (with this kārikā) following the maxim of Lion’s Glance. A bird soaring very high in the sky (though existing) is not perceived by the eye due to excessive distance. The term ati (in the text) should be read with sāmipyā (proximity) also. The collyrium applied to the eye is not perceived (though it is present) due to close proximity. Impairment of organs indicates blindness, deafness etc. Absent-mindedness is like one not perceiving things even in bright day-light,

though they are in contact with the senses, because the mind is overcome by strong passion and other emotions. From subtlety it is the inability to perceive things like atom etc however much one may concentrate one’s mind on it and though they may be very near one’s faculty. From intervention it is like one not seeing the queen and other persons (though existent) they being obstructed (concealed) by a wall. From suppression it is like one not seeing the planets and stars during the day because they are suppressed by the brighter rays of the sun. From internixture it is like not perceiving the drops of water released from clouds in a tank (where they mingle). The particle ca (in the Kārikā) has a collective force and includes even those not mentioned (in the kārikā). By this, even the unmanifested gets included (among the causes for non-perception) like the curd not being perceived as it is unmanifest in the state of milk.

What is meant by all this is that a thing does not become non-existent just because it is not directly perceived; for, there is a danger of the argument being unwarrantably stretched too far. For example, a man, going out of his house, would then conclude that the people in his house are non-existent just because he does not see them. But it is not so. The non-existence is determined of only such things which have the capability of being perceived but are not perceived at the time. Primordial nature, Spirit and the rest do not possess the property of being perceived and it is not proper for intelligent men to infer from this that they are non-existent just because they are not perceived. The question as to which of the above mentioned causes applied to the non-perception of Primordial Nature and others, is answered in the following Kārikā:

सौक्ष्यातिभ्रमाभिव्रिस्यञ्ज्ञायात्

Simhāvalokana Nyāya is the maxim of a lion’s backward and forward glance. The lion has the habit of looking in front and behind after killing his prey to see if there is any rival to dispute possession. This maxim is generally used when one casts a retrospective glance at what has been left behind while at the same time he is going ahead with his work.
8. Its non-perception is due to its subtlety and not due to its non-existence. It is apprehended through its effects; these effects are the Mahat (Great Principle) and the rest; prakṛti-sarūpaṃ, similar to Prakṛti; virūpaṃ ca, and dissimilar.

Why not we say that these are not apprehended only because of their non-existence, just like the seventh kind of rasa?

The author answers: Na-abhāvāt: not because of its non-existence; why? because it is apprehended through its effects. Tat (in the text) refers to Primordial Nature. The proof for the apprehension of the Spirit is given (in Kārikā-17) as follows: the aggregate must be for the sake of non-aggregate. When we find that direct sense perception does not apprehend objects whose existence is proved by stronger proofs, it is to be understood that the senses are incapable of apprehension. The non-apprehension of seventh taste by the senses cannot be attributed to the incapability of the senses to apprehend it; it is because its (i.e. of the seventh taste) existence has not been established by any valid proof.

Question: What again, are the effects from which the existence of Primordial Nature is inferred?

Answer: Mahat and the rest are its effects. Details of how they indicate (the existence of Pradhāna) will be explained later on (in Kārikā 22). The statement in the text: Similar and dissimilar to Nature is mentioned because a comprehension of similarity and dissimilarity of these effects is helpful in gaining discriminative wisdom (Viveka Jñāna). This will further be classified (in Kārikā 23 etc).

The cause alone is apprehended through the effects. With regard to this (subject of cause and effect) there are different versions among different philosophers.

(1) Some say (Buddhists assert) that existent (effect) emanates from the non-existent (cause); (2) Others (Advaitins) affirm that all effects are merely illusory appearances of One Reality and are not real entities by themselves. (3) Others (like Kanāda and Gautama) hold that the (previously) non-existent effect (arises) from the existent cause; and lastly, (4) the ancients (like Kapila) declare that existent (effect) emanates from the existent (cause). Under the first three of the opinions (about the theory of cause and effect), the existence of Pradhāna (Primordial Nature) cannot be proved. The world is of the nature of sound and other elements which are only different modifications of pleasure, pain and delusion. This proves that the cause of the world is Pradhāna which is of the nature of the attributes of Sattva, Rajas and Tomas (which are of the essence of pleasure, pain and delusion sukha, duhkha, and moha respectively). If the argument 'that the existent effect is produced from the non-existent cause' is accepted, then, how could the non-existent Cause which must be inexpressible as it is characterless, be of the nature of Sound etc? Certainly, the non-existent can never be of the nature of existent. Even if it be said that the world of the nature of sound etc is an illusory appearance of One Reality, then also it cannot be proved that the existent effect is produced from the existent cause. Nor can the One Reality without a second ever constitute the phenomenality; rather, the conception of the non-phenomenal as constituting the phenomenal is only an illusion. Even under the theory of Kanāda and Gautama, that the non-existent effect is born of existent cause, it cannot be considered that the effect is entirely constituted by the cause as there could be no identity

3. I.e., Tastes are only six; they are: Kaśa, pungent, Amla, acidic; Madhura, sweet; Lavana, saltish; Tikta, bitter; and Kāraṇa, astrigent. Therefore, the rasa being only six, the seventh kind of rasa is non-existent.
between the existent and the non-existent; hence under this
theory also, the existence of Pradhāna cannot be established.

Therefore, in order to establish the existence of Pradhāna,
the author at the outset declares that the effect is existent.

असत्करणुपादनाग्रहणात् सर्वसंभवभवात् || १ ||

Akat akaranāt, from the non-effectuation of the non-existent;
upādānagrahanāt, from the selection of material for the effect;
sarva sambhava abhāvāt, from the absence of the production
defined as the existence of every means; saktasya, of the
competent; sakyakaranāt, from the effectuation of the producible;
ca; and, kārapabhāvāt, from the effect being of the same essence as
cause; sat kāryam, the effect is existent.

9. The effect is ever existent, because (1) what is non-
existent can by no means be brought into existence; (2) because
effects take adequate material cause; (3) because all effects are
not producible from all causes; (4) because an efficient cause
can produce only that for which it is efficient; and finally,
(5) because the effect is of the same essence as the cause.

Satkāryam (in the text) means that the effect is existent
even before the operation of the cause. The Naiyāyikā-s should
not raise the objection (against this doctrine) by saying that it
suffers from the absurdity of establishing what is already estab-
lished. Even though products like the sprout and the jar are
found to be produced after the destruction of the seed and lump
of clay takes place, it cannot be said by this that the causal
efficacy belongs to destruction (pradhvamsa as it is a pure
negation); causal efficacy belongs only to positive entities consisting

of competent particles of the seed (and lump of clay). If it were
possible that a positive entity is produced from mere negation,
then, such negation being easily available everywhere, the absurd
possibility that all things could be produced at all places would
arise. All this has been explained in full by us in the Nyāya
vārtika-tātparyātikā.

(The Vedāntic theory) that the phenomenal world is merely
an illusory appearance cannot be justified unless we have some
proofs to invalidate its existence. Now remains the theory
of Gautama and Kanāda (that the previously non-existent effect
evolves from the existent cause). Here, the author establishes his
view that the effect is existent. The reasons for this assertion are
given (in the text): (1) What is non-existent can by no means be
produced: If the effect were non-existent before the operation of
the cause, then it could never be brought into existence by any-
body; for, not even thousands of artists can ever change blue
(colour) to yellow. If it be said that existence and non-existence
were mere properties (dharma) belonging to the jar, even then,
the object being non-existent, there can be no property subsisting
in it, and the existence of the jar remains even as it was; and also
non-existence cannot be the property of the jar because if the
non-existence is not connected to and not identical with the jar,
how could the jar be regarded as non-existent? Hence it follows
that effect must be existent before the causal operation also, even
as it exists after the causal operation. This being so, what is
expected of a cause is only the manifestation of pre-existing
effect. It is quite appropriate to affirm that the latent effect mani-
ests, for example, the manifestation of oil from sesame seeds
by applying pressure; of rice from paddy by thumping, and of
milk from cows by milking. But we have no such instance to

4. This is known as siddha siddha doṣa; it means that if the effect is already
existent, then the operation of the cause to bring into existence that effect is
superfluous.

5. Though this the first theory of the Buddhists that the existent effect
emanates from the non-existent cause is refuted.
prove the production of a non-existent thing. In fact what is non-existent is never found to be either manifested or produced.

For the following reasons also the effect should be taken as subsisting in the cause even before its operation: *because of the selection of the material for the effect.* The term *upādāna;* (in the text) stands for the cause; and *grahana* (in the text) means *grahana* of cause and stands for its relation to the effect. The compound *upādānagrahahanā* therefore means *because there is definite relation of the cause with the effect.* The meaning is that the cause produces the effect only when it is related to that effect; there could be no such relation with the effect if it were non-existent. Therefore, effect must be regarded as existent.

**Question:** Let it be so. Even then, why not the effects be produced from causes not related to them? In such a case, it could be that *non-existent effect* alone is produced. This is answered by the text *'sarvasambhāva abhāvāt - because of absence of production of everything from everything.'* If it is said that an effect could be produced without being related to the cause, then, every effect could arise from every cause as all would be equally unrelated to the cause; but such a thing never happens. Hence an unrelated effect cannot be produced by an unrelated cause but only a related effect can be produced by a related cause. *That is why Sāṅkhya teachers assert: 'Causes which are always related to existent things, can have no connection with non-existent things; for one who desires the production of an unrelated effect there would be no restriction, (ie there would be indiscriminate production of things).'

**Objection:** Let it be so; but the cause, even though unrelated, is capable of producing only that effect for which it is efficient; and this efficiency of the cause is apprehended by actually seeing the effect being produced. Thus, there can be no disorderliness, (as mentioned above). This is answered by the text: *'because the efficient cause can only produce that for which it is efficient.'*

Now, does this efficiency (*sakti*) subsist in the efficient cause operative on all things or only on that effect which it is efficient to bring forth? If the former is accepted, then, the same confusion of disorderliness arises; if the latter, then it has to be explained as to how it can operate on a *non-existent* thing. If it be said that the causal efficacy (*sakti*) itself is constituted in such a way that it can produce only certain effects and not all effects, we ask, well, is this peculiarly constituted efficiency of yours related to the particular effect or not? If related, then no relation is possible with what is *non-existent;* so, the effect has to be accepted as *existent.* If not related, we have again the same problem of *avyavasthā,* disorderliness. Therefore, rightly it has been said (in the text) *'that the efficient cause can produce only that for which it is efficient.'* Further, the reason for regarding the effect as existent is being given by the statement *'because the effect is of the same essence as the cause.'* Effect is of the same essence as the cause: so, effect cannot be different from the cause. Therefore, the cause being existent, how can the effect which is non-different from the cause, be *non-existent?*

The following are the proofs that establish the non-difference of the effect from the cause: (1) The cloth is not different from the yarns (constituting it) because the cloth subsists in the yarns. A thing differing in its essence from another, cannot subsist in it, like a cow in a horse; but here, the cloth subsists in its yarns. From this it follows that the effect is not different from its cause. (2) The cloth and the yarn cannot be two different things because of the relationship between the material *cause* and the effect (*upādāna-upādeya bhāva*). Whenever two things are found to be different from each other, there the relationship between the constituent cause and effect is never found, eg in the case of the jar and the cloth. But the relationship between the constituent cause and the effect is found between the yarn and the
cloth; thus the two are not different things. (3) For the following reason also cloth and yarn are not two different things: 'because there is neither conjunction nor disjunction between them (samyoga-aprapti abhavati).' Conjunction is found to exist only between objects different from each other, as between the well and the jujube tree; the same with regard to separation also, as between the Himavān and the Vindhyā. In case of the cloth and the yarns, there is no such conjunction or disjunction; hence, they are not two different things. (4) For the following reason also, the cloth does not differ from the yarns because the cloth does not contain in itself any other product which makes it heavier than the yarns. In fact, it is only in an object that differs in essence from another that a different product with greater weight is accepted; eg the lowering of the balance caused by a bracelet weighing two pālas is more than that caused by the bracelet weighing a single pāla. But no such difference is seen between the effect of the weight of the cloth and the effect of the weight of the yarns. Therefore, the cloth is not different from the yarns. These proofs establishing the non-difference between the cloth and the yarns are afforded by avyaya inference (negative inference).

Thus the non-difference between the cloth and the yarns is established. It follows, therefore, that the cloth is only the yarns arranged in different fashions and that the cloth is non-different from the yarns in its essence. Nor can it be established that the two are entirely different from each other by such arguments as:

(a) In a non-different thing, there would occur self-contradictory actions (ie when the cloth is torn and reduced to threads it involves the action of being destroyed on the part of the cloth and the action of being produced on the part of the threads or yarns; if the identity of the cloth and yarn is accepted then it would thus involve self-contradictory actions like destruction and production). (b) The knowledge that the cause and effect are related (leads to the notion that the two members of the relation are different); and (c) the purpose of the function of the cause is different from that served by the effect (eg the cloth serves the purpose of covering things, which purpose cannot be served by the yarns). These arguments cannot establish the difference between the cause and the effect, because all the above mentioned oppositions can be explained and reconciled by attributing the notions to the appearance and disappearance of certain factors; (1) The limbs of the tortoise disappear when they enter into its body; and appear again when the limbs are drawn out. Because of this, it cannot be said that the limbs are produced and destroyed by the tortoise. In similar way, the jar, and the crown etc are only some particular modifications of the selfsame clay, gold and so forth; they are said to be produced when they appear (ie emerge) from clay or gold and said to be destroyed when they disappear by entering into them again (ie when they become again clay, gold etc). In reality, there can be no production for what is non-existent and no destruction for what is existent. This has been declared to be so by Bhagavān Kṛṣṇa Dvaitasyana (in Bhagavad Gītā 2.16): 'There is no being for the non-existent nor non-being for the existent.' In the example quoted, the tortoise is not different from its appearing and disappearing limbs; similarly, the jar, the crown and other products also are not different from clay, gold etc.

(2) The significations (of difference between the cloth and the yarns) implicit in such statements as 'the cloth is in these yarns' (ie the cloth is made up of these yarns) is like the statement: 'These are Tilaka trees in the forest.' (Here, this statement does not mean that the forest is different from the Tilaka trees; rather the forest is nothing but the aggregate of Tilaka trees. Similarly, in the example of the cloth and yarns also, the cloth is but the yarns in a particular form; in essence there is no difference between the two).
(3) The difference in the functions of purpose served by them also cannot establish the difference between the cause and the effect; because, one and the same thing is found to have several different purposes. For example, fire, though one only, yet serves different purposes like burning, cooking and lighting. Nor can it be said that variations of functions is the cause of differences; because, it is seen that the functions of the same thing vary with their operating collectively or individually; for example, each individual bearer performs only the function of pointing out the way and not that of carrying the palanquin. But collectively they perform the function of carrying the palanquin. In like manner, yarns do not serve the purpose of covering when they are scattered severally; but, joining together and thus appearing in the form of cloth, they serve the purpose of covering.

Object: Now, was this appearance (ie coming into being of the cloth) existent before the causal operation? or was it non-existent? If it was non-existent, then the production of what was non-existent, has to be admitted. If it was existent (before the operation of the cause), then, where is the necessity for causal operation? For, we do not see any necessity for causal operation when the effect is already there. If it is said that though this manifestation is existent, yet it is the manifestation of this manifestation for which causal operation is needed, it only lands us in an endless series of manifestations (which is absurd). Therefore, it is hollow to argue that what all happens when a cloth is produced is just that the yarns become manifested in the form of cloth.

Answer: We reply: This is not so. If according to your opinion, a non-existent effect is produced, then, tell us, what is this production of non-existent effect? Is it existent or non-existent? If it is existent, then where is the need for the cause? If it is non-existent, then there should be production of that production also, and thus there would be an endless series of productions (which is absurd and unacceptable). (To avoid this defect) it be said that production is not some thing different from the cloth but verily the cloth itself, then it would mean that the utterance of the term cloth is synonymous with the utterance of the term is produced. In which case, when the term cloth is uttered, the term is produced should not be uttered because, (these two being synonymous) the utterance of the term is produced would only be a needless repetition. Also, one cannot say, the cloth is destroyed because both production and destruction can never coexist in one and the same thing.

Therefore, this production of cloth must consist either in inherence (of the cloth) in its cause (sva-kāraya-samāvāya), or inherence (of the cloth) in its Being (sva sattā samāvāya). In either of these, the said production is not produced (because inherence is eternal). Even so, for the purpose of that production, several causes must become operative. Thus it is appropriate to say that there is a need for causes to bring about the manifestation of the already existent products like the cloth etc. Again it is not that the causes are related to the form of the cloth, because, the form is not an operation; it is only to an operation that the causes are related, as otherwise, (ie if the causes are not related to operation) they would not be causes at all. Thus it has been amply proved that the effect is ever existent (saktāryam).

Thus, having proved that the effect is existent, which fact is helpful in proving the existence of Pradhāna, the author, in order to show the means of proving the existence of Pradhāna, next states the similarity and dissimilarity between the manifested (vyakta) and the unmanifested (avyakta), a proper comprehension of which is conducive to vivekajñāna (discriminative wisdom), in the next kārikā:
Vyaktam, The Manifested; hetumat, is possessing or depending upon a cause; anityam, non-eternal; avyāpi, not pervasive, ie finite; sakriyam, mobile or active; anekam, manifold; āśrītam, supported or dependant; lingam, mergent, mark; sāvayavam, made up of parts; paratātratram, subordinate; avyaktam, the unmanifested; viparitam, is the reverse (of the above).

10. The manifested is producible, non-eternal, non-pervasive, active, multiform, dependant, serving as a mark (of inference), aggregate of parts and subordinate. The Unmanifest is the reverse of this.

The manifest is with the cause (ie it is a product). The question as to what is the cause of what is being dealt with later (in Kārikā 22). Anityam is destructible, ie subject to disappearance (in its material cause). Non-pervasive, because it does not pervade all its evolutes. It is only the effect that is pervaded by the cause, not the cause by the effect. For instance, Buddhi (intelligence) and other products can never pervade Pradhāna; as such they are non-pervasive. Active, because of mobility like entering and exiting; Buddhi and other evolutes are regarded mobile, because they give up the body they had occupied earlier and occupy another body. Mobility of body, earth and other substances is well-known. Manifold, because Buddhi and other evolutes differ with each person (ie there are as many of them as there are persons). Earth and other evolutes too are multitudinous according to differences in bodies, jars and other products. Dependant - because they are supported by their respective causes. Though the evolutes like the Buddhi and the rest are non-different from their cause, yet, assuming some sort of difference, they are connected to the cause in the relation of the support and the supported, as found in the statement 'There are Tilaka trees in the forest.' (Here, trees have no existence apart from that of the forest).

Lingam, ie the mark of Pradhāna. Buddhi and other products are the marks of Pradhāna (Primordial Matter). This will be explained later (under Kārikā-15 etc). But Pradhāna is not the mark of Pradhāna itself though it may be regarded to be so of the Spirit. Sāvayavam-ie containing in itself the relation of the whole and the parts; or, the term avaya may be explained as equivalent to avayavana, which means mutual adhesion, ie conjunction between the whole and the parts. Conjunction consists in union following disunion. Sāvayavam is therefore that which has such contact. For instance, substances like the earth etc conjoin mutually. Similarly, other substances too conjoin. But Pradhāna does not conjoin with (its products) Buddhi and the rest, because they are non-different (ie they are essentially one with Pradhāna). Nor is there any mutual conjunction among the attributes of Sattva, Rajas and Tamas, because there is the absence of disunion among them.

Paratātratram: Buddhi and the rest are the subordinates. In order to produce its evolute, ahankāra (the I-Principle), Buddhi needs the assistance of Prakṛti in the form of infilling it. Without such assistance, Buddhi, being weak, won't be able to produce ahankāra. Similarly, ahankāra and the rest too need the assistance of Prakṛti in producing their evolutes. Thus everything requires the infilling of Prakṛti for evolving its products. Therefore, even though efficient in producing its own evolutes, the assistance of the Supreme Nature (Param Prakṛti) by way of infilling them is needed. Therefore, the Manifest is dependent.

The Unmanifest is the reverse of the Manifest. That is to say, the Unmanifest is without cause, eternal, pervasive and inactive. Even though the Unmanifest possesses the activity of evolution, yet, there is no mobility in it. The Unmanifest is
therefore one, not a component, non-mergent, unconjunct and independent.

