“If the sole object be the attainment of the Highest Truth (the supreme goal of existence) the single Upanishad of Māndūkya is sufficient.” —Muktikopanishad.

“The Upanishad (Māndūkya) with the Kārikā embodies in itself the Quintessence of the substance of the entire philosophy of Vedānta.” —Śankara.

THE MĀNDŪKYOPANISHAD
WITH
GAUDAPĀDA’S KĀRIKĀ
THE
MĀNDŪKYOPANISHAD
WITH
GAUḌAPĀDA’S KĀRIKĀ
AND
ŚANKARA’S COMMENTARY

TRANSLATED AND ANNOTATED
BY
SWĀMI Nikhilānanda
WITH A FOREWORD BY
V. SUBRAHMANYA IYER

SRI RAMAKRISHNA ASHRAMA
MYSORE
1949
TO
HIS HIGHNESS
SRI KRISHNARAJA WADIYAR BAHADUR IV
G.C.S.I., G.B.E.
MAHARAJA OF MYSORE

AS A MARK OF THE HIGHEST ESTEEM FOR THE
REMARKABLE EXAMPLE HE HAS SET BY HIS
UNDEVIATING STEADFASTNESS IN THE
PURSUIT OF TRUTH, WHEREVER
FOUND: IN ART, RELIGION,
SCIENCE OR PHILOSOPHY,
OF WHATEVER AGE
OR COUNTRY.

*
"If thou wouldst master care and pain,
Unfold this book and read and read again
Its blessed leaves, whereby thou soon shalt see
The past, the present, and the days to be
With opened eyes.........."

C. R. Haines.
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NOTE

"The unique feature of Māndūkya lies in this that while all the other Upanishads deal with the several phases of Vedānta, such as Religion, Theology, Scholasticism, Mysticism, Science, Metaphysics and Philosophy, Māndūkya deals exclusively with Philosophy, as defined by the most modern authorities. The three fundamental problems of philosophy, according to this special treatise are, (1) the nature of the external (material) and the internal (mental) worlds; (2) the nature of consciousness; and (3) the meaning of causality. Each of these subjects is dealt with in a chapter. The first chapter sums up the whole at the very commencement. There is nothing more for philosophy to do. While it shows how the most advanced modern sciences and modern philosophies are approaching its conclusions, it gives to the world of our own times its central doctrine that partial data give partial truth, whereas the totality of data alone gives perfect truth. The 'Totality' of data we have only when the three states of waking, dream and deep-sleep are co-ordinated for investigation. Endless will be the systems of philosophy, if based on the waking state only. Above all inasmuch as this philosophy holds that mere 'satisfaction' is no criterion of truth, the best preparation for a study of Vedānta Philosophy is a training in scientific method, but with a determination to get at the very end: 'To stop not till the goal (of Truth) is reached.'"

V. S. I.
FOREWORD

NO one that knows anything of the philosophy of the Upanishads can be said to be ignorant of the place that Māndūkya Upanishad with its Kārikās occupies in it. If a man cannot afford to study all the hundred and more Upanishads, it will be enough, it is declared in the Muktiḳopanishad, if he reads the one Upanishad of Māndūkya, since, as Śankara also says, it contains the quintessence of all of them. Thoroughly to grasp the philosophy taught in Māndūkya, one needs a knowledge of the whole field of ancient Indian thought. Such being the nature of this work, one with my limitations of knowledge cannot presume to be able to do any justice to its merits and that in, what is called a “Foreword”. And yet if I agreed to write a foreword to Swāmi Nikhilānandaji’s most valuable publication it was not because I had any thought that this well-known and learned author of the translations of Vedāntasāra and Dṛg Drṣya Viveka and frequent writer to many leading Indian journals on religion and philosophy needed an introduction to the literary world. Nor did I think that I could add anything of value to his critical and scholarly preface and notes. On the other hand, I consented because I felt that this was an opportunity for me to indicate in some measure the place of Gauḍapāda, not among religionists, theologians, scholastics or mystics but among philosophers. In what high regard he is held by the Vedāntins of the past is well known. But the esteem that he commands among distinguished men of our own times has yet to be pointed out. With this object
in view and also with an idea of acknowledging my own indebtedness to some of them I have ventured to say a few words. Of two such renowned personages of our day one was my most revered Guru, the late Śri Satchidananda Sivābhinava Narasimha Bhārati Śwāmi of Sringeri, who introduced me to the study of the Kārikās, at whose feet I had the inestimable privilege of sitting as a pupil. Here, a short account of my first lesson in Gauḍapāda may not be considered irrelevant by the reader. The very first day I paid my respects to the Śwāmi more than forty years ago, I started thus: "The follower of every religion thinks that his faith, his scripture or his interpretation of it reveals the highest truth and that they are therefore superior to other faiths, scriptures or interpretations. This notion has contributed not a little to the misfortunes of mankind in this world. The case is not far different with many of those that are called philosophers. Though they have not instigated men to cause bloodshed, as mere religionists have done and are still doing, yet they have made their followers delight rather in their points of difference than in those of agreement. How then is a Hindu in any way better than a Mahomedan or a Christian? Or, again, if truth or ultimate truth, a something common to all minds, cannot be rationally reached, is not philosophic enquiry a wild goose chase, as so many modern and honest thinkers have held? Lastly, as regards truth itself, everyone, even a fool, thinks that what he knows is the truth."

The Śwāmi in reply said, "What you say may be true with regard to mere religion, mysticism, theology or scholasticism which are mistaken for philosophy. It may be so with the early or intermediate stages in philosophy. But Vedānta, particularly its philosophy,
is something different. It starts with the very question you ask. It sets before itself the object of finding a truth, “Free from all dispute” and “Not opposed to any school of thought or religion or interpretation of scriptures”. Its truth is independent of sect, creed, colour, race, sex, and belief. And it aims at what is “Equally good for all beings.” Then, I said, that I would devote the whole of my life to the study of Vedānta, if the Swāmi would be so gracious as to introduce me to a Vedāntin, past or present, that did not or does not claim superiority for his religion over others on the authority of his own scripture, who does not refuse to open the gates of his heaven to those that differ from him, but who seeks only such philosophic truth as does not lead to differences among men. Immediately the revered Guru quoted three verses from Gauḍapāda, Kārikās II–1, III–17 and IV–2, and explained them, the substance of which has been quoted above. “If you want,” he added, “truth indubitable by any one and truth beneficent to all men, nay, to all beings, read and inwardly digest what Śankara’s teacher’s teacher, Sri Gauḍapāda says in his Kārikās.”

The other eminent personage to whom I owe most of my effort to make a critical study of Gauḍapāda is His Highness the Maharaja of Mysore, Śri Krishnarāja Wadiyar Bahadur IV. His profound and extensive knowledge of philosophy and particularly his high regard for Māndūkya Upanishad and the Kārikās, led to frequent talks on the topics dealt with therein. His Highness who is accustomed to meeting learned scholars, pious religionists, and deep thinkers of all types and of different countries, is a most disinterested critic. This drove me to the necessity of ascertaining how far
Gauḍapāda’s views are of value from the standpoint of the student of Western science and philosophy and how far the ancient Vedānta could stand the fire of modern criticism, particularly of science, a knowledge of which is so indispensable to the study of philosophy nowadays.

In this connection, I must not forget to mention that my debt is also immense to Mr. K. A. Krishnaswami Iyer, the Vedāntin of Bangalore, and to those Swāmis of the Śrī Rāmakrishna Order, that have devoted their life to the philosophical pursuit of truth both from the ancient and from the modern view-points and that have been with me at Mysore.

After studying Gauḍapāda for a time I turned to the Upanishads and to Brahma-Sūtras as interpreted by Śankara, under the Sringeri Swāmi’s invaluable guidance. I have now for more than forty years read and re-read them in the light of the Swāmi’s teachings and I find that Vedānta is far in advance, not merely of the most modern Western philosophic thought, but also of scientific thought, so far as its pursuit of knowledge for its own sake is concerned. To refer to an instance or two: Two thousand years ago Gauḍapāda anticipated what science is just beginning to guess in regard to ‘causal’ relation without a knowledge of which Vedānta can never be understood. The meaning of ‘Truth’ which is still a matter of dispute among many philosophers, has been investigated by him more deeply than has yet been done by other thinkers.

Vedānta in its highest, that is its philosophic, aspect can have no significance to one who has not realized the importance of the most fundamental question in philosophy: What is truth, particularly ‘Ultimate Truth’? How is it to be tested? It is the Upanishads-
that answer it by declaring that Ultimate Truth is that which admits of no difference of view of any kind, as two plus two are equal to four. Gauḍapāda and Śankara follow this doctrine in all its implications. It assigns to religious faith, theology, scholasticism, mysticism, art and science, their respective places in the one grand edifice of human knowledge, as a whole. Gauḍapāda rejects no kind of knowledge or experience. Even the views of his opponents, he welcomes and accepts as parts of the knowledge that leads to the attainment of truth and Ultimate Truth. His distinction lies in the emphasis he lays on the impossibility of reaching the highest truth unless the totality of human experience or knowledge be taken into consideration. Others generally build their systems on the waking state alone. But the philosophers of the Upanishads hold that unless the three states of waking, dream and deep sleep be co-ordinated, there cannot be adequate data for the enquiry regarding Ultimate Truth. This is a matter still unknown to Europe and America. Nor has the West as yet evaluated conceptual knowledge: The relation of mind to its ideas or contents is another problem that has not as yet been even dreamt of in Western Philosophy.

To one desirous of making a scholarly study of Vedānta, the historical side of the evolution of philosophic thought in India is of great value. One can, however, easily obtain this information in any of the modern text-books on Indian Philosophy. But, though Gauḍapāda could be fairly appreciated even without such background, yet, his commentator Śankara and his followers cannot be fully comprehended without a previous acquaintance with the several systems of Indian thought. Swāmī Nikhilānandaji has therefore furnished
valuable notes to make such matters clear. One point, however, needs to be referred to here, as it is of special interest to modern thinkers.

The several theories of perception, for instance, are discussed in the Kārikās, it being taken for granted that causal relation is an unquestionable fact. Like all true philosophers, not mere metaphysicians, he starts with the perceptual world and pursues the enquiry. If the word "real" be confined to percepts, Gauḍapāda is not a realist. If the word "ideal" be confined to what is known within, apart from the senses, he is not an idealist. But he admits that the concepts, real and ideal, are of value as steps leading to the highest truth which is beyond idealism or realism, or spiritualism, all of which only refer to waking experience. To him the external world as well as the internal is unreal. But his philosophy does not lead to illusionism, as the goal. The relation between mind and matter, idea and sense objects, or even mind and its contents is a matter of dispute to this day. But Gauḍapāda's explanation may or may not be accepted, to the extent to which it is confined to the waking state. It does not, however, affect in the least his conclusion which is based on the three states. He denies the category of relationship, in what is Ultimate Truth. Nor does he admit 'Satisfaction' (Ānandam) to be a test of it.

Another important feature is that he is a thinker of the most rational type, which Śankara's interpretation of him, points out. The "philosophic method" (prakriya) described here clears so many misapprehensions regarding the meaning of philosophy, in general.

Philosophy, according to Gauḍapāda and Śankara, is an interpretation of the totality of human experience
or of the whole of life from the standpoint of truth. Philosophy, therefore, is the whole, of which Religion, Mysticism (Yoga), Theology, Scholasticism, Speculation, Art and Science are but parts. Such philosophy or Vedānta as ignores any part or parts, is no Vedānta. In fact it employs the scientific method more rigorously than modern science does. Gauḍapāda’s and Śankara’s view of philosophy is being echoed and re-echoed by modern Western thinkers in defining it. These ancient philosophers further declare that all other kinds of experience and knowledge are but several stages in the evolution of life and philosophic thought. And the object sought by philosophy, as these two pre-eminent Hindu philosophers say, is the happiness (Sukham) and welfare (Hitam) of all beings (Sarva Sattva) in this world (Ihaiva).

Gauḍapāda is little known in the West. There is not the least doubt that his work will open new vistas of thought to Western enquirers and will make them turn to the East for more light. Without the slightest fear of exaggeration, it may be said that in no other part of the “world” has man dared to pursue truth with the degree of devotion, and particularly of determination with which he has done in India. It is in India alone that one sees the seeker sacrificing not merely all his material belongings as in other countries, but also every feeling, thought, view, or perception to which he may, at the start, be attached. Till one makes sure that one’s mind has been completely purged of all preconceptions or prejudices which are the offspring of attachment, one cannot hope to command the concentration of mind needed for climbing the topmost steps leading to truth. One of the greatest characteristics of philosophy in India—
not Indian theology and the like—is the perfection to which the method of eliminating preconceptions is carried. And to do this one must be a dhīra (hero).

Much less does the West know of Gauḍapāda’s method of complete eradication of the ‘Ego’ or the personal ‘self,’ a subject, to the supreme importance of which, Western Science—not its Philosophy or speculation which is blissfully ignorant of it—is just becoming alive. Swāmi Vivekānanda says, “Can anything be attained with any shred of ‘I’ left?” And Śri Śankara says, “The root of all obstacles (in the pursuit of Truth) is the first form of ignorance called the ‘Ego’. So long as one has any connection with the ‘Ego,’ vile as it is, there cannot be the least talk about liberation (from ignorance).”

As has been hinted in the Note also at the beginning, the best modern scientists hold that: “The Scientific man has above all things to strive at self-elimination, in his judgments to provide an argument which is true..... unbiased by personal feeling is characteristic of what may be termed the Scientific frame of mind.....”

“The validity of a scientific conclusion depends upon the elimination of the subjective element.....”

“What is most difficult of attainment and yet indispensable is distrust of our personal bias in forming judgments. Our hypothesis must be depersonalized....”

—From J. A. Thomson.

How strongly this discipline is enforced on the seeker after truth in India may be gathered from what Śri Kṛshna says in the Bhāgavata:

“One should prostrate oneself on the ground before every creature down to..... an ass or a dog,..... so that ‘egoism’ may quickly depart.”
The essence of the teachings of Hindu Philosophy here is found in the following prayer of the great Sri Rama-

krishna Paramahamsa: (Translated). "One man says this, another man says that. O mother, pray, tell me what the Truth is."

Many such and other matters of great value are ably dealt with by the Swāmiji in the body of the work. This distinguished and learned author has done a real service to such earnest seekers after truth, as are determined to reach the end, wherever English is known, by translating this priceless work of Śri Gauḍapāda, the first Vedāntic philosopher, known to Indian history in what is said to be the post-Upanishadic or modern period.

V. Subrahmanya Iyer.
PREFACE

The Māndūkya Upanishad, like Mundaka, Praśna and some minor Upanishads, forms part of the Atharva Veda. It is one of the shortest of the ten principal Upanishads. Gauḍapāda has written two hundred and fifteen verses known as the Kārikā to explain the Upanishad and Śankara has written a commentary on both the Upanishad and the Kārikā. Ānandagiri in his Tikā explains at greater length Śankara’s commentary.

The Māndūkya Upanishad, like other Upanishads, discusses the problem of Ultimate Reality. The knowledge of Brahman or Ātman, the goal of existence, is its theme. Unlike most of the Upanishads, it does not relate any anecdote or any imaginary conversations to elucidate the subject-matter. It is also silent about rituals and sacrifices in any form as they are irrelevant to the metaphysical or philosophical discussion of Reality. It goes straight to the subject. The extreme brevity of its statements has been the cause of despair to superficial readers who are unable to understand its real significance.

The well-known method of Vedānta to arrive at Reality is what is known as “Vichāra”. This Upanishad also follows the same method. In the first place Ātman is associated with the three states of waking, dream and deep sleep, and, then, these states are shown to merge in Turīya or the Ultimate Reality. And in the sequel it is pointed out that the non-dual Ātman is identical with the three states and therefore all that exists is Brahman. The nature of the Ultimate Reality has been described in the seventh text of the Upanishad.
As the generality of men cannot realize the Ultimate Reality which is beyond all categories of time, space and causation, it is sought to help them to do so by means of a symbol. The symbol selected by the Māndūkya Upanishad as well as the other Upanishads is Aum, the word of all words. Aum consists of three sound symbols, viz., A, U, and M. These three denoting the gross, the subtle and the causal aspects of Brahman (from the relative standpoint), have been equated with the three states mentioned above, which contain the totality of man’s experience. The method adopted by the Upanishad and followed by Gauḍapāda for arriving at Reality is to analyse our experience. Through the contemplation of the three sound symbols as the three states, the student, endowed with the mental and moral qualifications required for the understanding of Vedānta, is helped to reach the Ultimate Reality.

The Kārikā of Gauḍapāda is divided into four chapters (prakaraṇas): (1) Āgama (Scripture), (2) Vaitathya (the illusoriness of sense-experiences), (3) Advaita (nonduality), (4) Alātasānti (the quenching of the fire-brand). The first chapter deals with the problem of Reality from the standpoint of the Vedas. The three subsequent chapters demonstrate the same truth by means of reason.

Śankara, who has commented only on Vedāntic works of the most authoritative character, such as the Gītā, the Upanishads and the Sūtras, has deemed it necessary to write a commentary on Gauḍapāda’s Kārikā. This indicates the supreme importance and value of this treatise to the philosophy of Advaita Vedānta.

Who was Gauḍapāda? Tradition makes him the teacher of Govinda who was the teacher of Śankara.
It is said that Gauḍapāda wrote, besides the Kārikā on Māndūkya Upanishad, commentaries on the Sānkhya system and Uttara Gītā. But there does not exist much evidence to support it. Ānandagiri says in his Tīkā on Śankara’s commentary on the Kārikā (4–1) that Gauḍapāda performed great austerities in the Badarikāśrama, in the interior of the Himalayas, in order to propitiate Nārāyaṇa who is worshipped there as the God-Man. Nārāyaṇa being pleased with his devotion revealed to him the secret of the Advaita Vedānta. Gauḍapāda salutes this Nārāyaṇa in the opening verse of the fourth chapter of the Kārikā. In the face of the controversy regarding the date of Śankara, the date of Gauḍapāda cannot be definitely fixed. The generally accepted date of Śankara’s birth, one agreed to by Bhāndārkar, Pāthak and Deussen, 788 A.D. is not free from objections. According to Śwāmi Prajñānānanda Saraswati and a few other scholars, Śankara flourished before Christ. Some eminent scholars, by an examination of the literary style of Śankara and the historical and other references, push back his date to the second century B.C. Their contention cannot be lightly brushed aside. One fact, however, can be asserted without fear of contradiction that Gauḍapāda is the solitary philosopher, known to us, who, before Śankara, gave a rational explanation of the Advaita Vedānta which is the objective of the Upanishadic teachings.

Even the Sūtras of Bādarāyana are not free from a priori reasoning, that is, reasoning conditioned by the tradition and the authority of the Scriptures. It is only Gauḍapāda that has successfully demonstrated in his Kārikā that the non-dual Ātman declared in the Upanishads as the Ultimate Reality is not a theological
dogma, and that it does not depend upon the mystic experiences of the Yogis; but that it is a metaphysical rather a philosophical truth which satisfies the demands of universal tests and which is based upon reason independent of scriptural authority. Gauḍapāda, as already stated, follows, in the first chapter of his book, the traditional method of basing his conclusions on the authority of the Scriptures and demonstrates that the aim of the Śruti is to establish the non-dual Ātman as the ultimate authority. In the following chapters he re-establishes the same truth through reasoning alone and thus meets the arguments of the Buddhists and other thinkers who do not admit the authority of the Vedās. Śankara refers to this in his commentary on the first verses of the last three chapters of the Kārikā.

Here, we deem it necessary to review some of the observations of the latest among well-known authors. Professor S N. Das Gupta, M.A., Ph.D., in his celebrated work, A History of Indian Philosophy (pp. 423–29) regarding Gauḍapāda and his philosophy writes: "Gauḍapāda thus flourished after all great Buddhist teachers Aśvaghošha, Nāgārjuna, Asanga and Vāsųbandhu, and I believe that there is sufficient evidence in his Kārikās for thinking that he was possibly himself a Buddhist, and considered that the teachings of the Upanishads tallied with those of Buddha. Thus at the beginning of the fourth chapter of his Kārikās he says that he adores that great man (dwipadām varam) who by knowledge as wide as the sky realized (sambuddha) that all appearances (Dharma) were like the vacuous sky (gaganopamam). He thus goes on to say that he adores him who has dictated (desita) that the touch of the untouch (Asparśa Yoga—probably referring to Nirvāṇa) was the
goal that produced happiness to all beings and that he
was neither in disagreement with the doctrine nor found
any contradiction in it (avívāda aviruddhaścha). . . . In
IV. 19 of his Kārikā, he again says that the Buddhas
have shown that there is no coming into being in any
way (sarvathā buddhairajātī paridīpitāḥ). Again in IV. 4. 2
he says that it was for those realists (vāstu-vādis), since
they found things and could deal with them and were
afraid of non-being, that the Buddha had spoken of
origination (jāti). In IV. 90 he refers to Agrayāna
which we know to be a name of Mahāyāna. Again,
in IV. 98 and 99, he says that all appearances are ‘pure
and vacuous’ by nature. These the Buddha, the emanci-
pated one (mukta) and the leaders know. It was said
by Buddha that all appearances were knowledge. He
then closes the Kārikās with an adoration which in all
probability also refers to the Buddha. . . . Gauḍapāda does
not indicate his preference one way or the other (i.e.,
regarding the theories of creation), but describes the
fourth state. . . . In the third chapter Gauḍapāda says
that truth is like the void (Ākāśa) which is conceived as
taking part in birth and death, coming and going and as
existing in all bodies, but, however it be conceived, it is
all the while non-different from Ākāśa. . . . He should
awaken the mind (citta) into its final dissolution. . . .
All the Dharmas (appearances) are without death or
decay. Gauḍapāda then follows a dialectical form
of argument which reminds us of Nāgārjuna. . . . All
experiences (prajñapti) are dependent on reasons, for
otherwise both would vanish. . . . When we look at all
things in a connected manner they seem to be dependent,
but when we look at them from the point of view
of Reality or truth the reason ceases to be reason. . . .
Therefore neither the mind nor the objects seen by it are ever produced. Those who perceive them to suffer production are really traversing the reason of vacuity (Kha).... It is so obvious that these doctrines are borrowed from the Mādhyamika doctrines, as found in the Nāgārjuna Kārikās and Vijnānavāda doctrines as found in Lankāvatāra, that it is needless to attempt to prove it. Gauḍapāda assimilated all the Buddhist Śūnyavāda and Vijnānavāda teachings and thought that these hold good of the ultimate truth preached by the Upanishads. It is immaterial whether he was a Hindu or a Buddhist, so long as we are sure that he had the highest respect for Buddha and for his teachings which he believed to be his.... He only incidentally suggested that the great Buddhist truth of indefinable and unspeakable Vijnāna or vacuity would hold good of the highest Ātman of the Upanishads, and thus laid the foundation of a revival of the Upanishadic studies on Buddhist lines....” (The English words in italics are ours.)

Our interpretation of the passages in the above quotation will be found in the body of the book. Prof. Das Gupta has given his own interpretation of the Kārikā, without attaching any value to the commentary of Śankara or the Tīkā of Ānandagiri and it is clear from the point of view of Prof. Das Gupta that Śankara has failed to understand the sense of the Kārikā. This attempt of Prof. Das Gupta to interpret the Kārikā according to his own view is no doubt responsible for ascribing to Gauḍapāda the views which, according to us, he never seems even to have dreamt of cherishing. Prof. Das Gupta tries to prove that Gauḍapāda was possibly a Buddhist and that his philosophy was borrowed
from Buddhism. We shall therefore offer a few words of criticism regarding the views of Prof. Das Gupta.

It has not been settled that Gauḍapāda flourished after the Buddhist philosophers, Aśvaghosha, Nāgārjuna, Asanga and Vāsубandhu. Some recent researches reveal that he lived long before them. This is, however, a point for the student of history of literature. Further, the standpoint and the conclusion of Gauḍapāda’s philosophy, however, are fundamentally different from those of the Buddhist thinkers named above. There is no evidence in his Kārikā to show that Gauḍapāda was possibly a Buddhist. There is positive proof on the other hand to show that he was not a Buddhist. Gauḍapāda himself states, for instance, in the clearest possible language at the conclusion of the Kārikā (IV. 99) that “This (his own view) is not the view of Buddha.” Śankara in his commentary of this Kārikā says that the essence of the Ultimate Reality, which is non-dual and which is free from multiplicity of the perceiver, perception and the perceived, has not been taught by Buddha. In its refutation of the reality of the external objects and in asserting that all objects are mere acts of mind (manahspandanam), the Buddhist Vijnānavāda, no doubt, approaches the non-dual consciousness of the Upanishads, but the knowledge of the non-dual Ātman, which alone is the Ultimate Reality, can be found in Vedānta alone. We are of opinion that Buddhist metaphysical thought is nearest to Gauḍapāda’s Kārikās. Further corroboration can be found in Śankara’s commentary on Kārikās IV. 28 and 83.

Prof. Das Gupta, in order to prove his conclusion, has given his own interpretations. One studying the
Upanishads and the Kārikās in accordance with the six canons (lingam) of interpretation, viz., the beginning and the conclusion (upakrama and upasamhāra), repetition (abhyāsa), originality (apūrvatā), result (phalam), eulogy (arthavāda) and demonstration (upapatti), will find that the aims of the Upanishads and the Kārikā are identical, namely, the establishment of the non-dual self as the Ultimate Reality and this cannot be found in the teachings of the Buddhist philosophers.

At the beginning of the fourth chapter of the Kārikā, Gauḍapāda does not adore Buddha but Nārāyaṇa who is worshipped in Badarikāśrama through the symbol of Man. The word Dharma used by Gauḍapāda does not mean appearance. ‘Dharma’ literally means ‘attribute’, which is, according to the Vedānta philosophy, non-different from the substance—as the heat and the light are non-different from the sunshine. ‘Dharma’ is used by Gauḍapāda to mean Jīva which if taken as an attribute of Brahman is non-different from it. Gauḍapāda has admirably proved in his Kārikā that all Dharmas or Jīvas are identical with the non-dual Brahman and therefore they are ever-pure and ever-illumined. The word ‘Dharma’ has been used in the plural sense in view of the multiplicity of the Jīvas from the standpoint of empirical experience. Gauḍapāda contends that what others, from their relative standpoint, take to be multiple Jīvas, is nothing but non-dual Brahman. The analogy of Dharma to Ākāśa, based upon vacuity, is far-fetched. The real point of analogy lies in their all-pervasiveness, purity and subtle nature. But Dharma is not really identical with Ākāśa as the latter is known, from the empirical standpoint, to contain the element of insentience (jāda). The adoration referred to in IV. 2 is not directed
to Buddha, as hinted by Prof. Das Gupta, but to Nārāyaṇa.

The translation of the word ‘Asparśayoga’ as the ‘touch of the untouch’ does not convey any meaning. It certainly does not refer to Nīrṇaṇa as suggested by Prof. Das Gupta, if Nirvāṇa means total annihilation. We prefer to translate the word as the Yoga which is not related to anything. Apparently there is a contradiction involved in the word. The word ‘Asparśa’ meaning freedom from relationship refers to the non-dual Brahman alone. But Yoga signifying union indicates duality. Gaṇḍapāda designates the path of knowledge described in the Kārikā and in Advaita Vedānta as Asparśayoga inasmuch as the word Yoga was used in his time also to denote the method of attaining to the Ultimate Reality. In the Bhagavadgītā, for instance, Yoga is used in different senses. Yoga is also used in the broad sense, of ‘discipline’ or ‘path’. That this method is free from all relationship has been demonstrated in the Kārikā. The Ultimate Reality taught in the Kārikā and Advaita Vedānta cannot be Nirvāṇa if that word means, as is known from the study of some of the Buddhist writers, the total negation of everything. But whether Buddha himself used the word in that sense is doubtful. The non-dual Brahman taught (vide Chapter III and II. 23 of Kārikā) in the Advaita Vedānta is free from hostility and contradiction as according to this philosophy non-dual Brahman alone exists. Hostility and contradiction are inherent in all dualistic systems of thought.