By this, the dissimilarities between the Manifested and the Unmanifested have been explained. Now, the author states the similarities between them and their dissimilarities from the Spirit in the following verse:

त्रिगुणार्थिवेति विषयः तामान्यमचेतनं प्रसारभर्मम्

व्यक्तं तथा प्रधानं तेतियात्यथा च पुष्पभर्म॥ १२ ॥

Vyaktam, The Manifest; triguṇam, is constituted of three attributes; avivekā, indistinguishable; viśayā, objective; sāmānyam, common; acetanam, non-intelligent; prasāvadharma, prolific; Tatā, so; Pradhānām, is the Primordial Nature; Pumān, the Spirit; tadvipātah is the reverse of that; ca tathā, and also similar (in some respects).

11. The Manifest is constituted of the three attributes (of Sattva, Rajas and Tamas), is non-distinguishable, objective, common, non-intelligent, and prolific. So also is the Primordial Nature. The Spirit is the reverse of both of them and yet is similar in some respects.

Three attributes: The Manifest is constituted of three attributes of pleasure, pain and delusion (which are the essence of Sattva, Rajas and Tamas respectively). By this statement the theories of all those (Tārkikas and others) who hold that pleasure etc are the qualities inhering in the Spirit are refuted. Indistinguishable because just as Pradhāna cannot be distinguished from itself, so also Mahat and the rest cannot be distinguished from Pradhāna, because of their being identical with Pradhāna; or, indistinguishability may mean the characteristic of creating things by uniting together, because none of them is capable of evolving even its own product singly but only by uniting together. Thus, by itself, it is not possible for anything to produce anything out of anything.

Doubt: Some say (ie the Viññāṇa Vādins belonging to the Yogācāra School of Buddhism) that pleasure, pain and delusion which are of the form of sound and other elements are nothing but mere Ideas; further, there can exist nothing besides this Idea that can have these as its attributes. To refute this, it is said Viśaya (in the text), that is, the Manifest is objective. Objective is that which is apprehended by the senses and it is exterior to Idea. Because it is objective, it is also Common ie it is apprehended by all purusas alike. If it is said that it is only a form of Idea, then all that is manifest would have to be only Specials (as opposed to Common as they belong only to particular persons), because Ideas being in the form of special mental modifications, belong specially to particular individuals. (That is to say, one’s Idea is not apprehended by another; thus the cognition of a person’s Idea always remains unrecognisable to another). In the case of a dancing girl, her side-long glances (which are manifest actions of the eye) are stared at continuously by many persons at the same time. If it were otherwise (ie if the glance were merely an Idea) then this could not be possible (ie then the staring at one person by many persons at the same time would not be there).

Unintelligent - Everything, Pradhāna, Buddhi and the rest are insentient. Sentient does not belong to Buddhi as held by the Vaiśṇavas. (The followers of a particular school of Buddhists). Prolific: because, it is possessed of the faculty of producing unceasingly. The form of the word ought to have been prasava-dharma (in the text instead of prasavadharmi); but the author has employed the participle possessive affix here in order to point out that the Manifest is endowed with the property of constant productiveness and that it never ceases from evolving similar and dissimilar products. By saying so is pradhāna, the author attributes the properties of the Manifest to the unmanifest Pradhāna also, that is to say, as is the Manifest, so is the
unmanifest. By saying, *The Spirit is the reverse of both*, the author points out their dissimilarity to the Spirit.

**Objection:** There are points of similarity between the *Purusa* and the *Pradhana*, such as causelessness, eternity and so on. Similarly, there is similarity between the *Manifested* and the *Purusa*, such as being multiform. Then how is it that you say that the *Purusa* is the reverse of these?

**Answer:** This is replied: 'yet also similar.' Here ca has the meaning of api also. Though there are points of similarity such as causelessness etc there are also points of dissimilarity, such as the absence of these attributes and the rest.

What are the three attributes and what are their characteristics? The next verse answers this:

**प्रीत्यप्रीतिविषादात्मकः प्रकटाप्रत्युत्तिनियमार्थः:**

**अन्योपन्यासाभिभवाश्रयजननमितुस्वत्वम्युष्णु स्पष्ट: गुणः:** 

*Gunah*. The attributes; *priti-apriti-visada-atmakah* are of the nature of pleasure, pain and delusion; *prakata-pravritti-niyam-antarikah*, they serve the purpose of illumination, endeavour and restraint; *ananyya-abhibhava-asraya-janana-mithuna-vritayah ca* are mutually dominating, supporting, productive and cooperative.

12. The attributes are of the nature of pleasure, pain and delusion; they serve the purpose of illumination, action and restraint and they are mutually dominating and supporting, productive and cooperative.

*Gunah* - They are called so because they exist for the sake of the other (i.e. the Spirit). In the next *Karika*, *Satva* and other *Gunas* will be explained in a systematic order. Following the maxim of foresight, or according to the convention among the authors of treatises, *priti* etc (appearing in this *Karika*) ought to be considered in the same order (as *satva* etc in the next *Karika*). The meaning is that *priti* being pleasure, *satva* attribute comes to be known as of the nature of pleasure; *apriti* is pain and is of the nature of *Rajas*; *visada* is delusion; so, *Tamas* is of the nature of delusion. In order to refute the contention that 'pleasure is nothing more than the mere absence of pain' and 'pain is no more than the absence of pleasure,' the term (of the nature of) *atman* has to be read with the above. Pleasure and pain are not merely mutual negations, but they are positive entities and the term *atman* connotes this positive reality. Therefore, those whose nature consists of pleasure are *prityatman*. Other terms too are to be explained accordingly. Positive nature of these (i.e. of pleasure etc) is established by common experience. If they were merely of the nature of mutual negations, then they would be dependent on each other, in which case non-fulfilment of the one would lead to the non-fulfilment of the other too.

Having thus described their nature, the author next describes their several uses and purposes. 'They serve the purpose of illumination, action and restraint.' Here too, these three are to be compounded (with *gunas*) as before. The attribute of *Rajas* which is always and everywhere action-oriented, motivates the buoyant *satva guna* to action if it were not restrained by the dull *Tamas* attribute; if it were restrained by the *Tamas* attribute, then it operates only intermittently. Thus, the *Tamas* here functions as a restraining element.

Having thus explained their uses, the author next explains their operation: 'they are mutually dominating and supporting, productive and cooperative.' *Vyrti* (in the text) is function and this is to be connected with each term in the compound. (Then it will be *ananyya-abhibhava-vyrti* etc).

1. **Mutually dominating** because, when one becomes active for some purpose, it dominates over the other (i.e. it subjugates the other). For example, *Satva* attains its calm nature only after dominating over (or subjugating) the *Rajas* and *Tamas* attributes. Similarly, the *Rajas* attains its agitated nature by subduing the
Sattva and Tamas attributes and Tamas attains to its torpid condition by subjugating both Sattva and Rajas.  

2. Mutually supporting: The statement supporting each other is not made in the sense of the container and the contained. What is meant by āṣraya (support) here is that when the operation of one depends upon another, then it becomes the āṣraya of the former. For instance, Sattva by resting upon activity and restraint, subserves Rajas and Tamas attributes with illumination. Rajas by resting upon illumination and restraint subserves Sattva and Tamas with activity; and Tamas resting on illumination and activity subserves Sattva and Rajas with restraint.  

3. Mutually productive: One produces its effects resting upon the other two. Production here means modification and it is always of the same nature as of the attributes. This is why it (modification) is not caused (ie not produced by some cause) because of the absence of a cause which is a different Tatva. Neither is non-eternity entailed here because of the absence of dissolution (laya) in another tatva. (ie there is no merging of it into another tatva essentially different from itself).  

4. Mutually cooperative: That is, they are mutually concomitants and never exist separated from one another. The particle ca is used in the collective sense. In support of the above there is this āgama text (Devī Bhāgavata 3.8)  

Anyonyamithunāḥ sarve sarve sarvatra gāmināḥ  
Rajas mithunam sattvam sattvasya mithunam rajāḥ  
Tamasācāpi mihune te sattvarajasi ubhe  
Ubhayoḥ sattvarajasi mithunam Tama ucyate  
Nāsāmādhiḥ samprayogō viyogo vopalabhayaś  

—All the attributes are mutual consorts; all go everywhere (ie are omnipresent). Sattva is the consort of Rajas, Rajas is the consort of Sattva; both of these Sattva and Rajas are the consorts of Tamas and Tamas is the consort of both Sattva and Rajas. The first union or disunion of these has never been seen. It has been said that the attributes serve the purpose of illumination, activity and restraint. Next is being explained as to what those attributes are and why they are so:

Sattva, the Sattva attribute; laγhu, buoyant, active; prakāśakam, illuminating, enlightening; ca, and rajas the Rajas attribute; īstam, desired; upaṣāmbhakam, exciting; calam, mobile, restless. Tamah-Tamas, attribute; Guru, heavy, sluggish; Varanakam, enveloping, obscuring; eva, to be sure; ca, and; vṛttiḥ, (their) operation, functioning; arthataḥ, (is) for a (single) purpose; pradīpavat, like a lamp.

13. The Sattva attribute is buoyant and illuminating; the Rajas attribute is exciting and mobile; and the Tamas attribute is sluggish and obscuring; Their functioning is for a single purpose, like that of a lamp.

The Sāṅkhya Teachers hold that (of the three guṇas) the Sattva attribute alone is buoyant and illuminating. Here laγhava (buoyancy) is that quality which is the cause for springing up of things and is opposed to sluggishness. It is this quality which causes the shooting upward of the flame of fire. Sometimes, the same quality of laγhava (buoyance) causes lateral motion also, as in the case of air. Therefore, laγhava is that which cause the efficient functioning of all instruments, while sluggishness would make the instruments inefficient. The illuminative character of Sattva guṇa has been explained (in the earlier verse).

Now, Sattva and Tamas are attributes which are inactive by themselves and, are therefore, unable to produce their own effects, derive their driving force from Rajas which rouses them from their inertia and excites them to accomplish their own respective effects. That is why it is said that Rajas is exciting. It is
exciting because it is mobile. Through this it is indicated that the operation of Rajas is necessary for all activity. The Rajoguna, because of its mobility, keeps the three guṇas in a continuous state of activity; but it is operative only in some cases because of its mobility getting restrained by the sluggish and obscuring qualities of Tamas. Therefore, in order to distinguish it from Rajas, Tamas is said to be the restraining force in the Text: ‘Tamas is both sluggish and obscuring.’ The particle eva ( appended to Tamas) is to be appended to Sattva and rajas also; thus it is to be read as sattvaneva, raja eva and tama eva.

**Objection:** Now, these guṇas are endowed with mutually contradicting properties. It is but natural that (instead of cooperating) they would only destroy each other like Sunda and Upasunda.6

**Answer:** It has been said earlier that their functioning is for a common purpose, like that of a lamp. It is a matter of common observation that the wick and oil, though opposed to the action of fire, when brought together, cooperate to perform the task of giving light. In a similar way, the three humours of the body, viz, wind, bile and phlegm, though possessed of mutually opposite properties, cooperate with each other for the sole purpose of sustaining the body. In the same way, Sattva, Rajas and Tamas attributes also though contradictory to each other, cooperate and effect their single purpose of bringing about the emancipation of the Puruṣa - (Spirit), as has been explained (in Kārikā 31): ‘Serving the purpose of the Puruṣa is the sole motive (for the activity of the instruments); by nothing else is an instrument (organ) made to act!’

6. Sunda and Upasunda were sons of Nikumbha. After terrible ascetic practices for many many years, they got a boon from Brahma that they would not die unless they kill themselves. On the strength of this boon, they grew very oppressive. Indra at last had to send down a lovely nymph named Tilottama, and while quarrelling for her, they killed each other.

Pleasure, pain and delusion are mutually contradictory attributes and people naturally assume their causes also as having the nature of pleasure, pain and delusion, following their respective connotations. And these causes appear in many forms, because, by their very nature, they are mutually suppressive. As for instance, a single woman endowed with youth, beauty and virtue is the source of happiness to her husband because, to him, she appears in the form pleasure; but the very same woman is the cause of pain to her co-wives, because, to them, she appears in the form of pain. Again, the same woman deludes another man who is unable to have her; to him she appears in the form of delusion. The example of this woman illustrates the nature of all things. That thing which causes pleasure is the Sattva guṇa the essence of which is pleasure; that which causes pain is Rajas which is of the nature of pain and that which causes delusion is Tamas which is of the nature of delusion. Pleasure, enlightenment and buoyancy, appearing simultaneously in one substratum, are not mutually contradictory, because, they are seen to co-exist together. Thus, there is no need to assume a different cause for each of pleasure, enlightenment and buoyancy as they are not mutually contradictory unlike in the case of pleasure, pain and delusion which are mutually contradictory (and as such cannot co-exist in the same substratum) and assumption of three different causes becomes necessary. Similar is the case with regard to pain, mobility and activity (properties of Rajas), and delusion, sluggishness and obscurity (properties of Tamas, where there is no need to assume different causes for each of the properties). Thus it is conclusively established that the attributes are only three.

**Objection:** Let the properties like indistinguishability and the rest which are things of our experience, subject in things like earth and others which are actually perceived. But how can we establish attributes like indistinguishability, objectivity,
insentience and productivity as belonging to Sattva and other guṇas which are beyond the range of perceptible experience (as described in Kāraṇkā). This is answered in the following Kāraṇkā:

Avivekāyādeh, (The existence) of indistinguishability and others; Siddhih, is proved; raigunyāt, from their being constituted of three attributes; tad-viparyaya-ahāvāt, from the absence of their reverse; (ie from the absence of non-existence of three guṇas); Kāraṇyāsa-Kāraṇa-guna-ātmakatvāt, from the effects which are of the same nature as that of the cause; avyaktam, The Unmanifest; api, also; Siddham, is proved.

14. (The existence) of indistinguishability and others (in the Manifest and the Unmanifest) is proved from their being constituted of three guṇas and from the absence of their reverse. The existence of the unmanifest is proved from the effects possessing the attributes of their cause.

Aviveki (in the text) is to be understood as avivekātman, as is found in the Pañjini Śūtra: ‘dvāyekayonvivacanaikavacane’ (1.4.22). Here, dvi and eka stand for dvitva and ekatva respectively; otherwise, the form of the compound would be ‘dvyekeśu.’

**Question:** How are properties like indistinguishability and others are proved to exist?

**Answer:** From the existence of three guṇas. Whatever is of the nature of Pleasure, Pain and Delusion, that thing is endowed with properties like indistinguishability and the rest, even like this Manifest which is directly perceived. This is inferred through the method of agreement (anvayya anumāna). This has not been stated explicitly in the text because it is clearly understood. But the method of difference (vyatireka anumāna) has been stated: tad-viparyaya-ahāvāt. Whatever does not possess properties like indistinguishability etc that thing does not possess Pleasure, Pain and Delusion, as in the case of Purusa (Spirit), in whom the three guṇas are non-existent. Alternatively, both the Manifested and the Unmanifested can be taken as the subject (minor term, pāka) of the syllogism in which the reasoning will be: ‘because of the existence of three guṇas’ as a purely negative (avita) inference. There could be no other thing (besides the Vyakta and the A vyakta) where there could be an affirmation (of the middle term, ie the existence of the the attributes).

**Objection:** The existence of properties like indistinguishability etc in the A vyakta can be proved only if the existence of A vyakta is first proved. But the existence of A vyakta itself does not stand proved. How, then, could the existence of properties like indistinguishability etc be proved?

**Answer:** Because of the effects consisting of the same properties as those of the causes. The meaning of the above argument is that all effects are verily found to be possessing the same properties of their causes. For example, the cloth etc are constituted of the same property as those of the yarns. Similarly, all products characterised as Mahat and the rest, possessing the

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7. And not dvye kayōh. Here, if the compound is analysed into dvi and eka, the sum would be three; this would require a plural ending and not the dual ending as is found in the compound. If dvi and eka are explained as standing for dvīva and ekatva, then they can have dual ending as they make only two nouns.

8. The full form of the syllogism is as follows: ‘All things other than the Spirit, that is to say, both the Manifested and the Unmanifested, possess properties like indistinguishability etc since they possess three guṇas and whatever does not possess properties like indistinguishability etc also does not possess three guṇas.’ In this syllogism we have the vyakta and the avyakta for the pāka. Now, in this pāka can be comprehended all cases where the presence of three guṇas can be found.
form of Pleasure, Pain and Delusion must possess the properties of Pleasure, Pain and Delusion, inhering in its own cause. Thus, its cause in the form of Pradhâna, the Unmanifest, possessing the properties of Pleasure, Pain and Delusion, becomes established.

Question: The followers of Kanâda (Vaiśeṣikâs) and Gautama (Nâyâyikâs) hold that the Manifest is produced from the Manifest. (Vyakta evyakta utpadyate). The atoms are the manifests. From them proceeds the creation of manifest products of the nature of the Great Earth and the rest through a chain of combinations like the binary compound etc. The creation of qualities like form etc in Earth and other substances are in accordance with similar qualities in their causes (i.e. in atoms). Inasmuch as all the manifest substances and their qualities are produced from a Manifest cause, why postulate an Unmanifest cause which is not even a perceptible Entity?

This is replied:

मेदानां परिमाणात्, समन्वयात् शक्तिः प्रवृत्तेऽः
कारणकायधिनागद्विभागिध्वजस्वस्य || १५ ||
कारणमस्थत्वं प्रवृत्ते त्रिवर्णम् समुदयात् || १६ ||
परिमाणम्: सतिलब्धत्व प्रतिस्थापणामपविदोषात् || १६ ||

Ayavakta karunam asti. There is the Unmanifest as the cause; bhedatam parimâna, because of the finite nature of specific objects of the evolutes; samanavyât, because of homogeneity; ca, and; sakta pravṛtteh, because of evolution being due to the efficiency of the cause; kârana-kârya vibhâgat, from the differentiation of cause and effect; avibhâgat, because of non-differentiation or merging; Vaisvârâpvasya, of the whole world (of effects); trigunatah, through the three attributes; pravartate, it operates; ca, and; samudaya, through combination; parinâma, through modification; salilavat, like water; prati-prati-
guna-aârava-viśeṣat, through differences arising from diversity of the several receptacles of the attributes.

15 & 16. The Unmanifest cause exists because of (1) the finite nature of special objects; (2) homogeneity; (3) evolution being due to the efficiency of the cause; (4) the differentiation between cause and effect; (5) the non-differentiation or merging of the whole world of effects; (6) its operation through the three attributes by combination and modification, like water, through differences arising from diverse nature of the several receptacles of the attributes.

There exists this Unmanifest, the Root Cause, which is the cause of all specific products of elements like the Mahat and the rest up to the Earth element. Why so? 'Because of the difference between the cause and the effect and because of the non-difference (i.e. merging) of the whole world of effect.' It has been established that the effect is already existent in its cause. The limbs of the tortoise which already are there, when emerging out of its body, become distinguished from it when we express: 'this is the body of the tortoise and these are its limbs,' and when these limbs enter into its body, they become unmanifest. In the same way, products like jar, crown, etc emerge from their causes, viz, clay and gold, and become distinguished from their causes. Similarly, the pre-existing products like earth and the rest, emerge from their causes in the form of Primary Elements (Tannâtras) and become distinguished from their causes. The pre-existing Primary Elements emerge from their cause, the I-Principle (ahamkâra) and become distinguished from it. The pre-existing I-Principle emerges from its cause, the Great Principle (Mahat) and becomes distinguished from it. The pre-existing Great Principle emerges from its cause, the Supreme Unmanifest (Parama ayatukam) and becomes distinguished from its cause. Thus the whole universe of products related to its ultimate cause, the Highest Unmanifest, either immediately (as with Mahat) or
through successive series of productions (like the earth etc),
comes to be distinguished from its cause — this is what is meant
by 'differentiation between cause and effects.' At the time of
dissolution, products like jar, crown etc merge back into their
respective causes, clay and gold, ie they disappear in their causes
and become unmanifest; that is to say, the effects become
unmanifest in the form of their cause itself which is unman-
ifest as far as that particular product is concerned. Similarly,
substances like Earth etc, entering the Primary Elements render
them unmanifest in so far as the earth and other substances are
concerned. In a similar way, the Primary Elements merge into the
I-Principle rendering the I-Principle unmanifest in so far as the
Primary elements are concerned; when the I-Principle disappears
in the Mahat, it renders the Mahat unmanifest in so far as its own
form is concerned. When, finally, this Mahat merges into the
Prakrti, it renders the Prakrti unmanifested. But Prakrti does not
merge into anything else; it is the pure unmanifest state of all
products. This is what is meant by the merging of the whole
world of effects of all kinds. The term vaivartapaya is formed by
affixing the reflective affix yam. Therefore the existence of the
unmanifest as the cause is proved inasmuch as there is the separ-
arion and emergence of the already existing effects in the cause.