Gaṇḍapāda has, no doubt, used the word ‘Buddha’ several times in the Kārikā. But the word does not refer to the traditional founder of Buddhism, as Prof.
Das Gupta seems to suggest. It only means the knower of Truth. The word ‘Agrayāna’ in IV. 90 may be made to indicate ‘Mahāyāna’ only by a fanciful resemblance of words. The word really means ‘Prathamataḥ’, i.e., in the first place, otherwise one cannot get any meaning out of the Kārikā text in which the word occurs.

Prof. Das Gupta complains that Gauḍapāda ‘does not indicate his preference one way or other’ regarding the theory of creation. In the Āgama Prakaraṇa (Kārikā, 7–9) he enumerates several current theories of creation given by those who accept creation as a fact. He calls these theorisers mere speculators on the process of creation (sṛṣṭichintakāḥ). Those to whom creation is real are certainly at liberty to advance any theory according to their tastes. But none of these speculators proves the reality of creation on rational grounds. Gauḍapāda is not in the least interested in these theories. He questions the reality of the act of creation, from the standpoint of the ultimate truth. Creation may be a fact to those who, like children, take empirical knowledge to be ultimate truth. Gauḍapāda, throughout his Kārikā and particularly in the fourth chapter, clearly demonstrates that the category of causality cannot be applied to the non-dual Ātman. Absolute non-manifestation (ajāti) is the only truth. Centuries before Hume and Bradley, Gauḍapāda proved that causality has no basis in fact. Creation indicates an unsatisfied desire on the part of the creator. If the Ultimate Reality be complete or perfect in itself and self-satiated (āptakāma), then the act of creation can never be predicated of it. Hegel contradicts himself when he says that a logical necessity impels the evolution of the Absolute. Schelling’s explanation that the evolution of the Absolute into ego
and non-ego can only be understood by an *intellectual intuition*, is mysticism or mystification, but not rational truth. If there be no creation how can one explain the multiplicity of empirical experience in the universe? Gauḍāpāda by an inexorable logic proves that this is the *very nature* of the Effulgent Being (*Devasya esha svabhāvaḥ*). Whatever one experiences is only non-dual Brahman. All this is verily Brahman. Non-dual Brahman alone is. Diagnosis of the headache of a headless man (*kabandha*) is ludicrous and irrelevant. If the manifested manifold had ever existed, then one would think of its origination or destruction. That we see duality is due to our ignorance of the true nature of Reality which is non-dual Brahman. Again this ignorance (*Māyā*) does not exist from the standpoint of Reality. *Māyā* is only an explanation of creation given by those who hold creation to be a *fact*. Therefore Gauḍāpāda sums up his philosophy, ‘None (is) in bondage, none liberated, this is the ultimate truth’ (II. 32). ‘No *Jīva* is ever born. Such birth is unreal. Such indeed is the highest truth that nothing whatsoever is born’ (III. 48).

Gauḍāpāda, no doubt, says that *Ātman* is like *Ākāśa* (III. 3). But voidness is not the point of analogy. He intends to convey the idea that *Ātman*, like the *Ākāśa* is subtle, without parts and all-pervading. Gauḍāpāda was well aware of the fallacy of Nāgārjuna’s reasoning. Void or a negation cannot be the substratum of an illusion. The illusion of the mirage, the snake or the silver must have a positive substratum in the form of the desert, the rope or the mother-o’-pearl. Śankara aptly criticises the position of the Buddhist nihilists as lacking in intelligence, for they, in spite of the very fact of recognition and experience, describe every thing, including
their own experience, as mere void. Therefore the Ultimate Reality is not a void or a negation. Without a positive Reality we cannot affirm our empirical experience. But this affirmation is not a co-relative of negation. Our relative experiences have the dual predicates of affirmation and negation. The Ultimate Reality is free from affirmation and negation, the inevitable characteristics of the relative.

The translation of the first line of the 44th Kārikā of the third chapter as “He should awaken the ‘mind’ (citta) into its final dissolution (laya)” does not convey the correct meaning. Gauḍapāda uses the word ‘laya’ in the sense of deep sleep or Yogic Samādhi. Samādhi is the last word of the Yoga mystics. According to Gauḍapāda this is an obstacle to the realisation of truth. The seeking of pleasure in Samādhi shows an exhaustion of the inquiring mind. It is because the Yogis look upon mind as separate from Ātman, that they seek to control it in Samādhi. But Gauḍapāda says that the mind is the non-dual Ātman. Therefore there does not arise any question of controlling it. The mind and its activities (prachāra, Comp. III. 34) are nothing but non-dual Brahman, ever-pure, ever-free and ever-illumined. It is only due to ignorance that one perceives the duality of the subject-object relationship in the activities of the mind. But a knower of truth perceives everywhere and in all activities only the non-dual Brahman (Gītā, IV. 24). Hence Gauḍapāda warns the student against the trap of the Yogic Samādhi, as described in the line quoted above (III. 44) which really means that one should awaken the mind from the (inertia of) laya (Samādhi or deep sleep) by the repeated practice of discrimination. The Vedāntic Samādhi does not signify the realization of Truth with closed eyes. It means the vision of Truth with eyes open
on every object. A Vedantist thus describes the Samadhi, “With the disappearance of the attachment to the body and with the realization of the Supreme Self, to whatever object the mind is directed, one experiences Samadhi.”

Nowhere does Gauḍapāda, or Śankara or this Upanishad itself say that the ‘Fourth’ is a ‘State’ (Avasta) as Prof. Das Gupta says.

All Dharmas according to Gauḍapāda, are without death or decay (IV. 10). Prof. Das Gupta, as we have already pointed out, wrongly translates Dharma as appearance. ‘Appearance’ is certainly attended with disappearance, i.e., death and decay. For, Gauḍapāda rightly defines appearance and illusion as that which does not exist at the beginning or at the end (II. 6). Any appearance is perceived by Ātman only so long as that particular condition of his mind which gives rise to the appearance lasts. But Dharma can be said to be without decay or death only if it means Jīva which is the same as the non-dual Brahman.

We are afraid the translation of the 24th Kārikā (Chapter IV) as “all experience is dependent on reasons” (sanimittatvam) is not correct. This Kārikā gives the view of the opponent (Pūrvapaksha) who asserts the reality of the external objects. The opponent says that all subjective experiences have their ‘cause’ (not ‘reason’) in external objects as otherwise there would exist no variety in experience. Further as no true explanation can be given of the pain and misery we experience, Gauḍapāda refutes the view of the realists with the arguments of the Buddhist idealists in the next Kārikā. Gauḍapāda says: If this be the contention of the opponent that external world or objects create subjective idea, we ask, What causes the external world or objects?
The realist cannot point out any such cause. Hence the argument of causality based upon such experience fails. The position is summed up in the statement that the argument of so-called external cause (viz., the external objects) is not valid. A knower of truth does not see any object other than ideas which, being identical with the mind, are the same as the non-dual Brahman. In IV. 28 Gauḍapāda refutes the Buddhist idealists (Vijnānavādins) as well. He quotes the views of the Vijnānavādins for the refutation of the realistic theory of consciousness which is, according to that school of thought, momentary, subject to birth and death and full of misery. He says that those who hold mind to be subject to birth and death, etc., are really like those who seek to trace the foot-prints of birds in the sky. The translation of this Kārikā (IV. 28) as “Those who... vacuity” given by Prof. Das Gupta, does not seem to be correct.

As we have already stated, Prof. Das Gupta tries to prove that Gauḍapāda has borrowed his ideas from the Buddhist philosophers. His criticism and estimate of Kārikā appear to be prejudiced. Gauḍapāda may have “assimilated all the Buddhist Sūnyavāda and Vijnānavāda teachings,” but this does not prove that he “thought that these hold good of the Ultimate Truth preached by the Upanishads.” Madhusūdan Saraswati and Vachaspati Miśra may have assimilated the entire Nyāya system of thought but this does not prove that the Nyāya views hold good of the truth established in the Advaita Siddhi or Bhāmati. Every philosopher, worth the name, studies contemporary systems of thought. He may even borrow some lines of arguments from others for purposes of explanation. Śankara himself has done so. But it is
a travesty of truth to call Śankara a crypto-Buddhist (Prachchhanna Baudhā), as some of the dualists have done. We have not seen anywhere in the Kārikā Gauḍapāda saying that he is a believer in Buddha, the founder of Buddhism.

Granting that Gauḍapāda had “the highest respect for Buddha”, every Hindu and every lover of truth cherishes a similar feeling of the highest regard for the Compassionate One. But this does not prove that they necessarily accept all that Buddha or Buddhism teaches. In fact the Hindus recognised centuries ago and even now recognise Buddha as one of the Avatārs of Vishṇu like Rāma and Kṛṣṇa. Gauḍapāda does not certainly “incidentally suggest that the great Buddhist truth of indefinable and unspeakable Vijnāna or vacuity would hold good of the highest Ātman of the Upanishads.” To assert this is to pervert the real import of the Kārikā. On the other hand, Gauḍapāda emphatically declares (IV. 28) that he accepts the conclusion of the Buddhist Vijnānavādins in order to refute the realist’s contention of the reality of the external objects. But neither the Vijnānavādins nor the Śūnyavādins have got anything to say regarding the non-dual Ātman, which can be realized only through the rigorous pursuit of truth which the Advaita system alone does. Gauḍapāda does not let an opportunity pass without criticising the Mādhyamika view of absolute nihilism. The estimate of Gauḍapāda and his Kārikā as given by Prof. Das Gupta in his History of Indian Philosophy, does not indicate the high watermark of unbiased judgment.

Prof. Rādhākrishnan gives an estimate of Gauḍapāda’s philosophy in his well-known Indian Philosophy (Vol. II, pp. 452–465). He thinks the use of some words in the
Karikā is peculiarly Buddhistic. We have answered this point in our criticism of Prof. Das Gupta's remarks. It may be stated here that it is a favourite method of Gauḍapāda and Šankara to put one school of thought against another and ultimately show the untenability of both. Even the conclusions of the Buddhist philosophers can be found in some place or other of the Upanishads. It only proves the fact that at that time certain philosophical terms were the common property of Indian thought in general. One cannot accuse a modern philosopher if he uses the arguments of modern science in order to refute the contentions of his opponents or establish his own position.

Prof. Rādhākrishnan says that both "Bādarāyaṇa and Šankara strongly urge that there is a genuine difference between dream experience and the waking one and that the latter is not independent of existing objects." According to Gauḍapāda there is no difference between the dream and the waking states from the standpoint of the Ultimate Reality. Thus an attempt is made to point out the difference between Gauḍapāda's system and that of Šankara. Again it is said that "in Gauḍapāda the negative tendency is more prominent than the positive. In Šankara we have a more balanced outlook." We disagree with Prof. Rādhākrishnan. In his commentary on Brahma-Sūtras Šankara, no doubt, makes a distinction between the waking and the dream states. But that is done from the empirical standpoint. We have not seen Šankara anywhere declaring the reality of both the states, from the standpoint of Ultimate Truth. Gauḍapāda also admits the two states of waking and dream on the empirical plane, in which our experiences are associated with external objects and their absence:
(IV. 87). But the next Kārikā indicates the Ultimate Reality to be that in which there is neither any object, nor the idea of experiencing it. We do not know of any difference between the thoughts of Śankara and Gauḍapāda. Had it been so Śankara would not have written a commentary on the Kārikā. Nowhere in his explanation of the Kārikā does Śankara point out his disagreement with the views of Gauḍapāda. It cannot be said that the views of Śankara as embodied in the commentary on the Kārikā are different from those expounded in the commentaries on the Upanishads, the Brahma-Sūtras and the Gītā. Even the acutest critic of Śankara has not been able to point out any inconsistency in the writings of Śankara.

Sir Rādhākrishnan makes the following remarks regarding the philosophy of Gauḍapāda: “The general idea pervading Gauḍapāda’s work, that bondage and liberation, the individual soul and the world, are all unreal, makes the caustic critic observe that the theory which has nothing better to say than that an unreal soul in trying to escape from an unreal bondage in an unreal world to accomplish an unreal supreme good, may itself be an unreality. It is one thing to say that the secret of existence, how the unchangeable reality expresses itself in the changing universe without forfeiting its nature is a mystery, and another to dismiss the whole changing universe, as a mere mirage. If we have to play the game of life, we cannot do so with the conviction that the play is a show and all the prizes in it are mere blanks. No philosophy can consistently hold such a theory and be at rest with itself. The greatest condemnation of such a theory is that we are obliged to occupy ourselves with objects, the existence and value of which we are continu-
ally denying in theory. The fact of the world may be mysterious and inexplicable. It only shows that there is something else which includes and transcends the world; but it does not imply that the world is a dream."

The main difference between the Advaita and other systems of thought is that the former does not find any reason for believing in the reality of the process of becoming whereas the latter pin their faith to evolution, creation or manifestation as real. Some Advaitic philosophers in order to explain the fact of the manifested manifold (which is perceived) adopt their theory of Vivarta according to which Brahman appears as the world without forfeiting its essential nature. It is like the rope appearing as the snake. Other schools of thought give other explanations of the process of becoming and not one of these explanations can be supported by reason. Gauḍapāda by an irrefutable logic disproves the reality of causation in the fourth chapter of Kārikā, and posits the Ajātavāda according to which Brahman or Reality has never become the universe. No one can ever prove the apparent mystery of one becoming the many, for, the many does never really exist.

Neither Gauḍapāda nor Śankara ignores those who believe in the reality of the external objects or of the manifested manifold on account of their perceiving those objects through the instrumentality of the sense organs or their attachment to the particular avocations of life (IV. 42). They are generous enough to say that any defect that may attach to the belief in the reality of the external objects is not at all serious. If these realists will only pursue truth they will see that to the non-dual Ātman causality or duality can never be applied (IV. 42). The generality of mankind bereft of the power of dis-
crimination is, no doubt, satisfied with empirical experience. Let it do so. But it is the aim of the philosopher that is bent upon the discrimination of the real and the unreal to point out the truth, the Ultimate Reality even if it proves the unreality of the tinsels and baubles of sense-perception. The non-discriminating mind, no doubt, plunges headlong into the play of life taking every experience to be real and takes the prizes of such experience. But it is only a philosophic mind that sees that the so-called play is but an unreal ‘shadow show’ and all the prizes are mere blanks. Is that not also the conviction of all sober-minded persons, when they, in their maturity of thought, take a retrospective view of life?

There are two ways of enjoying a theatrical show. Both spectators and those who take part in the show enjoy it. The actors identify themselves with their respective characters and take the show as real. Therefore they cannot be said to enjoy the show in reality. But the spectators on account of their detached outlook, with their knowledge of the unreality of the show, really enjoy it.

The existence of external objects depends upon the belief that they exist (IV. 75). No one has yet been able rationally to demonstrate that things exist independently of the perceiver’s mind. Even the thing-in-itself of Kant is a mere hypothesis based upon the belief in causality. Kant by making the things-in-themselves which are beyond the categories of time, space and causality, the cause of the phenomena is inconsistent with himself. But, a mere belief in the existence of the external objects does not prove the reality of their existence. Even in common parlance it is said that all that glitters is not gold. The ‘hay, wood and stubbles’ of the world, when
tested by the fire of the philosopher’s reasoning, are found to be unreal. It is certainly not irrational in a philosopher to pursue truth and to demonstrate that the game of life which he plays is a mere show and that "all the prizes in it are mere blanks". All of us, in a rare moment of discrimination and reflection, realise that ‘the world is a dream’. To our utter disillusionment we ultimately discover that we occupy ourselves with objects the existence and value of which must really be no more than those of appearances. A student must be disappointed if he expects Advaita Vedānta to point out to him the means of enjoying pleasures, which depend upon the subject-object relationship, which is based upon duality of existence. The only aim of Vedānta is to dehypnotise the mind which has been hypnotised into the belief that duality really exists. The only positive satisfaction guaranteed to a Vedāntist is that he will no longer be deluded by ignorance which paints the unreal or the seeming as the real. For, in the language of Śankara, the knowledge of Reality destroys one’s hankering after objects which are unreal just as the knowledge of the mother-o’-pearl (mistaken for silver) removes the delusion regarding the silver. This knowledge may be chimerical to those who are still attached to the tinsels and gew-gaws of the world and the prizes it offers; but it is of supreme value to the seeker of Reality.

Sir S. Rādhākrishnan seems to suggest that Śankara thinks waking experiences to be more real than the dream ones. This view may be true from the non-philosophical standpoint. The distinction between the reality of the waking and that of the dream experiences is said to depend upon the sense-organs apparently indicating reality. We create a false standard of reality in
our relative plane of consciousness and thus hold one
set of experiences to be more real than another. But
does Śankara say anywhere that waking experiences are
real from the standpoint of the Ultimate Truth? All
our experiences, whether waking or dream, are possible
if we believe the act of creation to be real. What is the
view of Śankara regarding creation? When the oppo-
nent (Pūrvapakshin) tries to find inconsistencies in the
different accounts of creation given in the Vedas, Śankara
says in various places, for instance, in the introduction
to the fourth chapter of the Aitareya Upanishad as
follows: "Here (i.e., the theories and stories of
creation), the only fact intended to be conveyed is
the realization of Ātman, the rest is but attractive figure
of speech; and this is no fault. It seems to be more
reasonable that the Lord, omniscient, omnipotent, did,
like a magician, display all this illusion to facilitate
explanation or comprehension, inasmuch as stories,
although false, are easily understood by all. It is well
known that there is no truth to be attained from accounts
of creation (as they are false); and it is well established
in all the Upanishads that the end attained by the
conception of the unity of the Real Self is Immortality."
Does it differ from the views expressed by Gauḍapāda
regarding creation? He also says: "Evolution or
creation as described by illustrations of earth, iron,
sparks of fire, etc., has another meaning, viz., they are:only the means to the realization of the unity of Exist-
ence. There is nothing like distinction (in it)" (III. 15).

Does Vedānta take away from man his zeal for work? Does Vedānta teach pessimism? Many a Western and
Eastern critic of the philosophy of Advaita holds that it
makes a man only a dreamer, a sky-gazing spectator.
This is a wrong interpretation of Vedānta. Vedānta never teaches one to fly away from the world or to shut himself up in caves and forests. Many a poetic picture has been drawn of the Vedāntic seer living the life of a recluse far away from the maddening crowd of ignoble strife. But this is not true. Śankara, 'the lion of Vedānta,' and Swāmi Vivekānanda, 'the paragon of the Vedāntists' (as Prof. James of America characterised him) of the modern times, lived in human society and made the mightiest efforts for the uplift of humanity. They dedicated their lives to the amelioration of mankind. Vedānta has nothing to do with pessimism or optimism, or any 'ism' for the matter of that. It only teaches Truth. If the realization of Truth stand as an impediment to human progress, then the charge against Vedānta as the enemy of progress may be well justified. Nothing wonderful will happen to the world if the entire mankind be converted to Hinduism, Christianity, Buddhism, or Islam or to any other religion. But assuredly something marvellous will happen if a dozen of men and women pierce the thick walls of the church, temple, synagogue and realize the Truth. Again Truth is no characteristic of a recluse or a misanthrope or a bigoted thinker. The ancient Rishis of the Upanishads breathed the free air of Truth, sang the song of freedom and enjoyed the truth of life. Many of their highest teachings were imparted in the crowded courts of kings. The message of the Gītā, the excellent vade mecum of Vedānta, was delivered on the battlefield, where the grimmest realities of life were faced and battles fought. Arjuna after realizing the Vedāntic Truth did not flee away from the world, but girded his loins with fresh vigour and strength to discharge his duty (svadharma).
After Śri Kṛṣhṇa had delivered his message, Arjuna said, “Destroyed is my delusion, and I have got back the memory of my real nature through Thy grace, Oh Kṛṣhṇa. I am now firm, my doubts are gone. I will carry out Thy word.” Straightway he plunged into the terrible battle of Kurukshetra and performed his duty.

Renascence of Indian life, in its various aspects, political, social, material, æsthetic and religious, always followed the restoration of the Truth of Advaita to its pristine glory. The Upanishads, the Gītā, Buddha, Śankara and Rāmakṛṣhṇa stand at the crest of the mighty tidal waves of India’s renaissance. And all of them taught the essential truth of Vedānta in different forms.

The greatest tragedy of life is to think that no work is possible without a firm belief in duality and subject-object relationship. Men say that no work is possible without the consciousness of egoism and agency. On the other hand selfishness, sordidness, jealousy, passion, etc., which are manifested in our daily activities, are due to a belief in the reality of the subject-object relationship. The mightiest achievements that have really transformed the fate of humanity have been done by those who have had no thought of their ego. Śri Kṛṣhṇa says in the Gītā, “He who is free from the notion of egoism, whose intelligence is not affected (by good or evil), though he kills these people, he kills them not, nor is bound (by action).” The artist or the musician shows himself at his best when he feels himself one with his art. Śri Rāmakṛṣhṇa never had the idea of agency in the work of his spiritual ministration. He used to say, “Perform your work keeping always the knowledge of Advaita in your pocket.”
Is it possible to do any work which always implies the triad of perceiver, perceived and perception, if one be established in non-dual Brahman? The idea may involve a logical or psychological contradiction, but this position can be fully justified from the metaphysical or rather, philosophical standpoint. One pursuing Truth disinterestedly, when once established in Truth, can see this world of multiplicity and at the same time know it to be the non-dual Brahman, pure, free, and ever-illumined. A knower of Truth may move and act in the world like an ordinary man. He feels hungry and thirsty. He goes to sleep when tired. He feels compassion for the misery of others and tries his utmost to alleviate it; but at the same time he sees everywhere the non-dual Brahman alone, ever-free and ever-pure. Sri Kṛshṇa also says in the Gītā, "The offering is Brahman, the clarified butter is Brahman, in the fire of Brahman offered by Brahman, by seeing Brahman in actions, he reaches Brahman alone" (Gītā, IV. 24). We admit that this position is most difficult to be comprehended by those who are not trained in the pursuit of Ultimate Truth. Truly says Gauḍapāda, "Those few alone are known in the world as of high intellect who are firm in their conviction of the unborn and undivided Brahman. The ordinary people cannot understand them or their action" (IV. 95). He himself characterises the teachings of Kārikā as very deep (atigambhiram) and extremely difficult to be understood (durdarśam) (IV. 100).

The superficial critic often asks how it is possible to apply the teachings of Vedānta to our practical everyday life, if we are taught continually to think of the unreality of the world. How can the truth of non-dual Brahman, as taught by Vedānta, help one to work for individual
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...or collective progress? Vedānta certainly does not help us to bring grist to our individual or national mill. It certainly does not tell us how to increase our capacity to enjoy the pleasures derived from material objects. But Vedānta really teaches us how to enjoy the world after realizing its true nature. To embrace or comprehend the universe after realizing it as the non-dual Brahman, gives us peace that passeth all understanding. Says the seer in the Īṣa Upanishad, "All this—whatesoever moves in the earth—should be realized as permeated by the Lord (Ātman). Enjoy (the world) by renunciation (of the illusory names and forms). Covet not anybody's wealth." Does Vedānta really ask us to negate the world? Does it really teach us to negate the existing objects? A student of the Kārikā will at once realize that there is nothing to be negated or added. That which exists can never be non-existent. Brahman alone is existent on account of its persistence in all acts of cognition. Names, forms and relations are illusory on account of their changeability and negatability. Vedānta teaches us to realize the world as Brahman and then be one with it. Vedānta teaches us to see Brahman everywhere even in the so-called illusion. An illusion can never be real and it is perceived on account of our ignorance. A Vedāntist does not negate the world which, being Brahman, can never be negated. It only asks the student to know the real nature of the world. A knower of truth, as we have already stated, does his duty or work in the world. But the knowledge of Truth makes all the difference in his attitude towards the world. Where the ignorant person sees non-Brahman, the Jñāni realizes Brahman alone. A Jñāni just exercises his understanding, and then uses the same sense-organs in
dealing with the same external objects. He sees everywhere the non-dual Brahman.

One often hears in Europe and America that Vedānta is pantheism or idealism. Many foreign critics characterise Vedānta as illusionism. The critics only look at the Vedāntic truth from the relative standpoint. From the standpoint of the Ultimate Truth Vedānta is not idealism, as it does not see, in the Platonic fashion, the duality of illusory external objects and the reality of ideas. Nor does Vedānta teach, like the Buddhist idealists, that ideas, which alone are real, have birth, death and the characteristics of misery. Vedāntic truth is different from Kantian dualism which makes a distinction between noumena and phenomena. Berkley says that all external objects are but ideas in the perceiver's mind and God or the cosmic mind sends these ideas. Vedānta says that God is also an idea and the plurality of ideas and their relationship cannot be proved to be real. Vedānta is not certainly pantheism as it does not recognize any God, independent of the Self, who is the universe. Vedānta denies causality from the highest standpoint and thus invalidates the process of becoming. Vedānta, like Hegel, says that Reality is thought but denies the evolution of the Absolute. Bradley says that time, space, or causal relation cannot apply to the Absolute but at the same time he says that the Absolute 'somehow' becomes the manifested manifold. Gauḍapāda denies the manifestation, evolution or the becoming of Ātman.

The conclusion of Vedānta can be summed up in four words "All this is Brahman". Only the non-dual Brahman exists. There is no phenomenal Jīva about whom birth and death can be predicated. If one sees such birth, etc., it is due to his ignorance of the nature-
of Reality. Again this ignorance is not real (IV. 58). Jīvas are all peace from the very beginning, ever unproduced and indestructible by their very nature, and therefore, eternal and inseparable. All this is unborn and enlightened Brahman (IV. 93). The Jīvas are ever free from any obstruction (as obstruction does not exist) being entirely pure by nature. They are all-right and ever-liberated from the beginning (IV. 98). As Brahman alone exists there is nothing which can be accepted nor anything injurious which can be shunned.

The Teachings of Gauḍapāda can benefit only those that are equipped with the Sādhana Chatushtaya or the fourfold pre-requisites of philosophical discipline, such as discrimination, non-attachment (renunciation), self-control and an irrepressible hankering after the realization of Truth. Any one who undertakes the study of the Kārikā in a dilettante fashion will see in it nothing but confusion and may even be misled. Gauḍapāda has dealt with all the problems of philosophy following the scientific method of the modern times. The careful reader will find in the Kārikā the solution of such outstanding problems of philosophy as perception, idealism, causality, truth, Reality, etc. Every verse of the Kārikā demands profound thinking before it can be understood and appreciated. *But people will rather die than think.* The glory and value of the Māndūkya Upanishad has been infinitely enhanced by the Kārikā of Gauḍapāda.

We are not aware of any other English translation of the Māndūkya Upanishad with the Kārikā and Śankara's commentary than the one by Manilal N. Dwivedi published in 1894. For the most part the translation is reliable and we have looked into it while preparing our translation. We have felt that exhaustive notes are
necessary for the average reader to understand the real import of the Kārikā and Śankara’s commentary. Therefore we have tried to elucidate Gauḍapāda and Śankara with copious notes.

We are profoundly grateful to Mr. V. Subrahmanya Iyer, the retired Registrar of the Mysore University, for explaining to us the abstruse philosophy of the Kārikā. Mr. Iyer, the courageous thinker, taught us that no philosophy can live to-day in anything but a fool’s paradise, unless it ventures out into the open but biting air of critical reason as natural science does. Philosophy, like science, is vitally concerned with reasoned or rationally demonstrable truth and must not depend upon mere mystic vision or tradition or authority. The seed which ripens into vision may be a gift of the gods but the labour of cultivating it so that it may bear nourishing fruit is the indispensable function of arduous scientific or rational processes of thought. Mr. Subrahmanya Iyer has laid us under an additional debt of obligation by revising the entire book in its manuscript form and agreeing to stand sponsor to it in placing it before the public.

Above all, we cannot adequately express our deep sense of indebtedness to the distinguished Ruler of Mysore, His Highness the Maharaja, Śri Kṛṣṇarāja Wadiyar Bahadur IV. Not only his philosophic knowledge, but also his philosophic life, has become a household word in the State and throughout India. The days that we spent breathing the spiritual atmosphere created all around by the Temple on the Chamundi Hill, at the foot of which is situated His Highness’s famous and picturesque capital, were among the happiest. His great devotion to Śri Rāmakṛṣṇa, the teacher of Universal Love, lends an additional charm to his life. And we felt that the
best way in which we could acknowledge all that we owe to Mysore and its famous Ruler would be to bring out a work of this kind, associating it with the name of the royal Vedāntin, who is himself an ardent admirer of Śrī Gauḍapāda.

_Vedānta Society, Providence, Rhode Island, U.S.A., 24th June, 1932._

**Swāmi Nikhilānanda.**
Aum  Salutation to Brahman

THE MĀNDŪKYOPANISHAD

VEDIC INVOCATION

O Gods (Devā)! Auspicious sounds may we hear with the ears. Auspicious forms may we behold with the eyes. May we, full of praise of the Highest, enjoy, in healthy body with perfect limbs, our allotted years, (may we be) the beloved of the Gods.

Aum Peace! Peace! Peace!

INVOCATION BY ŚANKARA

I bow to that Brahman that (during the waking state) after having enjoyed (experienced) all gross objects by pervading the entire universe through the omnipresent rays of its immutable consciousness that embraces the entire variety of the movable and the immovable objects; that again, after having digested, as it were,—that is to say, experienced within (in the dream state)—all the variety of objects produced by desires and brought into existence by the mind, enjoys bliss in deep sleep and makes us experience through Māyā, the bliss; which, further, is designated, in terms of Māyā, as the fourth (Turīya), and which is supreme, immortal and changeless.

May that Turīya that, (through Māyā) having identified itself as the entire universe, experiences (in the waking state) the manifold gross objects of enjoyment through ignorance and attachment, that again during the dream state, experiences, being enlightened by its own light, the
subtle objects of enjoyment, the objects that are brought into existence by its own internal organ, and which, lastly, in dreamless sleep withdraws all objects (subtle as well as gross) within itself and thus becomes free from all distinctions and differences,—(May this Turiya that) is ever devoid of all attributes, protect us.

ŚANKARA'S INTRODUCTION TO THE UPAISHAD

COMMENTARY

With the word Aum, etc., begins the treatise, consisting of four¹ chapters, the quintessence² of the substance³ of the import of Vedānta.⁴ Hence⁵ no separate mention is made of the (mutual) relationship, the subject-matter and the object to be attained (Matters usually stated in an introduction to a study of any Vedāntic treatise). For, that which constitutes the relationship, the subject-matter and the object of the Vedāntic study is evident here. Nevertheless, that one desirous of explaining a Prakarana (treatise), should deal with them is the opinion of the scholastic. This treatise must be said to contain a subject-matter on account of its revealing⁶ the means (for the realization of Ātman) that serves the purpose, or the end to be attained. It therefore possesses, though indirectly, ‘specific relationship’, ‘subject-matter’ and ‘the end to be attained’. What then, is that end⁷ in view? It is thus explained: As a man stricken with disease regains his normal⁸ state with the removal⁹ of (the cause of) the disease, so the self labouring under misapprehension, owing to identification¹⁰ of itself with misery, recovers its normal¹¹ state with the cessation (of the illusion) of duality, which manifests itself as the phenomenal universe. This realization of non-duality is the end to be attained. This treatise is begun for the
purpose of revealing\textsuperscript{12} Brahman inasmuch as by knowledge (\textit{Vidyā}) the illusion of duality, caused by ignorance, is destroyed. This is established by such scriptural passages as: ‘For where there is, as it were, duality, where there exists, as it were, another, there one sees another, and one knows another. But where all this has, verily, become \textit{Ātman} (for one), how should one see another, how should one know another?’

The first chapter, then, seeks, by dealing specifically with the Vedic texts,\textsuperscript{13} to indicate the (traditional) means to the realization of the essential nature of \textit{Ātman} and is devoted to the determination\textsuperscript{14} of the meaning of \textit{Aum}. The second chapter seeks rationally\textsuperscript{16} to demonstrate the unreality of duality; the illusion (duality) being destroyed, the knowledge of non-duality (becomes evident), as the cessation of the imagination of snake, etc., in the rope reveals the real nature of the rope. The third chapter is devoted to the rational demonstration of the truth of non-duality, lest it should, in like manner,\textsuperscript{16} be contended to be unreal. The fourth chapter is devoted to the rational refutation of the other schools of thought which are antagonistic to the truth as pointed out in the Vedas and which are opposed to the knowledge of the Advaitic Reality, by pointing out their falsity on account of their own mutual\textsuperscript{17} contradiction.

\textsuperscript{1} \textit{Four chapters}—\textit{i.e.}, the \textit{Māndūkyopanishad} with the \textit{Kārikā} by Gauḍapāda treated in four chapters: \textit{viz.}, the \textit{Āgama Prakaraṇa}, the \textit{Vaitathya Prakaraṇa}, the \textit{Advaita Prakaraṇa} and the \textit{Alāta-śānti Prakaraṇa}. The mere Upanishadic portion without the \textit{Kārikā} does not present a full view of the \textit{philosophic system of Vedānta} which seeks to interpret human knowledge as a whole (\textit{vide} Foreword).

\textsuperscript{2} \textit{Quintessence}—It is because the \textit{Māndūkya Śruti} confines itself only to the establishment of non-duality without controverting
the doctrines of the other systems. *Muktikopanishad* aptly describes that *Māndūkya* alone, among the Upanishads, is sufficient for liberation (the attainment of truth). *Cf.* माण्डूक्यमेकमेवांले 

\[3\] Substance—The doctrine of the non-difference of *Jīva* and *Brahman*.

\[4\] *Vedānta*—It literally means the last portion of the Vedas which is identical with the Upanishads. The word also signifies the essence of the Vedas. Vedāntic works usually deal with the following: the fitness of a pupil for the study of *Brahmavidya*, the qualification of the teacher, the nature of *Jīva* and *Brahman*, and finally the non-difference or non-duality of the two.

\[5\] Hence, etc.—Śankara treats the *Māndūkyopanishad* and the *Kārikā* not as a *Śāstra* but as a *Prakarana* (treatise). A *Śāstra* though related to a particular end in view deals with varieties of topics. But a *Prakarana* is a short manual which confines itself to some essential topics of a *Śāstra*. All the arguments of the *Māndūkyopanishad* with *Kārikā* ultimately point to the establishment of the attributeless *Brahman*, thus serving the purpose of a *Prakarana* which is defined as follows:

\[6\] 

शाख्रक्षेत्यसंभवं 

शाख्रकार्यान्तरे 

स्थितम् 

आहः प्रकरणं नाम प्रस्थंभेदं विपाष्ठेत् ।

The other Vedāntic texts also establish the truth of non-duality but they incidentally discuss various other philosophical doctrines.

A *Prakarana* (treatise) has four indispensable elements (अनुवंध) literally, "what sticks to another," namely, the determination of the fitness of the student for the study of the treatise (अविकारी), the subject-matter (विषय), the mutual relationship (संबंध) between the treatise and the subject-matter (which is that of the explainer and the explained) and the object to be attained by the study, *i.e.*, its utility (प्रयोजन).

\[6\] Revealing, etc.—Though liberation is attained through the knowledge of the non-duality of *Jīva* and *Brahman* and not as a result of the study of scriptures, yet the scriptures indirectly help the attainment of this knowledge by pointing to the illusory character of duality.

\[7\] Object—Is the knowledge something to be produced or is it ever-existent? In the former case, it would be like other effects,
impermanent, and in the latter case, the means pursued would be futile. The reply is that though the Knowledge of Ātman is eternally existent, yet it is obscured by ignorance in the Jīva. The aim of Sādhanā is to remove this obstruction. Thus Sādhanā serves a useful purpose though it does not make the student attain anything new.

8 Normal state—The sick man thinks that he has lost the normal state during the period of his illness.

9 Removal, etc.—This is done by means of medicine, etc.

10 Identification, etc.—This suffering is due to the illusion of duality, such as egoism, etc., caused by ignorance which does not exist in reality. Otherwise its destruction would be an impossibility.

11 Normal state—This state being in itself perfect, cannot be transcended by any other state.

12 Revealing, etc.—This is done by the removal of ignorance which is the cause of the illusion of duality.

13 Vedic texts—The first chapter of the Māndūkyopanishad, namely, the Āgama Prakaraṇa, consists mainly of the Upanishadic texts. The doctrines contained therein are established rationally in the following three chapters.

14 Determination—This would enable the student to attain the knowledge of the self, whose real nature is revealed by the demonstration of the unreality of duality which is an illusion. Ātman is realized through such knowledge. Therefore the indirect result of the explanation of the real nature of Aum leads to the attainment of the sumnum bonum. The rational treatment will follow.

15 Rationally—With the disappearance of the sense of reality with regard to illusions, there spontaneously arises the knowledge of truth. Gauḍapāda in the second, third and fourth chapters of the Kārikā, rationally presents the truth, presented in the first.

16 In like manner—There may be a doubt regarding the very existence of Reality when duality is removed. The argument followed by the author of the Kārikā is that the knowledge of Reality is such that it is never contradicted.

17 Mutual contradiction—The contradictions are pointed out with a view to establishing the truth of non-dualism—a course infrequently pursued by both Gauḍapāda and Śankara.
CHAPTER I

ĀGAMA PRAKARĀṆA
(THE UPAŅISHADIC CHAPTER)

I

INTRODUCTORY REMARKS BY ŚANKARA

How does, again, the determination of (the meaning of) Aum help the realization of the essential nature of Ātman? It is thus explained: The Śruti passages such as these declare thus: "It is Aum." "This (Aum) is the (best) support." "Oh, Satyakāma, It is the Aum which is also the higher and the lower Brahman." "Meditate on the Self as Aum." "Aum, this word is Brahman." "All this is verily Aum." As the rope, etc., which are the substratum of such illusions (misapprehensions) as the snake, etc., so is the non-dual Ātman, which is the Ultimate Reality, the substratum of such imaginations as the vital breath (Prāṇa), etc., which are unreal. Similarly, Aum is the substratum of the entire illusion of the world of speech having for its (corresponding) contents such illusory objects as Prāṇa, etc., imagined in Ātman. And Aum is verily of the same essential character as the Ātman; for it is the name for Ātman. All illusions such as Prāṇa, etc., having Ātman for their substratum and denoted by words—which are but modifications of Aum—cannot exist without names (which are but the modification of Aum). This is supported by such Śruti passages as: "The modification being only a name arising from speech." "All this related to It
(Brahman) is held\textsuperscript{16} together by the cord\textsuperscript{17} of speech and strands\textsuperscript{18} of (specific) names.” “All these (are rendered possible in experience) by names,” etc.

\textsuperscript{1} Thus—The reason given here chiefly depends upon the scriptural authority, because the first chapter of this work lays emphasis on the scriptural texts.

\textsuperscript{2} Sruti passages—For detailed explanations of these passages the reader is referred to the respective Upanishads in which they occur.

\textsuperscript{3} Declare—The ultimate relationship between \textit{Aum} and Brahman is thus explained. The phenomena of the world consist of ideas or the mental states. Ideas depend upon words for their expression. The utterance of the word \textit{Aum} (\textit{A U M}) gives the clue to the pronunciations of all the words or sounds used by human beings. The various parts of the vocal organ used in the utterance of sounds come in contact with each other while pronouncing the word \textit{Aum}. Therefore, \textit{Aum} is the matrix of all sounds which in their diversified forms give rise to words used in the language. The substratum of phenomena is Brahman. The substratum of all sounds, as seen above, is \textit{Aum}. The sounds signifying the phenomena are non-different from the phenomena as both are illusions. When the illusion disappears the substratum alone remains which, being one, admits of no difference. Hence Brahman is \textit{Aum}.

\textsuperscript{4} It is, etc.—Kathopanishad, 1.2.15. When \textit{Aum} is uttered with concentration there arises the consciousness of Brahman in the mind. Therefore \textit{Aum} is the nearest symbol helping the concentration of the mind leading to the realization of Brahman. The principle of this process is known as \textit{शाखाचन्दनव्रताय}.

\textsuperscript{5} Best—Kathopanishad, 1.2.17. This is the best symbol of Brahman like an image (प्रतिमा) of Vishnu.

\textsuperscript{6} It is, etc.—Praśnopanishad, 5.2. “The knower through the support (of the \textit{Aum}) attains to one or the other. Through the meditation of \textit{Aum} one can realize both the \textit{Para} (attributeless) \textit{Brahman} and the \textit{Apara} (associated with names and forms) Brahman.”

\textsuperscript{7} Meditate—One, who seeks to realize the Self through “one-pointed” concentration on \textit{Aum}, feels that the gross universe (symbolised by \textit{A}) is absorbed into the subtle (\textit{U}) and (\textit{U}) into the causal (\textit{M}) and, finally, the universe dependent upon causal relation is withdrawn into the transcendental which is known as \textit{Aṃātrā} and which cannot be designated by any letter or sound.
8 This word, etc.—Taittiriyopanishad, 1.8.1: Aum indicates that both Saguna and Nirguna Brahman have the same substratum which is the Nirguna (attributeless) Brahman or the highest Reality.

9 All this is, etc.—Both, i.e., Aum and Brahman, are the support of everything, they form the most universal concept. Therefore the knowledge of Aum and Brahman is identical.

10 Vital breath—The non-dual Brahman, being the only existing Reality, does not admit of any other existence. Therefore Prana, etc. and their effects are but mental manifestations which are unreal, having Brahman for their substratum,—like the illusion of snake superimposed upon a rope.

11 Having, etc.—Prana, etc., are merely modifications of speech because they cannot be conceived of without names. As again names are nothing but different manifestations of Aum, therefore Prana, etc., have Aum for their substratum.

12 Same nature—The name and the thing indicated by it are identical inasmuch as both are mental (Kalpanika).

13 Modifications—All sounds are included in “A”—the first letter of the alphabet (cf. The Sruti passage, अकारां वै सर्वावकु । “A” is the chief constituent of Aum. Therefore all mental manifestations (i.e., the objects denoted by them are identical with the sounds associated with them) cannot exist apart from Aum.

14 Cannot exist, etc.—The purpose of the Sruti is to show the identity of the name and the object. This can be understood from the standpoint of mentalism which explains everything as mere idea or a mental state or content.


16 Held with—i.e., Pervaded.

17 Cord—It stands for the general (सामान्य).

18 Strands—They denote the particular (विशेष).

Therefore it is said:—

हृिः ओमु । ओमिलेिदक्षरमिदं संवं तत्स्योपव्यास्त्यानं 
भूिं भवाद्रविध्यादिति सर्वमोऽकार एव । यथान्यविति- 
काहातीिं तद्भ्योऽकार एव || १ ||
Hariḥ Aum. *Aum*, the word, is all this. A clear explanation of it (is the following). All that is past, present and future is verily *Aum*. That which is beyond the triple conception of time, is also truly *Aum*.

**ŚANKARA’S COMMENTARY**

*Aum*, the word, is all this. As all diversified objects that we see around us, indicated by names, are not different¹ from their (corresponding) names, and further as the different names are not different from *Aum*, therefore all this is verily *Aum*. As a thing is known through its name, so the highest Brahman is known through *Aum* alone. Therefore the highest Brahman is verily *Aum*. This (treatise) is the explanation of that, *tasya*, that is, of *Aum*, the word, which is of the same nature as the higher as well as the lower Brahman. *Upavāyā-khyānam* means clear explanation, because *Aum* is the means to the knowledge of Brahman on account of its having the closest proximity to Brahman. The word ‘*Prastutam*’ meaning ‘commences’ should be supplied to complete the sentence (as otherwise, it is incomplete). That which is conditioned by the triple (conceptions of) time, such as past, present and future is also verily *Aum* for reasons already explained. All that is beyond the three (divisions of) time, *i.e.*, unconditioned by time, and yet known by their effects, which is called ‘*Avyākṛta*’, the unmanifested, etc.,—that also² is verily *Aum*.

¹ *Not different*—That the name and the object denoted by it are identical is understood from the standpoint of mentalism which explains everything cognized or perceived as only a form of thought.

² *Also, etc.*—Because the effect is non-different from the cause.
INTRODUCTORY REMARKS BY ŚANKARA

Though the name and the object signified by the name are one and the same, still the explanation has been given (here) by giving prominence to the name (Aum). Though in the Upanishadic passage,—“Aum, this word, is all this”—explanation has been furnished by giving prominence to the name (Aum), the same thought is again expounded by giving prominence to the thing signified by the name. The object is to realize the knowledge of the oneness of the name and the thing signified by it. Otherwise, (the explanation) that the knowledge of the thing is dependent on the name, might suggest that the oneness of the name and the thing is to be taken only in a figurative sense. The purpose of the knowledge of the unity (of the name and the thing signified by it) is to simultaneously remove, by a single effort, (the illusion of) both the name and the thing and establish (the nature of) Brahman which is other than both. Therefore, the Śruti says, “The quarters (Pādas) are the letters of Aum (Mātrā) and the letters are the quarters.”

1 Explanation—i.e., of what is intended to be taught by the Upanishadic text.

2 Prominence—Because Aum is the first word of the first Upanishad. The purport of the sentence is that Aum is the symbol, the most universal, for all the phenomena of the world. Therefore prominence is given to Aum (अभिधान).

3 Prominence—The second Upanishad is “All this is, truly, Brahman.” Hence the emphasis is on ‘All this’—which is the object (अभिधेय) signified by Aum.

4 Figurative—i.e., the mere convention of calling a thing by a particular name.
Which is, etc.—The knowledge of the attributeless Brahman is possible only when the illusion of both the name and the thing signified by it is removed.

Therefore it says:—

सर्वं हेतुस्मायमात्मा ब्रह्म सोडयमात्मा चतुष्पातः ॥ २ ॥

All this is verily Brahman. This Ātman is Brahman. This Ātman has four quarters.

ŚANKARA’S COMMENTARY

All this is verily Brahman. All that has been said to consist merely of Aum (in the previous text) is Brahman. That Brahman which has been described as existing inferentially is now pointed out, as being directly known, by the passage, “This Self is Brahman”. The word this, meaning that which appears divided into four quarters, is pointed out as the innermost self, with a gesture (of hand) by the passage, “This is Ātman”. That Ātman indicated by Aum, signifying both the higher and the lower Brahman, has four quarters (Pādas), not indeed, like the four feet (Pādas) of a cow, but like the four quarters (Pādas) of a coin known as Kārshāpana. The knowledge of the fourth (Turiya) is attained by merging the (previous) three, such as Viśwa, etc., in it in the order of the previous one, in the succeeding one. Here the word ‘Pāda’ or ‘foot’ is used in the sense of instrument. The word ‘Pāda’ is again used in the sense of an object when the object to be achieved is the fourth (Turiya).

1 Described—i.e., by the Śruti.

2 Inferentially—i.e., we cannot directly perceive its presence but we can infer it. It is opposed to अपरिश्चर्य which refers to the knowledge of a thing that is not directly perceived but about
the existence of which one becomes absolutely certain by means of what is known as realization.

3. Directly—The word प्रक्रिय, nowadays, is applied, especially in the Nyāya Philosophy, to the knowledge of the objects of sense-perception. But occasionally it is used, in the Upanishad and the Vedāntic text, in the sense of अप्रक्रिय.

4. Four quarters—Namely, Viśwa (the waking state), Taijasa (dream state), Prājna (Sushupti or the state of dreamless sleep) and Turīya which is same as Brahman or Ātman. These four quarters correspond to the three Mātrás of Aum and the Amātra of Aum. A, U and M are the three Mātrās. The fourth, which is known as Amātra or without a letter, has no corresponding letter or sound. This is silence or Ātman corresponding to Turīya. The idea of sound suggests the idea of soundlessness or silence from which sound may be said to proceed.

5. Gesture—i.e., by placing the hand on the region of the heart which, in popular belief, is the seat of Ātman.

6. Has, etc.—The four quarters are imagined in Ātman to facilitate the understanding of the pupil.

7. Cow—Because cow has actually four feet which are unrelated with one another.

8. Coin—Kārśāpana is a coin made up of four quarters. A quarter-Kārśāpana is merged in the half-Kārśāpana; the half is merged in the three-fourth-Kārśāpana and the three-quarters ultimately is merged in the full Kārśāpana.

9. In the, etc.—Viśwa is merged in Taijasa, Taijasa in Prājna and finally Prājna is merged in Turīya.

10. Here—It is because the ‘fourth’ pāda is realized by means of merging the three states in it.

11. In the sense of—It is because the attention is here drawn to the fourth ‘pāda’ which is the object of the enquiry.

III

How1 four quarters are said to indicate Ātman is thus2 explained:

बाहिष्प्रक्रियास्तिस्थानाओऽविवर्धितमेवः
स्थूलभूतविन्द्वनानां: प्रथमः पादः || २ ||

अगमाप्रकरणानः
The first quarter (Pāda) is Vaiśwānara whose sphere (of activity) is the waking state, who is conscious of external objects, who has seven limbs and nineteen mouths and whose experience consists of gross (material) objects.

ŚANKARA'S COMMENTARY

Jāgaritasthāna, i.e., his sphere (of activity) is the waking state. Bahishpraṇa, i.e., who is aware of objects other than himself. The meaning is that consciousness appears, as it were, related to outward objects on account of Avidyā. Similarly Saptāṅga, i.e., he has seven limbs. The Śruti says, "Of that Vaiśwānara Self, the effulgent region is his head, the sun his eye, the air his vital breath, the ether (Ākāśa) the (middle part of his) body, the water his kidney and the earth his feet." The Āhavanīya fire (one of the three fires of the Agnihotra sacrifice) has been described as his mouth in order to complete the imagery of the Agnihotra sacrifice. He is called Saptāṅga because these are the seven limbs of his body. Similarly, he has nineteen mouths. These are the five organs of perception (Buddhindriyas); the five organs of action (Karmendriyas); the five aspects of vital breath (Prāṇa, etc.); the mind (Manas); the intellect (Buddhi); egoity (Ahamkāra); mind-stuff (Chitta). These are, as it were, the mouths, i.e., the instruments by means of which he (Vaiśvānara) experiences (objects). He, the Vaiśvānara, thus constituted, experiences through the instruments enumerated above, gross objects, such as sound, etc.

He is called Vaiśvānara because he leads all creatures of the universe in diverse ways (to the enjoyment of various objects); or because he comprises all beings. Following the grammatical rules regarding the compound
which gives the latter meaning, the word that is formed is Viśwānara, which is the same as Vaiśwānara. He is the first quarter because he is non-different from the totality of gross bodies (known as Virāt). He is called first\(^{12}\) (quarter) because the subsequent quarters are realized through him (Vaiśwānara).

(Objection)—while the subject-matter under discussion treats of the innermost Self (Pratyak Ātmā) as having four quarters—in the text, “This Ātman is Brahman”—how is it that (the external universe consisting of) the effulgent regions, etc., have been described as its limbs such as head, etc.?

(Reply)—This, however, is no\(^{13}\) mistake; because the object is to describe the entire phenomena, including those of gods (Adhidaiva) as having four quarters from\(^{14}\) the standpoint of this Ātman known as the Virāt (i.e., the totality of the gross universe). And in\(^{15}\) this way alone is non-duality established by the removal of (the illusion of) the entire\(^{16}\) phenomena. Further, the one Ātman is realized as existing in all beings and all\(^{17}\) beings are seen as existing in Ātman. And, thus alone, the meaning of such Śruti passages as “Who sees all beings in the Self, etc.” can be said to be established. Otherwise,\(^{18}\) the subjective world will, verily, be, as in the case of such philosophers as the Sāmkhyas,\(^{19}\) limited by its (one’s) own body. And if that be the case, no room would be left for the Advaita which is the special feature of the Śruti. For, in the case of duality, there would be no difference between the Advaita and the Sāmkhya and other systems. The establishment of the identity of all with Ātman is sought by all the Upanishads. It is, therefore, quite reasonable to speak of the effulgent regions, etc., as seven limbs in connection with the
subjective (individual self, \textit{Adhyātma}) associated with the gross body, because of its identity with the \textit{Adhidaiva} (comprising the super-physical regions) universe from the standpoint of the \textit{Virāt} (the totality of the gross physical universe). This is further known from such characteristic indication (of the Šruti), as “Thy head shall fall”, etc.

The identity (of \textit{Adhyātma} and \textit{Adhidaiva}) from the standpoint of the \textit{Virāt} indicates similar identity\textsuperscript{21} of the selves known as the \textit{Hiraṇyagarbha} and the \textit{Taijasa\textsuperscript{22}} as well as of the Unmanifested\textsuperscript{23} (Īśwara) and the \textit{Prājna}. It is also stated in the \textit{Madhu Brāhmaṇa}, “This bright immortal person in this earth and that bright immortal person in the body (both are \textit{Madhu}).” It is an established fact that the Self in deep sleep (\textit{Prājna}) is identical with the Unmanifested (Īśwara) because\textsuperscript{24} of the absence of any distinction between them. Such being the case, it is clearly established that non-duality is realized by the disappearance (of the illusion) of all duality.

\textsuperscript{1} \textit{How, etc.—}The reason for doubting is that \textit{Ātman} is without parts.

\textsuperscript{2} \textit{Thus, etc.—}Four quarters are merely assumed to facilitate understanding by the unenlightened.

\textsuperscript{3} \textit{Sphere, etc.—}It is because the Self identifies itself with the experincer in the waking state.

\textsuperscript{4} \textit{Who is aware, etc.—}Consciousness (\textit{Prājna}), really speaking, is identical with Self. It cannot be related to external objects because nothing exists outside consciousness. Owing to \textit{Ajnāna} (ignorance), the \textit{Buddhi Vṛitti} (mental modification) objectifies itself into what are called material entities, ego and non-ego. These material objects do not possess any independent existence. Both the \textit{Vṛitti} and its objects are imagined in \textit{Ātman}. From the standpoint of \textit{Ātman} it does not experience any object external which is totally non-existent.
Seven—This assumption is based upon scriptural authority. Cf. Chhand. Up., 5. 18. 2.

Effulgent, etc.—i.e., Dyuloka or the sky with its luminary bodies such as the sun, the moon, the stars, etc.

Water—The word "Rayi", meaning "Food" and "wealth", also indicates "water" by which whatever is "food" grows, bringing in its turn "wealth".

Five organs, etc.—namely, the organ of sight, sound, smell, taste and touch.

Five organs, etc.—namely, hands, feet and organs of speech, generation and evacuation.

Five airs or humours, etc.—viz., Prāṇa, Apāṇa, Samāna, Vyāna and Udāna.

To the enjoyment, etc.—He makes people enjoy pleasure and pain according to their virtuous or vicious deeds.

First—The word does not denote any priority of creation. It is called first because from the standpoint of Vaiśvānara or the waking state alone one can understand the other states, i.e., as has been pointed out under the first Upanishad, we see first how from the waking state the dream state and the state of dreamless sleep are known.

No mistake—The subjective is known as the Adhyātma. The Adhidaiva comprises the objective universe including the spheres of the sun, the moon, the stars, etc. Adhyātma is non-different from Adhidaiva because both these, as has already been pointed out, are but ideas imagined in Ātman. Hence there is no mistake in assuming Adhidaivika members as forming the limbs of the Adhyātma.

From the standpoint, etc.—The gross physical aspects of both Adhyātma and Adhidaiva, known as Vīrāt (i.e., the totality of all physical bodies), form the first quarter of the Ātman or Brahman. The subtle or Sūkṣhma (namely, the Apanchikṛta) aspects, known as the Hiranyagarbha (i.e., the totality of the subtle), form the second quarter of the Ātman or Brahman. The Kāraṇa or causal aspect known as the A Vyākṛta (unmanifested) or the Īśwara comprising both the Adhyātma and Adhidaiva is the third quarter. And the transcendental (Turiya) which is beyond all causal relations and which is the ultimate substratum of all appearances, viz., Vīrāt, Hiranyagarbha and Īśwara, is the fourth quarter. In all these
instances there is non-difference between the Adhyyātma and Adhidaiva. Therefore there is no mistake in applying the limbs of Adhidaiva to Adhyyātma.