Further proof for the existence of the Unmanifest as the
cause is given: Because of evolution being due to the efficiency
of the cause. It is well-known that effects evolve due to the
efficiency of the cause; for, no effect can ever arise from an
inefficient cause. This efficiency is latent in the cause and is no
other than the existent effect in its unmanifest condition. Thus, on
the hypothesis that effect already exists in its cause, the existence
of any other form of causal efficiency other than the latent form
at the unmanifest effect, cannot be proved in the cause.

The difference between sand and sesamum seed which is
the material cause of oil, lies in the fact that it is only in the

sesamum seed that oil exists in its unmanifest state and not in the
sand.

**Objection:** Now, the reasons that evolution being due to the
efficiency of the cause and separation and merging of the cause
and effect prove the supreme unmanifest character (parama
avyaktatvam) of Mahat itself. Then why postulate another
unmanifest entity beyond that?

**Answer:** Because of the finite nature of specific objects of the
evolutes. Here, the term parimana stands for parimitatvat
ie because of finiteness due to its non-pervasiveness. The form of
syllogism here is as follows:

'Mahat and the rest which are the specific objects in ques-
tion, have the Ayyaka for their cause; because they are finite; like
jars and the like.'

Jars etc are finite objects and are seen to inhere in their
causes clay etc in an unmanifested state. It has already been said
that cause is verily the unmanifested state of the effect. Thus, the
cause of Mahat must be the supreme unmanifest and that should
be the final cause as there is no proof for assuming a further
unmanifest entity beyond that.

The specific objects in question must have the unman-
ifest as their cause for the reason of homogeneity (samanyavat).
Homogeneity is possessing common forms among different
things. Baddhi and the rest are of the nature of Pleasure, Pain
and Delusion and manifesting themselves as cognition etc
are found to be homogeneous. Things which are invariably
connected with certain forms must have only that for its cause
which has those forms for its constituent elements, just as jar,
crown etc which are inherent in clay and gold pieces, have clay
and gold as their unmanifest causes. Thus, it is established that
the Unmanifest exists as the cause of specific objects.

Having thus established the existence of the unmanifest, the
author next states the methods of its operations: it operates
through the three attributes. At the time of cosmic dissolution, Sattva, Rajas and Tamas attributes undergo homogeneous modifications. The attributes are verity of the nature of modification. As such, they can never remain even for a moment without undergoing modification. Therefore, even at the time of dissolution, sattva attribute operates through its particular sattva form, Rajas operates through its own particular Rajas form and Tamas operates through its own Tamas form. (That is to say, the gunas attain a state of equilibrium in their respective particular forms at the time of dissolution). That is why it is said: operates through the three attributes.

Yet another method of operation is given: through combination (samudayā). Here, the term samudaya means appearing after having blended together. And this blending together is not possible without some sort of relation of the gunas with the Principal guna. (That is, the blending of the gunas in a particular ratio in which subsidiary gunas cooperate and combine with the Principal guna). This relationship of subserviency among the gunas in which one is the principal, is not possible without differentiation. And this differentiation is not possible without mutual suppression. (That is, certain principal guna suppresses the other gunas and then combines with them). This is the second method of operation by which Mahat and other products are evolved.

**Question:** How can diverse methods of operation be attributed to gunas when they are of uniform nature?

**Answer:** Because of modification, like water. Even though the water released from the clouds is of one taste only, yet, it gets modified into different tastes like sweet, sour, saline, bitter, pungent and astringent according as it comes in contact with different modifications of earth and become transformed into the juice of fruits such as coconut, palmyra, palm, wood-apple, ebony fruit, Myrobalan fruit etc. In the same manner, owing to the combination and mutual suppression of the subservient gunas, the gunas of Primordial Nature (Pradhāna gunāh) come to be predominant one by one and thereby bring about diverse modifications in the state of various products. This is what has been said by the phrase: through differences arising from diversity of the several receptacles of the attributes. That is, by the peculiarities due to the predominance of one or the other of the gunas.

There are some self-contented ones (Tautskikā-Materialists) who consider the Unmanifest or the Great Principle, or the I-Principle, or the senses or even the elements as the Spirit (Aman), and worship them alone. To them, the author declares as follows:

**सङ्गहाता** (because) all composite products; parārthavatā; are for the sake another’s use; triguha-di-viparyayā, because of the absence of three gunas and other properties; adhiṣṭhānāt, because there must be some controlling agency; bhoktār-bhavāt, because there must be an experience; ca, and; pravṛttē Kaivalyārtham, because of the tendency of activities towards final beatitude; Purusāṅga asti. — The Spirit exists.

17. The Spirit exists because (a) the aggregate is for another’s sake; (b) of the absence of three gunas and other properties; (c) there must be some controller; (d) there must be some experience; and (e) of the tendency of activities towards final beatitude.

There must be the Spirit, distinct from the Unmanifest and other evolves. Why? Because all aggregaates of compoenents are for the sake of another. The following is the form of syllogism here: ‘The unmanifest, the Great Principle, the I-Principle and other products exist for another’s sake, because they are
composites, like the bedstead, chair, unguents and the like.' The Unmanifest and the rest are all composites, because they are constituted of pleasure, pain and delusion (which are represented by Sattva, Rajas and Tamas attributes respectively).

**Objection:** Let it be so; but it is observed that bedsteads, chairs and other aggregates exist only for the use of the body which itself is a composite product; it is not seen that they are for the use of the Spirit which is beyond the Unmanifest and the rest. This leads us to the inference that composite products are verily for the purpose of some other composite product and not for the purpose of the Spirit which is non-composite.

This is answered: because of the absence of the three gunas and other properties. The intention is this: If it is said that one composite thing is for the use of another composite thing, then, we have to infer yet another composite thing for the use of which the latter composite product exists; similarly, another composite product and so on. Thus we have to assume an unending series of composite products *ad infinitum.* With a reasonable termination being available, it is not proper to assume an endless series of composite products, as it leads to multiple assumptions. Nor can it be said that multiplication of assumptions becomes excusable when it is supported by evidence. Because, here, the composite character of the bedstead is put forward in the inference only in so far as it is concomitant with being for another's use. (It is not meant to include all the properties of the composite object). If it is insisted that inference should be in accord with all the properties (*sarvadr̥ma anuvr̥da*) of the corroborative example, then that would be the end of all inference.

9. Because hardly can one come across any two occurrences in nature which are identical. Even in the inference: 'The yonder hill is fiery, because of smoke, as in the hearth,' the fire in the hill is not similar to the fire in the hearth in all its aspects; because, the fire in the hearth is for cooking food, in order to avoid the absurdity of *recessus ad infinitum*, if we have to accept the non-composite nature of the Spirit, then we will have also to attribute to the Spirit the properties such as *without the three gunas, non-distinguishability, non-objectivity, uncommonness, sentency, and non-productivity.* Properties like the quality of possessing the three gunas etc are always accompanied by the nature of being composite. Thus, when the *nature of being composite* is excluded from the Spirit, then the being of the *three gunas* in the Spirit also gets excluded, just as by excluding Brāhmaṇness, all brahmins like Kaṭha (a special class of brahmin) and others get automatically excluded. Thus, when the Teacher of Sāṅkhya (Īśvara-Kṛṣṇa) laid down the term: 'because of the absence of three gunas,' he intended to mean that there is some supreme thing which is not a composite product and that thing is the Spirit.

For the following reason also, Spirit as apart from Matter exists: because there must be a controlling Agency, that is, inasmuch as the evolutes constituted of the three gunas are always controlled, there must be a controller. It is observed that whatever is of the nature of pleasure, pain and delusion, all such things are controlled by something else, just like the chariots etc being controlled by the charioteer etc. These *Buddhi* and other evolutes are constituted of the nature of *pleasure, pain and delusion*; therefore, they too must have some one else to control them, and that some one beyond the *three gunas* is the Spirit.

For the following reason also, the Spirit exists: because there must be an enjoyer. The term *bhogya* indicates the objects of enjoyment in the form of pleasure and pain. Every soul experiences the objects of enjoyment as pleasure and pain according to and is seen in the house made by men whereas such is not the case with fire in the mountain. So, if one were to insist that an inference must be in accord with all the properties of the corroborative examples like the fire in hearth in the above syllogism, then no inference is possible.
their being felt agreeable or disagreeable respectively. Now, this agreeable and disagreeable feelings can take place only in some one other than the feelings themselves. Feelings cannot be agreeable or disagreeable to Buddhī and other products because Buddhī etc are themselves constituted of pleasure and pain; otherwise, there will be the anomaly of things operating upon themselves. Therefore, only that thing which is not constituted of pleasure etc can have either agreeable or disagreeable feelings and that is the Spirit.

Others, however, interpret it thus: Things of enjoyment (bhogyāh) are the visible things, like the Buddhi and the rest. They cannot become visible without an observer. Therefore, there is a seer beyond the visible things like Buddhi and the rest, and that seer is the Spirit. Because there is an experiencer (in the text) means because there is an observer, ie because the observer is to be inferred from the visible. The visibility of Buddhi and the rest is to be inferred from the fact of their being constituted of pleasure etc like the earth and other substances.

Yet for another reason also the Spirit must be there: because of the tendency of activities towards final beatitude. According to the Scripture and Sages endowed with divine perception, the final beatitude characterised by the absolute and final cessation of the three kinds of pain can never take place in Buddhi and other products. Buddhi and other products are, by their very nature, constituted of pleasure etc; they can never be isolated from their component elements. Only that thing which is distinct from Mahat etc and which is not constituted of pleasure etc can be isolated. According to the Scriptures and opinions of wise-men of great intelligence, all activities tend towards final emancipation. Therefore, there must be something which is beyond Buddhi and the rest, and that is the Spirit.

Having thus proved the existence of the Spirit, the author next explains the theory of plurality of Spirits in answer to questions whether the Spirit is one inhabiting many bodies, or many, being different in each body:

_**अन्नज्ञमणका́णा प्रतिनियमदुगुप्तयुक्ते**

_**प्रुषवहुत्व सिद्ध धृणेविपर्ययाचि**

Puruṣa-bahutvam-siddham, Multiplicity of Spirits is established; pratiniyamāt, because of individual allotment; Jātana-marana-karanānām, of birth, death and instruments of action and cognition; ca eva, and verily; pravṛtyteḥ ayugapat, because of non-simultaneity of activities; traigunya viparyayāt, because of the diverse modifications due to the three guṇas.

18. The multiplicity of the Spirit is verily established (1) from the individual allotment of birth, death and the instruments, (2) from the non-simultaneity of activities, and (3) from the diverse modifications due to the three guṇas.

On what basis is the plurality of Spirit established? This is answered: because there is definite individual allotment of birth, death and the organs. Birth is the connection of the Spirit with a particular aggregate of a special group of body, sense-organs, mind. I-Principle, Great Principle and experiences; it is not a modification of the Spirit, because the Spirit is not subject to any kind of modification. Death is only giving up of that body etc; it is not the destruction of the Spirit, because the Spirit is immutable and eternal. Organs of action and cognition are thirteen, beginning with Buddhī. Niyama is a particular adjustment of these organs, birth, death etc. It cannot be said that all these are connected with one Spirit dwelling in all the bodies. If the Spirit were one and the same in all bodies, then, when one is born, all would be born, when one dies, all would die; should one become blind etc, then, all else too would become blind. On one going out of mind, all would go out of mind; thus there will be confusion. A definite adjustment is possible only if a distinct Puruṣa dwelling in each set of body is accepted. Nor is it proper...
to hold that a definite adjustment can be had by assuming that a single Puruṣa has connection with different adjuncts of bodies. Because, this also would land us in confusion as the Spirit would then either be born or die according to the differences of even adjuncts like the hands, breasts etc. For, a maiden does not become dead when her hands are cut off her body; nor does she become born on the appearance of breasts and other things on her body! For the following reason also, the Spirit must be different in each body: because of non-simultaneity of activities. Activity is a form of effort, though it is a function of the internal organs; yet, here, it is attributed to the Spirit in a figurative sense. If the Spirit were accepted as one in all the bodies, then, when the Spirit is active in one body, all the bodies would become active and there would be simultaneous movement in all the bodies. This absurdity can be done away with if the Spirit is accepted as multiple, i.e., each Spirit in each body.

For the following reason also, Spirit is different in each body: because of the diverse modifications of the three gunas. Eva in the text should be read after siddham and not with Viparyaya (as found in the text) to emphasise that the plurality of the Spirit is verily a proved fact (siddhameva), and not an unproved one. Traiguṇya means the three attributes. Their differentiation is Viparyaya. Some abound in Sattva attribute, i.e., the composition of their body excels in sattva guṇa, like the ascetics and divinities. Some abound in Rajaguṇa, like ordinary people; some abound in Tāmoguṇa, such as animals etc born in inferior wombs. This differentiation in the distribution of the three guṇas in different entities could not be explained if the Spirit were to be one and the same in all the bodies. This defect can be eliminated if the Puruṣa is accepted as multiple.

10. Ordhvairājasah, i.e, those whose vital fluid flows upwards, i.e, those who abstain from sexual intercourse, like saints, ascetics etc.

Having thus established the plurality of the Spirit, the author next states the properties of the Spirit as a knowledge of these are conducive to the attainment of discriminative wisdom (Viveka jñāna):

तस्मात् विपयायसत् सिद्ध साधित्वमभ्रमः पुरुषस्वः
कैवल्य विद्यास्य द्रष्ट्वमकर्त्तृभावः || 19.11

Tasmāt-ca-viparyāsati, And from that contrast; asya-puruṣasya sāṅgpttvam siddham, is established that the Puruṣa is a witness; Kaivalya, is solitary; mādhivyam, is neutral; draṣṭtvam, is a seer; akārīrbhāvah ca, and is a non-agent.

19. And from that contrast it is established that the Spirit is the pure witness. He is solitary, neutral, spectator, and non-agent.

The particle ca in the text adds the following properties of the Spirit to its plurality. If it had been said Viparyāsād asmat - And from this contrast (in the text), then the reference would relate to the 'differentiation due to the three guṇas' appearing in the previous Kārikā. To avoid this it is said tasmāt-from that-(in the text). A thing immediately preceding becomes the object of the pronoun idam-this; whereas by tad-that, something not so proximate is denoted; hence, tad here denotes 'three attributes,' 'indistinguishability' etc mentioned much earlier in Kārikā 11. Therefore, the phrase: opposite of three guṇas etc connotes the properties of the Spirit, such as being without three guṇas, possessing the quality of discrimination, being non-objective, uncommon, sentient, and non-prolific. The properties of being seniency and non-objective indicate the characteristics of being a witness and a seer. A sentient being alone can be a seer and not an insentient being; one becomes a witness only when objects are shown to him; he is a witness to whom objects are exhibited. In daily life we find that the two parties of a dispute show the object of the dispute to the witness; in a similar way, the prakṛti also exhibits its creations to the Puruṣa who thus becomes the witness.
No object can be exhibited to one who himself is an object and is insentient. The Spirit thus becomes the witness as it is both the sentient and non-objective. For the same reason also, the Spirit is the seer.

The Spirit is solitary because of the absence of three gunas. Solitariness or Isolation is the final and absolute cessation of three kinds of pain. And the Spirit being without three gunas by its very nature, the absence of Pleasure, Pain and Delusion also will be there, which proves the solitary nature of the Purusa. Purusa is also neutral, because, of the same quality of being without the three gunas. One who is satiated with happiness is a happy man; he who hates pain is a miserable man; such a one cannot be a neutral person. Only he who is devoid of both, can be called neutral or indifferent. The non-agentship of the Purusa is proved from its being discriminative and non-producing.

**Objection:** Let it be so; but it is a fact of experience, that one decides what is to be done by him after proper reasoning, and then thinks as follows: 'I am a sentient being, I want to do this, and I shall do so.' Thus it is proved that sentience and activity are found to co-exist in the same substratum. This argument contradicts the Sankhya theory that the Sentient is inactive and the insentient is the active agent. This is answered:

\[ \text{तस्मात् संयमाधवेतनं चैतन्यविविदव रिज्ञम्} \]

\[ \text{गुणकृत्वभिप्ति तथा कर्तव्य मत्यु्र्दशीन्:} || \text{20} || \]

\[ \text{Tasmat, Therefore; Tatsamyogat, from conjunction with the Purusa; acetanam lingam, the insentient evolute; cetanavat iva, (appears) as if possessing sentiency; tathâ, and similarly; gunakartiTV api, also from agency really belonging to the attributes; udâsinah, the neutral; KarteVai bhavati, appears as if he were the agent.} \]

20. Therefore, through this union, the insentient evolute appears as if it is intelligent; and similarly, also from agency belonging to the gunas, the neutral Spirit appears as if it were the Agent.

The term tasmât (in the text) suggests that inasmuch as sentiency and agency having been proved by reasons to be in different substrata, the objections (immediately preceding the above verse) are only false impressions. The cause of the false impression (of the objector) is the union, ie the proximity of the Spirit with the evolute. The word linga (in the text) stands for every evolute from the Great Principle down to the Primary Elements. The rest is clear enough.

**Objection:** It is said in the above verse: Through this union. But there can be no union between two different things without some mutual need; and this expectation of some need is not possible without the relation of the helped and the helper. (Then, how is it possible to have any union between the Spirit and the Evolute if there is no mutual expectancy)?

This is replied:

\[ \text{पुरुस्य दर्शानाय वेदनायादित्वं प्रधानस्य} | \]

\[ \text{पद्धतिवृद्धियोऽर्थं संवैधानिक्तृतं:} \text{ सर्वं:} || \text{29} || \]

Pradhânasya, of the Primordial Nature; puruṣasya, by the Spirit; darsanârtham, for the sake of exhibition; tathâ Kaivalyârtham, and for the sake of emancipation; paśgu-ahâravat, like the lame and the blind; ubhayok api, of both also; samyogah, there is union; tat kriyâh sargâh, from this union proceeds the creation.

21. For the exhibition of nature to the Spirit and for the emancipation of the Spirit, (there is conjunction between the Spirit and Nature) like the union between the lame and the blind; from this conjunction proceeds creation.

The term pradhânasya (in the text) is in the genitive affix having active force. It means: 'for the sake of perception of Pradhâna, the cause of all evolutes, by the Purusa.' By this, the fact of nature as being an object of enjoyment is shown. From
this it follows that pradhāna as an object of enjoyment could not be without an enjoyer; therefore, it is quite logical to accept that the Pradhāna needs an enjoyer. Next, the author shows the need of the Spirit for Pradhāna by saying: for the sake of isolation of the Spirit. The Spirit, ignorant of its distinction from Pradhāna, while in union with that, considers the three kinds of pain which are really the constituents of Pradhāna, to be his own; and seeks liberation from this bondage. And this liberation is possible only on the knowledge that the Purusa is distinct from Pradhāna. This knowledge of distinctness of Purusa from Pradhāna cannot take place without the Pradhāna (with all its evolutes). Thus, for its own liberation, the Purusa needs Pradhāna. This union is eternal due to the continuous series of connections between the Spirit and the Nature. Though the Spirit unites with Nature for the purpose of enjoyment, it unites again with it for the purpose of achieving liberation.

**Question:** Let there be union between the Purusa and the Pradhāna; but whence is this evolution of Mahat and the rest?

This is answered: From this proceeds creation. Union by itself would not suffice either for enjoyment or for liberation if Mahat and the rest were not there; hence the act of union itself brings about the evolution for the sake of enjoyment and liberation.

Now is explained the process of evolution:

प्रकृतिमहत्तोतस्मात्माद्राणकोऽर्जुनः

तस्मादिप्तोऽर्जुनकालपञ्च्य: पञ्च मूलानि ॥ २२ ॥

Prakṛti, From Prakṛti; Mahāt, evolves Mahat, The Great Principle; tatah, from that; ahamkāra, proceeds the I-Principle; tasmāt ca, and from that; sādāsaṅkātha ganah, proceeds a set of sixteen; sādāsaṅkāt tasmād api pāñcācalishyah, from the five of this set of sixteen; pāñca bhūtāni, proceed the five elements.

22. From the Primordial Matter evolves the Great Principle; from this evolves the I-Principle; from this evolves the set of sixteen; from the five of this set of sixteen, evolves the five elements.

Prakṛti is the Unmanifest. Mahat, the Great Principle, and Ahamkāra, the I-Principle will be defined later. The set of sixteen consist of eleven sense-organs, to be described later, and five tanmātras (Primary elements). Since this set is limited by sixteen, it is known as a set of sixteen. From the five Primary elements out of the above sixteen, evolve five elementary substances such as Space, Earth, Water, Air and Fire.

(a) From the Primary element of sound (śabda Tanmātra) proceeds Space (ākāsa) having sound as its characteristic property; (b) from the primary elements of touch as combined with that of sound, proceeds Air (Vāyu) with sound and touch as its characteristic properties; (c) from the Primary element of colour (rūpa) as combined with those of sound and touch proceeds Fire (tejas) with sound, touch and form as its characteristic properties; (d) from the primary element of taste (rasa) as combined with those of sound, touch and form proceeds Water (āpah) possessing sound, touch, form and taste as its characteristic properties; and (e) from the primary element of odour (gaṇḍha) as combined with those of sound, touch, form and taste proceeds Earth (prthvi) with sound, touch, form, taste and odour as its characteristic properties.

The Unmanifest has been defined in general terms by the statement the reverse of this is the Unmanifest etc (in Kārikā 10), and in specific terms by the statement Satva is buoyant and illuminating etc (in Kārikā 13). The Manifest too has been defined in general terms by the statement depending upon a cause (in Kārikā 10) etc. Now Buddha which is a special form of the Manifested, and whose knowledge is conducive to obtain discriminative wisdom, is being defined.
Puruṣa (Spirit). Dispassion is the absence of passion (for sensual enjoyments).

Dispassion is four-fold known as (1) yatamāna samjñā, (2) Vyatireka samjñā, (3) ekendriya samjñā, (4) vaśikāra samjñā. Passion and other emotions which are so many impurities, dwell in the citta, the retentive faculty; prompted by them, the sense organs flow towards their respective objects. The preliminary efforts at boiling (purifying) those impurities (in the form of passion etc) in order that the sense-organs do not turn towards their objects, is the first known Yatamāna samjñā or the Stage of endeavour. When this effort of boiling (ie purification) is commenced, it is found that some passions have become refined or purified while some others are in the stage of getting purified. At this stage the relation of before and after (purvāparī bhāva) comes into existence. The ascertainment of the purified emotions from those that are in the process of being purified by means of discrimination is the second stage of dispassion known as vyatireka samjñā or discriminative stage. When the sense-organs have become incapable of activities, the purified emotions continue to dwell in the chitta in the form of mere craving. This is the third stage known as ekendriya samjñā, the one-organ stage. The cessation of this craving also which is subsequent to the first three stages, towards all sensuous and supersensuous objects of enjoyments even when they are near at hand, is the fourth stage known as vaśikāra samjñā, the control stage which has thus been described by the Blessed Patañjali: ‘The dispassion known as vaśikāra samjñā belongs to one who has rid himself of the craving for both the seen and revealed objects of enjoyment.’ (1-15). This type of dispassion is a property of the Buddha.

Power also is a property of Buddha from which perfections like animā and the rest become manifest. Animā is to become atomic by means of which one could enter into even (such dense matters) as stones; laghimā is levitation by which one could go to
solar regions by following the path of sun's rays. Mahimā is magnification by which one becomes great; prāpti - is the ability to touch the farthest, by which one would be able to touch the moon with fingertips. Prākṣāmya is unfettered fulfillment of desires, by which one would be able to sink into the earth and rise again as in water; Vaśītvam is mastery by which one masters all elements and their products and is not mastered by others. Isītvam is sovereignty by which one becomes sovereign over production, absorption and arrangement of elements and their productions. Yatra Kāmāvāsanāpisītvam is the infallibility of will, by which all the elements follow the course as willed by him. The decisions of ordinary mortals follow what has already been ordained whereas in the case of Yogins, their will dictates the course of events. Thus four are the properties of Buddhī abounding in Sattva attribute. The Buddhī abounding in Tamas attribute has just the reverse of those properties, viz, vice or demerit, ignorance, passion, and servility. Thus four are the properties of Buddhī abounding in Tamas.

The author next defines ahamkāra, the I-Principle:

अबिमानोइड़कंकरः तस्माद् द्विविभ: प्रवति सर्गः: |
एकादशक्ष्व गणन: तस्मात्राप्रक्रमक्ष्य || २४ ||

Ahankāra abhimānaḥ, I-Principle is self-assertion; Tasmāt, from that; pravartate, proceeds; dvividhah sargah eva, a two-fold evolution only; ekādāsakaḥ ganah, the set of eleven; ca, and; Tannātra pañcaakaḥ, the pentad of Primary elements; ca, and.

24. Ahankāra is self-assertion; from that proceeds a two-fold evolution only, viz, the set of eleven and the five-fold primary (or rudimentary) elements.

Ahankāra is self-assertion. The ego centricity, involved in self-assertions as observed in ideas which are well-thought of and reasoned and take such forms as 'I am entitled to this,' 'verily, I am competent to do this,' 'all these objects of sense are for my sake only,' 'there is none else other than me who is entitled for this,' 'hence I am,' etc are the unique operations of this ahamkāra, depending upon which the Buddhī determines like 'this should be done by me.' Its different products are mentioned: from that proceeds a two-fold evolution. The two forms of this evolution are stated; the set of eleven consisting of the sense organs, and the five-fold Primary elements. Eva in the text has the force of emphasising that only these two sets of evolution proceed from the I-Principle and nothing else.

Objection: Let it be so; Now, the I-Principle and the rest are of uniform nature; how can two different kinds of evolution viz, the sentient (elements) and the illuminative (sense) which are of mutually contradictory nature, proceed from such a cause? This is answered in the following verse:

सत्सिंह एकादशकं प्रवर्तिते वैष्णवद्वस्यापात ||
भूतादेशस्त्तथा: स तामसस्तैज्ञातसाहम्मयम || २५ ||

Vaikṛtād ahamkarāt, From out of the Vaikṛt form of ahamkāra: ekādāsakaḥ, the set of eleven; sattva, substances abounding in sattva attribute; pravartate, evolves. Tannātraḥ, the primary elements; bātādhe, (proceed) from the Bhūtādi form of the I-Principle, sa tāmasah, they abound in Tamas; taṣāvād, from the Taśāya form of I-Principle; ubhayam, both of them (the indriyas and the tanmātras) proceed.

25. The set of eleven abounding in sattva proceeds from the Vaikṛta form of I-Principle; the set of five primary elements proceed from the Bhūtādi form of I-Principle; they are Tāmasa. From the Taśāya form of I-Principle proceed both of them.

From the Vaikṛta I-Principle abounding in sattva attribute having properties of buoyancy and illumination, proceed the set of eleven sense organs. From the Bhūtādi I-Principle abounding in Tāmasa attribute, the set of Primary elements proceed. How so? Because the set of five Primary elements abound in Tāmas
attribute. The I-Principle, though one and uniform, evolves products of diverse kinds according as it is either dominated or suppressed by one or other of the three gunas.  

**Objection:** If all the products are evolved by the action of Sattva and Tamas attributes only, then, what good is Rajas, which serves no useful purpose?  

**Answer:** From the Taijasa, both of these evolve, ie from the I-Principle abounding in Rajoguna proceed both the sets of eleven and five. Just because the Rajas attribute does not produce exclusively any separate product it cannot be said that the Rajas attribute serves no useful purpose inasmuch as it energises both Sattva and Tamas attributes which, by themselves, are absolutely inert and as such incapable of performing any function, and thus Rajas becomes instrument in the evolution of both the sets of products by the Sattva and Tamas attributes (of the I-Principle) by exciting Sattva and Tamas to perform their own activities.  

In order to describe the set of eleven, predominated by the Sattva attribute, the author in the following verse describes the ten external sense-organs:  

\[ \text{कुमुदिनिष्ठाणि} \text{ विश्वायुपायूपस्थः: कम्पलिऊष्ठाणि} \text{ } \text{ } || 26 || \]

Buddhi indriyāni. The organs of cognition (are); ākhyāni, known as; sakṣuḥ, the Eye; śrīrām, the Ear; ghrūṇa, the Nose; rasanā, the Tongue; tvak, (and) the Skin; Karmendriyāni ñuhu, (the following) are known as the organs of action; Vāk, Speech; pāṇi, Hand; pāda, Feet; pāyu, Anus; upasthāh, and the generative organ.  

26. Organs of knowledge (or cognition) are called the Eye, the Ear, the Nose, the Tongue and the Skin. The organs of action are called the Speech, the Hand, the Feet, the excretory organ and the organ of generation.  

Organmōs (indriyatvam) is to have for its substratum (ie as its constituent adjunct (upādānakāvatvam) the I-Principle abounding in Sattva attribute, and it is of two kinds: organs of knowledge, and organs of action. Both of these organs are called indriyas inasmuch as they serve as the indicators of the Spirit.  

They are known by their respective names such as Eye etc. Of these, the organ or the instrument through which colour is perceived is the Eye, that which perceives sound is the Ear, that which perceives odour is the Nose, that which perceives taste is the Tongue, and that which perceives touch is the Skin. The function of the organs of speech and the rest are spoken of later on (in Kārikā 28).  

The eleventh sense organ is next described:  

\[ \text{उभयवन्यक्षक्रम मन:}; \text{संकल्पक्रियां च साध्यांतः} \text{ \ \ गुणपरिभाषाविवेचतानात्वं वाहनभवाध्य} \text{ } \text{ } || 27 || \]

Atra. Among these sense organs; manah ubhayātmatkam, mind possesses the nature of both; Sankalpakam, it is deliberative; ca sādharmyāt, and because of common properties; indriyam, it is an organ (as well); nānātvaṁ, its multifariousness; bāhyā bhedaḥ ca, and also its external diversities; guṇa-parināma-viśeṣat, are because of special modifications of the Attribute.  

27. Of these (sense organs), the Mind possesses the nature of both (the sensory and motor organs). It is the deliberating principle, and is also called a sense organ since it possesses properties common to the sense organs. Its multifariousness and also

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11. When Sattva guna dominates, the ashmaka is called Aukta; when Tama guna dominates, it is called Bhūtād, and when Raja guna dominates it is called Taijasa.

12. Indriya sadā iti indriyaḥ: it is indriya because it reminds one of Indra, meaning paramāترا, the Supreme Soul. Indriya is, therefore, that which reminds one of the Supreme Lord. All indriyas work for the sake of the Aman only.
its external diversities are owing to special modifications of the Attributes.

Among the eleven sense-organs, the Mind possesses the characteristics of both, i.e., it is an organ of knowledge, and also is an organ of action inasmuch as sensory organs like the Eye and the rest and the motor organs like the Speech and the rest operate on their respective objects only when the mind is operative in conjunction with the organ and receives the impression. Next the author states the special definition of the Mind: it is the deliberating principle; that is to say, the mind appears in the form of deliberation. As for example, when a certain object is vaguely apprehended by a sense organ merely as this is something, a doubt arises as to whether it be this or it be that. The mind correctly cognizes it as it is this and not that by discerning the properties as belonging to the thing apprehended. Thus has it been described by an ancient text:

Samyugdhah Hastumatrah hi Prāgrahaṇaḥ avikalpitaṃ |
Tat saṁmāṇvitaśubhyuṃ kalpojanīti mārjitaṃ.||
Also, Asi hi uacana jñānaḥ Pratamam nirvikalpakaṃ |
Bālemukaḥ vijtāṇa sadrisaḥ Sukha vastujamāti.||
Tataḥ parah punarvastu dharmajādibhir yayā |
buddhyā vastyate sa hi prayaṣṭatvena sammatā.||

— ‘At first, one apprehends an object in a vague way merely as a thing; then the intelligent people cognize it as belonging to a certain genus and as possessing certain specific properties.

‘Also, (says another writer): First one has a simple and indeterminate apprehension of a thing before him, like the idea in the mind of a boy, a dumb person and the like. After this, the thing is cognised as possessing certain properties and as belonging to a certain genus etc. The cognition that apprehends all this is also accepted as sense perception.’ This operation characterised by the faculty of deliberation belongs to the mind and it serves to distinguish the mind from all similar and dissimilar classes of things.

**Objection:** Let it be so; but Mahat and Ahaṅkāra, having distinct operations of their own, are not classed as sense organs. Hence, the mind too should not be classed as a sense organ inasmuch as it too has a distinct operation of its own.

This is answered: it is a sense organ. Why? because it has properties in common with the other sense organs. Homogeneity is to have for its constituent cause the I-Principle abounding in sattva attribute. Here, indriya should not be interpreted in the sense of its being a characteristic of Indra (Spirit), because, in that case both Mahat and I-Principle also would have to be classed under the senses inasmuch as they too possess the above characteristic. Therefore, its being the indicator of the Spirit should be taken only as occurring from the derivation of the term indriya and not from its operational character.

**Question:** How is it that a set of eleven sense-organs proceeds from a single I-Principle abounding in Sattva attribute?

**Answer:** Its multifariousness and also its external diversities are due to peculiar modifications of the Attributes. The diversity of a product is due to the diversity in the auxiliary unseen force that brings about the experiences of sound and other objects. The diversity in the unseen force is also a modification of the Attribute. The statement in the text bāhyabkedāḥ - external diversities, is added for the purpose of illustration, that is to say, the multifariousness of the mind is just like the diverse external forms, (all owing to the diverse modifications of the attributes).

Having thus described the nature of the eleven sense organs, the specific functions of the first ten sense organs are being described:
Pañcāṇām, the function of the five senses; rūpadisu, in respect of form and the rest; ālocanamātram isyate, is considered to be mere observation; pañcaśām vṛttih, the functions of the other five; vacana, (are considered to be) speech; ādāna, manipulation; viharana, locomotion; uṣarga, excretion; ca, and; ānandāḥ, gratification.

28. The function of the five in respect to form and the rest, is considered to be mere observation. Speech, manipulation, locomotion, excretion and gratification are the functions of the other five.

The function of the organs of knowledge is said to be mere observation. A simple apprehension of the objects is observation. Speaking, handling, walking, excretion and gratification are the functions of the five organs of action. The organ located in the throat, palate etc is speech and speaking is its function. The functions of other organs are clear.

The functions of the three internal organs are now described:

व्यक्तिक्षण्ये ज्ञेयभवत्सरामास्या |
सतांशक्रेणहरिति: प्रणाया वायव: पञ्च || २९ ||

Trayasya, of the three internal instruments; svālaksānyam, their own characteristics; Vṛttih, are their respective functions; sā eṣā. And these same functions; asamāṇyā bhavati, are peculiar to each; sāmāṇya-karana-vṛttih. The common modifications of the instruments; prāṇādhyāḥ-vāyavah-paṇca, are the five airs such as the Prāṇa and the rest.

29. Of the three internal organs, their own characteristics are their functions: this is peculiar to each. The common modification of the instruments is the five airs such as prāṇa and the rest.

The term svālaksānyam means those having their own distinct special characteristics and they are the Mahat, the Great Principle, ahaṅkāra, the I-Principle and the manas, the mind. The distinct characteristics are their natures too. They are the properties which serve as the distinguishing mark of each internal organ. They also denote their respective functions; they are: determination is of the Will (Buddhi), ego-centricity of the I-Principle (ahaṅkāra) and observation of the mind (Manas).

Function is of two kinds: common and specific. This is stated: they are peculiar to each. The vital airs are five beginning with Prāṇa. They form the common functions of the internal organs. These five vīta airs are the very life of the three internal organs since the latter exist when they exist and cease to exist when they are absent. Of the five vīta airs, the Prāṇa is located at the tip of the nose, the heart, the navel, feet and the thumb; apana is located in the nape of the neck, the back, the feet, the anus, the generative organ and the sides; samāna in the heart, the navel and all the joints; udāna, in the heart, the throat, the palate, the head, and between the eye-brows; vyāna is located in the skin. These are the five Vital Airs.

The author next describes the order of functions, both successive and simultaneous, of the four-fold organs (the three internal organs and the external organs):

युगपत्तिवशय्यस्य तु गुर्जितः क्रमशः तत्स्य निर्दिष्टः |
इद्दैं तद्यथयोद्देशप्रयत्न तत्स्यूर्वित्तः व्रत्तिः: || ३० ||

Drṣeṣṭa, with regard to the perceptible; catusṭayasya tu, of the set of four; ugra-pat vṛttih, the functions are simultaneous; tasya krama-śāca, and also successively; nirṛṣṭā, are said to be; tathā api adṛṣeṣṭa, and also with regard to the imperceptible; trayasya vṛttih, the functions of the three; tat pūrvi, are preceded by that.
30. Of all the four, the functions are said to be simultaneous and also successive with regard to the seen objects; with regard to the unseen objects, (and also seen objects) the functions of the three are preceded by that.

Drṣṭe - simultaneous with the perceptible objects: For example, when one sees in darkness, by means of the flash of lightning, a tiger facing him, then all the four, viz observation (by the eyes), consideration (by the mind) identification with the self (by the I-Principle) and determination (by the Buddhi) take place simultaneously, and he runs away from that place at once. Again successively. This is as when a man sees vaguely in dim light a certain thing; then, applying his mind intently, he observes that he is a very cruel robber with his bow stretched to his ear and arrows aimed at him; then his abhūtāra makes himself conscious that he (the robber) is approaching him; lastly, his will (Buddhi) determines that he should run away from that place. But with regard to unseen things, the three internal organs, viz. Mind, will, and the I-Principle, operate without the help of the external organs - this is pointed out by the text in the statement: the functions of the three are preceded by that. That is to say, the simultaneous as well as the successive functions of the three internal organs are preceded by perception of some object. Verily the cognition arising from inference, valid Testimony and Remembrance is preceded by a knowledge of sense perception and not otherwise.13

As in the case of perceptible things, so also is with regard to imperceptible things.14

13. That is to say, nothing can be cognised if it had not previously been seen by the senses. Thus, there can be no inference or testimony or recollection of what has never been perceived earlier.

14. The functioning of the internal organs is possible only when there is already a knowledge gained by means of direct sense perception of some external object.

Objection: The functions of either the set of four or the set of three, cannot be depending on themselves alone; for, in that case, the organs being everlasting, their functions too would be everlasting; on the other hand, if they are mere adventitious (i.e. transient), then their functions too would be adventitious which again would cause an admixture of the functions, there being nothing to regulate them.

This is answered in the following verse:

स्वां स्वां प्रति प्रदाने परस्पराकृतेश्वरोऽवत्तता व्रतिम्
पुरुषार्थं एव हेतुर्न केनचित्तकायति कर्मम् || 31 ||

Svāṁ svāṁ vr̥ttim, To their respective functions; pratipadyante, they enter into; paraspare - ākāta - hetukāṁ, being incited by mutual impulses. Purvārtha eva hetuḥ, the purpose of the Puruṣa is the sole motive; na kenacit, by none whatsoever; karaṇam kāryate, is an organ made to act.

31. The organs enter into their respective modifications being incited by mutual impulse. The purpose of the Spirit is the sole motive (for the activity of the organs). By none whatsoever is an organ made to act.

Karaṇāṇi (sense organs) must to be supplied to the above verse as the subject of the verse.

When a number of men wielding lances, sticks, bows and swords etc., having determined beforehand as to their respective roles, engage themselves in overpowering a common enemy, they proceed to act only on knowing each other’s impulse, and while acting the lance-wielder uses only lance and not stick etc.; similarly, the stick-wielder uses only the stick and not weapons like lance etc. In the same manner, each of the organs operates only by the reason of the impulse to action by the other organ. This impulse being the cause of functions of the organs, there cannot arise any admixture of functions (as the impulse acts as the regulating motive power).
**Objection:** But the lancers etc are sentient beings. It is, therefore, quite appropriate to say that they act having comprehended each others' impulse. Whereas, the organs are insentient; as such, they can never motivate others to act. Consequently, the organs can be motivated to act only by a controller who is cognisant of the nature, capacity and uses of the organs.

This is answered: *The purpose of the Spirit is the sole motive; by nothing else is an organ made to act. The sole motive of the organs is to fulfil the purpose of the Purusa in the form of bringing about the experience of unfulfilled enjoyment, and emancipation to the Purusa. Consequently, there is no need to postulate an intelligent controller cognisant of the nature of the organs etc. This has further been elucidated in the verse 'Just as the secretion of milk is for the sake of the nourishment of the calf' etc. (Kārikā 57).*

It has been declared in the verse that by none else whatsoever is an organ made to act. Now, in the following verse, the organs are being clarified.