15 In this way alone—i.e., by merging each of the three states step by step, in the Turiya or the transcendental.

16 Entire, etc.—i.e., from Brahmā or the highest cosmic being to the mere blade of grass.

17 All beings—i.e., they are seen as mere imagination upon Ātman. Compare the following couplet from the Manu Smṛti:

सर्वभूतत्थमात्मानं सर्वभूतानि चातमनि ।
संसप्तनामस्यायो वेष्काराजयमविविधच्छांत ॥

18 Otherwise—i.e., by admitting the duality of Adhyyātma and Adhidaiva.

19 Sāmkhyas—The Sāmkhya doctrine admits the plurality of souls as based upon manifoldness of experience. The Vedāntin explains the plurality to be due to Avidyā.

20 Thy head, etc.—i.e., if thou worshippst the effulgent region which is but a part of Vaiśwānara as the Vaiśwānara itself.

21 Identity—i.e., in the spiritual plane.

22 Taijasa—The individual self while dreaming is called Taijasa.

23 The Unmanifested, etc.—The identity of Iśwara and Prājna. The individual self in the state of deep sleep (Sushupti) is called Prājna.

24 Because, etc.—The Prājna or the causal self withdraws into itself at the time of deep sleep all distinctions of objects as well as the objects themselves experienced in waking and dream states. The Iśwara (the cosmic soul) too at the time of dissolution withdraws into itself all distinctions experienced in the planes of Virāt and Hiranyagarbha which correspond respectively to the waking and the dream states of the subjective.

IV

सत्साक्षाद्वजन: प्रज्ञा सतात्म एकोनविशालितमुक्तः
प्रविविक्तभृजाजसो द्वितीय: पादः ॥ ४ ॥
The second quarter (Pāda) is the Taijasa whose sphere (of activity) is the dream, who is conscious of internal objects, who has seven limbs and nineteen mouths and who experiences the subtle objects.

ŚANKARA’S COMMENTARY

He is called the Svapnasthāna because the dream (state) is his (Taijasa) sphere. Waking consciousness, being associated as it is with many means,¹ and appearing² conscious of objects as if external, though (in reality) they are nothing but states³ of mind, leaves in the mind corresponding⁴ impressions. That the mind (in dream) without⁵ any of the external means, but possessed of the impressions left on it by the waking consciousness, like⁶ a piece of canvas⁷ with the pictures painted on it, experiences the dream state also as if it were like the waking, is due to its being under the influence of ignorance, desire and their action.⁸ Thus⁹ it is said, “(And when he falls asleep) then after having taken away with him (portion of the) impressions from the world during the waking state (destroying and building up again, he experiences dream by his own light)” (Bṛhd. Up., 4. 3. 9). Similarly the Atharvāṇa, after introducing the subject with “(all the senses) become one in the highest¹⁰ Deva, the mind,” continues “There the god (mind) enjoys in dream greatness”¹¹ (Praśna Up.). From¹² the standpoint of the sense-organs, the mind is internal. He (the Taijasa) is called the Antahprajna or conscious of the internal because his consciousness in dream becomes aware of the mental states, which are impressions left by the previous waking state. He is called the Taijasa because he appears as the subject though this (dream) consciousness is without any (gross) object and
is of the nature of the essence of light. The Viśwa (the subject of the waking state) experiences consciousness associated with gross external objects; whereas, here (in the dream state), the object of experience is consciousness consisting of Vāsanās (the impressions of past experience). Therefore this experience is called the experience\textsuperscript{13} of the subtle. The rest is common (with the previous Śruti). This Taijasa is the second quarter (of Ātman).

\textsuperscript{1} Means—Subject-object relationship, agency, instrumentality, etc.

\textsuperscript{2} Appearing—According to Vedānta, external objects, perceived by the sense-organs, have no absolute reality. They appear as real on account of Avidyā. Their reality cannot be proved for the simple reason that they become non-existent when their essential character is enquired into.

\textsuperscript{3} States of mind—External objects are nothing but mental existents produced by Avidyā. There are no such independent external entities as objects; they are but creations of the mind. In fact we are not conscious of any external objects independent of the mind. We take our mental creations to be such objects. Again those who seek for the cause of these mental creations or ideas, which we think we see as external objects, are led into a logical regressus. This causal chain leads nowhere. It will be shown later on that the whole idea of cause and effect is unreal.

\textsuperscript{4} Corresponding, etc.—that is, like those experienced in the waking state. These impressions are subsequently reproduced in the form of dream-objects.

\textsuperscript{5} Without any, etc.—It is because in dream no other separate entity than the mind of the dreamer, is present.

\textsuperscript{6} Like a piece, etc.—Dream experiences appear as real as the experiences of the waking state.

\textsuperscript{7} Like a piece of canvas, etc.—The picture painted on a piece of canvas appears to possess various dimensions though, in reality, the picture is on a plane surface. Similarly, dream-experiences,
though really states of mind, appear to be characterized by the presence of externality and internality.

8 *Action*—The word "*Karma*" is used in *Vedānta* in more senses than one. "*Karma*" primarily means "action". It also signifies the destiny forged by one in one's past incarnation or present: the store of tendencies, impulses, characteristics and habits, which determine one's future embodiment and environment. Another meaning of "*Karma*", often used in reference to one's caste or position in life, is ritual, the course of conduct, which one ought to follow in pursuance of the tendencies acquired in the past, with a view to work them out. The meaning of the word, here, is the tendencies generated in the mind by the activities of the waking state. *Avidyā* gives rise to *Kāma* or desire, and this in its turn, impels a man to action.

9 *Thus, etc.*—The causal relation between the waking and the dream states is sought to be established here on scriptural authority.

10 *Highest, etc.*—It is because in the dream state the *Jīva* is associated with the *Upādhi* of mind.

11 *Greatness*—The *Jīva* in sleep, characterized by darkness, possesses the light by means of which the subject-object relationship is seen. The greatness of mind consists in the fact that in dream it can transform itself into knowledge, act of knowing and the object of knowledge.

12 *From the standpoint of*—From the standpoint of the waking state alone when the sense-organs are active, one can review the dream experiences and thus come to know the internal activity of the mind which acts in the dream state independently of the sense-organs of the waking state.

13 *Experience of the subtle*—The experiences of waking and dream states are of the same nature; for in both the states the perceiver is aware only of his mental states which are not related to any external objects, as they are non-existent. From the standpoint of dream, dream objects are as gross and material as those experienced in the waking state. From the view-point of the waking state alone, one may infer that the dream objects are subtle, that is, composed of mere impressions of the waking state, inasmuch as in the dream state no external (that is, gross) object exists at all.
That is the state of deep sleep wherein the sleeper does not desire any objects nor does he see any dream. The third quarter (Pāda) is the Prājna whose sphere is deep sleep, in whom all (experiences) become unified or undifferentiated, who is verily, a mass of consciousness entire, who is full of bliss and who experiences bliss, and who is the path leading to the knowledge (of the two other states).

ŚANKARA’S COMMENTARY

The adjectival clause, viz., “Wherein the sleeper,” etc., is put with a view to enabling one to grasp what the state of deep sleep (Sushupti) signifies. Inasmuch as sleep characterized by¹ the absence of the knowledge of Reality is the common feature of those mental modifications which are associated with (waking, that is) perception² (of gross objects) and (dream, that is the) non-perception³ (of gross objects). Or⁴ the object of the introduction of the adjectival clause may be to distinguish the state of deep sleep (of the sleeping person) from the two previous states as sleep characterized by the absence of knowledge of Reality is the common feature of the three states. ‘Wherein,’ that is to say, in which state or time, the sleeping person does not see
any dream, nor does he desire any desirable (object). For, in the state of deep sleep, there does not exist, as in the two other states, any desire or the dream experience whose characteristic is to take a thing for what it is not. He is called the ‘Sushuptasthāna’ because his sphere is this state of deep sleep. Similarly it is called Ekābhyūta, i.e., the state in which all experiences become unified—a state in which all objects of duality, which are nothing but forms of thought, spread over the two states (viz., the waking and the dream), reach the state of indiscrimination or non-differentiation without losing their characteristics, as the day, revealing phenomenal objects, is enveloped by the darkness of night. Therefore conscious experiences, which are nothing but forms of thought, perceived during dream and waking states, become a thick mass (of consciousness) as if it were (in deep sleep); this state of deep sleep is called the ‘Prajñānaghana’ (a mass of all consciousness unified) on account of the absence of all manifoldness (discrimination of variety). As at night, owing to the indiscrimination produced by darkness, all (percepts) become a mass (of darkness) as it were, so also in the state of deep sleep all (objects) of consciousness, verily, become a mass (of consciousness). The word ‘eva’ (‘verily’) in the text denotes the absence of any other thing except consciousness (in deep sleep). (At the time of deep sleep) the mind is free from the miseries of the efforts made on account of the states of the mind being involved in the relationship of subject and object: therefore, it is called the Ānandamaya, that is, endowed with an abundance of bliss. But this is not Bliss Itself; because it is not Bliss Infinite. As in common (experience) parlance, one, free from efforts, is called happy and
enjoyer of bliss. As the Prājna\textsuperscript{11} enjoys this state of deep sleep which is entirely free from all efforts, therefore it is called the ‘Ānandabhuk’ (the experiencer of bliss). The Śruti also says, “This is its highest bliss.” It is called the ‘Cetomukha’ because it is the doorway\textsuperscript{12} to the (cognition) of the two other states of consciousness known as dream and waking. Or because the Ceta (the perceiving entity) characterized\textsuperscript{13} by (empirical) consciousness (Bodha) is its doorway leading to the experience of dreams, etc., therefore it is called the ‘Cetomukha’. It is called Prājna as it is conscious of the past and the future as well as of all objects. It is called the Prājna, the knower \textit{par excellence}, even in deep sleep, because\textsuperscript{14} of its having been so in the two previous states. Or it is called the Prājna because its peculiar feature is consciousness\textsuperscript{15} undifferentiated. In the two other states consciousness exists, no doubt, but it is (there) aware of (the experiences of) variety. The Prājna, thus described, is the third quarter.

\textsuperscript{1} By, etc.—The mere absence of desire or objects associated with waking or dream states is no characteristic of the Highest Knowledge; for, deep sleep, swoon, etc., are characterized by such absence. Therefore the Knowledge of Reality is true Jnānam.

\textsuperscript{2} Perception—In the waking state one is aware of the mental modifications which are known as the perception of gross physical objects.

\textsuperscript{3} Non-perception—Dream experience is here designated as "non-perception", as it is \textit{distinct} from the perception of gross objects of the waking state. In the dream state the objects of perception, which are also modifications of the mind, are but the subtle impressions left by the objects of the waking state. That the dream objects are such can only be known from the experience of the waking state.

\textsuperscript{4} Or—The commentator gives two meanings of the first sentence of the text. The first meaning lays emphasis on "\textit{yatra}”, \textit{i.e.},
wherein, because we are dealing here with the three states. The natural meaning of the text is that after describing the states of waking and dream the Āruti proceeds to describe the state of Sushupti or deep sleep which is said to be distinguished from the two other states in not having desire, etc., the common feature of the other two states. And such a distinction has to be made because all the three states have the common feature of the absence of knowledge of Reality. The second meaning emphasizes the word "supta" and explains it thus in this connection. Jāgrat, Swapna and Sushupti are the three states which have for their perceiver one who experiences the three states. Though the perceiver of the three states has three different appellations yet the word "supta" is used as the common term for them by Āruti in a special sense, to denote the absence of knowledge of Reality. Therefore, in this sense, though the word "supta" means the same as the experiencer in the state of Jāgrat, and Swapna yet it is differentiated from the latter by the adjectival phrase, "Wherein the sleeper does not see, etc."

5 Forms of thought—Mental or thought forms arise in Ātman, which constitute external and internal objects.

6 State of indiscrimination—This is known in the empirical language as the causal state. One viewing sushupti from the waking state takes it to be the causal state because he finds that the experiences of jāgrat and swapna merge in sushupti. The mind moving within the sphere of causality further takes sushupti to be the cause of the waking and the dream states, believing the former to be antecedent to the latter.

7 As it were—As suggested in the previous note sushupti is designated as the state of causal unity because the waking man looks upon it as the cause of waking and dream experiences. But even sushupti is also a vṛtti or an idea of the waking man, which arises in his mind on account of his seeking for a cause of the waking and dream experiences. Therefore the unity experienced in sushupti as understood by the wakeful man is not the unity of Brahmacajana—otherwise the reappearance of multiplicity as real in the waking state would not be possible.

8 Absence, etc.—The state of sushupti is characterized by the absence of the objects which one perceives in the waking or dreaming state.
Miseries of the efforts—The perceiver in the jāgrat and swapna states who always experiences subject-object relationship, finds its absence in sushupti.

It is not, etc.—The sushupti is not the state of Bliss Infinite because the perceiver from the waking standpoint associates deep sleep with the Upādhi of the idea of the causal state.

Prājna—The experiencer of sushupti. That the Prājna, in deep sleep, enjoys bliss is viewed from waking state:

Doorway—Sushupti is the doorway because it leads to the experience of the waking and dream states. The state of unified existence of sushupti, wherein all diversities disappear, is the invariable antecedent of the waking and dream experiences. Hence it is looked upon as the cause of the two other states.

Characterized, etc.—It is because the consciousness, present in sushupti, is a necessary condition for becoming aware of the states of jāgrat and swapna. No experience is possible without consciousness.

Because, etc.—Though there are no specific states of consciousness in sushupti still it is known as Prājna or the knower par excellence because all previous states of consciousness experienced in jāgrat and swapna are the same as that of sushupti.

Consciousness, etc.—This consciousness, which exists as Prājna in deep sleep appears as particular (विशेष) states of consciousness in jāgrat and swapna.

VI

एष सर्वेऽभर एष सर्वं एषोक्त्यम्येष योनि: सर्वस्य
ग्रहवायणै हि भूतानाम् || ६ ||

This is the Lord of all; this is the knower of all; this is the controller within; this is the source of all; and this is that from which all things originate and in which they finally disappear.

ŚANKARA’S COMMENTARY

This in its natural state, is the Lord (Iśwara) of all. All, that is to say, of the entire physical and
super-physical universe. He (Iśwara) is not something separate from the universe as others\(^2\) hold. The Śruti also says, “O good one, Prāṇa (Prājna or Iśwara) is that in which the mind is bound.” He is omniscient because he is the knower\(^3\) of all beings in their different conditions. He is the Antaryāmin, that is, he alone entering into all, directs everything from within. Therefore He is called the origin of all because from Him proceeds the universe characterized by diversity, as described before. It being so, He is verily that from which all things proceed and in which all disappear.

\(^1\) Natural state—Prājna is the natural state because in deep sleep all diversities of waking and dream states merge. This state, being free from the conditions of the waking and dream states, manifests, in a marked degree Pure Consciousness.

\(^2\) Others—The Naiyāvikās and others admit an extra-cosmic creator. Sankara has refuted this theory in the commentary on the Vedānta Sūtra (2-2-37). When seeking for the cause of the universe, Vedānta posits Prājna as the material as well as the efficient cause of the universe.

\(^3\) Knower—The Ātman is the witness of the past, the present and the future as well as the three states. Knowledge of the three states implies the common knower of all.

Here commence Gauḍapāda’s Kārikās in explanation of the Māndūkya Śruti:—

**Gauḍapāda-Kārikā**

Regarding this there are these Ślokas.

**Śankara’s Commentary**

In explanation of the foregoing (texts) there are these Ślokas.

Gauḍapāda takes up the preceding six texts of the Upanishad and comments upon them as follows:—
1. Viśva (the first quarter) is he who is all-pervading and who experiences the external (gross) objects. Taijāśa (the second quarter) is he who cognizes the internal (the subtle) objects. Prājna is he who is a mass of consciousness. It is one alone who is thus known in the three states.

ŚANKARA’S COMMENTARY

The implication of the passage is this:—That Ātman is (as witness) distinct from the three states (witnessed), and that he is pure¹ and unrelated,² is established by his moving in three states, in³ succession, and also on account of the knowledge, “I am that,” resulting from the experience which unites⁴ through memory. The Śruti also corroborates it by the illustration⁵ of the ‘great fish’, etc.

¹ Pure—The ideas of purity and impurity, weal and woe, pleasure and pain, etc., are the characteristics of the states and do not, in any way, pertain to Ātman who is only the witness of the three states. The Jīva or the reflected consciousness, which is identical with Ātman, falsely identifies himself with the states and considers himself to be impure, miserable, etc. Ātman is ever-pure.

² Unrelated—No relation of any kind, even that of causality, exists between the three states and Ātman as the latter alone exists. That Ātman is unrelated is further known from the fact that the experiences of the waking state do not, in reality, affect Ātman in the dream state, nor those of the dream state affect Ātman in the state of deep sleep.

³ In succession—Though it appears that Ātman identifies itself with each of the three states for the time being, yet the fact that he moves from one state to another without being affected shows that he is only the witness of the three states.
From the standpoint of common experience we find a relationship between past, present and future. This is due to the unifying power of memory. Even this relationship between experiences is possible only if an Ātman is posited as the witness of them.

Illustration, etc.—This is taken from the Brhd. Up. As a powerful fish swims from one bank to another unimpeded by the currents of the river, so also Ātman moves in the three states totally unaffected by them. As no characteristics of the banks, good or bad, affect the fish, so also no experiences of the three states affect the pure nature of Ātman. Another illustration is that of the bird, which flies unobstructed in the sky and unattached to the surrounding lands.

KĀRIKĀ

दक्षिणाक्षिमुखे विण्ड्रो मनस्यन्तरस्तु तैजसः ।
आकारो च हदिर प्राणिक्रिया देहे व्यवस्थितः ॥ २ ॥

2. Viśwa is he who cognizes in the right eye, Taijasa is he who cognizes in the mind within and Prājna is he who constitutes the Ākāśa in the heart. Thus the one Ātman is (conceived as) threefold in the (one) body.

ŚANKARA’S COMMENTARY

This verse is intended to show that the threefold experience of Viśwa, etc. (Taijasa and Prājna) is realised in the waking state alone. Dakshinākshi: the means of perception (of gross objects) is the right eye. The presence of Viśwa, the cognizer of gross objects, is chiefly felt there. The Śruti also says, “The person that is in the right eye is known as Indha—the Luminous One” (Brhd. Up.). Indha, which means the effulgent one, who is the Vaiśwänara and also known as the Virāt Ātman (the totality of gross bodies), the perceiver in the sun, is the same as the perceiver in the eye.
(Objection)—The Hiranyagarbha is distinct from the knower of the body (Kshetra) who is the cognizer, the controller of the right eye, who is also the general experiencer and who is the Lord of the body.

(Reply)—No, for, in reality, such a distinction is not admitted. The Śruti says, “One effulgent being alone is hidden in all beings.” The Smriti also says: “Me do thou also know, O Arjuna, to be the Kshetrajna (the knower of the body) in all Kshetras (bodies)” (Gītā, 13. 2). “Indivisible, yet it exists as if divided in beings” (Gītā, 13. 16).

Though the presence of Viśwa is equally felt in all sense-organs without distinction yet the right eye is particularly singled out (as the chief instrument for its perception), because he (Viśwa) makes a greater use of the right eye in perceiving objects. (The right eye is made here to represent all the sense-organs). The one, who has his abode in the right eye, having perceived (external) forms, closes the eye; and then recollecting them within the mind sees the very same (external objects) as in a dream, as the manifestation of the (subtle) impressions (of memory). As is the case here (waking), so also is the case with dream. Therefore, Taijasa, the perceiver in the mind, within, is verily the same as Viśwa. With the cessation of the activity known as memory, the perceiver (in the waking and dream states) is unified with Prājna in the Ākāśa of the heart and becomes verily a mass of consciousness, because there is, then, a cessation of mental activities. Both perception and memory are forms of thought, in the absence of which the seer remains indistinguishably in the form of Prāṇa in the heart alone. For, the Śruti also says, “Prāṇa alone withdraws all these within.” Taijasa
is identical with Hiranyagarbha on account of its existence being realised in mind. Mind is the characteristic indication (of both). This is supported by such scriptural passages as “This Purusha (Hiranyagarbha) is all mind,” etc.

(Objection)—The Prāṇa (vital breath) of a deep sleeper is manifested. The sense-organs (at the time of deep sleep) are merged in it. How, then, can it (Prāṇa) be said to be unmanifested?

(Reply)—This is no mistake, for the unmanifested (Avyākrita) is characterised by the absence (of the knowledge) of time and space. Though Prāṇa, in the case of a person who identifies himself with (particular) Prāṇa, appears to be manifested (during the time of waking and dream), yet even in the case of those who (thus) identify themselves with individualized Prāṇa, the Prāṇa, during deep sleep, loses (such) particular identification, which is due to its limitation by the body, and is verily the same as the unmanifested. As in the case of those who identify themselves with individualized Prāṇas, the Prāṇa, at the time of death, ceases to be the manifested, so also in the case of those who think of themselves as identified with the individualized Prāṇas, the Prāṇa attains to the condition like the unmanifested, in the state of deep sleep. This Prāṇa (of deep sleep) further contains the seed (cause) of (future) creation (as is the case with the Avyākrita). The cognizer of the two states—deep sleep and Avyākrita—is also one (viz., the Pure Consciousness). It (one in deep sleep) is identical with the (apparently) different cognizers identifying themselves with the conditioned (in the states of waking and dream), and therefore such attributes as “unified,” “mass of all consciousness,” etc., as described above, are
reasonably applicable to it (one in deep sleep). Other reason, already stated, supports it. How does, indeed, the word Prāṇa apply to the Avyākrita (unmanifested)? It is supported by the Śrutī passage, “Oh, good one, the mind is tied to the Prāṇa.”

(Objection)—In that Śrutī passage, the word Prāṇa indicates Sat (Existence,) i.e., the Brahman, (not the Avyākrita) which is the subject-matter under discussion, as the text commences with the passage, “All this was Sat in the beginning.”

(Reply)—This is no mistake, for (in that passage) the Sat is admitted to be that which contains within it the seed or cause (of creation). Though Sat, i.e., Brahman, is indicated in that passage by the word ‘Prāṇa’, yet the Brahman that is indicated by the words Sat and Prāṇa (in that connection) is not the one who is free from its attribute of being the seed or cause that creates all beings. For if in that Śrutī passage, Brahman, devoid of the causal relation (i.e., the Absolute) were sought to be described, then the Śrutī would have used such expressions as “Not this, Not this,” “Wherefrom speech turns back”, “That is something other than both the known and the unknown”, etc. The Smriti also declares, “It is neither Sat (existence) nor Asat (non-existence)” (Gītā). If by the text were meant the (Absolute) devoid of causal relation then the coming back, to the relative plane of consciousness, of those who were in deep sleep and unified with Sat at the time of Pralaya (cosmic dissolution), could not happen. Further, (in that case) the liberated souls would again come back to the relative plane of consciousness; for the absence of seed or cause (capable of giving birth to the world of names and forms) would be the common feature of both.
Further, in the absence of the seed (cause, *i.e.*, at the time of *Sushupti* and *Pralaya*) which can be destroyed by Knowledge (alone), Knowledge itself becomes futile. Therefore the word *Sat* (the text of the *Chhāndogya Upanishad*, the passage under discussion) in that aspect in which causality is attributed to it, is indicated by *Prāṇa*, and accordingly has been described in all the Śrūtis as the cause. It is for this reason also that the Absolute Brahman, dissociated from its causal attribute, has been indicated in such Śrūti passages as “It is beyond the unmanifested which is higher than the manifested”, “He is causeless and is the substratum of the external (effect) and the internal (cause),” “Wherefrom words come back....”, “Not this, not this”, etc. That which is designated as *Prājna* (when it is viewed as the cause of the phenomenal world) will be described as *Turiya* separately when it is not viewed as the cause, and when it is free from all phenomenal relationship (such as that of the body, etc.), *i.e.*, in its absolutely Real aspect. The causal condition is also verily experienced in this body from such cognition of the man who is awakened from the deep sleep, as “I did not know anything (at the time of deep sleep).” Therefore it is said that (one) *Ātman* is perceived as threefold in the (one) body.

1 *Waking state alone*—From the ordinary empirical standpoint, *Viśwa*, *Tājasa* and *Prājna* are generally related to three states, *viz.*, waking, dream and deep sleep. But the three states are comprehended from the standpoint of the waking state alone. That dream and deep sleep are two states, having different characteristics, is known in the waking state alone. Therefore these two become known to the waking consciousness. Besides *jāgrat* (waking), in so far as it denotes the absence of the knowledge of Reality, covers the dream and sleep states as well. The three apparent cognisers
known as Viśwa, Taijasa and Prājna are really one, because a plurality of perceivers in the same state, namely, the waking, and in the same body is an absurdity, as that would preclude the possibility of the continuity of perception as revealed through memory. Therefore the apparently three different perceivers are identical and their apparent distinction is due to their identification with the three states.

2 Same—It is because, as already shown, the Adhidaiva is identical with Adhyātma.

3 Is not admitted—The difference is only imaginary and empirical and due to the identification with different bodies. Really speaking, one Ātman alone manifests itself in different forms, microcosmic or macrocosmic.

4 Singled out—This assertion is based upon scriptural authority. In actual experience also one finds that the right eye is more efficient in the perception of objects than the left one.

5 Sees, etc.—Viśwa, the perceiver of gross objects, becomes Taijasa when he closes the eyes and thinks within his mind about the gross objects. Cognisers of dream and ideas (in the waking state) are identical. Both, viz., ideas and dream objects, possess, for the time being, the same characteristics.

6 As, etc.—There is no difference whatever between the dream state and the state of imagination in the waking. In both the states, the perceiver cognizes the impressions of gross physical objects experienced in the preceding states. The only difference between the states of dream and imagination (in the waking state) is that dream represents a whole state whereas the reflection represents the part of a state.

7 Memory—Memory is also a form of mental activity implying subject-object relationship. The impressions of gross external objects perceived in the waking state manifest themselves in the forms of memory and dream.

8 Unified—That is, this state is characterised by the absence of subject-object relationship.

9 Becomes verily, etc.—Whenever in the waking state the mind ceases to be active, i.e., whenever ideas disappear from it, the state is said to be Sushupti. Even memory does not function then. This state is identical with deep sleep, when subject-object relationship
is absent. This state is posited from the actual experience of the change from a state which was without the dual relationship of subject and object. The experience of the three states and the transition from the one to the other proves that there is only one perceiver who is the witness of the three states and their succession

10 Mass of, etc.—That is, there is no particular cognition in that state.

11 Indistinguishably—i.e., in unmanifested form.

12 Śruti—See Brhd. Up.

13 Identical—That Viśwa and Virāt as well as Prājña (deep sleep) and Iśwara (unmanifested) are identical, has been already shown. Now it is pointed out that Hiranyagarbha is identical with Taijasa. Hiranyagarbha and Taijasa are only what are termed as the cosmic mind and the individual mind respectively. Really speaking, macrocosm and microcosm, both being mere forms of thought, are identical. Therefore the perceivers, Hiranyagarbha and Taijasa, are identical because they are also forms of thought. Their different appellations are due to their identification with different Upādhis (adjuncts) namely, the thoughts of macrocosm and microcosm.

14 Indication—Both are formed of the same stuff or the mind.

15 Manifested—The manifestation of the activities of the Prāṇa of a deep sleeper is witnessed by on-lookers.

16 Unmanifested—The characteristics of manifestedness and unmanifestedness of Prāṇa are predicated of it from the standpoint of waking and sleep states respectively.

17 At the time of death—This illustration is given on the basis of the scriptural authority. Comp. Brhd. Up., 4. 4. 2.

18 Creation—Both the states of Āvyākrita and deep sleep (here called Prāṇa) are followed by a state in which names and forms are manifest. On account of the identity of effects, the causes are also said to be identical.

19 One—The identity of deep sleep and Āvyākrita is further demonstrated from the identity of their common cogniser, viz., Pure Consciousness.