**करण त्रयोदशविद्यम् तदाहरणानां प्रकाशकालम्**<br>**कार्यं च तत्र दशा-धारायेऽध्यायं धार्यं प्रकाये च ** || 32 ||

*Karaṇaṁ. The organs; trayodasa vidyaṁ, are of thirteen kinds; ṭad āharana, it (performs the action of) seizing; dhāraṇa, sustaining; prakāśakaram, (and) illuminating; āsya kāryam ca, and its objects; dasadhā, are ten-fold; āhāryam, the seized; dhāryam, the sustained; prakāśyam ca and the illuminated.

32. Organs are of thirteen kinds performing the functions of seizing, sustaining and illuminating. Its objects are of ten kinds, viz, the seized, the sustained and the illuminated.

The sense organs are eleven. Will and the I-Principle are the other two organs; thus, taken together, the organs are thirteen. An organ is a special kind of active agent. This agency cannot be there unless it has the capacity to function. Hence, the functions of the organs are next stated: *Performing the functions of seizing etc.* The organs of action such as the Speech etc perform the function of seizing; that is, they pervade and apprehend their respective objects by their operations over them, while the Will, the I-Principle, and the Mind, sustain them by their respective functions in the form of the Vital Airs; and the organs of knowledge illumine their respective objects.

The functions such as seizing, sustaining etc must have their objects; hence, they are being named and classified: *And its objects etc.* The objects of the thirteen kinds of organs are ten-fold, in the form of the apprehended, sustained and illumined. To seize is to pervade: the organs of action pervade over speech, seizing locomotion, excretion and gratification respectively. And, they each being celestial and non- celestial, seizing is ten-fold. Similarly, the object to be sustained by the three internal organs through their functions in the form of the Vital Airs etc is the body which is an aggregate of the five elementary substances such as the earth etc. The earth is an aggregate of five elements of sound etc. Each of these five elements being celestial and non-celestial, it becomes ten-fold; hence, the objects to be sustained also become ten-fold. In a similar way, the organs of knowledge too pervade their respective objects, viz, sound, touch, form, taste and odour. They also being celestial and non-celestial, are ten-fold, and hence, the objects to be illumined by them also become ten-fold.

A further sub-division of the thirteen organs is made:

**अनव:करणं त्रिविषयं दशाधा बाह्यम् तयस्य विषयवाक्यं**<br>**साप्रतिकालं बाह्यं विकालामाध्यन्तरं करणं** || 33 ||

*Aññahāraṇaṁ trividhaṁ. The internal organ is three-fold; bāhyam dasadhā, the externals are ten-fold; trayasya viśayākhyāyam, (they are) called the objects of the three; bāhyam, the external; sāmpratikālam, functions at the present time; ābhyaḥkāram**
karaṇam, the internal organs; trikālam, (function) at all three times.

33. The internal organ is three-fold. The external is ten-fold; they are called the objects of the three (internal organs). The external organs function at the present time and the internal organs function at all the three times.

The internal organs are three, viz, Will (buddhi), I-Principle (ahamkāra) and Mind (Manas). They are known as internal organ as they are located inside the body. The external organs are ten; they are known as the objects of the internal three organs inasmuch as they are the channels through which the internal organs operate in apprehending, self-identifying and determining objects. Here, organs of Buddhi and the rest function by apprehending things, and the organs of action function by their respective operation on the objects. The specific differences between the external and the internal organs are next declared: The externals act at the present time and the internal organs at all the three times. The term present time suggests also time immediately preceding and immediately following; because of this, speech also becomes an object of the present. The internal organs function at all points of time, as found in the examples: (a) It had rained because the river has become full with water (indicates the past); there is fire in the mountain because there is smoke (indicates the present); it would rain provided no obstacles are there, because, we see ants carrying eggs (indicates the future). Here, following the events, the internal organs apprehend, become self-conscious, and determine (the occurrences at all the three points of time).

According to the Vaiśeṣikas, Time is one indivisible thing and as such it does not admit of conventional divisions such as present, past etc. This conventional division of time as past, present etc is owing to adventitious conditions. The teachers of Sāṅkya, however, hold that the very same adventitious conditions

as past, present etc may be considered as the basis for the conventional notions of future, present and past. Therefore, there is no need for postulating another intervening entity as Time.

Now the Author discusses about the objects of the external organs, operating at the present time.

Teṣāṁ. Of these; pañca buddhi āndriya, the five organs of knowledge; viśeṣa-aviśeṣa-aviśayoni, have, as their objects, both gross (specific) as well as subtle (non-specific). Viśeṣa, the Speech; sāda-aviśayah-hhavati, has sound as its object; Šeṣān i tu, but the rest; pañca-aviśayān, have all the five as their objects.

34. Of these, the five organs of knowledge have, as their objects, both the gross as well as the subtle. Speech has sound as its object; the rest have all the five as their objects.

Of the ten external organs, the five organs of knowledge have, for their objects, both the specific and non-specific. The specific objects are the gross sound and the rest (touch, colour, taste and odour) in their cāṇam, turbulent and deluding forms (sānta, gīrā, and mūḍha), abiding in the form of earth and the rest (ie Water, Air, Fire and Ākāśa). The non-specific are the subtle forms of sound and the rest, in the form of Primary elements (Tāṃmātras). The particle mātra in Tāṃmātra serves to eliminate gross forms of the elements. Those alone are the organs of knowledge which have for its objects both the gross and subtle things. For example, the great sages and ascetics perceive both the subtle elements of sound (sāda Tāṃmātra) and also the gross form of sound; but ordinary people like ourselves are capable of perceiving only the gross form of sound; similarly, the tactile organ of these ascetics is capable of perceiving both the gross and the subtle touch, whereas our tactile organ perceives objects of gross touch only. Similarly, the eye and other organs of those
ascetics can perceive colour and the rest in their subtle as also gross forms, while our organs can perceive their gross forms only.

Among the organs of action, speech has sound as its object, because, the organ of speech is the cause of the gross sound. But it cannot produce the Primary element of sound which is the evolute of the I-Principle, inasmuch as Speech also is an evolute of the I-Principle (ie both the organ of speech and the primary element of sound are the direct evolutes of Ahamkāra). The rest of the organs of action such as the Anus, the Generative organ, the Hand and Feet have, for their objects, the Jīva and such other things which can be manipulated by hand etc as they are of the nature of five elements of sound, colour, touch, taste and odour.15

Among the thirteen organs, some are principal ones; some are subordinate ones; the reason for the same is being stated:

सान्तः करण बुधते सर्व सिद्धविज्ञाह्यते सत्मात्
तस्मात् ब्राह्मणः द्वारे द्वाराणि शोभणि || 35 ||

Yasmāt, Because; Buddhaḥ, the Will or Intelligence; sāntah-karanāḥ, together with other internal organs; sarvam viṣayām avagāhate, comprehends all objects; tasmāt, therefore; trividham these three-fold; Karanaṁ dvāri, organs or instruments are the warders; sesaṁ, (and) the rest; dvārāni, are the doors.

35. Since buddhi along with the other internal organs, comprehends all objects, these three organs are like the warders while the rest are like the gates.

The warders are the principal organs. While the other external organs are the doors, ie are mere instruments. They are only subordinate organs because the buddhi along with the mind and ahamkāra, determines all objects that are exhibited by the external organs. Therefore, the external organs are like the doors whereas the Buddhi along with other internal organs is like the Warder.

Buddhi is principal not only in relation to the external organs but also in relation to the warders, ie the internal organs, viz, the I-Principle and the mind. This is stated in the following verse:

एते प्रदीपकल्या: परस्परविज्ञाना गुणविविवेष्या: ||
कुलम् पुरुषस्याध्र श्रवन्य बुधी प्रयवच्छिति || 36 ||

Ete, these (ten external organs, manas and ahamkāra); pradipa-kalpaḥ, resemble a lamp (in action); paraspara vilaksanāḥ, characteristic-wise different from one another; gunaviśeṣāḥ, are different modifications of the attributes; Kṛṣṇam prakāśya, illuminating all; purusasyārtham, for the purpose of the Spirit; buddhau prayacchati, presents (all objects) to buddhi.

36. These (external organs with the Mind and the I-Principle) which are characteristic-wise different from one another, and are different modifications of the attributes, and which resemble a lamp, illuminating all (their respective objects) present them to the Buddh for the purpose of the Spirit, (ie for their exhibition to the Spirit).

The chief officer of the village collects taxes from the heads of different families, and delivers it to the head of the District; he, in turn, delivers it to the Head of all the Districts who in turn hands it over to the king. In like manner, here also, the external organs, having perceived objects, present them to the mind which observes them and presents them to the I-Principle which taking a personal cognisance, presents them to the Buddha who is like the Head of all of them. That is why it is said in the text: These, illuminating all objects, present them to the Buddha for the purpose of the Spirit.
The external organs, the Mind and the I-Principle are the various modifications of the Attributes, i.e. they are the various mutations of the Sattva, Rajas and Tamas Attributes. Though they are mutually contradictory by their very nature, yet, they are led in unison for the purpose of the Purusa in the form of bringing experiences of enjoyment and emancipation. It is just like the wick, oil and fire, though opposed to each other (in their individual action) combine together in the form of a lamp in order to illuminate forms, colours etc. This meaning has to be applied to the statement in the verse: 

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ete gunaviveśaya
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**Object:** Why is it that the other organs present their impressions to the buddhi? Why should not the buddhi present its impressions to the Ahankara, or to the manas which are like the Warders (as mentioned before)? This is answered:

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सर्व प्रत्युपमों कर्मप्रथेण सत्यविपक्षिता बुद्धि: ।
तैव च विशिष्टकृत्व पुनः प्रभान्वुल्लान्तां सूक्षमम् || 37 ||
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Yasmat, Because; buddhi, it is the buddhi; purusaṣya upa-bho-gam, for the experience of the purusa; sarvam prati-sadhavati, accomplishes with regard to all objects; sa eva ca punah. And it is that alone; suksmaṃ, subtle; pradhāna-puruṣāntaram, difference between the purusa and the pradhāna; Viśinastī, discriminates.

37. Because, it is the buddhi that accomplishes the experiences with regard to all objects to the purusa. It is that again that discriminates the subtle difference between the Pradhāna and the Purusa.

The sole motive of the organs to act is to serve the purpose of the Spirit; that alone could be the principal organ which accomplishes this purpose directly; among the organs, the buddhi alone does this directly; hence, that alone is considered to be the Principal organ, just like the Governor being considered superior to all other chiefs by virtue of his being the direct Agent of the

King, while others such as the village heads etc, are only of secondary importance when compared to the former. It is the buddhi alone that accomplishes the experiencing of all objects to the Spirit by pretending to be the Spirit itself due to the reflection of the Spirit in the buddhi owing to its proximity to the Spirit. Experiencing consists in the enjoyment of feelings of pleasure and pain; this feeling takes place in the buddhi. The buddhi appears as if it has assumed the form of the Spirit; thus the buddhi makes the Spirit undergo these experiences. Just as perception, observation and self-consciousness of things get transmitted to the buddhi by taking their own respective forms, the functions of the senses too, in a similar way, become identified with buddhi in its own operation in the form of determining. It is just like the troops of the village-chief becoming one with the troops of the Governor. In a similar way, the buddhi accomplishes for the Purusa experiences of all things in the form of sound etc.

**Object:** If the buddhi is the one that accomplishes the experiences for the Purusa in respect to all the objects, then, no emancipation is ever possible. This is answered: it is again etc. It discriminates the difference between the Purusa and the Pradhāna. Here, the usage of the term antaram viṣinastī - discriminates the difference, is similar to the usage of the clause odanapākam pacati - cooks the cooking of nīc. Thus is shown that emancipation is the purpose of the Spirit. Since the difference between the Purusa and the Pradhāna is only artificial it should be transient; then, the emancipation brought about by the discrimination of that difference also must be transient. This is

16. The idea is this: the term Viśinastī has been explained as 'discriminates the difference.' Thus, the mention of antaram also seems to be superfluous. The example of odanapākam is cited to point out that the usage of antaram is not superfluous. It only helps in emphasising the meaning of the sentence.
answered: subtle etc. The said difference is subtle, i.e. it is difficult to perceive. ‘Pradhāna is subject to modifications. I am different from that’ - this difference is ever existing; but due to the absence of discrimination, the Buddhi just creates an awareness that there is no difference; but it does not create that difference due to which only transience could be implied. The organs have been described: Now the author describes the specific as well as the non-specific objects.

तम्मत्त्राणंविदीशोपाल्लेयं भूतानि पत्तं पञ्चमयः

पते स्वरुता विदीशया: शान्ता धोरष्ठं मुद्रपं || 38 ||

Tammātraṁ avīśeṣāṁ. The Tammātras are the indiscernibles; tebhya paicāghaḥ, from these five; pañca bhūṣān, proceed five gross elements; ete viśeṣāṁ smṛtāṁ, these are remembered as the discernibles; sūṁśāṁ, calm; ghorāḥ, turbulent; madhyāḥ ca, and deluding.

38. The tammātras are the indiscernible; from these five proceed the five gross elements; they are remembered as the discernibles, because, they are calm, turbulent and deluding.

Sound and the rest are the Tammātras, i.e. they are the subtle forms. The term māra (in Tammātra) indicates that these Primary elements are devoid of specific characteristics such as calmness etc which alone render them fit to be experienced (as pleasure, pain etc).

Having described the non-specific things (avīśeṣān), the author now, in order to describe the specific objects, mentions the manner of their production by stating: from these .... etc. From these five Primary elements of sound, touch, colour, taste and odour, proceed respectively, the five gross elements of Ākāśa, Air, Fire, Water and Earth.

Objection: Let these five gross elements be produced from the five Primary elements, but what about their specific characteristics?

Answer: These are remembered as the specifics. Why? Because, they partake of the nature of calmness, turbulence and delusion. The first ca (in the text) indicates the reason; the second ca (in the text) indicates the cumulative force (ie the things have all the three characteristics of calmness etc). Among the gross elements like the ākāśa and the rest, abounding in sattva Attributes, some are calm, happy, pleasant and buoyant; some, abounding in Rajas attribute, are turbulent, miserable, and unstable; some, abounding in Tamas attribute, are deluded, despondent, and sluggish. These gross elements, which are objects of experience, being distinguished from each other, are said to be discernible (vīśeṣa) and gross (sthaīle). But the Primary elements (Tammātras) distinguished from each other, are not the objects of our experience; hence they are said to be non-distinguishable (avīśeṣāḥ) and subtle (sūṁśāḥ).

A further sub-division of the specific objects is next mentioned:

सुक्ष्मम् मतापित्रजाज: संह प्रभूति: त्रिधा विदीशया: स्व: ||
सुक्ष्मात्त्वसम् नियता मातापित्रजाज निवर्तने || 39 ||

Sūkṣmāḥ, the subtle bodies; mātapitrājāḥ, the bodies born of father and mother; saha prabhūtaḥ, together with gross elements; triḍhā vīśeṣāḥ syuḥ, are the three kinds of the Specific; teṣāṁ, Amongst them; sūkṣmāḥ niyataḥ, the subtle bodies are everlasting; mātā-pitrājāḥ, the bodies born of father and mother; nivartante, are perishable.

39. The subtle bodies, bodies born of parents, together with gross elements are the three kinds of the specific. Of these, the subtle bodies are everlasting and those born of the parents are perishable.

The Specific objects are three-fold. They are mentioned.

(a) Subtle bodies are presumed (as they are not perceptible), In order to become perceptible, it must have some extra
qualification or vīśeṣaṇa by means of which it becomes distinguished from others. Here, the Vīśeṣaṇa is the property of causing pleasure, pain and delusion, which constitute the nature of the three Attributes. These are absent in the tanmātras but are present in sthūla bhūtas.17

(b) The bodies born of father and mother consist of six sheaths. Among these six, hair, blood and flesh are from the mother; arteries, bones and marrow are from the father. These six are the six sheaths (of the body).

(c) Prabhūtāni are the Great or gross elements. Along with these great elements, the other two constitute the specific. Thus, the subtle body is the first kind of specific object; bodies born of parents are the second kind; and the gross elements are of the third kind. Objects like the jar etc are included in the class of gross elements: The difference between the subtle body and the body born of parents is next explained: the subtle body among them......etc. The meaning is that among the specific things those that are subtle, are lasting while those born of parents are perishable, ie they dissolve into either fluids (when buried) or ash (when burnt) or putrid matter (when left to decay).

Now the subtle body is being classified:

पूर्वत्स्थितत्वानां नियतं महादिद सूक्ष्मार्थ्यन्त्म ||
संसारनिरूपणम् भावार्थव्यवस्थितं शिल्पम् || ४० ||

Līṅgaṃ. The mergent (subtle) body; pūrvatpānam, is produced at the beginning of creation; asaktaṃ, unconfined; niyataṃ, constant; Mahat-ādi-sūkṣma paryantam, is composed of tattvas, beginning with the Mahat and ending with the subtle Tanmātras;

17. Though both the tanmātras and the sthūla bhūtas are material, yet, there is a marked difference between them. The Tanmātras are devoid of vīśeṣaṇa-s; hence are non-specific or non-discriminable; while the gross elements are specific or discernible as they have the special properties of pleasure, pain etc; and thus become fit for experience. This is an evolution downward.

samsarati, migrates; nirupabhogam, devoid of experience; bhūvaih adhīvāsitem, tinged with dispositions.

40. The mergent subtle body, produced primordially, unconfined, constant, composed of the Tattvas beginning with Mahat and ending with tanmātras, transmigrates, free from experience, and tinged with dispositions.

Produced primordially means that at the beginning of creation by the Pradhāna, the subtle body was evolved one for each Puruṣa. Not confined because it is unobstructed; as such, it can pass through even a mountain. Constant because it continues to exist from the first evolution to the time of final dissolution. The Subtle body is composed of the Mahat down to subtle Tanmātras, that is to say, the subtle body is an aggregate of Mahat (Will), I-Principle, the eleven sense-organs and the five Primary elements. It is specific because it is endowed with the sense organs which are calm, turbulent and delusive.

Objection: Let this subtle body itself be the field of experience for the Spirit; where then is the need for a perceptible physical body comprised of the six sheaths (as mentioned above)?

Answer: it migrates - ie the subtle body transmigrates from body to body, ie it gives up and again occupies the six-sheathed physical body one after the other. Why so? Because, it is devoid of experience. The subtle body is incapable of having any experience without a physical body of six sheaths; that is why it migrates.

Objection: Transmigration is caused by Virtue and Vice and the subtle body has no connection with them. Then, how does the subtle body migrate?

Answer: The text answers: it is tinged with dispositions. The dispositions are Virtue and Vice, knowledge and ignorance, passion and dispassion, power and weakness. The Buddhi is endowed with all this and the subtle body is connected to the Buddhi. Thus, the subtle body also becomes tinged with those
dispositions. It is just like a piece of cloth becoming perfumed with the sweet fragrance of the champaka flower by virtue of the cloth coming in contact with that flower. Thus, becoming tinged with those dispositions, the subtle body migrates. (That is to say, affectation by these dispositions is the cause of transmigration).

**Question:** Like the Pradhāna, why not the subtle body also remain at the time of final dissolution?

**Answer:** Because it is the mergent. That which gets dissolved is the lingam or mergent. The meaning is that it gets dissolved in its cause. (It is a product, a combination of things; therefore, it being a product, it suffers resolution in its cause at the time of Final Dissolution).

**Objection:** Let it be so; But why not the Buddha itself migrate accompanied by the I-Principle and the sense-organs? Where then is the need to assume the migration by the subtle body for which there is no proof?

This is answered in the following verse:

विन्ध यथार्थसु स्थाध्यायिनि विना बना छाया ।
तत्त्वज्ञानिन्य तियति निराश्रयं लिङ्गम || ४१ ||

Yathā citram, As a painting; āśrayam rte, (cannot stand) without a support; yathā chāyā, even as a shadow; śāyānābhīḥ vinā, (cannot be) without a stake etc; tadvā, similarly; līṅga na tisṭhati, the līṅga does not subsist; Viśeṣāḥ vinā, without the subtle body; nirāśrayam, without a support.

41. As a painting cannot stand without a support, as a shadow cannot be without a stake, similarly, the līṅga also cannot subsist without a subtle body and without a support.

Līṅga in the text means the Buddhi and the rest (ie the I-Principle, the Mind, the senses and the five Tanmatras) because they make things known, and that cannot subsist without a substratum. Here, the following syllogism is given: ‘During the intervening period between death and rebirth, the Buddhi and the rest are supported by a refined body; because they are endowed with the refined five Primary elements; like the Buddhi etc as found in the perceived physical body. Without the specific body, ie without the subtle body. There is a scriptural text in this connection: ‘Then yama extracted by force the Spirit of the size of the thumb’ (from the body of Satyavān - Mahābhārata). Here, the thumb-sized Puruṣa implies the fact of its being the subtle body because of the impossibility of the extraction of Puruṣa. As such, the Puruṣa here stands for the subtle body only. Here the word puruṣa has the sense of that which sleeps in the gross body (puri śete). Having thus explained the existence of the subtle body, the author next states the reason and the manner of its migration:

पुरुषांविरहितकामिनं निभित्तन्निस्तिक प्रसेधः ।
प्रकृतिरस्यद्वायं भगानाभवत्वं विलित्ते लिङ्गम || ४२ ||

Idam liṅgam, This subtle body; nātavat, like a dramatic actor; vyavatīṣṭhate, appears in different roles; puruṣāṛhahetukam, which has the purpose of Puruṣa as its motive; nīmitta-naimittikā-prasāṅgāna, by association with instrumental causes and effects; prakriyā vibhūtav yogān, from conjunction with the all-embracing power of Nature.

42. Impelled by the purpose of Puruṣa, this subtle body appears in different roles, like a dramatic performer, by means of association with instrumental causes and their effects, through the all-embracing power of Nature.

The subtle body is formed for the purpose of the Spirit. Nīmittān (efficient) causes are virtue, vice etc nāmītātakam - effects are in the form of taking up of various kinds of physical bodies consisting of five sheaths which are born in consequence of the force of virtue etc. So, by association with virtue, vice etc various bodies are produced. Like an actor in a drama, the subtle body appears in various roles. An actor, while acting in a drama,
takes on the roles of Paraśurāma, or Ajātaśatrū, or Vatsarāja; in a similar way, the subtle body also, taking on the gross physical body, acts like a god or a man, an animal or a tree.

**Question:** Whence does it get such a great power?

**Answer:** From its conjunction with the all-embracing power of Nature. Declares the Purāṇa: ‘This evolution is wonderful indeed on account of the all-embracing Might of Nature.’

It has been explained above that the subtle body acts owing to its connection with causes and effects. The Author now classifies the cause and effects:

संसिद्धिकाल्यभाजः प्राकृतिका वैकुटश्च धर्मायति: ||
\\

**वंश:** करणाश्रिष्टिः कार्याश्रिष्टिश्च कडळायतः: || २३ ||

Dharmādyāḥ bhāvāḥ, Dispositions such as Virtue and the rest; sāmśiddhikāh, are innate; prākṛtikāh ca, and are of Nature; vaikṛtikāh ca, and incidentals or acquired; Karanāśrayināh deśāḥ, they are seen as residing in Buddha; Kalalādyāḥ ca, and the ovum etc; Kāryāśrayināh, reside in the effect.

43. Virtue and other dispositions are innate, of Nature, and acquired. They are seen as residing in Buddha; the ovum (female sex cells) and the rest reside in the body.

**Vaikṛtikāḥ** (in the text) are **Vaikṛtikāḥ** which are the effects. **Prākṛtikāḥ**, dispositions are dispositions of Nature, springing from the Prakṛti. Sāmśiddhikā dispositions are the innate dispositions. They are produced from the means already in existence; for example, it is declared that at the beginning of creation, the Primordial Sage Lord Kapila appeared endowed with the four dispositions of Virtue, Wisdom, Dispersion and Power. The incidental dispositions are not innate; they are brought about by personal efforts, like the Virtues belonging to great sages like Vālmiki and others. It is also the same with regard to dispositions like Virtue, Ignorance, Passion and Weakness.

Where are they seen? This is answered by saying:

Karanāśrayināh - they reside in the Karana. Karana is the Buddhī Tatvā. Kāryam is the body. Hence, those that reside in the body is Karanāśrayināh. The aggregate formed of the ovum (Kalala), foetus, (budbuda) (the embryo, one night after conception, is known as Kalala, after five nights it is known as budbuda) and flesh, muscles and every other organ like the liver etc are the various states of formation of the body while in the womb; so also the childhood, youth, old age etc are the various forms of the body after it comes out of the womb.

**Question:** Causes and their effects in general are understood by us; but, what are the special effects of special causes?

This is answered:

धर्मण गमनमूर्त्यम गमनासाधस्तङ्क्तथाध्यमण।

ज्ञानेन चापवनो विपत्याविविधावते बन्य: || २४ ||

Dharmena, By means of Virtue; udhva-gamanam, upward ascent; adharmena, by Vice; adhastād gamanam bhavit, takes place the downward descent; jñānena ca, and by Knowledge; apavargah, is release or emancipation; viparyayat, from the reverse (of Knowledge); banāthaḥ isyate, bondage is considered.

44. By virtue, ascent to higher planes, and by vice, descent to lower planes take place; by knowledge release is obtained while by the reverse of it (ie by ignorance) one gets bound.

19 Thus there are eight bhāvās; four when satva guṇa predominates, and the reverse four when tamoguna preponderates. These eight bhāvās are the nīmittas or efficient causes bringing about particular migrations of the subtle body or tīkāṇa sarira. They operate by connection with their effects, the nāmāntikaḥ by bringing about the first commingling of blood and semen in the uterus up till the full development of the embryo in the womb.
By following Virtue one attains to the Heaven and higher regions of Light etc. By vice, one goes to the nether regions such as bhūtāla etc. \(^{20}\) Prakṛti offers its experiences to the Puruṣa only till such time as the discriminative knowledge is not brought about. When the knowledge of discrimination arises, the prakṛti ceases from ministering to the Puruṣa who having fulfilled all his experiences, has become endowed with discriminative Knowledge. That is why it is said: ‘The operations of Prakṛti last only till such time as the attainment of discriminative Wisdom.’ From the reverse means from the wrong knowledge results bondage. This is three-fold; (1) Prakṛtikā - related to Nature (2) Vaikṛtikā - evolutional and (3) dākṣinaṇaka - Personal. Prakṛtika bondage is for those who mistake the Prakṛti for the Puruṣa and worship prakṛti and contemplate upon it and not on Puruṣa. This is the bondage resulting from Nature. The Purāṇa speaks about the men who become absorbed in Prakṛti (Prakṛtilaya) after death. ‘The contemplators of the Aṣṭāka (the Umanifest) continue to live a full hundred thousand years.’ The vaikṛtika bondage results for those who contemplate only on the evolutes like the elements, the sense organs, the I-Principle and the Buddhi, identifying them with the Puruṣa. The following has been said with regard to them:

‘Daśa manvantarānih tīṣṭhānānīrvaṇīcintakāh
bhautkāstum śatam pūrnam sahasraṁ tvahimāničakāh
Buddhā bhāsānī tiiṣṭhanti Vijgatajvarāh’

‘Te khalvāmī videhāh yeśāṁ vaikṛtiko bandhaḥ’

---

20. The worlds of Brahmā, Prajāpati, Soma, Indra, Gandharvas, Yakṣas, Rākṣasas and Piśācas extend upward, while the world of beasts, reptiles, birds, trees etc. descend downwards. The seven upward planes, one above the other, are: Bhu, Bhuvah, Svāh, Māhā, Jana, Tapas and Satya. The seven nether planes, one below the other, are: Tālā, Viśāla, Sutala, Rasātala, Tālāntala, Mahātala and Pārala.

Those who contemplate on the sense-organs live here for ten Manvantaras.\(^{21}\) Those who contemplate on elements, live for one full hundred Manvantaras; those who contemplate on the I-Principle, live for a thousand, and those who contemplate on the Buddhi, live for ten thousand Manvantaras, free from all anxieties. ‘Those who labour under this vaikṛtika bondage are the Videhās.’ The Dākṣinaṇaka bondage results from the performance of sacrifices, like the Iṣṭāpurāṇa. Ignorant of the Puruṣa Tattva, those who undertake charitable works with their minds influenced only by desire for personal gain, suffer from this bondage.

वैराग्यस्मात् क्रुद्धिः संसारो भवति राजस्त्रिवा गतः।
पंचवेदविनिद्रातो विपर्ययात्रत्वं द्विप्रयासः।

Vairāgyāt. From dispassion (divorced from the knowledge of the Puruṣa); prakṛtilayaḥ, is absorption into Prakṛti; rājasūt rāgāt, from passion abounding in Rajas Attribute; samsāro bhavat, results transmigration; asvārayāt, from power; avighātāh, results non-impediment, Viparītyāt, from the reverse (ie weakness); tad viparītyāh, results the contrary of that.

45. From Dispassion results absorption into Prakṛti; from the Passion of Rajas results transmigration; from Power results unimpediment and from the reverse results the contrary.

Those who are free from passion but are ignorant of the true nature of Puruṣa, become absorbed in Prakṛti. Here Prakṛti includes the whole set of evolvent-evolutes such as Prakṛti, Mahat, the I-Principle, the elements and the sense organs. Those who contemplate on them considering them as the Ātman, merge into them. They are born again in course of time.

21. A Manvantara is the age of a Manu comprising 4,320,000 human years, or 1/14th day of Brahmā whose one day consists of 14 manvantaras. It is said that six such Manvantaras have passed away and we are now living in the seventh Manvantara; 7 more are yet to come.
From the passion of rajas attribute results transmigration. Here the term Rajas implies the painful character of transmigration because rajas is the source of pain. From power results unimpediment of desires. A man of power does whatever he likes. From the reverse, i.e., from the absence of power, there occur obstructions everywhere in fulfilling one’s desires.

In order to describe collectively as also severally, the eight dispositions of Buddhi to highlight those that are to be adopted and those that are to be relinquished by those desiring emancipation, the author first describes the dispositions collectively.

एव प्रत्ययसमग्ना विपर्ययशस्त्राशिविशिश्शिष्यः ||
गुणवैस्यम्यविभागतत्स्य च मेदास्तू पावणात || ८६ ||

Ether, This; pratyayasargaḥ, is the creation of Buddha; ākhyā, termed as; viparyaya, ignorance; aśakti, disability; tustīḥ, contentment; siddhiḥ, (and) success or perfection; guna-vaisaṃyavimardat, from the mutual suppression of the attributes due to their inequalities; tasya ca bhedāḥ tu, the different forms of this; pañcāśat, becomes fifty.

46. This is the creation of the Buddha, termed as ignorance, disability, contentment, and perfection. From the mutual suppression of the Attributes due to their inequalities, the different forms of this become fifty.

That through which which becomes known is pratyaya, i.e., the buddhi. The evolution proceeding from that is the pratyayasarga. Viparyaya is ignorance or nescience, and that is the property of the Buddha. Disability resulting from incapacity of the sense-organs also is a property of the Buddha. Similarly, both contentment and success are also the properties of the Buddha which will be explained later. Of these, in ignorance, disability and success are included all the seven Virtues leaving aside wisdom which is included only in success. Next, the properties are described severally: their forms are fifty. How? from mutual suppression of the Attributes due to their inequalities. This inequality may consist either in the unequal degrees of strength of the one guṇa in comparison with the other two, or in the combination of the two guṇas with that of the third, or in the unequal degrees of weakness of the one in comparison with the other two, or of the two in combination with that of the third. The various degrees of this inequality like preponderance of the one over the other two etc. are assumed according to the requirements of particular cases. This leads to mutual suppression by the Attributes, or predominance of one over the other two etc. Thus, the different forms are fifty.

Paṭica. Five; viparyaya bhedaḥ bhavantu, (are) the divisions of ignorance; Karana vaikalyaḥ ca, and from the impairment of the organs; aśaktiḥ ca, and incapacity; āśāṁśaḥ bhedaḥḥ, has twenty eight divisions. tustīḥ, contentment; navadhā, has nine divisions; siddhiḥ, āśāṁśa, success is eight-fold.

22. In Karikās 44 and 45 are given the 8 efficient causes, four from Sāttvic predominance and four from Tāmasic predominance. To this are to be added their corresponding effects. Thus, we have sixteen-fold causes and effects:

**Sāttvic:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cause</th>
<th>Effect</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Virtue</td>
<td>2. Evolution to higher planes.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Tāmasic:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cause</th>
<th>Effect</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15. Weakness</td>
<td>16. Impediment to fulfillment of desires.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
47. There are five forms of ignorance or error and twenty eight of disability arising from the impairment of the organs. Contentment has nine forms while success has eight forms.

The five forms of ignorance are: Nescience (avidyā), egotism (āśnīta), attachment (rāga), aversion (dveṣa), and clinging (abhiniveṣa); they are respectively known as obscurity (Tamas), delusion (moha), extreme delusion (Mahā-moha), gloom (Tamiśra), and blinders (andhatamiśra). Egotism and the rest are the products of ignorance, hence they are of the nature of ignorance, or when an object is understood erroneously due to nescience, then egotism and the rest come to have the nature of ignorance. It is for this reason that the Blessed Vatsagulya declared ignorance to be of five divisions. (In the above verse 50 different forms of Buddha have been described).

Now, further sub-division of the five forms of ignorance is described:

मेदतत्तमसौक्ष्यविद्यो मोहस्तय पदाविद्यो महामोहः |
तामसादह यथा भवत्तथात्तामिन्द्रसः || ४८ ||

Tamasah. Of false knowledge; aśta vidhā bhedah, there are eight divisions. Mohasya ca, and also of delusion; Mahā mohah, extreme delusion; dasavidhah, is tenfold; tamiśrah, gloom is; astādadaśadā, is eighteen-fold; tathā bhavat, so also is; andhatamisrah, the blinding gloom.

48. False knowledge or ignorance is of eight divisions; so also is delusion; extreme delusion is ten-fold; gloom is eighteen-fold and so also is blinding gloom.

Of Ignorance, there are eight divisions. Ignorance consists in imposing the notion of the Spirit on the non-Spirit, Unmanifest, Mahat, I-Principle, and the five Primary elements; this is known as Tamas or Darkness. The objects of false identification being eight, it is said that Tamas is eight-fold. Moha, or delusion also is of eight forms; here, the particle ca serves to connect eight forms to moha also. The deities having acquired the eight supernatural powers consider themselves as immortal and look upon their occult powers such as animā and the rest to be everlasting. This is the delusion caused by Egotism. Since this relates to the eight occult powers, it is said that delusion also is eight-fold. Extreme delusion is ten-fold. Attachment to the five sense objects such as sound and the rest, which are ten-fold being earthly and celestial, is extreme delusion. Since delusion has these ten for its objects, it is said to be ten-fold. Tamiśra or aversion is eighteen-fold. By nature, ten objects such as the sound and the rest are delightful; the eight supernatural powers are, however, not delightful by themselves but they are the means of acquiring sense-objects of delight and craving. The objects of the senses are mutually suppressive and the eight occult powers such as animā and the rest which are the means to the attainment of the sense-objects of delight, become incensed. Thus, these eight occult powers together with ten sense-objects like the sound etc become eighteen and these being the objects of aversion, it is said that Tamiśra or aversion is eighteen fold. Andha Tamiśra is abhiniveṣa, i.e. clinging. It is of the nature of blinding darkness. Tathā in the text applies to blinding gloom also, signifying eighteen forms of blinding gloom. The Devas (deities) having acquired the eight occult powers like the Animī; etc are engaged in delightful enjoyment of the ten objects of the senses, such as sound and the rest. They live in perpetual fright of the Rākṣasas, thinking that the Rākṣasas would snatch away from them those supernatural powers like the Animī etc which are the means for enjoying the ten objects of the senses. This fear is known as clinging or Andha Tamiśra or blinding gloom. It has for its objects the above-said eighteen; hence it is said to be eighteen-fold. These five forms of Ignorance which are but forms of fancy, become sixty two with their sub-divisions.
Having thus described the five forms of Ignorance, next is described the 28 forms of disability:

एकादशी सहस्त्राधिकारित्वम्

Samadossadhasampraptavatudhikramanam

49. The injuries of the eleven organs; buddhi vadhah saha, together with the injuries of the buddhi; asakti uddisata, are considered to be the disabilities. buddhe vadhah, the injuries to the buddhi; satpadasa, are seventeen; tusti siddhinam viparyayat, owing to the inversion of contentment and success.

49. The injuries of the eleven organs together with the injuries of the Buddhi are considered to be the disabilities. The injuries of the Buddhi are seventeen owing to the inversion of contentment and success.

As causes of injuries to the Buddhi, they are mentioned as injuries of the organs and not as independent forms of disabilities by themselves. The eleven disabilities are:

Baddhiron Kuṣṭhita iñdhatvan Jadatva jighrata tathā
Mukatva Kaunyaparagatu Klaibbyodavartta mandatāh

—baddhiron is deafness, is the disability of the ear; Kuṣṭhita is numbness, is the disability of the skin; iñdhatvan, blindness, the disability of the eye; jadatva is tastelessness, the disability of the tongue; jighrata, is insensibility of the olfactory nerves, the disability of the nose; mukatva is dizziness, the disability of the speech; Kaunya is the palsy of the hand, the disability of the hand; pāṅgutva, is lameness, the disability of the foot; Klaibbyom is impotency, the disability of the generative organ; udāvartah is intestinal paralysis, the disability of the Anus; and mandatā is stupidity, the disability of the mind. These are the eleven disabilities of the eleven organs such as the auditory organ and the rest. The disability of the Buddhi with regard to its own function is caused by the injuries of the senses. The Buddhi is considered to have eleven disabilities owing to the eleven causes of disability. These have been treated on par because of the theory of non-difference between the cause and the effect.

Having thus described the disabilities of the Buddhi through the injury of the sense organs, the natural disabilities of the Buddhi itself are described: together with the disabilities of the Buddhi. How many are the natural injuries of the Buddhi itself? This is answered: seventeen are the injuries of the Buddhi. Why? Due to inversion of contentment and success. Contentment is nine-fold; hence, the disabilities caused by its inversion are also nine-fold; similarly, success is eight-fold; hence, the disabilities caused by its inversion are also eight-fold. It has been said that contentment is nine-fold. They are being enumerated.

आध्यात्मिकस्थात: प्रकृत्युपाध्यात्मात्मात्मात्मात् भावाभावा: || 50 ||

Nava raṣṭrayaḥ abhimātaḥ. The nine forms of Contentments are considered to be; Catosraḥ adhyātmikāḥ. Four are internals; ākhyāḥ, they are named as; Prakṛti, Nature; upādāna, material; Kala, time; and bhāgya, Luck; Viṣaya uparamat, due to abstinence from objects; bhāhyāḥ pañca, the externals are five.

50. The nine forms of contentment are considered to be
(a) four internals named Nature, Material means, Time and Luck;
(b) five externals due to abstinence from objects.

A person has the belief that there is a Spirit quite distinct from the Pradhāṇa; but being wrongly advised, no attempt is made to directly acquire discriminative Wisdom by taking recourse to such practices as hearing, discernment etc and remains satisfied with this wrong advice. Such a one comes to have these four internal contentments. They are internal inasmuch as they are based on the Ātman as distinct from Prakṛti. Which are these? It is answered: they are named Nature, Means,
Time and Luck. The contentment called Prakṛti is the complacency the disciple gets into on being told ‘that discriminative wisdom is only a modification of Prakṛti and that such a knowledge is brought about by the Prakṛti itself; hence, there is no need to have recourse to the practice of meditation etc. So, my child, remain as you are.’ This sort of contentment is called Ambha.

The second type of contentment arises from the following instruction: ‘Discriminative knowledge cannot be attained even through the process of Prakṛti. If it were so, then, every one would attain wisdom at all times because Prakṛti functions equally in respect to all. This can be acquired only by embracing Sanyāsa. Therefore, take to renunciation. Where, then, is the need for you, O long-lived one, for practising meditation?’ At this, out of indolence, the disciple is content with mere sanyāsa and fails to make efforts to realise the Truth. This is the second variety called upādāna tūṣṭi which is also called Sabīla. The third type of contentment follows from the instruction ‘even if one has recourse to the path of renunciation, emancipation is possible only when the time is ripe for it; hence, there is no need for undergoing the troubles of renouncing etc before time.’ This type of self-contentment is known as Kāla, or also called Oghas.

The fourth type of contentment arises from the feeling of satisfaction arising from the thinking ‘that the discriminative wisdom cannot be attained either from Nature, or from any other means; nor does it depend solely on time but it comes only by luck. It was through mere luck alone that the children of Madālaśi, though very young, attained wisdom through their mother’s instructions and thereby attained emancipation.’ The feeling of contentment arising from such instructions is known as bhāgya, also called Vṛṣṭi.