20 Identical—The meaning is that the perceiver of the three states is one and the same.

21 Other, etc.—viz., the identity of Adhyātma and Adhidaiva.
Prāṇa—The contention of the objector is that the ordinary meaning of Prāṇa is vital breath having five aspects, viz., Prāṇa, Apāna, Samāna, Vyāna and Udāna.

Seed—That is, the Saguṇa Brahman.

All, etc.—Both animate and inanimate.

Could not, etc.—For, after the realisation of the Absolute Brahman return to the plane of ignorance is not possible. But the person who goes into the Sushupti or the Ayyākrita state without attaining Jñānam again returns to the plane of ignorance. It is the Knowledge of Brahman alone which is the condition of liberation but not mere absence of duality without knowledge, which can be experienced in deep sleep, swoon or trance.

Common feature—If Existence free from causal relation, i.e., the Absolute Brahman, be the meaning of Sat in the scriptural passage under discussion, then the reverting of the deep sleeper, who has not yet attained to Jñānam, to the dual plane of consciousness would not be possible. And if a person, after realising the Absolute Brahman, is to come back to the state of duality, then Jñānam or liberation would be impermanent. The meaning is this: At the time of Pralaya when the created beings become unified with Sat or Existence they do not become really the Absolute Brahman. They remain only in a seed or potential condition and therefore they re-appear at the time of creation. Similarly, an ignorant person who goes into deep sleep retains in a latent form, all his previous impressions of duality and gets them back after coming down from the state of Sushupti. But a Jñāni, once realising his identity with Absolute Brahman, is never misled by the sense (of the reality) of dual existence.

Seed—The causal standpoint comprises false apprehension and non-apprehension as well as their effects. The Naiyāyikas affirm this causal standpoint, popularly known as the cosmic ignorance, to be a Padārtha or independent category which arises in the absence of the contact of the sense-organ with its object. Therefore Ajñānam, according to them, is a negation or Abhāva. But according to Vedānta, Ajñānam is not purely a negation (characterising the Āvaraṇa aspect), but a negation combined with an affirmation or creation (Vikshepa aspect). It is not an independent category but dependent upon present consciousness and comprehended by it. This ignorance is destroyed by the knowledge of truth.
28 *Cause*—It is because a causal explanation is necessary.

29 *Such cognition*—The experience of the absence of knowledge in *Sushupti* is possible only for a man who is awakened from deep sleep. From the perception in the waking state of a change involving names and forms, he thinks of the previous state of deep sleep as devoid of them. Therefore the knowledge of deep sleep is possible only in the waking state. This shows that *Sushupti* is knowable only in *Jāgrat* consciousness.

30 *As threefold*—The meaning is this: That the Ātman is the witness of the three states is known from the perception of the change of one state into another. The Ātman is the witness not only of the three states but also of their cognizers, *viz.*, Viśwa, Taijasa and Prājna. In this body and in the *Jāgrat* state alone, the three states as well as their cognizers are perceived.

3. Viśwa always experiences the gross (object), Taijasa the subtle and Prājna the blissful. *Know these to be the threefold experiences.*

4. *The gross (object) satisfies Viśwa, the subtle the Taijasa and the blissful the Prājna. Know these to be threefold satisfaction.*

ŚANKARA’S COMMENTARY

Verses 3 and 4 have already been explained.

5. *He who knows both the experiencer and the objects of experience that have been described* (associated)
with the three states, is not affected though experiencing the objects.

ŚANKARA'S COMMENTARY

In the three states, namely, waking, etc., the one and the same object of experience appears in threefold forms as the gross, the subtle and the blissful. Further, the experiencer (of the three states) known (differently) as Viśwa, Taijasa and Prājna has been described as one on account of the unity of consciousness implied in such cognition as ‘I am that’ (common to all conditions), as well as from the absence of any distinction in respect of the perceiver. He who knows the two (experiencer and the objects of experience), appearing as many in the form of subject and objects of experience, though enjoying them, is not affected thereby; because all objects (of experience) are experienced by one subject alone. As (the heat of the) fire does not increase or decrease by consuming wood, etc., so also nothing is added to or taken away (from the knowingness or awareness of he Atman) by its experience of that which is its object.

1 One and the same, etc.—It is because the experiences of the three states are only the different forms of thought or ideas.

2 Unity of, etc.—That the experiencer of the three states is one and identical is also known to the waking consciousness.

3 Such cognition, etc.—This cognition takes the following form: I, who now have been perceiving objects in the waking state, had seen forms (ideas) in dream and experienced nothing in deep sleep.

4 Absence, etc.—There is nothing to suggest that the experiencers of the three states are different.

5 Is not, etc.—He who knows that the three states are one and that their perceivers are also one, is not affected by the experiences of the states, nor does he identify himself with the (apparently separate) perceivers thereof. He is not affected because he clearly
perceives that objects which appeared as real in the waking and
dream states disappear again in the deep sleep. Therefore he is
convinced of the unreality of dream and waking experiences. As
a witness, he views unaffected the cropping up of these ideas of
experience (in dream and waking) and also their disappearance in
Sushupti).

6 Because—i.e., it is because one Ātman in three forms alternately perceives the emergence and disappearance of the experiencer and all objects of experience. Hence he knows them to be unreal.

7 Does not, etc.—The principle or character of heat remains the same irrespective of the quantity of wood it consumes.

8 Nothing, etc.—The self or Ātman, when it knows that it is the witness of the three states, is not subject to any modification by the experiencer of the objects thereof. Because he knows these objects (including their perceivers) as mere मनः स्पन्दनेः or his own thoughts, and hence unreal. An imaginary tiger or the one seen in the dream cannot harm its perceiver.

प्रभवः सर्वभावानां सतामति विनिष्ठयः ||
सर्वं जनयति प्राणश्रेतोशृण्पुरुषः पृथक् ॥ ६ ॥

6. It is thoroughly established that the coming into effect can be predicated only of all positive entities that exist. The Prāṇa manifests all; the Purusha creates the conscious beings (the Jivas) in their manifold form separately.

Śankara’s Commentary

The manifestation can be predicated of positive entities comprehended as the different forms of Viśwa, Taijasa and Prājna—whose existence, of the nature of illusory names and forms caused by an innate Avidyā (ignorance), cannot be denied. This is thus explained later on: “Neither in reality nor in illusion can the son of a barren woman be said to be born.” For, if things
could come out of non-entity, Brahman whose existence is inferred from experience will itself be rendered a non-entity because of the absence of means of comprehension. That the snake (in the rope) appearing as such on account of an illusory cause (Māyā) which itself is the effect of ignorance (Avidyā), pre-exists in the form of the rope is a matter of common experience. For by no one is the illusion of the rope-snake or the mirage, etc., ever perceived without a substratum. As before the illusory appearance of the snake, its existence was certainly there in the rope, so also all positive entities before their manifestation certainly exist in the form of a cause, i.e., Prāṇa. The Śruti also declares this in such passages as: “All this (the phenomenal universe) was verily Brahman at the beginning” and “All this existed, at the beginning as Ātman.” Prāṇa manifests all. As the rays proceed from the sun, so also all different centres of consciousness (i.e., the Jīvas) which are like the (many) reflections of the same sun in the water and which are manifested differently as Viśwa, Taijasa and Prājna, comprising various physical forms of gods, animals, etc., proceed from the Purusha. The Purusha manifests all these entities called as living beings, which are different from inanimate objects, but of the same nature as itself (Purusha), like fire and its sparks and like the sun with its reflections in water. Prāṇa, the causal self, manifests all other entities like the spider producing the web. There are such scriptural passages in its support as, “The sparks from the fire, etc.”

1 Positive, etc.—Kārikās from 6 to 9 give different views of the manifestation. The Kārika under discussion points out that the manifested universe is not non-existent like the son of a barren woman. It has an empirical existence. The object of this is only
to show that no causal relation can be predicated of Brahman as Prājna unless we admit the positive existence of the world. The detailed discussion about causality will be found in the body of the Karikās.

2 Will itself—Those who depend upon causality to prove the existence of Brahman cannot but believe in the existence of the manifested objects through which alone they infer Brahman to be the cause of all.

3 Illusory—Vedānta makes a distinction between Avidyā and Māya, from the causal standpoint. Māya is associated with Iswara and it presents the variety in the universe. Comp. Vedānta Sūtra, 1. 4. 3. and 2. 1. 14.

4 All—It means here only the inanimate objects, as the manifestation of the animate is ascribed to the Purusha.

5 Purusha—It is indicated by the text as well as the commentary that there are two manifestors, namely, the Purusha and the Prāṇa. The Purusha manifests the Jivas and Prāṇa the inanimate objects. From the empirical standpoint we see two kinds of manifestations, viz., the sentient and the insentient. Therefore we naturally ascribe these to two manifestors, viz., Purusha and Prāṇa. (The general principle of causality is that the like produces the like.) But, in reality, Prāṇa is identical with Purusha. Brahman is looked upon as the manifestor of the universe; when he manifests the insentient objects he is said to be Prāṇa, and when he manifests the sentient beings he is called Purusha.

विभूति प्रसृतं तथ्ये मन्यन्ते सृष्टिचिन्तकः ||
ख्ममायासरस्येति सृष्टिर्यर्विचकलिपता || ७ ||

7. Those who think of (the process of) creation believe it to be the manifestation of the superhuman power of God; while others look upon it as of the same nature as dream and illusion.

Sankara’s Commentary

Creation is the manifestation of the superhuman power of God1; thus think those who reflect on (the process of) creation. But2 those who intently think3...
of the Ultimate Reality find no interest in (the theory of) creation. It (that no interest should be attached to the act of creation) is also supported by such Śruti passages as, "Indra (the great god) assumed diverse forms through Māyā". The juggler throws the thread up in the sky, climbs by it with his arms, disappears from the sight (of the spectators), engages himself in a fight (in the sky) in which his limbs, having been severed, fall to the ground and he rises up again. The on-looker, though witnessing the performance, does not evince any interest in the thought in regard to the reality of the jugglery performed by the juggler. Similarly there is a real juggler who is other than the rope and the one that climbs up the rope. The manifestation of deep sleep, dream and waking is analogous to the throwing up of the rope by the juggler (in the above illustration) and the (empirical selves known as) Prājna, Viśwa and Taijasa, related to the three states, are similar to the juggler, who appears to have climbed up the rope. As he, the juggler, remains on the ground unseen (by the on-lookers) having veiled himself, as it were, by his illusion, so also is the truth about the Highest Reality known as Turīya. Therefore those noble souls seeking Moksha evince interest in the contemplation of this (the Turīya) but not in the creation which is futile. The word, 'Śvapnamāyāśarūpa'—meaning, alike dream and illusion—is intended to show that all these (false) notions (regarding manifestation) belong only to those who imagine the process of creation or manifestation.

1 God—He is naturally the Personal God. This is the theistic theory of creation.

2 But—The seekers after God as creator may be either those who hold that creation is real or those who hold that creation is
illusory. In the latter case Śankara compares the seekers after truth to those who are interested in the magician and not in the magical feats.

3 *Intently think*—i.e., still pursuing the law of causation. Those who uphold the *Māyā* theory of the world see the illusion and infer *Turīya* as the Transcendental Cause.

4 *Turīya*—The text contemplates two alternative theories of creation (मृत्तिक) namely, (i) creation is real in so far as it is mere manifestation of God’s real power, (ii) creation is manifested as an illusion by God (खप्रमाण्या). Both the alternative theories lay emphasis on the act of creation and this is pointed out by Śankara in his commentary. Śankara indicates in his commentary that those who seek the Highest Reality (परमार्थ) are not interested in any theory of creation.

5 *Futile*—The truth about the Highest Reality can be realised only by the highest Knowledge and not by any thought bestowed upon creation.

6 *All these, etc.*—Because *Māyā* is also admitted to be a fact by the *Māvāvādins*, their theory does not also convey the highest truth.

इष्टामात्रं प्रभोऽसृष्टिरितिसृष्टिविनिधित्ता: ||
कालत्प्रसूतिः मूनानां मन्यन्ते कालचिन्तकं: ||8||

8. *Those who affirm (the existence of the) created objects attribute this manifestation to the mere will of God, while those who look upon time as real declare time to be the manifestor of all beings.*

ŚANKARA’S COMMENTARY

The manifestation (creation) proceeds from the mere will of God because His will in reality cannot but achieve its purpose. Such objects as pot, etc., are but the (manifestation of the) will (of the potter). They can never be anything external or unrelated to such will. Some say manifestation proceeds from time.
1 Cannot, etc.—It is because they look upon the world as real, therefore they affirm that God whose will manifests the world cannot but be real.

2 But—The potter, first of all, conceives in his mind the name and form of the object and then creates it.

भोगार्थ सृष्टिरित्येक कीडार्थमिति चापे ।

देववैष्ठ ख्यातोयमात्यामकामस्य का स्वरूपा ॥ ९ ॥

9. Others think that the manifestation is for the purpose of enjoyment (of God) while still others attribute it to mere diversion (on the part of God). But it is the very nature of the Effulgent Being (Ātman) (for), what other desire is possible for Him whose desire is always in the state of fulfilment?

Śankara’s Commentary

Others think that the purpose of manifestation is only the enjoyment (by God of the objects so created), that creation is merely a diversion of God. These two theories are refuted (by the author) by the single assertion that it is the very1 nature of the Effulgent (Brahman). Thus taking this standpoint (the nature of the Effulgent Being) all2 the theories (of creation) herein (stated) are refuted3 for the reason indicated by: “What could be the desire for manifestation on the part of Brahman whose desires are ever in a state of fulfilment?” For the rope, etc., to appear as snake, no4 other reason can be assigned than Avidyā.

1 Very nature—According to Gaudapāda, what others see as the created universe, is nothing but the very nature or essence of Brahman. Brahman alone exists. What others designate as the universe of names and forms—subject to birth, change, death, etc.—is nothing but the non-dual Brahman. That one sees the
world of duality instead of the non-dual Brahman and seeks its cause is due to Avidyā or ignorance.

2 All the, etc.—The following theories of creation have been stated in the preceding Ślokas of the Kārikā :

(i) Creation is manifestation of the divine power of God (K. 6).

(ii) Creation is manifestation of the nature of dream or illusion (K. 6).

(iii) Creation is manifestation of the Divine Will which cannot but be fulfilled (K. 8).

(iv) Creation is manifestation which proceeds from "Time". Iswara is indifferent about it (K. 8).

The above four theories of creation may be classed as cosmological. The following two theories which may be designated as teleological are given in Kārikā 9 :

(v) Creation is for the purpose of the enjoyment of God.

(vi) Creation is an act of God's sport.

Now all these theories are refuted by the simple statement that Brahman, whose desires are always in a state of fulfilment, cannot create the world for any purpose whatsoever. No causal theory can explain the relation of the appearance of the world to Brahman. The assumption of will, desire, enjoyment, diversion, etc., as the causes of creation is due to Avidyā or ignorance of the human mind regarding the real nature (अत्मकामत्व, आत्मकामत्व, अक्रमत्व) of Brahman. It only reveals the ignorance of the human mind in regard to the origin of the world which is one of the objects displaying God's superhuman powers. Those who look upon the act of creation as real and then explain it as of the same nature as dream and illusion, forget that dream and illusion are, after all, unreal and hence they cannot explain the supposed reality of the act of creation. Therefore, manifestation is not an act of creation. No will can be the cause of creation because a will implies an effort at gratifying some unsatisfied desire. Brahman is Bliss (परमानन्द) which means the absence of all wants. Therefore the Divine Will cannot be the cause of the universe. The human mind, subject to Māyā, ascribes will, diversion, etc., as the cause of creation. This ascription is itself Māyā. Therefore it stands to reason that if anybody sees creation, it is only due to Māyā. Therefore all
theories regarding creation are in fact मात्रामण्डल, that is, due to
the ignorance of the mind that sees it. Viewed from the relative
standpoint this Māyā inheres either in Brahmā or in the perceiver.
Assigning a substratum for Māyā depends upon one’s standpoint.
Viewed from the Avidyā standpoint Māyā has its locus in Brahmā.

Refuted, etc.—The two theories implied by the first line of
the Karikā are refuted simply because “enjoyment” and “diver-
sion” cannot be proved to be the object of creation. Creation
or manifestation implies some adventitious or external factor, which
idea is refuted by the statement of the Scripture that “it is the very
nature of the Effulgent Brahmā”.

No other reason—Comp. the Scriptural passage. आत्मनः
आकाशः संब्रूतः—which means that it is the Ātman that appears
as Ākāśa. The appearance is due to Māyā and no external cause.

ŚANKARA’S INTRODUCTION TO UPAISHAD

The fourthquarter which now comes in order (for
explanation) has to be described. This is done in the
words of the text: “Not conscious of the internal
object.” It (Turīya) does not admit of description or
indication by means of words, for all uses (affirmative
or negative) of language fail to express it. Therefore
Turīya is sought to be indicated by the negation of all
attributes (characteristics).

(Objection)—Then it becomes mere void or Śūnya.

(Reply)—No, because it is impossible for imagination
to exist without a substratum. The illusion of silver,
a snake, a man or mirage, etc., cannot be conceived
as existing without the (corresponding) substratum of
the mother-of-pearl, rope, stump or desert, etc.

(Objection)—If that be the case, Turīya ought to be
indicatable by words and not by the negation of all
attributes. For, it is the substratum of all imaginations
such as, Prāṇa, etc., in the same way as jars, etc.,
which being the substratum of water, etc., are indicated as such by words.

(Reply)—The idea of Prāṇa, etc., (supposed to exist in Turiya) is unreal like the false idea of silver, etc., in the mother-of-pearl, etc. A relation between the real and the unreal cannot be expressed by words because such relation is, itself, non-existent. Turiya cannot be the object of any other instrument of knowledge (such as direct perception) like the cow, etc., because of its unique nature, owing to the absence of Upādhis. Ātman cannot have anything like a generic property, like the cow, etc., because it is devoid of all Upādhis or attributes; it has neither generic nor specific characteristics because it is one, without a second. It cannot be known by any activity (proceeding from it) as in the case of a cook; because it is devoid of all actions. It cannot be described by attributes such as blue, etc., because it is without any attribute. Therefore it follows that Turiya cannot be indicated by any name.

(Objection)—Then it (Turiya) would be like the “horns of a hare” and hence one’s pursuit of it must be futile.

(Reply)—No, the knowledge of Turiya as identical with Self (Ātman) destroys the hankering after objects which are non-self just as the knowledge of mother-of-pearls (mistaken for silver) removes the desire for (illusory) silver. For, once the identity of Turiya and Self is realised there is no possibility of one’s being deluded by ignorance, desire and the like misapprehensions (which are the effects of ignorance) and there is no reason for Turiya not being known as identical with the Self. For all the Upanishads point to this end only as is evident from the following: “That
thou art”, “This Ātman is Brahman”, “That is real and that is Ātman”, “The Brahman which is directly and immediately cognized”, “He is both without and within, as well as causeless”, “All this is verily Ātman”, etc. This very Ātman has been described as constituting the Highest Reality and its opposite⁹ (the unreal) and as having four quarters. Its unreal (illusory) aspect has been described as due to ignorance, like the illusion of snake in the rope, having for its characteristics the three quarters and being of the same nature as the seed¹⁰ and the sprout. Now is described (in the following Śruti) Turiya which is not of the nature of cause but which is of the nature of the Highest Reality corresponding to the rope—by negating¹¹ the three states, enumerated above, which correspond to the snake,¹² etc.

¹ Fourth quarter—The “fourth” is not the fourth state or condition in which Ātman is to be viewed. Turiya which is inditicated here as the “fourth” comes in only for consideration after the three states have been considered. Ātman itself does not admit of any condition or state. Waking, dream and deep sleep are its three states or quarters and Turiya, as will be seen later on, is present in all these three. Turiya is designated here as the fourth because in the preceding texts, three quarters of Ātman have been explained. It has occupied the “fourth” place in respect of explanations.

² Sought to be, etc.—It is because it cannot be directly pointed out like other objects of perception.

³ No, etc.—The contention of the opponent is this: You say that Turiya is not void (शून्य) as the illusion (विकृत) of Prāṇa, etc., cannot subsist without a substratum which is Turiya. In that case Turiya is not non-indicatable as it can be indicated as the substratum of Prāṇa, etc. Therefore it must be such as can be indicated. But you say that it is arrived at by mere negation and therefore non-indicatable by words. If Turiya is indicatable as a substratum, then it becomes indicatable by that which is superimposed upon it as is the case with a pot which is indicatable by
the water in it. In that case you contradict yourself as you have already said that Brahman is unindicatable by any word.

To this our reply is:—

We would like to ask you if (i) your idea of indicatability of Brahman as the substratum is that of illusory superimposition, or (ii) is that of real superimposition.

It cannot be thereby illusory superimposition because the superimposition, in that case, would not appear as existing as it does. From the standpoint of the empirical reality of the appearance which is experienced by the ignorant persons, we say that Turiya is indicatable by the illusory ideas that are superimposed upon it. And if you admit the ideas (विद्वेदन) of Prāna, etc., as unreal, then there is no disagreement between us.

Again this indicatability of Turiya as a substratum cannot be (due to) real superimposition or the superimposition of reality. For, as the idea of silver that is superimposed upon the mother-of-pearl is unreal, so also the idea of Prāna, etc., that is superimposed upon Turiya is equally unreal. There cannot be any relationship between a real substratum and the unreal form superimposed on it.

Therefore the conclusion is that if one takes his stand upon the causal or relative plane, then Turiya may be indicated as a substratum of the illusory ideas of Prāna, etc. But from the standpoint of Truth, Turiya cannot be indicated by any word which implies relationship. And Śruti also denies all relationship in Brahman.

4 Without, etc.—No illusion can be dissociated from the idea of existence. The first impression that one gets of an illusion is that it exists and later on its existence is traced to a positive substratum.

5 Relation—Indicatability by words is possible in the following instances only: (i) Possessive case, (ii) conventional meaning of a word, (iii) generic or specific property, (iv) activity, (v) attribute and substance. But none of these applies to Turiya because it is one without a second and also it is without any attribute. Hence Turiya cannot be indicated by any word.

6 Futile—It is because no benefit can accrue from the knowledge of something which is as unreal as the "mare's nest".
7 Objects—Such as the illusory worldly objects to which the ignorant are attached.

8 Deluded—Delusion is the cause of all human misery.

9 Its opposite—i.e., the illusory objects. As a matter of fact, only Brahman exists and He is the One and All. Nothing called unreal ever exists. What appears to the ignorant as unreal or illusory is also Brahman from the highest Adwaitic standpoint. Therefore Brahman comprises everything.

10 Seed and sprout—The three states are characterised by the relation of cause and effect as the seed and the sprout are.

11 Negating, etc.—The student, at first, by the process of negation separates Brahman from the superimposition and then realises that what has been negated as superimposition is, in fact, the very nature of Brahman. This is the highest Adwaitic realisation.

12 Snake, etc.—The rope is often mistaken for a snake or a garland or a stick or a streak of water or a fissure in the ground.

VII

नान्तःप्रज्ञः न बहिःप्रज्ञः नोभयतः प्रज्ञः न प्रज्ञानन्दनः न प्रज्ञः नाप्रज्ञः ।
अहंकारमृत्रस्मास्मार्थं मां इत्यादि ध्यानमस्य विचन्त्यम-ज्ञाते मा देशयते
चतुः प्रातः सायनः स आत्माः स विज्ञयः ॥ ७ ॥

Turiya is not that which is conscious of the internal (subjective) world, nor that which is conscious of the external (objective) world, nor that which is conscious of both, nor that which is a mass all sentiency, nor that which is simple consciousness, nor that which is insentient. (It is) unseen (by any sense organ), not related to anything, incomprehensible (by the mind), uninferable, unthinkable, indescribable, essentially of the nature of Consciousness constituting the Self alone, negation of all
phenomena, the Peaceful, all Bliss and the Non-dual. This is what is known as the fourth (Turiya).
This is the Ātman and it has to be realised.

(‘Consciousness’ as the nearest English word is used.)

ŚANKARA’S COMMENTARY

(Objection)—The object was to describe Ātman as having four quarters. By the very descriptions of the three quarters, the fourth is established as being other than the three characterised by the “conscious of the subjective”, etc. Therefore the negation (of attributes relating to the three quarters) for the purpose of indicating Turiya implied in the statement, “Turiya is that which is not conscious of the subjective”, etc., is futile.

(Reply)—No. As the nature of the rope is realised by the negation of the (illusory) appearances of the snake, etc., so also it is intended to establish the very Self, which subsists in the three states, as Turiya. This is done in the same way as (the great Vedic statement) “Thou art that”. If Turiya were, in fact, anything different from Ātman subsisting in the three states, then, the teachings of the Scriptures would have no meaning on account of the absence of any instrument of knowledge (regarding Turiya). Or the other (inevitable alternative would be to declare absolute nihilism (शुल्य) to be the ultimate Truth. Like the (same) rope mistaken as snake, garland, etc., when the same Ātman is mistaken as Antahprajna (conscious of the subjective) etc., in the three states associated with different characteristics, the knowledge, resulting from the negation of such attributes as the conscious of the subjective, etc., is the means of establishing the absolute absence of the unreal phenomena of the world (imagined) in Ātman. As
a matter of fact, the two\(^5\) results, namely, the negation of (superimposed) attributes and the disappearance of the unreal phenomena happen at the same time. Therefore no additional\(^6\) instrument of knowledge or no other\(^7\) effort is to be made or sought after for the realisation of \textit{Turiya}. With the cessation of the idea of the snake, etc., in the rope, the real nature of the rope becomes revealed and this happens simultaneously with the knowledge of the distinction between the rope and the snake. But those who say that the knowledge, in addition to the removal of the darkness (that envelopes the jar), enables\(^8\) one to know the jar, may as well affirm\(^9\) that the act of cutting (a tree), in addition to its undoing the relation of the members of the body intended to be cut, also functions (in other ways) in other parts of the body. As the act of cutting intended to divide the tree into two is said to be complete with the severance of the parts (of the tree) so also the knowledge employed to perceive the jar covered by the darkness (that envelopes it) attains its purpose when it results in removing the darkness, though that is not the object intended to be produced. In such case the knowledge of the jar, which is invariably\(^10\) connected with the removal of the darkness, is not the result accomplished by the instrument of knowledge. Likewise, the knowledge, which is (here) the same as that which results from the negation of predicates, directed towards the discrimination of such attributes as “the conscious of the subjective” etc., superimposed upon \textit{Atman}, cannot\(^11\) function with regard to \textit{Turiya} in addition to its act of negating of such attributes as “the conscious of the subjective” which is not the object intended to be produced. For, with the negation
of the attributes such as "conscιοus of the subjective," etc., is\textsuperscript{18} accomplished simultaneously the cessation of the distinction between the knower, the known and the knowledge. Thus it will be said later on, "Dualιty cannot exist when Gnosis, the highest Truth (non-duality), is realised." The knowledge of duality cannot exist even for a moment immediately after the moment of the cessation of duality. If it should remain, there would\textsuperscript{13} follow what is known as regressus ad infinitum; and consequently duality will never cease. Therefore it is established that the cessation of such unreal attributes as "conscιοus of the subjective," etc., superimposed upon \textit{Ātman} is\textsuperscript{14} simultaneous with the manifestation of the Knowledge which, in itself, is the means \textit{(pramāṇa)} for the negation of duality.

By the statement that it (\textit{Turiya}) is "not conscious of the subjective" is indicated that it is not "Taijas." Similarly by the statement that it is "not conscious of the objective," it is denied that it (\textit{Turiya}) is \textit{Viśwa}. By saying that it is "not conscious of either," it is denied that \textit{Turiya} is any intermediate state between\textsuperscript{16} the waking and the dream states. By the statement that \textit{Turiya} is "not a mass all sentiency," it is denied that it is the condition of deep sleep—which is held to be a causal\textsuperscript{16} condition on account of one's inability to distinguish the truth from error (in deep sleep). By saying that it is "not simple consciousness," it is implied that \textit{Turiya} cannot\textsuperscript{17} simultaneously cognize the entire world of consciousness (by a single act of consciousness). And lastly by the statement that it is "not unconsciousness" it is implied that \textit{Turiya} is not insentient or of the nature of matter.

(Objection)—How,\textsuperscript{18} again, do such attributes as "conscιοus of the subjective," etc., which are (directly)
perceived to subsist in Ātman become non-existent only by an act of negation as the snake, etc. (perceived) in the rope, etc., become non-existent (by means of an act of negation)?

(Reply)—Though the states (waking and dream) are really of the essence of consciousness itself, and as such are non-different from each other (from the point of view of the substratum), yet one state is seen to change into another as do the appearances of the snake, water-line, etc., having for their substratum the rope, etc. But the consciousness itself is real because it never changes.

(Objection)—Consciousness is seen to change (disappear) in deep sleep.

(Reply)—No, the state of deep sleep is a matter of experience. For the Śruti says, “Knowledge of the Knower is never absent.”

Hence it (Turiya) is “unseen”; and because it is unseen therefore it is “incomprehensible.” Turīya cannot be apprehended by the organs of action. Alakshanam means “uninferable” because there is no Linga (common characteristic) for its inference. Therefore Turīya is “unthinkable” and hence “indescribable” (by words). It is “essentially of the nature of consciousness consisting of Self”. Turīya should be known by spotting that consciousness that never changes in the three states, viz., waking, etc., and whose nature is that of a Unitary Self. Or, the phrase may signify that the knowledge of the one Ātman alone is the means for realising Turīya, and therefore Turīya is the essence of this consciousness or Self or Ātman. The Śruti also says, “It should be meditated upon as Ātman.” Several attributes, such as the “conscious of the sub-
jective" etc., associated with the manifestation (such as, Viśwa, etc.) in each of the states have already been negated. Now by describing Turiya as "the cessation of illusion", the attributes which characterise the three states, viz., waking, etc., are negated. Hence it is "ever29 Peaceful", i.e., without any manifestation of change—and "all30 bliss". As it is non-dual, i.e., devoid of illusory ideas of distinction, therefore it is called "Turiya", the "Fourth",31 because it is totally distinct (in character) from the three quarters which are mere appearances. "This, indeed, is the Ātman and it should be known," is intended to show that the meaning of the Vedic statement, "That thou art", points to the relationless Ātman (Turiya) which is like the rope (in the illustration) different from the snake, line on the ground, stick, etc., which are mere appearances. That Ātman which has been described in such Śruti passages as "unseen, but the seer", "the consciousness of the seer is never absent", etc., should be known. (The incomprehensible) Turiya "should be known", and this32 is said so only from the standpoint of the previously unknown condition, for duality cannot exist when the Highest Truth is known.

1 Is realised—The rope did not cease to be the rope when it appeared as the snake. The rope, again, is seen in its true nature when the snake idea is removed. Similarly, Ātman appears as Viśwa, Taïjasa and Prājna in the three states. And the same Ātman is realised as Turiya when the upādhis, namely the states, are negated. Turiya is not a separate entity nor is it a fourth state succeeding the three other states. The real nature of Turiya cannot be realised without the negation of the upādhis of the three states.

2 This is, etc.—The real significance of "That thou art", is Turiya and it is realised when the contrary qualities, known as the upādhis, indicated by the words "That" and "thou" are eliminated. Similarly, the Scripture by the negative process, removes...
the upādhis of the Ātman when associated with the three states and this reveals its eternal identity with Turiya.

3 Different—From the relative or causal standpoint, the Ātman associated with any of the three states, is, no doubt, different from Turiya. But from the standpoint of Turiya there is no difference whatsoever between it and the Ātman associated with the three states. As a matter of fact, it is Turiya as the witness (साधि) that is revealed out by the three states.

4 On account of—Ignorant person, for whom Scripture is prescribed for the attainment of Knowledge, moves in the relative plane of the three states. To him the Scripture suggests the examination of the three states in order to arrive at the Knowledge of Turiya. If Turiya were something totally separate from and essentially unconnected with the three states and if the three states were not the means of realising Turiya, then no other instrument of Knowledge would be left for the realisation of Turiya. It cannot be contended that one can get the Knowledge of Turiya from the Scripture. Because the Scripture also teaches about Turiya by the method of repudiation (अपवर्त्त) of the superimposed attributes (अष्टार्थ) i.e., by negating the upādhis which were superimposed upon Turiya. If Turiya were something totally different from the three states, then no scriptural teaching would be effective in establishing it. If Turiya cannot be established through the examination of the Ātman qualified by the three states, by following the scriptural method of negation, then one is faced with the only alternative that the Ultimate Reality is total non-existence (शून्य), because no other reality remains after the negation of the upādhis of the three states if the existence of Turiya be denied.

5 Two results—The instrument of Knowledge (प्रमाण) by means of which we become aware of the result of the negation of the upādhis, namely, the three states, reveals the relationless Turiya. It is like the seeing of the real rope (which is never absent) with the cessation of the illusory idea of the snake. It must be carefully noted that the realisation of Turiya is not the result of the Pramāṇa by means of which we become aware of the negation of the attributes of Ātman, viz., the three states. The two results are simultaneous—and not successive in time as the language seems to imply. It is because no new entity known as Turiya is discovered (or comes into existence) after the negation of upādhis. Turiya is always
present. Therefore there is no possibility of taking Turiya as the result of the negation of the upādhis, viz., the three states. Turiya being characterised by non-duality there is no subject-object relationship in Turiya in which case alone an instrument of Knowledge would have a meaning.

6 Additional instrument, etc.—No instrument of Knowledge can establish Turiya on account of its non-relation and non-dual nature. Even the function of the Śruti which indicates Turiya is only to negate what is unreal, relative and non-Brahman.

7 Other effort—Even contemplation, etc., which are the essential features of Yoga cannot establish Turiya, because it cannot be proved that Yogic contemplation can yield such Knowledge. Therefore the realisation of Turiya cannot be characterised as the result of any particular instrument of Knowledge or of any Yogic practice.

8 Enables, etc.—This means that the instrument of Knowledge, besides removing the darkness enveloping the Jar, also yields another positive result that is the manifestation of the Jar.

9 Affirm—This means that the act of cutting besides severing the parts to which it is directed also functions in other ways. But this is absurd because we have no knowledge of any other effect on the tree produced by the act of cutting.

10 Invariably, etc.—It is because the Jar always exists even when it is enveloped in darkness.

11 Cannot function.—It is because Turiya is Knowledge itself. Hence no instrument of Knowledge can act upon it. Turiya does not stand in need of any demonstration or proof because it is ever-existent. The instrument of Knowledge only removed the superimpositions falsely attributed to Aītman. The instrument of Knowledge (perception) continues to act upon an object till the object is revealed (as Brahman).

12 Is accomplished—The instrument of Knowledge, invariably connected with its employer and an object, can act only in the plane of duality. With the negation of duality, the instrument of Knowledge itself becomes ineffective, for it cannot function the next moment. The idea of time is also annihilated with the destruction of duality. When the non-dual Turiya is realised, all ideas of the instrument of Knowledge, the employer and the object with their distinction are destroyed. Only Brahman is.
13 Would follow, etc.—It is because a second instrument of Knowledge would be required to negate the residual Knowledge or instrument and a third would be necessary to negate the second and so on *ad infinitum*. An argument ending in a *regressus* is not allowed in logical discussion.

14 Is simultaneous—Here Pramāṇa is the Jnānam that results from the negation of attributes. And through this instrument of Knowledge alone we know that all relative ideas have been negated. Simultaneously with this assurance, *Turīya* is realised.

15 Intermediate, etc.—It is the state when one experiences something like a "day dream" that is, he half sees the one and half sees the other.

16 Causal condition—By seeing the manifestation in the waking state one naturally infers that the preceding state, that is Sushupti, is the cause of both the waking and dream experiences. In Sushupti, specific states of consciousness, which manifest themselves as different objects in dream and waking states, remain in a state of indistinguishability. In deep sleep, no distinctions are perceived.

17 Cannot, etc.—By this are denied such attributes as omniscience, etc., associated with Īswara.

19 How, etc.—The contention of the objector is this: That the idea of the snake, etc., in the rope is an illusion is a matter of common experience. When the error is pointed out, the idea of the snake disappears. Therefore the idea of such a snake can be said to be non-existent. But this is not the case with the attributes of Ātman which are sought to be negated. Such attributes are directly perceived by everyone and do not vanish even though they are negated. Therefore the phenomena of the three states cannot be said to be non-existent on the analogy of the rope and the snake.

19 Though, etc.—The reply is that the attributes, viz., the three states, can be demonstrated to be non-existent (unreal) by the act of negation. The illustration of the snake and the rope is quite apposite. The ideas of the snake, the water-line, etc., for which the rope is mistaken are first pointed out to be illusion because they are subject to change. Therefore, such objects as are indicated by the ideas are non-existent. Similarly it is a matter of common experience that the states of Jāgrat, Swapna and Sushupt
are subject to change. Therefore they are negatable. In any one state the two other states are negated. Besides, in the state of waking one can realise the three states as following one another. Therefore the three states partake of the nature of unreality as distinguished from Reality which is never subject to any change. Now, what is Reality? From the examination of the three states it becomes clear that though the states are changing and negatable the consciousness which is present therein is constant and invariable. Change of one state to another cannot affect the unchanging nature of Consciousness itself. Therefore pure Consciousness is real. Hence it follows that by constantly examining the changeable and negatable character of the attributes, viz., the three states, one can realise their non-existent or unreal nature. The fallacy of the contention of the objector is due to the partial examination of Reality in only one state in which case the changeable nature of the attributes cannot be realized. But the examination of the three states at once demonstrates their changeable and negatable nature and points out that consciousness itself which is the substratum of the changing attributes is the only Reality.

20. Change—That is, no one is aware of consciousness in deep sleep.

21. Experience—Consciousness cannot be dissociated from the state of deep sleep. Sushupti is experienced from the Jågrat state, that is to say, Turiya in Jågrat state knows that it experienced deep sleep. Otherwise Sushupti would have never been known to exist at all.

22. Unseen—it cannot be recognised by any organ of perception. It is because Turiya is the negation of all the attributes. It cannot be made the object of any sense-organ.

23. Incomprehensible—it cannot come within the cognizance of the senses: therefore Turiya cannot serve any purpose (अर्थकिर्या).

24. Uninferable—"Existence, Knowledge and Infinity," by which Brahman is described in the Taïtiriya Upanishad are not to be considered to be real and positive attributes for the purpose of drawing an inference about Brahman. They only serve a negative purpose indicating that Brahman is other than non-truth, non-consciousness and non-infinity. Besides, inference requires a common feature which always presupposes more objects than one. But Brahman is one and without a second. Therefore no inference is possible regarding Brahman.
25 Unthinkable—It is because the predicates by which we can think about an entity have been totally eliminated from Turiya.

26 Indescribable—Turiya cannot be described by words because it is unthinkable. That which one thinks in mind, is expressed by words.

27 Essentially, etc.—The elimination of all the attributes may make Turiya appear as a void to the unwary student. Therefore it is described as a positive existence which can be realised by spotting it as the changeless and the constant factor in the three states. The states, no doubt, do change but there is a unity of the subject implied in the conscious experience of “I am that perceiver” common to all the three states.

28 Or—The alternative meaning is that through consciousness of Self alone, which forms the basis of the three states, we can demonstrate Turiya which transcends all the states, or in other words, because there is Pure Consciousness, changeless and constant, known as Turiya, therefore we are aware of self-consciousness in the three states.

29 Ever-peaceful—Free from attachment of love and hate, i.e., changeless and immutable.

30 All Bliss—Pure and embodiment of the highest Bliss.

31 Fourth—This does not signify any numerical relationship with the three other states narrated previously. Turiya is called the “fourth” because it occupies the “fourth” place in order of explanation of Brahman of which the three states have previously been dealt with.

32 This is, etc.—The statement that “It should be known” cannot be properly made with regard to the non-dual Atman which is incomprehensible, etc. This objection is, no doubt, valid from the standpoint of Turiya where there cannot be a separate knower of Atman. But Turiya is certainly unknown from the standpoint of any of the three states, and from that dual standpoint it is perfectly legitimate to speak of Brahman as something “to be known”.

Here appear the following slokas:

निबृत्ते: सर्वदु:खानामीशान: प्रभुरव्ययः ||
अद्वैत: सर्वभावानं देवस्तुयों विभु: स्मृत: || १० ||
10. *In it, indicated as the changeless and the Supreme Lord, there is a cessation of all miseries. It is the one without a second among all entities. It is known as the Turiya (Fourth), effulgent and all-pervading.*

**SANKARA’S COMMENTARY**

In (the Knowledge of) *Isâna*, meaning the *Turiya Âtman* there is a cessation\(^1\) of all miseries characterised by the three states, *viz.*, *Prâjna,\(^2\) Taijasa and Viśwa*. The word *‘Isâna’* is explained as *‘Prabhu’,* *i.e.,* the one who brings about the cessation of miseries. It is because misery is destroyed by one’s own Knowledge of it (*Turiya*). *‘Aivyaya’* means that which is not subject to any change, *i.e.,* which does not deviate from its own nature. How? It is so because *Turiya* is non-dual, all\(^4\) other entities being illusory (unreal) like the idea of the snake, etc., imagined in the rope. It is he who is recognised\(^5\) as the *Deva* (on account of his effulgent nature), the *Turiya*, the fourth, the *Vibhu,\(^6\) that is the all-pervading one.

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1 *Cessation*—The three states are said to be in the *Âtman* because we, as *Turiya*, cognize them. Therefore all misery as well as its cause associated with the three states, are imagined by us to subsist in *Turiya*. It is because we do not realize this that we identify ourselves with the states and that we suffer from various kinds of miseries. But a complete cessation of miseries ensues if we realise the *Âtman* as *Turiya* and thus witness the appearance and disappearance of the ideas, *viz.,* the states without identifying ourselves with them.

2 *Prâjna*—The state of *Sushupti*, devoid of the Knowledge of *Turiya* on the part of the sleeper, is characterised as unhappiness.

3 *Knowledge*—Though *Turiya* is constant in all the states, yet we suffer from misery because we are not aware of the existence of the *Turiya*. It is only the Knowledge of *Turiya* that can destroy misery.

4 *All other, etc.*—Though *Viśwa*, etc., are perceived, they are really illusory like the ideas of the snake, etc., in the rope. *Turiya*
alone is real. Every part of Viśwa, Taijasa and Prājna is nothing but Turiya as every part of the illusory snake is the rope. Therefore from the highest standpoint only Turiya is.

5 Recognised—That is Turiya, as such, is known from the realisation of the wise.

6 Vibhu—Turiya is called Vibhu because it pervades all the three states.

कार्यकारणवद्वृत्तातिबिषय्येते विह्यतात्जस्मि ।
प्राङ्क्षः कारणवद्वृत्तेऽव्र तौ तु तुर्येन न सिद्धत: ॥ ११ ॥

11. Viśwa and Taijasa are conditioned by cause and effect. But Prājna is conditioned by cause alone. These two (cause and effect) do not exist in Turiya.

ŚANKARA’S COMMENTARY

The generic1 and specific2 characters of Viśwa, etc., are described with a view to determining the real nature of Turiya: ‘Kārya’ or effect is that which is done, i.e., which has the characteristic of result. ‘Kārana’ or the cause is that which acts, i.e., it is the state in which the effect remains latent. Both Viśwa and Taijasa, described above, are known as being conditioned by cause and effect,3 characterised by both non-apprehension and mis-apprehension of Reality. But Prājna is conditioned by cause alone. Cause, characterised by the non-apprehension of Reality, is the condition of Prājna. Therefore these two, cause and effect, i.e., non-apprehension and mis-apprehension of Reality, do not exist, i.e., are not possible in Turiya.

1 Generic—The generic or the common characteristic of Viśwa and Taijasa is that they are, both, characterised by the conditions of cause and effect.

2 Specific—The special characteristic of Prājna is that it is characterised by the causal conditions alone.
3 Cause and effect—Causal state (बीज) is that in which we do not know (अमहण) the Truth. From it follows the result (फल) which is the mis-apprehension of Truth (अन्यथाग्रहण). It is because one does not know the rope (बीज) one mistakes it for the snake (फल). Prājna or the state of non-apprehension as such is said to be the cause of the Viśwa and Taijasa or the states of mis-apprehension. In dream and waking states there are both non-apprehension and mis-apprehension of Reality. But in deep sleep, there is only non-apprehension. As a matter of fact these two conditions, mis-apprehension and non-apprehension, cannot be experienced separately. They have been differently classified only to facilitate understanding.

नारःमांन न पराण्डेव न सलं नापि चाचूतं ।
प्राज्ञः किचन संवेदति तुर्यं सत्यसंध्वस्य ॥ १२ ॥

12. Prājna does not know anything of the self or the non-self; nor truth nor untruth. But Turīya is ever existent and ever all-seeing.

ŚANKARA’S COMMENTARY

How is it that Prājna is conditioned by cause? And how is it, again, that the two conditions of non-apprehension and mis-apprehension of Reality do not exist in Turīya? It is because Prājna does not, like Viśwa and Taijasa, perceive anything of the duality,1 external to and other2 than itself and born3 of the cause known as Avidyā. Therefore it is conditioned by darkness characterised by non-apprehension of Reality which is the cause of mis-apprehension. As Turīya exists always, ever all-seeing4, on account of the absence of anything other than Turīya, it is never associated with the causal condition characterised by non-apprehension of Reality. Consequently mis-apprehension of Reality which is the result of non-apprehension is not found
in Turiya. For, it is not possible to find in the sun, whose nature is to be ever-luminous, anything contrary to light, viz., darkness, or any other light different from itself. The Sruti also says: “The Knowledge of the seer is never absent.” Or the phrase may be explained thus: Turiya may be designated as ever all-seeing because it subsists in all, in dream and waking states and all the seers that cognize them (in those states) are Turiya alone. This is also borne out by the following Sruti passage, “There is no seer other than this.”

1 Duality—This dual world is true from empirical standpoint. Prājna does not perceive it.

2 Other than, etc.—Prājna does not see the external world or the non-self. Therefore it does not see itself. Ego can be cognized only in relation to the non-ego.

3 Born, etc.—That is untruth. It is because Prājna does not see the unreal external world produced by Avidyā, therefore it is not aware of mis-apprehension.

4 Ever all-seeing—It is because it exists in the seers and the things seen in both the states, it is ever all-seeing.

13. The non-cognition of duality is common to both Prājna and Turiya. (But) Prājna is associated with sleep in the form of cause and this (sleep) does not exist in Turiya.

ŚANKARA’S COMMENTARY

This sloka is meant to remove a doubt that has arisen incidentally. The doubt is this: How is it that it is Prājna alone and not Turiya that is bound by the condition of cause, since the non-cognition of duality is the common feature of both? This doubt is thus removed1: The meaning of the phrase Bījanidrāyuta
is: Nidrā or sleep is characterised by the absence of the Knowledge of Reality. This is the cause which gives rise to the cognition of varieties. Prājna is associated with this sleep which is the cause. It is because Turiya is ever all-seeing, therefore the sleep characterised by the absence of the Knowledge of Reality does not exist in Turiya. Therefore the bondage in the form of causal condition does not exist in Turiya.

1 Removed—The contention that Turiya and Prājna are both characterised by the condition of cause on account of the common feature of the non-perception of duality in both the cases, is due to a wrong inference based upon insufficient data. The Prājna is thought to be the causal state because it is the immediately preceding condition of the manifestations of the waking state, etc. But this does not apply to Turiya because it is not the immediately preceding condition of any state. Turiya is not a state which is antecedent or subsequent to any other state. It is the substratum of all the states. Turiya is non-dual, changeless and pure consciousness itself. Hence it cannot be said to produce anything. Therefore causal condition cannot obtain in the case of Turiya.

ःप्राज्ञेःतुर्यियाः संस्कृत्यभालः ॥

न निद्राः नैव च स्मरं तुर्य एवं निद्रितां निश्चिताः ॥ १४ ॥

14. The first two (Vīśwa and Taijas) are associated with the conditions of dream and sleep; Prājna is the condition of sleep without dream. Those who have known the truth see neither sleep nor dream in Turiya.

ŚANKARA’S COMMENTARY

Svapna or dream is the mis-apprehension\(^1\) of Reality like that of the snake in the rope. Nidrā or sleep has already been defined as darkness characterised by the absence of the Knowledge of Reality. Vīśwa and Taijas are associated with these, viz., the conditions of dream and sleep. Therefore they have been described as
conditioned by the characteristics of cause and effect. But Prājna is associated with sleep alone without dream; therefore it is described as conditioned by cause only. The knower of Brahman does not see them (dream and sleep) in Turiya, as it would be inconsistent like seeing darkness in the Sun. Therefore Turiya has been described as not associated with the conditions of cause and effect.

1 Mis-apprehension—i.e., when one, then, thinks of Ātman as endowed with body, etc.

2 Turiya—Ajnāna and its effects cannot exist in Turiya which is pure Knowledge.

3 Therefore—It is because there is no Nidrā or sleep in Turiya.

अन्याय गुह्त: क्षो निद्रा तत्वमजानतः |
विपर्योऽसे तयोः क्षोणे तुरीयं पदमश्चुते || १५ ||

15. Svapna or dream is the wrong cognition of Reality. Nidrā or sleep is the state in which one does not know what Reality is. When the erroneous knowledge in these two disappears, Turiya is realized.

ŚANKARA’S COMMENTARY

When is one established in Turiya? It is thus replied: During the states of dream and waking when one wrongly cognizes Reality like the perception of the snake in the place of the rope, he is said to be experiencing dream.¹ Nidrā or sleep,² characterised by the ignorance of Reality, is the common feature of the three states. Viśwa and Taijasa, on account of their having the common features of Svapna (dream) and Nidrā (sleep), form a single class. That Nidrā (sleep) which is characterised by the predominance of wrong apprehension (of Reality) constitutes the state of inversion which is Svapna (dream). But in the third
state, Nidrā (sleep), alone, characterised by the non-apprehension of Reality is the only inversion. (This forms the second or the other class implied in the text which speaks only of dream and sleep as covering the three states.) Therefore when these two classes of the nature of effect and cause, characterised by the mis-apprehension and non-apprehension respectively (of Reality), disappear by the destruction of the inversion characterised by effect and cause, by the knowledge of the nature of the Highest Reality, then one realises Turiya which is the goal. Then one does not find in Turiya this condition, the characteristics of which are these two (effect and cause), and one thus becomes firm in the Highest Reality which is Turiya.

1 *Dream—Svapna* includes dream and waking states, ordinarily so called, as in both the states there is a wrong apprehension of Reality. The inversion (absence of the Knowledge of Reality) which is the characteristic of sleep is found in dream and waking also. In other words, this is the common characteristic of all the three states.

2 *Nidrā—Nidrā* includes the three states of waking, dream and sleep, ordinarily so-called, as all the three states are characterised by the absence of the Knowledge of Reality. The inversion, characteristic of Nidrā, is the non-apprehension of Reality and this is the only feature of Prājña. But Svapna (dream) including the waking state also is characterised by both non-apprehension and mis-apprehension of Reality.

अनादिमाया सुतो यदा जीवः प्रबुध्यते ।
अजमनिद्रमस्थममद्वैं बुध्यते तदा ॥ ९६ ॥

16. *When the Jiva or the individual soul sleeping (i.e., not knowing the Reality) under the influence of the beginningless Māyā, is awakened, it, then, realises (in itself) the non-duality, beginningless and dreamless.*
ŚANKARA'S COMMENTARY

One who is called the Jīva\(^1\), the individual soul, (whose characteristic is to be) subject\(^2\) to the law of transmigration, sleeping\(^3\) under the influence of Māyā which is active from time without\(^4\) beginning and which has the double characteristics of non-apprehending (on account of its being of the nature of the cause) and mis-apprehending Reality, experiences such dreams as, "This is my father, this is my son, this is my grandson, this is my property and these are my animals, I am their master, I am happy, I am miserable, I have suffered loss on account of this, I have gained on this account".....

When the Jīva remains asleep experiencing these dreams in the two states\(^5\) he is then thus awakened\(^6\) by the gracious teacher who has himself realised the Reality, indicated by Vedānta: "Thou art not this, of the nature of cause and effect, but That thou art." When the Jīva is thus awakened from sleep, he, then, realises his real nature. What is his nature? It (Self) is birthless, because it is beyond cause and effect and because it has none of the characteristics\(^7\) such as birth, etc., which are (inevitably) associated with all (relative) existence. It is birthless, i.e., it is devoid of all changes associated with the object of relative existence including the conditions of cause and effect. It is Anidram (sleepless) because there does not exist in it Nidrā (sleep), the cause, of the nature of the darkness of Avidyā, which produces the changes called birth, etc. Turiya is free from Swapna (dream) because it is free from Nidrā (sleep) which is the cause of mis-apprehension of Reality (dream). It is because the Self is free from sleep and dream therefore the Jīva, then\(^8\) realises himself as the Turiya Ātman, birthless and non-dual.
AGAMA PRAKARĀṆĀ

1 Jīva—It is the Paramātmāna or the Supreme Self who is thought to appear as world-bound on account of his assuming the characteristic of the Jīva, i.e., binding himself with the chain of cause and effect.

2 Subject, etc.—i.e., world-bound.

3 Sleeping—Sleep or ignorance is the common characteristic of the three states. See Kārikā 15.

4 Time without, etc.—Māyā is said to be Anādi or beginningless from the standpoint of the relative, because it is something for which we cannot think of a cause. From the Absolute standpoint, Māyā does not exist.

5 Two states—This covers the three states of waking, dream and deep sleep. See commentary on the previous Kārikā.

6 Awakened—Awakening or realisation of Knowledge is possible only for one who is asleep, i.e., who is ignorant.

7 Characteristics—All entities of relative existence possess six characteristics, such as birth, duration, growth, change, decay and death. Brahman is free from them.

8 Then—that is to say, when he is taught by the Guru what his real nature is. For the realisation of the Supreme Reality a competent teacher is absolutely necessary who alone is capable of dispelling the doubts that crop up in the mind of the student during the period of his inquiry into Truth.

प्रपन्धो यदि विचेत निवर्तेत न संशयः ।
मायामात्रमिदं हृतमद्वैतं परमार्थं: ॥ १७ ॥

17. If the perceived manifold were real then certainly it would disappear. This duality (that is cognized) is mere illusion (Māyā). Non-duality is (alone) the Supreme Reality.

ŚANKARA’S COMMENTARY

If¹ the knowledge of non-duality (Turiya) be possible after the disappearance of the perceived manifold, how could non-duality be said to exist (always) while the perceptual manifold remains? This is explained thus:
This would have been true if the manifold really existed.² This manifold being only a false imagination, like the snake in the rope, does not really exist. There is no doubt that it would (certainly) disappear if it really existed.³ The snake imagined in the rope, through false conception, does not really exist and therefore does not disappear⁴ through correct understanding. Nor, similarly, does the illusion of the vision conjured up by the magician exist and then disappear as though a veil thrown over the eyes of the spectators (by the magician) were removed. Similar is this duality of the cognized universe called the Phenomenal or manifold, (मायामात्र द्रव्य) a mere illusion. Non-duality Turiya like the rope and the magician (in the illustrations) is alone the Supreme Reality.⁵ Therefore the fact is that there is no such thing as the manifold about which appearance or disappearance can be predicated.

¹ If—This is the contention of the opponent: Your assertion that there is anything like the non-dual Turiya cannot be a fact: for, a second entity known as the manifold universe does exist, and is perceived. But if you say that the realisation of the non-dual Turiya is not inconsistent with that of the dual manifold, because Turiya can be realised as such only by the destruction of the manifested manifold, then, so long as the manifold is there as reality and does not disappear, Turiya cannot be established as the eternally existent non-duality.

² Existed—The manifold does not exist in the sense of a separate Reality. If it had any such existence then alone could it obstruct the eternally non-dual nature of the Turiya by the appearance (of the manifold). If anyone says that the manifold disappears that is only because he believes in its reality. But this is not the Truth, because the appearance of the manifold is only an illusion and not a reality.

³ Really existed—People say that duality disappears only because they believe in its reality. But really duality does not exist, therefore
it does not disappear. If any one believes in the reality of such illusory appearance then can one believe in the reality of the disappearance.