The external forms of contentment are being described. They are five from the abstinence of five objects of senses. These five belong to those who have Vairāgya but are, nevertheless, content in considering the non-Spirit, viz, Nature, Will, Intelligence, I-Principle and the rest as the Spirit. The feeling of satisfaction arising from this is called external because, lacking the knowledge of the Spirit, they undertake efforts based on the knowledge of the non-Spirit. These forms of contentment appear only when there is vairāgya. Therefore, these forms of vairāgya also are considered five-fold as the causes of vairāgya are five. Therefore, these contentments are also five. Abstinence from the objects of the senses is Vairāgya; and Vairāgya is the absence of attachment. These five abstinences arise from the perception of defects in the process of sense-enjoyments involving, as it does, the trouble of earning, saving, wasting, pleasure, and violence involved in killing etc. The means of earning wealth are by service, under another etc and they cause pain to the servants, as mentioned in the verse below:

‘Dṛpyed durtivaṁ vahṣhadandicarendāṅghacandagām
Vedōm bhāvana prāṣṭak kah sevāvanuṣṭate 11’

—Which wise one would ever get into the services of another when one thinks of the pain caused by the insults suffered at the hands of the terrible wardens armed with sticks and employed by a haughty and wicked Master?

Similar is the case with other means of acquiring wealth also. The contentment arising from abstinence from the objects of the senses because they cause pain, is called pāra.

Again, the protection of the wealth thus acquired from being destroyed by (the agents of) the king, thieves, fire and floods etc, involves great pain and misery. The contentment that arises from abstinence from the objects of senses due to such considerations is the second variety, called Supāram.

Again, the constant thought that the wealth acquired with great pain wastes away when enjoyed, leads to the abstinence from objects of the senses. The contentment arising
from such feelings is the third kind of contentment called pārāvāra.

'By becoming addicted to the enjoyments of the sense objects such as the sound and the rest, the cravings for them also increases. They make a lecherous person miserable if objects of enjoyments are not available.' The contentment that arises from the abstinence of the objects of the senses from such thoughts, is the fourth type, known as anuttamāmbha.

The contentment that comes from the abstinence of sense objects arising from the perception of defects of violence etc., caused by such thoughts as 'it is not possible to have the enjoyment of the objects of the senses without the process of killing animals etc.,' is the fifth kind of contentment, called uttamāmbha.

Thus, the four kinds of internal contentments along with the five varieties of externals make the total number of contentment, nine.

Next, the principal and secondary divisions of siddhi - success is being described.

Aṣṭau siddhāyāḥ. Siddhis are of eight forms; (they are): īḥah, reasoning; Sabdah, oral instruction; adhyayam, study; tryayah; three kinds of; dukhha-Vighātah, suppression of pain; suhṛt prāpṭih, acquisition of friends; dānam ca, and charity, purity; pūrṇah trividhah, the three kinds, mentioned before; siddheḥ aṅgkuṣah, are the restrainers of success.

51. Reasoning, oral instruction, study, the three-fold supression of pain, acquisition of well-wishers, and purity (or charity) are the eight forms of success. The three mentioned before are the three restrainers of siddhi (or success).

The pains to be suppressed are three-fold; hence the three siddhis which suppress them are the principal ones. The other five varieties of siddhis are secondary, inasmuch as they serve as the means to achieve this suppression of pain. They are also arranged as causes and effects, eg the first siddhi characterised by study is a cause only. The principal siddhis are only the causes while the middle ones are both causes and effects. Adhyayana, which is the first kind of siddhi, consists in learning while living with his teacher, according to the scriptural injunctions, of the science of the Self and comprehending the true nature of the Immutable. This is also known as Tāram. Its effect is sabda or Word which implies the comprehension of the meaning born of the study of the word or sabda. Here, the cause is treated as the effect (cause is the word or oral study, the effect is comprehension of the meaning). This is the second kind of siddhi called suśra. Śravaṇa or hearing constitutes both these two, viz, reading of the text and also comprehension of the meaning.

Ukha is reasoning or argumentation. This consists in the investigation of the meaning of the Agama texts by means of reasoning not inconsistent with the scriptures (ie reasoning which does not contradict or go against the teachings of the Scriptures). Investigation (pariksana) consists in establishing the viewpoint of the proponent by repudiating all the doubts and objections of the opponent. This process is called by the authors of the scriptures as manana or discernment. This is the third kind of siddhi known as Tārāra.

Even the truth arrived at by investigation following the right method of reasoning lacks credence until he discusses it with his own teachers, disciples and fellow-students and gets their endorsement of his own conclusions. This acquisition of such friends as teacher, disciple and fellow students is known as suhṛtrprāpti. This fourth kind of siddhi is called ramyaka. The term dāna means purity arising from discriminative wisdom. This word is derived from the root daip meaning to purify. Bhagavān Patañjali describes this (purity)as follows: 'An unimpeded
discriminative discernment is the means to the suppression of pain.' (Yoga-Sūtra II.26). The unimpediment (in the Yoga Sūtra) means purity. This consists in the process of establishment in the mind of the pure flow of direct discriminative wisdom after having eliminated all doubts and perverse notions along with all kinds of cravings or desires. And this purity cannot be obtained without achieving perfection by means of assiduous practice for a long and uninterrupted period; so, the term dāna includes this practice also. This is the fifth kind of siddhi called sadāmudita.

The principal siddhis are three; they are known as Pramoda Mudita, and Modamāna. Thus, siddhis are of eight types.

Others explain siddhi as follows: (a) That siddhi is called āhāh where one realises the Truth by himself without being instructed by any one, only by virtue of his practices in his past lives.

(b) That siddhi where the knowledge is acquired by listening to another expounding the Sāṅkhya philosophy is known as sabda as it is acquired through a study of sabda.

(c) study is said to be the cause of that form of siddhi, where Knowledge is acquired by the study of the both the Sāṅkhya text and its meaning by means of conversation between the Teacher and the disciple who lives with his Teacher. This is known as the adhyayana form of siddhi.

(d) Where one acquires knowledge by coming in contact with one who has already acquired that knowledge is known as the siddhi characterised by knowledge. This form of siddhi is known as suhṛprāpti.

(e) Lastly, the siddhi known as dāna. Here, dāna or charity is said to be the means, because, when a knower of Truth is propitiated by gifts etc he imparts him true Knowledge. The appropriateness (or otherwise) of the above interpretations is left to the consideration of learned ones. Our work is only to elucidate the cardinal doctrines of the Sāṅkhya philosophy; as such, we desist from pointing out others’ faults.

The disabilities of the Buddhi due to its injuries occasioned by the inversion of siddhi (success) and taśțī (contentment) are thus seventeen in number. It is well-known that the siddhi is the most sought after for the evolution proceeding from the Buddhi (ie for the subjective evolution). Ignorance, disability and contentment are fit to be abandoned as they are the causes for impediments to siddhi-success. This is implied in the statement: The aforesaid three act as the restrainers of success. By aforesaid is meant ignorance, disability and contentment. These three act as the curbs on success inasmuch as they thwart success, like a goad restraining elephants. Therefore, ignorance, disability and contentment are to be abandoned as they are obstacles to success.

Object: It has been said that the evolution proceeds for the purpose of the Spirit. This purpose of the Spirit could be served either by the subjective evolution (ie creation proceeding from Buddhi-prataya sargā) or by the objective evolution (ie creation proceeding from the Tānmatrās - Tānmatrā Sarga). Then, where is the need for both the evolutions?

This is answered:

न विना मावेलिंहुः न लिङ्गम माविवन्यसि:।
लिङ्गप्रक्ष्य भावास्वस्तस्मादेह्या प्रवर्तितमग्न:॥ ५२ ॥

Bhāva-vinā, without the dispositions; na lingam, there can be no evolution of tānmatrās; linga-vinā, without the creation of the tānmatrās; bhāva nīrṇyatī na, there would be no functions of the dispositions; Tasmāt, therefore; lingākhyā, known as the linga or objective; bhāvakhyā, known as the subjective; dve dhā sargah, two-fold creation or evolution, pravartate, proceeds.

52. Without the (subjective) dispositions, there would be no (objective) evolution of the tānmatrās; and without
the objective, there would be no subjective. Therefore, there proceeds two-fold evolution, known as the objective and the subjective.

Līngaṃ in the text suggests the evolution of Tānmatrās. Primary elements, and Bhāva indicates the evolution out of Buddhī or Will. The meaning is that the manifestation of the objective evolution is the means to bring about the accomplishment of the purpose of the Purusa. This is not possible without the subjective evolution. Similarly, the manifestation or the evolution of subjective evolution is also for the accomplishment of the purpose of the Purusa and this is not possible without the objective evolution. Thus it is that both the creations take place. Experience (bhoga) is the purpose of the Purusa; this experience cannot be brought about unless there are the objects of experience such as the sound and the rest, and also the field of experience in the form of the two bodies (ie the subtle and the gross); thus, it is quite appropriate to assume the objective evolution of Tānmatrās. Experience is not possible without the vehicles of experience in the form of sense organs; and the creation of internal organs in turn, is not possible without the dispositions such as Virtue and the rest. Nor Discriminative Wisdom which brings about the emancipation, is possible without both of these evolutions. Thus is established the appropriateness of both forms of Evolution (viz, subjective evolution proceeding from the Buddhī and the objective evolution proceeding from the Tānmatrās). The defect of mutual dependence (anyonya āśraya doṣa) does not affect this theory, because, the creation being eternal, it would be like the analogy of the seed and the sprout (bijā-āṅkura-nyāya, which is a maxim involving an eternal series of seed and sprout. As the seed produces the sprout, so the latter in turn reproduces the former. Each, therefore, is a cause and effect). The production of subjective and objective evolutions even at the very beginning of

the present cycle (Kalpa) is due to the subliminal impressions left behind by the corresponding subjective and objective evolutions in the earlier cycle; thus, this theory of the emanations of the evolutions is quite appropriate and is accepted by all.

Subjective evolution has been classified. Now, is described the objective or the elemental evolution:

अष्टिविकल्ये देवस्तर्यवृन्दकार्यः प्रजाविवृत्तिः
मानुषः दैवविविचारः समानातो भौतिकः सम्भवः || ५३ ||

Daivah, The celestial (evolution); āṣṭa vikālpah, is of eight kinds; tāiryāgyonah ca, and the species born of inferior wombs; pañcadhābhavati, is of five kinds; mānuṣakah ca, and the human; ēka vidhāh, is of a single kind; samāsatah, this, in brief; bhautikkah sargah, is the material evolution (ie the creation of beings).

53. The celestial creation is of eight kinds; the animal species is of five varieties; and the human is of one kind. This, in brief, is the elemental or material creation (of beings).

The eight celestial forms belong to (1) Brahmā, (2) Prajāpati, (3) Indra, (4) Pīṭṛ, (5) Gaṇḍharva, (6) Yakṣa, (7) Rākṣasa, and (8) Piśaca. The five kinds of animal species are (1) cattle, (2) deer, (3) bird, (4) reptile, and (5) the immobile things. Of the mankind, there is one kind only, without taking into account its four sub-divisions such as brāhmaṇa etc inasmuch as the physical frame is the same in all the classes of humans. Such is the elemental creation in brief. Objects such as the jar and the like, though bodyless, are included in the category of the immobile.

Next is described the three kinds of this material evolution, depending on the differences in higher or lower degree of intelligence, in the form of the higher, the intermediary and the lower.
prānpoti, the sentient Spirit experiences. avinivrtyteh, (because) of non-cessation; lingasya, of the subtle body; tasmāt, therefore; svabhāvena duḥkham, pain is in the very nature of things.

55. Therein does the sentient Spirit experience pain caused by decay and death on account of the non-cessation of the subtle body. Therefore, pain is in the very nature of things.

Tatra (in the text) means in the body etc. Even though the body pulsating with vital breath is the vehicle for the enjoyment of various forms of pleasure, yet, the constant pain caused by decay and death is common to all. Every one, even an insect, suffers from fear of death, and hopes: ‘may I not cease to be,’ ‘may I continue to be’ etc. Pain causes fear and death is a source of pain.

Objection: But pleasure and pain are material and are the properties of Buddhi. Then, how do these become related to the Sentient Spirit?

Answer: Puruṣa literally means one who sleeps in the subtle body. This subtle body is in connection with the Buddhi and its properties; because of this, the Spirit also becomes connected with that.

Objection: How can the pain which is related to the subtle body, be said to belong to the Sentient Spirit?

Answer: Due to the non-cessation of the subtle body. The Spirit, not apprehending its distinction from the body, superimposes the properties of the subtle body on itself; or, the ā in āvinnivṛtyteh may be taken to suggest the limit of the pain of the Puruṣa; then the meaning would be: until the subtle body has ceased to be, the Spirit suffers pain.

Next, the author refutes the different views regarding the cause of creation or evolution:

इत्येष: प्रकृतिकृत्तो महत्तमविविद्येश्वूर्मयंत: |
प्रतिपुरुषविविधाक्षरं स्वाभ इव परार्थ आर्यमं || ५६ ||
Ityeṣah, This evolution; mahadādi-viṣeṣa-bhūta-paryantah, beginning with Mahat down to the very specific elements; prakṛti kṛtaḥ, is brought about by (the modifications of) Prakṛti. Arāmbhaḥ, This creation is; Prati-puruṣa-vimoksāraṇam, for the emancipation of each Spirit; parārtha, and is for another's sake; svārthā iva, though appearing as if for her own interest.

56. Thus, then, this evolution from Mahat down to specific entities is brought about by the modifications of Prakṛti in the interest of another appearing as if in her own interest, for the release of each individual puruṣa.

Arāmbha (in the text) means being brought about, i.e. the evolution from Mahat down to the Earth is brought about by Prakṛti itself and not by Iśvara (i.e. God, as held by the Naiyāyikas) nor has it sprung from Brahman as its (material) support (as held by the Vedāntins), nor has it been created without any cause (as held by the atheists). If it were without a cause, then, either there would be the absolute absence of evolution or there would be eternal evolution. Nor can it be said to have been evolved from Brahman (as its material and efficient cause) because, there can be no modification for what is pure intelligence.

Nir is the evolution brought about by Prakṛti, as controlled by Iśvara, because, superintendence of Prakṛti is impossible by an Iśvara who is inactive. For example, a carpenter who is inactive never seen manipulating his instruments like an axe etc.

Objection: If it is said that the evolution is brought about by the Prakṛti, then, Prakṛti being eternally active, it will never cease from the act of creation; thus, there would be creation at all times and there would be no emanicipation at all.

This is answered in the text: For the emancipation of each Puruṣa, Prakṛti acts for the sake of another, though appearing as if acting for herself. It is just like one who desires food, engages himself in the act of cooking, and retires from the work of cooking when the food is ready. In a similar way, the Prakṛti, being motivated to action solely with the purpose of emancipating each Puruṣa, ceases from her operation with regard to that Puruṣa to whom she brings about emancipation. This action for another's sake is just like the action for one's own benefit.

Objection: Let it be so; but it is only the Intelligent being that could act either for the self or for another's purpose: Prakṛti can't act thus, it being inert. Thus there exists a Sentient being who exercises control over Prakṛti. The Spirits dwelling in bodies won't be able to control the actions of the Prakṛti, as much as the Spirits dwelling in bodies are ignorant of the true character of Prakṛti: Consequently, there must be existing an omniscient controller of Prakṛti and that being is Iśvara.

This is answered in the following verse:

वस्त्वविवृद्धिनिमित्तं क्षीरस्य यथा प्रवृत्तिक्रृतः ||
पुरुषविमोक्षनिमित्तं तथा प्रवृत्तिः प्राप्तास्य || ५७ ||

Yathā pravṛttiḥ, Like the flow of; Añṣaya kṣīrasya, milk which is sentient; vatsa-vyṛddhi-nimittam, is for the growth of the calf; yathā pradhānasya pravṛttiḥ, similar is the action of the Pradhāna; puruṣa-vimoksya-nimittam, for the sake of the emancipation of the Spirit.

57. Just as the secretion of milk which is unintelligent, is for the sake of the nourishment of the calf, similar is the action of the Pradhāna for the sake of the release of Puruṣa.

It is seen that sentient entities also act towards a definite purpose, e.g. milk, though inert, acts in the form of flowing for the nourishment of the calf. In a similar way, the Prakṛti, though in sentient, is engaged in action for the purpose of bringing emancipation to the Puruṣa. It cannot, however, be maintained that the secretion of milk takes place under the superintendence of God. Now, this action cannot be an instance vitiating the general proposition that the actions of inert things are due to the superintendence by sentient beings; because, the activity of every
intelligent being always proceeds from either selfishness or compassion. In regard to the creation of the universe, neither of this could be applied. From this it is clear that this creation cannot be due to the action of a sentient agent.

The Lord who is all-full, having all his desires fulfilled, wanting in nothing whatsoever, can’t have any selfish motive in creating this world. Nor can it be said that the Lord created this world out of compassion, because, compassion implies the desire to alleviate other’s pains; but prior to creation the Spirits would have had no bodies, organs and objects, and consequently, no pain, no suffering. Then, to remove whose pain would the compassion of the Lord be roused? If it be said that the pain subsequent to creation is the cause of compassion, then it would lead to the vitiating position of interdependence that creation is due to compassion and compassion is due to creation! Further, if the creation was an act of compassion on the part of Ishvara, one would wish, Ishvara to create only happy mortals, and not beings with variegated experiences. If diversity of experience is said to be due to the diversity of actions, then where is the necessity for the alleged superintendence of Karmas by an Omniscent and Omnipresent Being? The absence of control by a sentient being would then mean that deeds of man which are inert could have no manifestation in which case there would be no production of their effects in the form of bodies, organs and objects; the result of all this would then be that, there would be no pain too. Thus, the removal of pain too would become easy! Prakriti, being unintelligent, has neither any selfish motive nor compassion to impel her to activity. Since she exists only for another’s sake, the above said incongruities do not arise in her case. Since the activity of the Prakriti is directed only by her sole motive to bring about the fulfillment of another’s purpose, the instance of the secretion of mother’s milk for the sake of the growth of the child is quite appropriate.

The statement (in the earlier Kārikā) as if for her own sake is being explained:

अौत्सुक्यविभूतिः यथा त्रिव्यतं प्रक्षितं लोकः ||
पुरुषस्य विनिवार्तनं प्रबोधितं तद्वर्तत्वं || ५८ ||

Yathā lokah, Even as people; autsukyavivartakham, for the sake gratifying desires; kriyāsu pravartate, engage in acts; tadvat, in a similar way; avyaktam, the Unmanifest; puruṣasya-vimokṣartham, for the emancipation of Puruṣa; pravartate, acts.

58. Even as people engage in actions to relieve desires, so also the Unmanifest engages in activity for the emancipation of the Spirit.

Autsukya is desire. Desire ceases when the desired object is attained. The desired object is the purpose of the agent, because the end result of an action is the acquisition of the desired object. By this analogy it is explained that the unmanifest also energizes for the release of Puruṣa.

Question: Let the purpose of the release of Puruṣa be the motive for action by Prakriti, but how does the cessation of the operations of Prakriti take place? This is answered:

रक्षा दर्शनित्वा निवर्तति नर्तकी यथा तुव्यातः ||
पुरुषस्य यथात्मानं प्रकाश्य विनिवार्तते प्रकृति: || ५९ ||

Yathā nartakī, As a dancing girl; rāgasya darśayitvā, having exhibited herself to the spectators; nṛtyāt nivartate, ceases to dance; tathā, similarly; prakṛthi, the Prakṛti; puruṣasya ātmānam prakāṣya, exhibiting herself to Puruṣa; vinivartate, ceases to operate.

59. Just as a dancing girl ceases to dance after having exhibited herself to the spectators, so also, the Prakṛti ceases to operate after having exhibited herself to Puruṣa.

Ranga implies spectators who occupy the stage. Having exhibited herself means having shown that her different
also could again engage herself in activities even though she had ceased to act after exhibiting herself to the Purusa.

This is answered:

This is answered:

Pra$kri can be solely for the purpose of Purusa. But Pra$kri could certainly expect some returns from the Purusa who is benefited from her actions, like a servant expecting recompense from his gratified Master. Thus, it cannot be said that the actions of Pra$kri are entirely for the sake of Purusa.

This is answered:

Nanavidhaik upayaith. By manifold means; upakarii, (does) the benevolent (Pra$kri); gunavati, endowed with attributes; Sataha su$a ariham, the object of the sentient; curati, pursue; apiythaka, without benefit (to herself); pumsah, the Spirit; anupakarina, who confers no benefit in return; agunas$a, (and) who is devoid of attributes.

60. The benevolent Pra$kri, endowed with attributes, brings about, by manifold means, in a manner in which she has no interest of her own, the good of the Spirit, who is devoid of the attributes and who confers no benefit in return.

Like a servant endowed with qualities unselfishly accomplishes the good of his Master who is devoid of qualities and who does not recompense his labours, the Pra$kri too which is both generous and endowed with three attributes, brings about the good of Purusa who is without any attribute and who does not do anything in return. Thus, it is proved that the Pra$kri labours only for the sake of Purusa and not for self.

Objection: Let it be so; but a dancing girl, though retired from the stage after her performance, returns again to the stage when so desired by the spectators; in a similar way, the Pra$kri
another name for rebirth after one's death and Puruṣa can have none of it inasmuch as he is inactive. Thus, it is just hollow to assert that evolution is for bringing about the release of the Puruṣa.

The author, through the guise of concluding his disquisition, dispels such doubts by stating as follows:

तस्मात्त बाध्यते दक्षिण मुच्यते नानाध्यया प्रकृतिः || ६२ ||

Tasmāt, Therefore; na bādhya, the (the Purusa) is not bound; asau na mucyate, nor ever he is released; na api kaścit samsarati. Nor ever does he migrate; nānāśrayā Prakṛti, Prakṛti; the supporter of the manifold creation; samsarati, migrates; bādhya, is bound; ca mucyate, and is released.

62. Thus, venily, Puruṣa is never bound, nor is he released nor does he migrate. (It is the) Prakṛti, being the support of manifold creation, that migrates, is bound and is released.

The Spirit is never bound, nor does it ever migrate nor is it emancipated. It is the Nature alone, supporting many beings, that is bound, migrates and is released. Bondage, migration and release are merely ascribed to the Puruṣa in just the same way as defeat or victory is attributed to the King though, in reality, the soldiers are either defeated or victorious. Though it is the servants that really take part in the battle, yet the king suffers the effect of grief or profit, he being the support of his servants. In a similar way, though, in reality, both enjoyment and release belong to Prakṛti, yet due to the absence of discrimination of Puruṣa being quite distinct from the Prakṛti, they are attributed to Puruṣa. Thus, the doctrine stands clearly vindicated.

**Objection:** Very good; we understand that bondage, migration and release, though really belonging to Prakṛti, is ascribed to Puruṣa. But, what is the use of this to Prakṛti?

It is answered in the following verse:
The term *tattva* indicates the correct knowledge of the entities. Following the method described earlier, through the practice of the knowledge of the *Tattvas* through a long course of earnest and uninterrupted exercise, there arises the direct knowledge of the distinction of the Spirit from Matter. It is only the constant practice of the thing that brings about a direct knowledge of that very same thing. In a similar way, the practice relating to the *Tattva* also brings about a direct knowledge of those *Tattvas*. That is why (ie for the reason of its leading to the knowledge of the *Tattvas*) wisdom is called *pure*. The question as to why it is called pure is answered: *because it is free from falsity*. Doubt and falsity are the two impurities of wisdom; since it is free from these, it is called *pure*. The doubt that apprehends what is certain or uncertain also is a form of falsity. Therefore, by stating *absence of falsity* (in the text), the absence of both doubt and falsity are shown. This absence of doubt and falsity is also due to the knowledge relating to the *Tattvas*.

Let the knowledge of the Truth be produced by means of practice in the above said manner. But due to the subliminal impressions of the false knowledge which is without beginning, there is the possibility of the appearance of false knowledge also which, in effect would lead to the problem of non-terminality of transmigration. In answer to this, it is said that this knowledge is *absolute*, ie unmixed with false knowledge. Even though the subliminal impression of falsity is eternal, yet it can be totally eliminated by the impression of the knowledge of Truth culminating in the direct experience of the knowledge of true nature of things, because it is said that the nature of Intelligence always tends towards the knowledge of Truth. Even the outsiders (ie the Baudhhas) declare as follows:

*Nirupadravabhūtaḥ bhavabhāvasya Viparyayaḥ*
*Na bādho yatnavattvā puruṣaḥ tatpakṣapātataḥ*

The flawless knowledge of the true character of objects can never be contradicted by erroneous conceptions inasmuch as the nature of *buddhi* is to tend towards such knowledge.

The nature of knowledge is stated: *I am not, nothing is mine, not-I*. This denies all activity in the Self as is declared (by the Grammarians): 'the root as (as in asmi) together with bhū and kr signify action in general' (Siddhānta Kaumudi). Therefore, all operations, both external and internal, such as determination, self-consciousness, observation and apprehension etc are all denied in the Spirit. The idea of 'Not-I' arises because of the absence of all impulse for activity in the Spirit. 'I' here stands for Agency, because everywhere in usages such as 'I know,' 'I offer oblations,' 'I give,' the active agent is represented by 'I'; wherever there is the absence of action, there is also the absence of agency. Rightly it is therefore said 'Not-I'. Consequently, the idea 'Nothing is mine' follows, for it is only the agent who can be the possessor; hence, in the absence of agency, the notion of ownership also is naturally absent.

Or, it may be interpreted thus also: The sentence 'I am not' means that I am the Spirit, not the Evolvent. Because of the non-productive nature, the non-agency is indicated as 'I am not.' Being a non-agent, the sense of ownership also is not there; hence, the expression *Nothing is mine*.

*Objection*: Even after this Knowledge, there might be something left unknown; ignorance of such unknown things might lead to bondage.

*Answer*: No, this knowledge is complete, ie there is nothing left unknown after having attained this knowledge of the *Tattvas* which would bind a person.

*Question*: What is the result of such a knowledge of Truth as mentioned above?

The following verse is in reply to this:

§ 9
Tena. By means of this knowledge of the Tattvas; Puruṣaḥ, the Spirit; prekṣākavat, like a spectator; svacchāḥ, pure; avasthitah, at ease; paśyati, beholds; prakṛtiṃ, Nature; niyattapraśavā, which has ceased to be productive; Sāpta rūpa vinivṛttām, who has desisted from the seven forms of evolution; arthavāsitaḥ, through the influence of the purpose of the Spirit.

65. By means of this knowledge, the Spirit, as a witness, pure and at ease, beholds Nature, which has ceased from evolving products, and desisted from the seven forms of evolution, under the influence of the purpose of the Spirit.

The two things for which Prakṛti undergoes evolution are experience and direct discriminative Knowledge of the Truth. When these two have already been accomplished, there is nothing else left to be produced by the Prakṛti again. Therefore, under the force of the discriminative wisdom, the Prakṛti ceases from evolving. The seven forms of evolution, viz., virtue, vice, ignorance, dispassion, passion, power and weakness are there only as long as there is the absence of the knowledge of Truth. Even the dispassion of those who are fully content with it, is also due to erroneous knowledge. True knowledge of the Tattvas, being contrary to false knowledge, roots out the latter. With the cause eliminated, its effects in the form of seven evolutes are also removed; thus the Prakṛti turns back from the seven forms of evolution. Being at ease means being inactive. Pure, ie not mixed with the impurities of the Buddhi due to Rajas and Tamas attributes. But the Spirit, till the very last moment, is in slight contact with Buddhi abounding in Sattva attribute, as otherwise nature would be imperceptible.

Object: We don’t find fault with the statement that the Nature ceases to be productive. But, it has been said that evolution is due to the contact between the Spirit and Nature. Contact is the capability to connect. The capacity to experience belongs to the Puruṣa, the sentient Principle; and the capability of being experienced belongs to Prakṛti, it being inert and also objective. These two capabilities can never cease to exist. It cannot be said that they cease because there is nothing left to be done. Though some objects may have been experienced by the Puruṣa, there may be many more objects of that class that have not yet been experienced, as is found in case of the experience of sound etc which are sought to be experienced again and again?

This is answered:

Ekṣaḥ, one (thinks); mayā drṣṭā, (she) is seen by me; iti upekṣa-kah, and thus becomes indifferent; anāya, the other; drṣṭā aham iti, thinking ‘I am seen’; uparamati, (she ceases) to act further more; sānyoge api sati, even if there is still connection; sargagya, for evolution; prayojanam nāstī, there is no motive.

66. The one (Puruṣa) thinks: ‘she has been seen by me’ and therefore, loses all interest; the other (Prakṛti) thinks ‘I have been seen’ and ceases to act further. Therefore, even if there is still connection there is no motive for further evolution.

Let the Prakṛti accomplish repeatedly the experience of enjoyment of sound and the rest as long as she has not brought about the Discriminative Wisdom. But once the Discriminative Wisdom is brought about, then the Prakṛti produces no more the experience of enjoyment of sound and the rest. Enjoyment of sense-objects such as the sound etc is possible only as long as the bondage of erroneous knowledge is there; with the absence of this bondage, enjoyments also cannot be there, like the sprout not being there in the absence of the seed. The Self thinks, due to the absence of discrimination, ‘this is mine’ and enjoys the objects of
the senses such as the sound and the rest, which are the modifications of Prakṛti and are of the Nature of pleasure, pain and delusion. Similarly, the Spirit thinks of the Discriminative Wisdom which is also a modification of Prakṛti as 'this is for my purpose,' owing to the lack of discrimination. When, however, the right Discriminative Knowledge is produced, the connection of the Spirit with Prakṛti ceases, and it does not behove the spirit to crave any more for the objects of the senses, such as the sound and the rest; nor can it bring about the discriminative wisdom which belongs to the Prakṛti. Thus, the Aman who has realised himself to be completely distinct from the Prakṛti, cannot consider any purpose as his own. Experience and release are for the purpose of the Spirit; they only provide the motive for initiating the operations of Prakṛti; when these purposes of the Puruṣa are accomplished, there will also not be the motive for operation. This is what is said in the text: there is no motive for creation. Motive is that by which the Prakṛti is impelled to act to bring about evolution: with the cessation of the purpose of the Puruṣa, the motive too ceases.

**Objection:** We accept all this; but the body of the liberated Self would fall off immediately after the knowledge of the Truth is directly experienced. Then, how could the bodyless Spirit behold Prakṛti (as distinct from itself)? If it is said that the release does not take place immediately after the dawn of discriminative wisdom inasmuch as all the subliminal impressions of deeds are not spent; then, we ask, how is this impression destroyed? If the answer is 'by means of experience,' then, you would be as well saying that knowledge of the Tattvas does not bring about emancipation. Thus the proposition that by means of the knowledge of the Truth brought about by the knowledge of discrimination between the Manifest, the Unmanifest and the Spirit, emancipation is attained, becomes meaningless. Therefore, the possibility of attaining emancipation on the absolute elimination of the stocks of residual impressions of deeds by means of innumerable experiences extending to an uncertain period of time will remain only a fond wish (it will never be fulfilled):

This is answered:

सम्यक्ष्यानाभिधिव्याधिनामस्वतानामकारणप्रायम्
तिष्ठति संस्कारवशायेनक्षमित्वृत्तिवधिरः || ६७ ||

Sanjāk jiśāna adhigamāt, By the attainment of Perfect wisdom; dharmādānāni, Virtue and the rest; akāraṇa prāptau, lose their power of causal efficacy; Tṣṭhati, (yet the Spirit) remains for a while; dhṛta śaṅkaraḥ, invested with a body; samēkāra vaśāt, due to the momentum of past impulses; cakra bhramivat, like the revolutions of a potter's wheel.

67. Through the attainment of perfect knowledge, virtue and the rest become devoid of their causal efficacy; yet, the Spirit continues to live for a while invested with the body, just like a potter’s wheel continuing to revolve (even when the potter ceases in his efforts at revolving the wheel) due to the momentum of the past impulse.

By the very attainment of direct knowledge of the Tattva, the power of productivity of the entire stock of subliminal impressions of deeds, though beginningless and the time of its fruition is uncertain, gets destroyed like a burnt up seed, and no more produces any fruit in the form of experiences of rebirth, life etc. It is only when the field of Buddhi is watered with the waters of Kleśa (Kleśa is five fold; ignorance, egotism, attachment, aversion and clinging to life) that the seeds of Karma germinate. Where is the possibility of the seeds germinating in a field rendered barren owing to its water of ignorance and the rest being sucked away by the heat produced by the Knowledge of the Truth? In this connection it is said: 'Dispositions such as Virtue and the rest lose their causal efficacy to produce effects,'
ie they cease to be causes. Even so, the body lasts for a while longer even after the attainment of the knowledge of Truth on account of the previous impulses just like the potter’s wheel continuing to rotate for a while even though the potter has ceased from action, owing to the momentum of past impulses of the action. When, however, in course of time, the impulse is exhausted, it becomes inactive. In the case of the continuance of the body, the impulse is provided by virtue and the rest which have already started yielding fruits and which are destroyed only through exhaustion of their experience. It is declared in the Śruti: ‘Having exhausted the others by means of experience, the soul attains beatitude’ ‘The delay is for that long as beatitude is not attained’ (Cha. Up 6.14.2). The impulse of the subliminal impressions is of the nature of ignorance which is on the ebb of its life. Because of the momentum of this impulse, the Spirit continues to inhabit the body for a while.

Question: If it be said that the Spirit continues to inhabit the body due to some sort of impulse, then, when will his emancipation take place?

It is answered.

प्राप्त गतिरीभुवे विराज्ञात्वन्यासवत्वनिन्दिते ।
प्रकृतिकालकात्वमेव सत्तेऽक्षयमानातिः ॥ ५८ ॥

Śārīrabhedā prāpaś, When the separation from the body has been achieved; caritārthātāt, by reason of the purpose having been fulfilled; pradhāna vinivruttah, (and) the Prakṛti has ceased to act; ubhayam, both; aikāntikam, absolute; anvayāt-kam, final; Kaivalyam, Isolation or Freedom; prānapo’ti, attains.

68. When (in course of time) separation from the body has taken place, and there is the cessation of activity of the Pradhāna, for the reason of the purpose having been fulfilled, (Puruṣa) attains both absolute and final Freedom.

The seed state of those impressions which have not yet commenced fruitioning, having been destroyed by the fire of the knowledge of the auṣṭras and with the exhaustum of the actions which had commenced bearing fruits by their experience, the body gets destroyed because the purpose of Puruṣa has been fully accomplished by the Pradhāna and it desists from her activity with respect to that Puruṣa who has thus attained eternal and absolute release, ie the Puruṣa attains the release from the three kinds of pain.

Though the Śaṅkha philosophy has been established by means of reasoning, yet, in order to rouse intense respect for the Śastra, the precedence of the hoary sage is mentioned:

पुनर्वर्ज्याद्वियमि परमर्श्यां समाल्यात्।
स्थित्युत्तपभ्रतयाधिन्त्यायं यत्र भूतानाम। ॥ ६९ ॥

Idam, This; guhyan, abstruse; jñānam, knowledge; puruṣārthān, adapted to the end of Puruṣa; yatra bhāvānām, wherein, of the beings; sthitī, the duration; utpatī, the origin; pralayaḥ, (and) dissolution; cintyākte, are considered; paramarśinā, by the great sage; smākhyaśām, has been expounded.

69. This abstruse knowledge, adapted to the purpose of Puruṣa, wherein the production, duration and dissolution of beings are considered, has been thoroughly expounded by the great Rṣi.

Guhyan because, it lives in the depth of intelligence; that is to say, it is difficult of understanding by stupid people. By the great sage refers to the great sage Kapila. The feeling of reverence is enhanced by declaring that the doctrine is scriptural. Yatra, in which knowledge. This expression is like the expression: carmini dvipinam haṭṭi. Here, the literal meaning of carmini is: in the skin; but it is interpreted to mean: for the sake of the skin, the tiger is killed. The origin, duration and dissolution of the beings have been discussed in the Scriptures.
Question: We shall revere what has directly been said by the great sage Kapila; but why should there be such reverence for what has been said by Śavara Kṛṣṇa? This is replied:

एतद, त्वा पवित्रम्, अग्रयम्, असुरि, अनुकम्पयां, प्रदाता, असुरिः अपि, आनुकम्पयां, पाणिनकशिक्षाया, तेना का, तद्धुद्धा, तत्रत्र, क्रितम्, वर्धितम् || ७० ||

Etad, This; pavitram, purifying; agryam, Supreme; (doctrines); muni, The great Sage; āsura, to āsuri; anukampayā, with compassion; pradadau, imparted; āsuriyapi, and āsuri; paṇcaśāsikā, imparted it to Paṇcaśīkha; tena ca, and by whom; bahudhā, extensively; tāntram, the doctrine; kṛitam, was propounded.

70. This foremost, purifying doctrine, the sage (Kapila) imparted to Āsuri out of compassion; Āsuri taught it to Paṇcaśīkha, by whom this doctrine was propounded extensively.

This is purifying because it purifies the Spirit of all impurities and evils which cause the three-fold pain. Foremost as it is the most important of all purifying doctrines.

विविधभर्तिः विविधम् कृतत्त्वम् सत्त्वम् सत्त्वम् स्वत्त्वम् || ७१ ||

Siddhāntam, This doctrine; itśyam-paramparayo āgatam, has been handed down through a long tradition of disciples; āryamatir, by the noble-minded, Īśvaraśrēṣṭha, by Īśvara Kṛṣṇa; ca etad āryabhīth, and this in the Ārya metre; samskṛtam, has been briefly written; sāmyakviśvāya, understanding it thoroughly.

71. And this doctrine, handed down through a long tradition of disciples to the noble-minded Īśvara Kṛṣṇa, having been thoroughly understood by him, has been summarised in the Ārya Metre.

Ārya is one who has arrived at the Truth; one whose mind is such is the noble-minded. It is said: this is a Śāstra to indicate that this is a whole scripture by itself, and not just a section, because this deals with all the branches of knowledge.

Saptatīyām kila ye arthāḥ, The subjects which are treated in the seventy districts; śaṣṭhāṭhāya kṛṣṇasya, of the entire Śaṣṭhī tantra; te arthāḥ, are the subjects; akhyayika viraṭīyāḥ, excluding the illustrative tales; paravāda-vivarjitaḥ ca api, and also omitting the doctrines of others.

72. The subjects which are treated by the seventy districts are the very subjects which are treated in the śaṣṭhi Tantra also, (Sixty Topics) excluding the illustrative tales and omitting doctrines of other people.

The Rājavārtika enumerates the Sixty Topics as follows:

Pradhānā stūvatvam ekārthavatvam atāntyayatā
Pārārtham ca tathānaikyaṁ Viyogya yogya eva ca
Sesāvrthir akartrtvam Mauliṅkārtāṁ smṛtā Daśā
dVIParyayyaKāśicāvidhāsthāhārtaṁ nava tuṣṭaṭyāṁ
Karanaṁ asūmarthaṁ aṣṭāvinsatikāhā maṇiṁ
Iti śaṣṭhiḥ padarthaṁ aṣṭāvinsahā sāṁ śiddhāhīṁ

1. The existence of Pradhāna (Kārikā, 14),
2. Her singleness (15),
3. Her objectiveness (11),
4. Distinctiveness (of Nature from Spirit (11),
5. Her subordination to Spirit (17),
6. Plurality of the Spirit (18),
7. Disjunction of spirit from Nature in the end (20),
8. Conjunction of Nature and Spirit in the beginning (21),
9. Duration (19),
10. Inactivity of the Spirit (19),
These are the ten Radical topics.
Added to the above are:
1. Five kinds of error (47),
2. Nine of the contentments (50),
3. Twenty-eight of the disability of the organs (59), and
4. Eight forms of power (51)

These make up the Sixty Topics mentioned above. Since all these have been dealt with in the above seventy distiches, this is a complete philosophy by itself and not a section thereof.

Singleness, objectivity and subordination have been said in relation to the Praakrti; distinctness, inactivity and plurality are in relation to the Purusa. Existence, disjunction and conjunction are said in relation to both; and continuance is with reference to gross and subtle things.

मन्यासि कुमुदनीव बोधयनलि सत्ता मुदा |
श्रीबाचार्यतिमिश्रणा कृति: स्यात्तत्त्वकृपुदी ||

May this work of Vācaspātī Miśra known as the Tattva Kaumudi (the moonlight of Truth) continue to please (or cause to bloom) the pure (lily-like) hearts of good men!

इति तद्दर्शनीकारक्यौऽनुदानवर्त्तिमिश्रितवरिष्टि
सांवात्तत्त्वकृपुदी समामा ||

Thus ends the Sāṅkhya-Tattva-Kaumudi of Śrīmad Vācaspātī Miśra who has authored glosses on all the six systems of Philosophy. ♦

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