4 Does not disappear—The rope is mistaken for an illusory snake. There is no real snake. When one is pointed out the real rope, no such thing as a snake actually disappears, for no such thing as a real snake existed. It is the illusion due to ignorance that makes one see the snake that disappears but no real snake. The illusion disappears because it is not a reality. That which is liable to be negated cannot be said really to exist at all.

5 Supreme Reality—that is, it is never absent. If one contends that Turīya does not exist when the manifold is seen, we reply that the manifold is nothing but Brahman; only the illusion which manifests the manifold as separate from Brahman comes and goes but the manifold, having for its substratum Brahman, always exists.

This Kārikā deals with the crux of the Vedānta Philosophy. Vedānta says that non-duality (Turīya) alone is real and ever-existent. But the opponent points out to him the fact of the existence of the universe which incontestably proves duality. If this universe be real, then non-duality (Turīya) cannot be a fact. If non-duality is realised only after the disappearance of the objective universe, then non-duality cannot certainly exist so long as the universe exists.

Vedānta shows its boldest genius in answering this question. It at once states that non-dual Brahman alone exists. Whatever is, is nothing but Brahman. The manifold is Brahman. As Brahman, it always exists and never undergoes any change. If a man realises the universe as Brahman, then he is never subject to any illusion regarding its reality. The difference between a Jñāni and an Ajñāni is that a wise man sees the universe as Brahman and therefore never sees in it any appearance or disappearance. But the ignorant person believes in the reality of the universe as apart from Brahman and therefore talks about its disappearance. What really disappears is the illusion that the manifold exists as something other than Brahman. The universe as Brahman does not appear and disappear. It always is. The meaning of the disappearance of the universe really is the disappearance of one’s notion of the illusion (i.e., the existence of the universe as something other than Brahman). It is like the illusion conjured up by the magician. When the real nature of the rope is pointed out, what disappears
is only the illusion which presented the rope as other than it is. The on-looker, after his error is pointed out, realises that what he considered as snake is really the rope. It is illusion which made the rope appear as other than what it is. Knowledge removes this illusion. This illusion is unsubstantial and unreal, hence its appearance and disappearance cannot affect the nature of Reality.

उपदेशाद्यं वादो झाते हैतं न विचाते॥ १८ ॥

18. If anyone has ever imagined the manifold ideas (such for instance as the teacher, the taught, and the scripture), they might disappear. This explanation is for the purpose of teaching. Duality (implied in explanation) ceases to exist when the Highest Truth is known.

SANKARA’S COMMENTARY

(Objection)—How¹ could (duality implied in) ideas such as the teacher, the taught and the scripture disappear?

(Reply)—This is thus explained. If² such ideas had ever been imagined by someone then they might be supposed to disappear. As the manifold is like the illusion (conjured up by the magician or) of the snake in the rope, so³ also are the ideas of the teacher, etc. These ideas, namely, the ideas of teacher, taught, and scripture are for⁴ the purpose of teaching which are (therefore appear) true till one realises the Highest Truth. But duality does not exist when one, as a result of the teaching, attains knowledge, i.e., realises the Highest Reality.

¹ How could, etc.—If even the idea of teacher, etc., existed, non-duality could not be established. If such ideas be meant for the purpose of inferring Turiya, as the smoke is thought of for inferring fire, then duality cannot be refuted. For, the experience of smoke and fire, as existing together, does not demonstrate non-duality.
2 If, etc.—Such ideas as teacher, student and scripture have their applicability till one realises the Highest Truth of non-duality (Turiya). Such ideas, possible only from the standpoint of ignorance, cannot contradict Turiya because they are unreal and negatable by knowledge. The analogy of the smoke and fire is not appropriate. Brahman cannot be logically inferred from the world like the fire from the smoke. For, fire and smoke are objective realities of the same order and seen to exist together by a perceiver. That is not so with Brahman and the world. But the seeing of an object implies the seer. So Brahman may only be indicated.

3 So also, etc.—The entire manifold is an illusion, it is not reality. It appears as real till one attains to the Highest Knowledge. The idea of the teacher, etc., is a part of this manifold. Hence such ideas have no absolute reality. The appearance is also due to the non-apprehension of Reality.

4 For the purpose of—If one sees duality and seeks an explanation, one of the explanations, offered is that ideas are imagined for the purpose of attaining the Truth.

It has been seen in the previous Kārikā that the manifold is Brahman. As the wave is non-different from water, so also the world is non-different from Brahman. The idea that what we see is not Brahman and has got such attributes as birth, changeability, destruction, etc., is illusion which being negated enables one to realise the Highest Truth. Similarly the various ideas one has with regard to the manifold, are non-different from Brahman. Even the so-called illusion of the manifold universe has no existence other than that of Brahman. As the wind that arises from the air, disappears in the air and is identical with the air, so also the manifold is non-different from Brahman. As in dream, the objects that are experienced as the elephant, etc., with their names and forms are nothing but the mindstuff, so also in the state of ignorance what are experienced as the objects with their distinctive names and forms are nothing but Brahman. As in the same dream the idea that I have seen an elephant is non-different from the mindstuff which creates the elephant, so also the idea that there is a distinction between the teacher, etc., is not separate from Brahman. The cognition of ideas as teacher, etc., as separate from Brahman is due to one's still persisting in the relative plane, and this is explained as being useful for the realisation of Truth. But after enlighten-
ment these ideas are realised as non-different from Brahman. The Highest Truth is that the manifold as well as various thoughts associated with it are identical with Brahman. The non-duality (Turiya) alone is.

VIII

śāntyamālmādhyakṣaromoddāroddhīmaṁ pādra maṭtra
maṭrāśc pāḍra akāra ukārao mkaar ṁkār iṁti || 8 ||

The same Ātman (which has been described above as having four quarters) is, again, Aum, from the point of view of the syllables (अक्षरम्). The Aum with parts is viewed from the standpoint of sounds (letters, maṭtra:). The quarters are the letters (parts) and the letters are the quarters. The letters here are A, U and M.

ŚANKARA’S COMMENTARY

In the word Aum prominence is given to that which is indicated by several names. The word Aum which has been explained before as Ātman having four quarters is again the same Ātman described here from the standpoint of syllable where prominence is given to the name. What, again, is that syllable? It is thus replied: Aum. It is that word Aum which being divided into parts, is viewed from the standpoint of letters. How? Those which constitute the quarters of the Ātman are the letters of Aum. What are they? The letters are A, U and M.

In the first Upanishad it is said, “Aum, the word, is all this.” The word Aum is the name (अमिघान) which indicates everything (अभिघान) past, present, future and all that which is beyond even the conception of time. Thus Aum is the name for Brahman. The second Upanishad declares that Brahman is the Ātman. The Ātman with its four quarters has been explained in the following
Upanishads. Therefore all these explanations are of Aum from the standpoint of Ātman where prominence is given to that which is indicated by names. Now the same Aum is explained from the standpoint of the word itself, that is the name which indicates Ātman or the Supreme Reality.

The Highest Truth as explained above by the process of the refutation of the erroneous superimposition can be grasped only by the students of sharp or middling intelligence. But those ordinary students who cannot enter upon philosophical reflection regarding the Supreme Reality as given in the previous texts, are advised to concentrate on Aum as the symbol of the Ultimate Reality.

1 Are, etc.—It is because the quarters and the letters are identical.

IX

जागरितिस्थानो बैश्वानरोड्कारः प्रथमा मात्रायस्सेरादिमित्वा-
प्रास्स्मोति ह ने सर्वान्कानानादिश्च भवति य एवं वेद ॥ ९ ॥

He who is Vaiśwānara, having for its sphere of activity the waking state, is A, the first letter (of Aum) on account of its all-pervasiveness or on account of being the first (these being the common features of both). One who knows this attains to the fulfilment of all desires and becomes the first (of all).

ŚANKARA'S COMMENTARY

Points of specific resemblance between them are thus pointed out. That which is Vaiśwānara, whose sphere of activity is the waking state, is the first letter of Aum. What is the common feature between them? It is thus explained: the first point of resemblance is pervasiveness.¹ All sounds are pervaded² by A. This is corroborated by the Āruti passage, “The sound A is the whole of speech.” Similarly the entire universe is
pervaded by the *Vaiśwānara* as is evident from such *Śruti* passages as, "The effulgent Heaven is the head of this, the *Vaiśwānara Ātman,*" etc. The identity of the name and the object, indicated by the name, has already been described. The word ‘Ādimat’ means that this has a beginning. As the letter *A* is with a beginning, so also is *Vaiśwānara*. *Vaiśwānara* is identical with *A* on account of this common feature. The knower of this identity gets the following result: One who knows this, *i.e.*, the identity described above, has all his desires fulfilled and becomes the first of the great.

1 *Pervasiveness*—*A* (अ) pervades all sounds. It is present in all sounds. No articulate sound can be produced without opening the mouth and the sound that is thus produced is *A* (अ).

2 *Pervaded, etc.*—It has been already stated that the knowledge of all other states are possible only from the waking state. The three states constitute our entire experience of the universe. Therefore the waking state pervades the whole of the universe.

3 *As, etc.*—This is the second point of resemblance. *A* is the first of all sounds or letters. Therefore *A* has a beginning because no other sound or letter precedes *A*. Similarly from our common experience it is known that the states of dream and deep sleep are preceded by the waking state which is therefore the first of the three states.

4 *Result*—The enumeration of the merits is for the purpose of inducing students to understand the meaning of *Aum*.

X

सम्भानस्ते जस उकारो द्वितीया मात्रोक्षरं भवेत् भवेत्।
ह वै ज्ञानसंतति समानश्च भवति नायां भवित्कुले भवति
य एवं वेद ॥ १० ॥

*Taijasa*, whose sphere of activity is the dream state, is *U* (ऊ), the second letter (of *Aum*) on account
of superiority or on account of being in between the two. He who knows this attains to a superior knowledge, is treated equally by all alike and finds no one in his line who is not a knower of Brahman.

ŚANKARA’S COMMENTARY

He who is Taijasa having for its sphere of activity the dream state is U (ऌ) the second letter of Aum. What is the point of resemblance? It is thus replied: The one common feature is superiority. The letter U is, as it were, ‘superior’ to A; similarly Taijasa² is superior to Viśwa. Another common feature is: the letter U (ऌ) is in between the letters A (अ) and M (म). Similarly Taijasa is in between Viśwa and Prājna. Therefore this condition of being in the middle is the common feature. Now is described the result of this knowledge. The knowledge (of the knower of this identity) is always on the increase, i.e., his power of knowing increases considerably. He is regarded in the same way by all, i.e., his enemies, like his friends, do not envy him. Further, in his family not one is born who is not a knower of Brahman.

¹ Superior—As a matter of fact, A being the first of all sounds is superior to all letters. But U coming after A may be said to be superior to A in an indirect way.

² Taijasa—Taijasa is superior to Viśwa as it is associated with ideas (in dream state) whereas Viśwa is associated with gross objects (in the waking state). In dream alone one realises the world as states of mind (मनःस्पर्दन) which knowledge brings the student nearer to truth.

XI

सुषुस्त्यानः प्राज्ञो मकारस्तूतिया मात्रा मितेरपितेव्रि मिनोति ह वा इदं सर्वमपितित्वं भवति य एवं वेद || ११ ||
Prājna whose sphere is deep sleep is  M (म) the third part (letter) of Aum, because it is both the measure and that wherein all become one. One who knows this (identity of Prājna and  M) is able to measure all (realise the real nature of the world) and also comprehends all within himself.

ŚANKARA'S COMMENTARY

One who is Prājna associated with deep sleep is  M (म) the third sound (letter) of Aum. What is the common feature? It is thus explained. Here this is the common feature: The word Miti in the text means "measure". As barley is measured by Prastha (a kind of measure), so also Viśwa and Taijasa are, as it were, measured¹ by Prājna during their evolution (उत्पत्ति) and involution (प्रत्यय) by their appearance from and disappearance into Prājna (deep sleep). Similarly² after once finishing the utterance of Aum when it is re-uttered, the sounds (letters) A and U, as it were, merge into and emerge from M. Another common feature is described by the word "Apiteh" which means "becoming one". When the word Aum is uttered the sounds (letters) A and U become³ one, as it were, in the last sound (letter) M. Similarly, Viśwa and Taijasa become one (merge themselves) in Prājna in deep sleep. Therefore Prājna and the sound  M are identical on account of this common basis that underlies them both. Now is described the merit of this knowledge. (One who knows this identity) comprehends all this, i.e., the real⁴ nature of the universe. Further he realises himself as the Ātman, the cause of the universe, i.e., Iśwara. The enumeration of these secondary⁵ merits is for the purpose of extolling the principal means (of knowledge).
1 Measured—Both the waking and dream states appear (during their evolution) from and disappear (at the time of their involution) into deep sleep. Therefore Prājna is, as it were, the container in which Viśwa and Taijasa are contained. The nature of Viśwa and Taijasa (non-apprehension of Reality) is known from the nature of Prājna—because it is the cause of the two other states. Therefore Prājna is here described as the measure of the two other states.

2 Similarly—When the word ‘AUM’ is uttered quickly several times, the sound actually heard is Maum and not Aum, in which case it may be said that the sounds A and U emerge out of and merge into M.

3 Become one—i.e., merge themselves.

4 Real Nature—That is, the universe experienced in the dream and waking states is of the same stuff as the Prājna.

5 Secondary merits—The enumeration of these secondary merits is for the satisfaction of those that still move in the causal plane.

Here appear the following ślokas:

विश्वस्यात्विविष्कायामादिसामान्यसूक्तम् ।
मात्रासंप्रतिपत्तिः स्यादात्सामान्यमेव च ॥ १९ ॥

19. When the identity of Viśwa and the sound (letter) A is intended to be described, the conspicuous ground is the circumstance of each being the first (in their respective position); another reason for this identity is also the fact of the all-pervasiveness of each.

ŚANKARA'S COMMENTARY

When the Śruti intends to describe Viśwa as of the same nature as A (अ), then the most prominent ground is seen to be the fact of each being the first, as described in the Upanishad discussed above. “Māṭrā sampratipath” in the text means the identity of Viśwa and A. Another prominent reason for such identity is their all-pervasiveness.
20. The clear ground of realising Taijasa as of the same nature as U is the common feature of “Superiority”. Similarly another plain reason of such identity is being in “the middle”.

ŚANKARA’S COMMENTARY

When Taijasa is intended to be described as ‘U’, the reason of their being ‘Superior’ (in respective cases) is seen to be quite clear. Their being in ‘the middle’ is also another plain ground. All these explanations are as before.

21. Of the identity of Prājna and M (म) the clear reason is the common feature, i.e., they both are the ‘measure’. The other reason for such identity is another common feature, namely, all become one in both Prājna and M.

ŚANKARA’S COMMENTARY

Regarding the identity of Prājna, and M the plain common features are that both of them are the ‘measure’ as well as that wherein all merge.

22. He who knows without doubt, what the ‘common features’ are in the three states, is worshipped and adored by all beings and he is also the greatest sage.
SANKARA'S COMMENTARY

One who knows positively, i.e., without a shadow of doubt, the common features that are found in the three states, is worshipped and adored in the world. He is a knower of Brahmān.

1 Common features—That is, the three quarters of Ātman, viz., Viśwa, Taijasa and Prājna associated with waking, dream and deep sleep states are identical with the three sounds (letters) of Aum, viz., A, U and M respectively for reasons stated above.

2 Knower, etc.—The knower of this identity is highly extolled for this reason: From the standpoint of Ātman, Viśwa merges in Taijasa and Taijasa in Prājna; similarly from the standpoint of Aum the sound A merges in U and U merges in M. The quarters of Ātman are identical with the sound of M. He who knows this identity also knows that the entire universe of the dream and waking experiences emerges from and merges into Prājna. This Prājna is Brahmān though it appears as the causal self (ब्रज) to those whose mind still moves in the plane of causality. It is only the knower of Brahmān that knows Prājna also as Turiya.

अक्षारो नये विश्वमुकारशापि तैंजसम्।
मकारश पुनः प्राङ्गः नामात्रे विचित्रेते गति:॥ २३ ॥

23. The sound (letter) A helps its worshipper to attain to Viśwa, U to Taijasa, and M to Prājna. In the “Soundless” there is no attainment.

SANKARA'S COMMENTARY

Having identified the quarters of Ātman with the sounds (letters) of Aum, on account of the common features stated above, he who realises the nature of the sound Aum, described above, and meditates upon it, attains to Viśwa through the help of A. The meaning is that he who mediates on Aum having for his support A becomes Vaiśwānara. Similarly the meditator of U becomes Taijasa. Again the sound M leads its
meditator to Prājna. But when M too disappears, causality itself is negated. Therefore about such Aum, which thus becomes soundless, no attainment can be predicated.

1 Having, etc. —i.e., one who meditates on Aum laying emphasis upon A or the waking experiences, realises the entire universe experienced in the waking state as comprehended in the sound A.

2 Vaiśwānara—Vaiśwānara is the macrocosmic aspect of Viśwa and the same as Virāt.

3 Taijasa—i.e., the Hiranyagarbha. One who meditates upon Aumkāra laying emphasis upon U, realises the world as forms of thought like the world experienced in dream. Such worshipper attains to Hiranyagarbha who is the cosmic mind.

4 Prājna—That is, Iśwara. Prājna is the cause of the experiences of the waking and dream states as well as it is that wherein all these finally disappear. Iśwara is also he who is the cause of the Universe as well as that of its final disappearance. The meditator on M merges A in U and U in M. That is, he merges the gross universe of the waking state in the world of ideas experienced in dream and finally realises the dream as one with the state of deep sleep.

5 Causality—It is the idea of causality that makes a man think that he realises the same world after Sushupti which he had seen before going to sleep.

6 Soundless—i.e., it cannot be identified with any of the sounds or their corresponding states.

7 No, etc.—Because soundless Aum is the same as Turīva Brahman.

XII

अमात्रश्चतुर्योऽन्यवहायः प्रपञ्चोपयमः शिवोऽकैत एवमेकारः
अत्मेव सत्विश्वात्मनात्तन्तमानं य एवं बेद || १२ ||

That which has no parts (soundless), incompressible (with the aid of the senses), the cessation of all phenomena, all bliss and non-dual Aum, is the
fourth and verily the same as the Ātman. He who knows this merges his self in the Self.

ŚANKARA’S COMMENTARY

The अमात्राḥ (soundless) is that which has no parts (sounds, etc., or letters). This partless Aum which is the fourth, is nothing but Pure Ātman. It is incomprehensible, because both speech and mind which correspond to the name and the object disappear or cease; the name and the object (that is indicated by the name) which are only forms of speech and mind cease or disappear (in the partless Aum). It is the cessation of the (illusion of) phenomena and all bliss and is identical with non-duality. Aum, as thus understood, has three sounds which are the same as the three quarters and therefore Aum is identical with Ātman. He who knows this merges his self in the Self which is the Highest Reality. Those who know Brahman, i.e., those who realise the Highest Reality merge into Self, because in their case the notion of the cause which corresponds to the third quarter (of Ātman) is destroyed (burnt). They are not born again, because Turiya is not a cause. For, the illusory snake which has merged in the rope on the discrimination of the snake from the rope, does not reappear as before, to those who know the distinction between them, by any effort of the mind (due to the previous impressions). To the men of dull or mediocre intellect who still consider themselves as students of philosophy, who having renounced the world, tread on the path of virtue and who know the common features between the sounds (मात्रा:) and the quarters (or parts) as described above,—to them Aum, if meditated upon in a proper way, becomes a great help to the realisation of Brahman. The same
is indicated in the *Kārikā* later on thus: "The three inferior stages of life, etc...." (*Mānd. Kārikā, Advaita* Chapter, 16.)

1 *Soundless*—It is because *Amātra Aum* cannot be expressed by any sound. It is relationless and therefore it cannot be described as the substratum of three other sounds. Sound points out, by contrast, the soundless *Aum*. All sounds must, at some time or other, merge in soundlessness. This *Amātra Aum* is identical with *Turiya Ātman* as described in a previous text (*Upanishad 7*).

2 *Name, etc.*—Name is but a form of speech or sound. All objects are again forms of mind. Both the name and the object are therefore mere ideas (मनःस्पन्दनम्). They disappear with the disappearance of the mind at the dawn of knowledge. Therefore soundless *Aum* like *Turiya* cannot be expressed by a name or pointed out as an object. Therefore it is incomprehensible.

3 *Cessation*—As the rope is realised when the illusion of snake disappears so partless (soundless) *Aum* is realised when the illusion of duality vanishes.

4 *All bliss*—This is a state of infinite and eternal bliss because no illusion which is the cause of misery exists there.

*Fourth*—*Amātra* is called fourth because it occupies the fourth place in order of explanation of *Aum*, of which three other states have previously been dealt with. Fourth does not signify any numerical relationship with the three aspects of *Aum* described previously.

5 *Non-duality*—From the standpoint of the relative world, the soundless state is the substratum of all illusory appearances. One can speak of duality only in the relative world.

6 *As thus, etc.*—i.e., with reference to the identity of the sounds and quarters as explained above.

7 *Identical with*—Three quarters, viz., *Viśwa*, *Taijasa* and *Prājña* are imagined to subsist in Ātman. *Viśwa* merges in *Taijasa*, *Taijasa* in *Prājña* and finally *Prājña* which is looked upon as the cause of the two preceding states merges in *Turiya Ātman*. Similarly the three sounds. *A*, *U* and *M* ultimately merge in the soundless *Aum*. In soundless *Aum*, the three sounds become identical with it as the three states are identical with *Turiya* from the absolute standpoint. Therefore *Turiya Ātman* is the same as soundless *Aum*. 
8. Merges—that is, the knower realises himself as Turiya.

9. They are, etc.—It may be contended that like a man coming back to the realm of duality having experienced deep sleep, the knower of Self who has identified himself with Turiya may also come back to the illusory universe, for Prājña and Turiya are identical having a common feature of the perception of non-duality. This contention is without ground, because Turiya is not a cause. Hence it cannot give rise to the world of illusory experience. Unlike Prājña it is beyond all relations of cause and effect. Therefore one who has identified himself with Turiya can never see the illusion of the manifold.

10. Effort of mind—All efforts of mind are nothing but ideas. Our so-called illusory experiences and their opposite in the relative plane are nothing but ideas (मनःस्वन्दनम्). To a man who has realised ideas as non-different from Brahman, no illusion which is of the nature of existence separate from Brahman, is possible.

11. Great help—Those students who cannot at once think of the soundless Aum or Turiya Ātman proceed step by step and ultimately realise the Highest Truth.

(Here ends the Māndūkya Upanishad with the Commentary of Śankara.)

The following verses explain the foregoing Upānishadic texts:

ओंकारं पादशो विघात् पादा मात्रा न संशयः ॥
ओंकारं पादशो ब्रात्वा न किचिदपि चिन्तयेत् ॥ २४ ॥

24. (The meaning of) Aumkāra should be known quarter by quarter. There is no doubt that quarters are the same sounds (letters). Having grasped the (meaning of) Aumkāra nothing else should be thought of.

ŚANKARA’S COMMENTARY

Here are, as before, the following verses:—

Aumkāra should be known along with the quarters; for the quarters¹ are identical with sounds (letters).
because of their common features described before. Having thus understood Aumkāra, no other object, seen or unseen, should be thought of; for, the knower of Aumkāra has all his desires fulfilled.

1 Quarters—It is because the quarters of Ātman are identified with the sounds (letters) of Aum. Therefore Aum should be meditated upon as Ātman.

2 Having, etc.—That is, by realising Aum as Brahman.

युञ्जीत प्रणवे चेतः प्रणवो ब्रह्म निर्भययम् ।
प्रणवे नित्यसुप्रस्तुः न भयं विपर्यते कचित् ॥ २५ ॥

25. The mind should be unified with (the sacred syllable) Aum. (For) Aum is Brahman, the ever-fearless. He who is always unified with Aum knows no fear whatever.

ŚANKARA’S COMMENTARY

The word Yunjita means to unify, i.e., to absorb. The mind should be absorbed in Aum, which is of the nature of the Supreme Reality, as explained before. The Aum is Brahman, the ever-fearless. He who is always unified with Aum knows no fear whatever; for the Śruti says, “The knower of Brahman is not afraid of anything.

He who is proficient or perfect in the knowledge of Aum, acquired by an enquiry into its parts, i.e., he who has unified himself with the soundless (partless) Aum by merging the three sounds in it, has annihilated the entire dualistic illusion and thereby attained to the supreme goal. But those who cannot do so and those who always depend upon the teachings of others for acquiring knowledge, should meditate upon Aum in the manner described in the Śruti.

प्रणवो हापरं ब्रह्म प्रणवव्यः परं स्मृतः ।
अपूर्वोदन्तरोऽसः ब्रह्मोऽद्यः प्रणवोऽविभ्यः ॥ २६ ॥
26. (The sacred syllable) Aum is verily the Lower Brahman, and it is also admitted to be the Supreme Brahman. Aum is without beginning (cause), unique, without anything outside itself, unrelated to any effect and changeless.

ŚANKARA'S COMMENTARY

Aum is both the Lower Brahman and the Supreme Turiya. When from the highest standpoint, the sounds and quarters disappear (in the soundless Aum) it is verily the same as the Supreme Brahman. It is without cause because no cause can be predicated of it. It is unique because nothing else, belonging to any other species separate from it, exists. Similarly nothing else exists outside it. It is further not related to any effect (because it is not the cause of anything). It is without cause and exists everywhere, both inside and outside, like salt in the water of the ocean.

1 Lower Brahman—That is, the Brahman which is looked upon as the cause of the universe. The dull and mediocre intellect should meditate upon Aum as described in the first line of Kārikā. The second line describes the soundless aspect of Aum or the Turiya Ātman which can be understood only by one possessing the keenest intellect.

27. Aum is verily the beginning, middle and end of all. Knowing Aum as such, one, without doubt, attains immediately to that (the Supreme Reality).

ŚANKARA'S COMMENTARY

Aum¹ is the beginning, middle and end of all; that is, everything originates from Aum, is sustained by it.
and ultimately merges in it. As the magician, etc. (without undergoing any change in themselves) stand in relation to the illusory elephant, (the illusion of) snake-robe, the mirage and the dream, etc., so also is the sacred syllable Aum to the manifested manifold such as Ākāśa (ether), etc. The meaning is that he who knows thus, the Aum, Ātman, which, like the magician, etc., does not undergo any change, at once becomes unified with it.

1 Aum—When a cause, etc., of the universe is sought, Aum is pointed out as such. This is in accordance with the Parināmavāda.

2 As the magician, etc.—This is from the standpoint of the Vivartavāda. The magician, the rope, the desert, etc., appear as the elephant, the snake, the mirage, etc., without undergoing any change in themselves. Similarly Aum also, from the relative standpoint, appears to have become the entire manifested manifold without undergoing any change in itself. But from the standpoint of soundless Aum, there is no manifested manifold. It is not the cause of anything nor does it appear in any way other than itself. Aum is inferred as is a juggler (मायाचि) by those who see the fact of creation and explain it as Māyā. Therefore, the idea of the juggler is also an illusion and it lasts as long as we look upon the manifold as Māyā. It vanishes as soon as the Māyā or illusion disappears.

3 At once—Jñāna or knowledge is alone the cause of Mukti which does not depend upon anything else. The moment we know the real nature of Aum, we become unified with it.

प्रणवं हीर्षरं विद्यात् सर्वस्य दृष्टि सन्धिस्तिम् ।
सर्वज्ञापिनमेंकारं मत्वा धीरो न शोचति || २८ ||

28. Know Aum to be Īśvara, ever present in the mind of all; the man of discrimination realising Aum as all-pervading, does not grieve.

ŚANKARA'S COMMENTARY

Know Aum as the Īśvara present in the mind, which is the seat of memory and perception, of all things.
The man of discrimination realising Aumkāra as all-pervading like the sky, i.e., knowing it as the Ātman, not bound by the law of transmigration, does not grieve; for, there is no cause of misery for him. The Scriptures also abound in such passages as, “The knower of Ātman goes beyond grief.”

1 Seat, etc.—The knowledge of past and present consists of ideas in the mind of the perceiver. From the recollection of the past one forms the idea of the future.

2 All-pervading—From the highest standpoint Aum is not confined to any particular space. It is beyond the limitation of time, space, etc. Therefore the knower of the all-pervading Aum transcends grief which is the outcome of limitation. Aum is called all-pervading because whatever we perceive or cognize is in consciousness.

3 Cause of misery—One can go beyond grief only by realising the Highest Truth by Viveka or discrimination of real and unreal.

अमात्रा द्वात्स्योपत्तम: शिव: ।
ओकारो विदितो येन स मुनिनेन्तरो जन: ॥ २९ ॥

29. One who has known Aum which is soundless and of infinite sounds and which is ever-peaceful on account of negation of duality is the (real) sage and none other.

ŚANKARA’S COMMENTARY

Amātra or soundless Aum signifies Turiya. Mātrā means “measure”; that which has infinite measure or magnitude is called Anantamātra. That is to say, it is not possible to determine its extension or measure by pointing to this or that. It is ever-peaceful on account of its being the negation of all duality. He who knows Aum, as explained above, is the (real) sage because he has realised the nature of the Supreme Reality.
one else, though he may be an expert in the knowledge of the Scriptures, is a sage.

1 *Amātra*—It is because there is no sound or part beyond the *AUM*, *i.e.*, the soundless and partless quarter (*Amātra*) is not indicated by any letter.

2 *No, etc.*—Book-learning without the direct realisation of Truth is of no value.

Here ends the first chapter of Gauḍapāda’s *Kārikā* with the Commentary of Śankara.
Aum Salutation to Brahman

CHAPTER II

ILLUSION

वैतध्यं सत्त्वभावानं खं आहर्मनीषिणः ॥
अन्तःस्थानातु भावानं संभृतत्त्वेन हेतुना ॥ १ ॥

1. The wise declare the unreality of all the objects seen in the dream, they all being located within (the body) and on account of their being in a confined space.

SANKARA’S COMMENTARY

Aum. It has been already said, “Duality does not exist when (true) knowledge arises,” and this is borne out by such Sruti passages as, “It (Atman) is verily one and without a second,” etc. This is all based merely on the authority¹ of the Sruti. It² is also equally possible to determine the unreality (illusoriness) of duality through pure reasoning; and for this purpose is begun the second chapter which commences with the words Vaitathyam (unreality) etc. The word, Vaitathyam signifies the fact of its being unreal or false. Of what is this (unreality) predicated? Of all objects, both internal³ and external,⁴ perceived in the dream. It is thus declared by the wise, i.e., those who are experts in the use of the means (pramāṇas) of arriving at true knowledge. The reason of this unreality is stated thus: For, the objects perceived are found to be located within the body. All these entities such as a mountain, an elephant, etc., perceived in the dream are cognized there⁵
(i.e., within) and not outside the body. Therefore they must be regarded as unreal.

(Objection)—This ("being within") is no valid reason. A jar and other things on account of their being perceived within a cover, such as a cloth, etc. (cannot be called unreal).

(Reply)—On account of their being confined in a limited space, that is, within the body (where dreams objects are cognized). It is not possible for the mountain, the elephant, etc., to exist in the limited space (within the nerves\(^6\) of the body) which are within the body. A mountain does not or cannot exist inside\(^7\) a body.

1 Authority of the Śruti—The subject-matter, namely, the illusoriness of duality, has been proved in the first chapter solely on Scriptural authority.

2 It is, etc.—Śankara contends that the illusoriness of the duality can be proved by reasoning also independently of the Śruti. The Scripture, no doubt, convinces those who believe in its authority. But the philosophy of Vedānta can hold its ground against those who do not believe in the authority of the Vedas, e.g., the Buddhists, the Jains, the Chārvākas and others. All fair discussions are based on reason which is the common platform for all. It betrays ignorance of higher Vedānta to say that the reasoning employed in the Vedānta philosophy to arrive at the Ultimate Truth is always subservient to Scriptural authority. The second chapter of the Kārikā establishes the unreality of duality through reasoning independent of Scriptural authority.

3 Internal—i.e., such ideas as those of happiness, misery, etc.

4 External—e.g., a pot, a mountain, etc. This distinction between internal ideas and external objects is made here from the dream standpoint. But from the waking standpoint all dream experiences are internal.

5 There—i.e., within the body. The dream is an activity of the mind and according to the common-sense view, mind is within the body. Therefore objects seen in dream are said to exist within the body.
6 **Nerves**—It is said in the Scriptures that the mind moves about during the time of sleep along some nerves and this produces the dream experiences.

7 **Inside, etc.**—If a mountain cannot exist within a body, it is still more impossible for it to exist within a nerve, which is an old-world view.

अदीर्घ्यात्म कालः गत्वा देशान्पत्यति ।
प्रतिकुञ्ज्य वै सर्वस्तत्सिन्देशो न तिच्छेत ॥ २ ॥

2. *On account of the shortness of time it is not possible for the dreamer to go out of the body and see (the dream objects). Nor does the dreamer, when he wakes up, find himself in the place (seen in his dream).*

**SANKARA'S COMMENTARY**

That all that is perceived to exist in dreams is located in a limited space, is not a fact. For a man sleeping in the east, often finds himself, as it were, experiencing dreams in the north. Anticipating this objection (of the opponent) it is said:—The dreamer does not go to another region outside his body where he experiences dream. For, it is found that as soon as a man falls asleep he experiences dream objects, as it were, at a place which is hundreds of Yojanas² away from his body and which can be reached only in the course of a month. The long period of time which is necessary to go to that region (where dream objects are perceived) and again to come back (to the place where the sleeper lies) is not found to be an actual fact. Hence on account of the shortness of time the experiencer of the dream does not go to another region. Moreover, the dreamer when he wakes up, does not find himself in the place where he experiences the dream. Had the man (really) gone to another place while dreaming and
cognized (or perceived) the dream-objects there, then he would have certainly woke up there alone. But this does not happen. Though a man goes to sleep at night he feels as though he were seeing objects in the day-time and meeting many persons. (If that meeting were real) he ought to have been met by those persons (whom he himself met during the dream). But this does not happen; for if it did, they would have said, “We met you there to-day.” But this does not happen. Therefore one does not (really) go to another region in dream.

1 As it were—The dream experiences, though they appear to be real to the dreamer, are not really so.

The experiences of dream are unreal on account of the absence of the appropriate time and place with which such experiences are associated. And this unreality can be known from the waking condition alone. The unreality of dream-experiences is proved here from the standpoint of time and space. For, those who believe in the reality of time and space cannot but admit the illusoriness of dream-experiences.

2 Yojana—It is a measure of distance of eight or nine miles.

अभावस्था रथादीनां शून्यस्त न्यायपूर्व्भक्तम् ।
वैतथ्यं तेन वै प्रात्स्र खम्म आहुः प्रकाशितम् ॥ ३ ॥

3. Following reason. (as indicated above) Śruti declares the non-existence of the chariots, etc. (perceived in dream). Therefore it is said (by the wise) that Śruti itself declares the illusoriness (of the dream-experiences), established (by reason).

ŚANKARA’S COMMENTARY

For this reason also the objects perceived to exist in dream are illusory. For, the absence of the chariots, etc. (perceived in dream) is stated by Śruti, in such passages as “There exists neither chariot, etc.,” its
Let the assertion be based on reason. In the opinion of the wise, i.e., the knowers of Brahman, the illusoriness (of the dream objects) has been established on the ground of their being perceived within the contracted space in the body. The Śruti only reiterates it in order to establish the self-luminosity (of Ātman) in dream.

1 There, etc.—Comp. Brhd. Up., 4.3.10.

2 Reason—The reason, as adduced in the previous Kārikā, is the absence of the appropriate time and space for the real existence of such dream objects.

3 Self-luminosity—Comp. Brhd. Up., 4.3.14. Mere examination of the waking experiences cannot prove that Ātman is self-luminous. For, it may be contended that various activities, associated with the waking state, are due to the functioning of the sense organs under the influence, as the Śruti says, of the various luminous deities as the sun, the fire, etc. But in sleep various activities are experienced by the dreamer and these activities, in the absence of the functionings of the sense-organs, are due to the self-luminosity of Ātman.

अन्तःस्थानातु भेदानां तस्मादंजागरितेः स्वरूपम्।
यथा तत्र तथा खः संद्वृत्तवेन भिन्नते॥४॥

4. Different objects cognized in dream (are illusory) on account of their being perceived to exist. For the same reason, the objects seen in the waking state are illusory. The nature of objects is the same in the waking state and dream. The only difference is the limitation of space (associated with dream objects).

ŚANKARA’S COMMENTARY

The proposition to be established (Pratijnā) is the illusoriness of objects that are perceived in the waking state. “Being perceived” is the “ground” (hetu) for the inference. They are like the objects that are perceived in dream, is the illustration (वाच्यम्). As the objects
perceived to exist in dream are illusory so also are the objects perceived in the waking state. The common feature of "being perceived" is the relation (Upānaya) between the illustration given and the proposition taken for consideration. Therefore the illusoriness is admitted of objects that are perceived to exist in the waking state. This is what is known as the reiteration (Nigamanam) of the proposition or the conclusion. The objects perceived to exist in the dream are different¹ from those perceived in the waking state in respect of their being perceived in a limited space within the body. The fact of being seen and the (consequent) illusoriness are common to both.

¹ Different—This difference is noted only from the waking condition. No inappropriateness of space is noticed during the dream.

Śankara’s commentary on the Kārikā is in the form of a syllogism.

ख्र्रजागरितस्वाते त्वेकमाहर्मनीषिणः ।
भेदानां हि समत्वेन प्रसिद्धेनैव हेतुना ॥ ५ ॥

5. The thoughtful persons speak of the sameness of the waking and dream states on account of similarity of objects (perceived in both the states) on grounds already described.

ŚANKARA’S COMMENTARY

The identity¹ (of the experiences) of the dream and waking states is declared by the wise on account of the reason, already stated, i.e., the experience of objects (in both the states) is associated with subject-object² relationship. This Kārikā enunciates the conclusion that has already been arrived at in the previous inference by the wise.

¹ Identity—Sometimes experience is said to be of three kinds, Pāramārthika, Prāthibhāṣīka, and Vyāvahārika, making the last two
different from each other. Gauḍapāda does not make any distinction between the dream (प्रतिभासिक) and waking (व्यावहारिक) experiences. Compare Kārikā 14 (1st chapter).

2 Subject-object—The two factors, namely, the seer and the seen, are equally present in both the waking and the dream states.

The dream and the waking experiences are identical because both are characterised by the same condition, viz., the characteristic of “being perceived”. Therefore they, both, are unreal. The reason of “being seen,” as already described, is a matter of common experience.

6. That which is non-existent at the beginning and in the end, is necessarily so (non-existent) in the middle. The objects are like the illusions we see, still they are regarded as if real.

SANKARA’S COMMENTARY

The objects perceived to exist in the waking state are unreal for this reason also,¹ that they do not really exist either at the beginning or at the end. Such objects (of experience) as mirage, etc., do not really exist either at the beginning or at the end. Therefore they do not (really) exist in the middle either. This is the decided² opinion of the world. The several objects perceived to exist really in the waking state are also of the same³ nature. Though they (the objects of experience) are of the same nature as illusory objects, such as mirage, etc., on account of their non-existence at the beginning and at the end, still they are regarded as real by the ignorant, that is, the persons that do not know Ātman.

¹ Also—This is an additional reason for the illusoriness of the waking objects.
2 Decided, etc.—The reason for the illusoriness of the objects perceived to be real is that such (illusory) existence is not perceived at the beginning or at the end. If it be contended that a perceived object exists at the beginning as the cause, it will be shown later on that this causal conception is itself illusory.

3 Same, etc.—i.e., illusory. According to Gauḍapāda, illusory objects are those that have no existence at the beginning and at the end. This is exactly the characteristic of objects perceived to exist outside of us. Changeability is the characteristic of all perceived objects. Change implies non-existence at the beginning, and at the end. As all perceived objects are of this nature, they are called illusory.

In this Kārikā emphasis is laid on the non-existence of the perceived objects at the beginning and at the end. The ego is the perceiver (Drk) of all objects seen. The ego does not change as it is the witness of all changes. The perceived objects are known to be illusory or unreal in comparison with the perceiver.

सप्रयोजनता तेषां खङ्गे विप्रतिपिष्टे।
तस्मादावन्तत्रेन मिध्यैव खङ्गु ते स्मृता: ॥ ७ ॥

7. The serving a purpose (as means to an end), of them (the objects of waking experience) is contradicted (opposed) in dream. Therefore they are undoubtedly admitted to be illusory on account of their (both waking and dream) being with a beginning and an end.

ŚANKARA'S COMMENTARY

(Objection)—The assertion that the objects perceived to exist in the waking state are illusory like those of the dream state is illogical. It is so because the objects of the waking experience, such as food, drink or vehicles, etc., are seen to serve some purpose, that is, they appease hunger and thirst as well as do the work of carrying a man to and fro. But this is not the case with the objects perceived in dream. Therefore the conclusion that the
objects perceived in the waking state are unreal like those seen in dream is mere fancy.

(Reply)—It is not so.

(Objection)—Why?

(Reply)—It is because the serving as means to some end or purpose which is found in respect of food, drink, etc. (in the waking state) is contradicted in dream. A man, in the waking state, eats and drinks and feels appeased and free from thirst. But as soon as he goes into sleep, he finds himself (in dream) afflicted with hunger and thirst as if he were without food and drink for days and nights. And the contrary also happens to be equally true. A man satiated with food and drink in dream finds himself, when awakened, quite hungry and thirsty. Therefore the objects perceived in the waking state are contradicted in dream. Hence, we think that the illusoriness of the objects perceived in the waking state like those of dream need not be doubted. Therefore both these objects are undoubtedly admitted to be illusory on account of their common feature of having a beginning and an end.

1 Therefore—Therefore the original assertion that the objects seen in the waking and dream states are illusory on account of their being characterised by a beginning and an end need not be doubted.

The test of reality is thought by some to be "what works" (as the Arthakriyākāryavādins hold). As the dream objects do not work in the waking state therefore they are unreal. The Vedāntin says that dream objects are means to dream ends as the waking ones are to waking ends. A sense of causal relation is present in the dream mind as in the waking mind. But what is considered logical sequence in the waking state is not thought to be such in the dream. Each has its own notion of propriety and each is stultified by the other in spite of its appearing to be real.
8. The objects (perceived by the dreamer), not usually met with (in the waking state) undoubtedly, owe their existence to the (peculiar) condition in which the cognizer, that is, his mind, works for the time being, as in the case of those residing in heaven. The dreamer associating himself (with the dream conditions) experiences those (objects), even as the one, well-instructed here (goes from one place to another and sees objects belonging to those places).

Śankara's Commentary

(Objection)—The assertion about the illusoriness of objects perceived in the waking state on account of their similarity to those perceived in the dream state is not correct.

(Reply)—Why?

(Objection)—The illustration does not agree with the thing to be illustrated.

(Reply)—How?

(Objection)—Those objects that are cognized in the waking state are not seen in dream.

(Reply)—What then are they (dream experiences)?

(Objection)—A man perceives in dream objects which are never usually seen in the waking state. He finds himself (in dream) to be with eight hands and seated on an elephant with four tusks. Similarly various other unusual (abnormal) objects are seen in the dream. These (dream objects) are not like other illusory objects. They are, without doubt, real (in themselves). Therefore the
Illustration does not agree. Hence, the statement that the waking experiences are unreal like those of dream is not correct.

(Reply)—No, your conclusion is not correct. You think that the objects perceived in dream are extraordinary (not like those usually seen in the waking state), but these are not absolutely real in themselves. What, then, is their nature? They\(^1\) are only peculiar to the circumstances of the perceiver associated with those (dream) conditions, \textit{i.e.}, of the dreamer associated with the dream-conditions. As\(^2\) the denizens of heaven, such as Indra, etc., have the characteristics of being endowed with a thousand eyes, etc. (on account of the very condition of their existence in heaven), so also there are the (peculiar) unusual (abnormal) features of the dreamer (on account of the peculiar condition of the dream state). These\(^3\) (dream experiences) are not absolutely real like the absolute reality of the perceiver. The dreamer associated with the (dream) conditions, while in the dream state, sees all these abnormal or peculiar objects which are but the imaginations of his own mind. It is like the case of a man, in the waking experience, who is well instructed regarding the route to be taken to reach another country, and who while going to that country sees on the way objects belonging to that locality. Hence as\(^4\) perception of snake in the rope and the mirage in the desert which are due to the (mental) conditions of the perceiver are unreal, so also the objects transcending the limits of the waking experience, perceived in dream, are unreal on account of their being due to the (peculiar) condition of the dream state itself. Therefore the illustration of dream is not incorrect.
1 They are, etc.—The dream experiences have no causal relation with the waking experience. A causal relation between two objects of even waking experiences, as will be seen later on, cannot be proved to be true. The objects of our experiences, whether in dream or in waking state, are but the creations of the mind (चित्तप्रभुन्मूष), and it is due to ignorance that we relate them causally. In dream, the mind is associated with those experiences which are realised as creations of dream.

2 As, etc.—It is only some particular forms of thought which create heaven, etc., with their peculiar denizens. They are not absolutely real but are only our imaginations. The moment we imagine heaven, we imagine it also to be peopled with Indra, etc., inasmuch as in our mind Indra, etc., are ever associated with heaven.

3 These, etc.—The experiences of dream are not real because of their changing nature. But the perceiver of dream is real because it is unchangeable and witnessing the changes. Even the so-called sentient beings we perceive in dream are sentient because they are also objects of perception (देख्य) and they appear and disappear.

4 As, etc.—The illusory perception of mirage, etc., is due to the peculiar mental condition of the cognizer. These illusions last as long as the mental conditions that create them last. The objects perceived to be real in the waking state, the illusions experienced in that state and the objects perceived in the dream state have the same nature, i.e., they are all seen (देख्य) and as such they are all forms of thought (मनःस्यप्रभुन्मूष). Hence they are all illusory. No reality can be attached to any of them.

It has been said before that both of dream and waking experiences are alike in nature. But a line of demarcation is sought to be drawn between them, contending that the dream percepts being most of them queer, fantastic and even unnatural, the like of them do not find a place in the world of the wakeful man. But such percepts, however grotesque or abnormal, appear perfectly normal to the dreamer. The dreamer evidently has his own notion of space, distance and form. But his standards have no applicability to the wakeful man. And the notions of the latter in regard to space, etc., have no place in the dreamer’s world, though for each everything is normal and real.
9–10. In dream, also, what is imagined within by the mind is illusory and what is cognized outside (by the mind) appears to be real. But (in truth) both these are known to be unreal. Similarly, in the waking state, also, what is imagined within by the mind is illusory; and what is experienced outside (by the mind) appears to be real. But in fact, both should be rationally held to be unreal.

SANKARA’S COMMENTARY

Having refuted the contention of the opponent that there exists no similarity between objects of the waking state and the abnormal (unusual) objects seen in dream, (the text proceeds to point out) the truth of the objects of waking state being (unreal) like those of dream. In the dream state also those which are mere modifications of the mind, cognized within, are illusory. For, such internal objects vanish the moment after they are cognized. In that very dream such objects as pot, etc., recognized by the mind and perceived by the sense-organs, eyes, etc., as existing outside, are held to be real. Thus, though all the dream experiences are, without doubt, known to be unreal, yet they arrange themselves as real and unreal. Both kinds of objects (in dream), imagined by the mind internally and externally, are found to be unreal. Similarly in the waking experience objects known as real and imaginary (mental) should be rationally held to be unreal. Objects, internal and
external, are creations of the mind (whether they be in the dream or in the waking state). Other matters have already been explained.

1. Are held to be real—That is, by the subject in the dream.

2. Known, etc.—We know the illusoriness of the dream experiences from the waking state.

3. As, etc.—i.e., at the time of dreaming.

This is another ground for proving the similarity of the dream and the waking states and the consequent unreality of the latter. It may be contended that in the waking state we make a distinction between “real” and “unreal” and that the latter corresponds to all dream objects. To this the reply of the Vedāntist is: In dreams also we make a distinction between “real” and “unreal”. We see unreal objects in dream and feel surprised when the picture wears off, which impression we consider unreal in dream itself. Therefore there exists a sense of distinction between the “real” and the “unreal” in the one state as in the other. For, while the dream lasts, to the dreamer not only are dream objects real but also is the dream state a waking one. The whole of dream experiences is known to be illusory only from the waking standpoint. Similarly the whole of waking experiences, including its so-called subjective imaginations and objective realities, is equally unreal from the standpoint of true knowledge.

उभयोंपि वैतत्त्वं भेदानं स्थानयोर्यंदि |
क एतान्नुभृत्ये भेदान्को वै तेषां चिकलपक: ॥ ११ ॥

11. If the objects cognized in both the conditions (of dream and of waking) be illusory, who cognizes all these (illusory objects) and who again imagines them?

SANKARA’S COMMENTARY

The opponent asks, “If the objects, cognized in the waking and dream states, be devoid of reality, who is the cognizer of these,—objects imagined by the mind, both inside (subjective), and outside (objective)?
Who is, again, their imaginer?" In short, what is the support (substratum) of memory and knowledge? If you say none, then we shall be led to the conclusion that there is nothing like Ātman or Self.

1 *Who, etc.*—It is the subject or the ego who, remembering his past experiences, has similar experiences in the present. We can infer a subject only from the facts of memory and experience. If experience and memory be unreal, the subject also would be unreal or non-existent.

2 *If, etc.*—If the Self (Ātman) and the objective world be unreal, then all categories of experience, *viz.*, knower, known and knowledge become mere illusion. That is the same as believing in absolute nihilism in which the existence of even Ātman or Self is denied. But this contention is invalid. One cannot deny the existence of Ātman. For, one who refutes Ātman (the knower) takes the position of Ātman. Therefore the theory of the non-existence of Ātman cannot be admitted.

Kalpavyutama\textsuperscript{1} Atmanamata\textsuperscript{2} deva: khamayya

sa\textsuperscript{3} avadhate bhedaniti vedanta\textsuperscript{4} ni\textsuperscript{5}dha:

12. Ātman, the self-luminous, through the power of his own Māyā, imagines in himself by himself (all the objects that the subject experiences within or without). He alone is the cognizer of the objects (so created). This is the decision of the Vedānta.

Śankara’s Commentary

The self-luminous\textsuperscript{1} Ātman himself,\textsuperscript{2} by\textsuperscript{3} his own Māyā, imagines\textsuperscript{4} in himself the different\textsuperscript{5} objects, to be described hereafter. It is like the imagining of the snake, etc., in the rope, etc. He\textsuperscript{7} himself cognizes them, as\textsuperscript{8} he has imagined them. There\textsuperscript{9} is no other substratum of knowledge and memory. The aim of Vedānta is to declare that knowledge and memory are not without support as the Buddhistic nihilists maintain.
1 **Self-luminous**—The self-luminosity of \( \text{\textit{\text{\textit{Atman}}} \) is predicated from the relative standpoint. Objects otherwise insentient, appear sentient on account of the conspicuous \( \text{\textit{\textit{Atman}}} \) pervading everywhere.

2 **Himself**—There is no extra-cosmic creator of the universe who, like the potter, is separate from his creation.

3 **By his own \( \text{\textit{\text{\textit{Mâyā}}} \)****—When one looks upon the creation as a fact and seeks its cause, \( \text{\textit{\text{\textit{Mâyā}}} \) or ignorance is pointed out as such cause. The \( \text{\textit{\text{\textit{Mâyā}}} \) inheres in Brahman as viewed from the same causal standpoint. It is like the ignorance which, inhering in the perceiver, makes him see his own mind appearing as various dream objects. The causal ignorance of the knowledge of the mind's act of imagining which makes \( \text{\textit{\text{\textit{Atman}}} \) appear as the manifested manifold, is here called \( \text{\textit{\text{\textit{Mâyā}}} \).

4 **Imagines**—There is no actual creation. It is an imagination due to the perceiver's ignorance.

5 **In himself**—From the causal standpoint \( \text{\textit{\text{\textit{Atman}}} \) is both the material and the efficient cause of the universe. There is no inert matter or anything else, separate from \( \text{\textit{\text{\textit{Atman}}} \), which he has fashioned into the universe.

6 **Different objects**—All perceived objects consisting of the ego and the non-ego.

7 **He himself**—\( \text{\textit{\text{\textit{Atman}}} \) creates this world with his own \( \text{\textit{\text{\textit{Mâyā}}} \) and then he himself being reflected in \( \text{\textit{\text{\textit{Buddhi}}} \) (mind), appears as \( \text{\textit{\text{\textit{Jiva}}} \) who perceives the objects.

8 **As he, etc.**—Agency, etc., associated with \( \text{\textit{\text{\textit{Atman}}} \), are not absolutely real. It is because \( \text{\textit{\text{\textit{Atman}}} \) imagines himself, owing to \( \text{\textit{\text{\textit{Mâyā}}} \), as an agent, that he is looked upon as the subject.

9 **There is, etc.**—Knowledge and memory, categories of relative perception, inhere in \( \text{\textit{\text{\textit{Atman}}} \) (Self from the subjective standpoint) and in the creator (Brahman from the objective standpoint). Brahman and \( \text{\textit{\text{\textit{Atman}}} \) are identical.

This illusory \( \text{\textit{\text{\textit{Jiva}}} \), \( \text{\textit{\text{\textit{Iswara}}} \) and the world last as long as ignorance (\( \text{\textit{\text{\textit{Mâyā}}} \)) lasts. Solipsism cannot be a charge against \( \text{\textit{\text{\textit{Vedānta}}} \). For, according to \( \text{\textit{\text{\textit{Vedānta}}} \), the ego is not the creator of the non-ego. They come into existence together. One cannot exist without the other. From the relative standpoint both ego and non-ego are the products of the mentation of \( \text{\textit{\text{\textit{Iswara}}} \) or the cosmic mind.
13. *The Lord* (Ātman), with his mind turned outward, variously imagines the diverse objects (such as sound, etc.), which are already in his mind (in the form of Vāsanās or Sankalpas or desires). *The Ātman* again (with his mind turned within), imagines in his mind various (objects of) ideas.

**Sankara’s Commentary**

How does he imagine the ideas? It is described thus:—The word “Vikaroti” means creates or imagines, *i.e.*, manifests in multiple forms. Lord, *i.e.*, Ātman, with¹ his mind turned outward, imagines in diverse forms various objects, perceived in the (outside) world, such as sound, etc., as well as other objects,² and also various objects permanent (such as earth, etc.), and impermanent,³ *i.e.*, which exist only for the moment, *i.e.*, as long as that imagination lasts—all being of the nature of subtle ideas (Vāsanās) in his mind and not yet fully manifested. Similarly, turning his mind within, the Lord imagines various ideas which are subjective. “Prabhu” in the text means the Lord (Iśwara), *i.e.*, the Ātman.

¹ *With his, etc.*—The distinction of objects as internal and external is due to the association of the two organs of perception, namely, mind and sense-organs. When mind alone is concerned we cognize internal objects, when sense-organs are associated with mind we perceive external objects; or in other words, the Ātman with the association of sense-organs externalises the internal ideas, *i.e.*, makes them appear as gross physical objects: This division of externality and internality is not true.

² *Other, etc.*—Such as heavenly worlds, etc., mentioned in the Scriptures.
3 Impermanent—Such as lightning, etc.

As a potter or a weaver, in order to produce a pot or a cloth, first of all, imagines these in his mind and subsequently manifests them outside, associating them with appropriate names and forms, so also the great Lord, first of all, conceives in his mind, as an idea, the external world to be and then projects it outside associating it with suitable means and forms.

The world that is seen extended in time and space, with its permanent and impermanent objects as well as the various ideas which are distinguished from matter, are all nothing but the ideas in the mind of the Creator, i.e., Ātman as Iśwara. This Ātman or the causal Self creates by his imagination the ego and the non-ego as well as their mutual relationship.

The word 'Imagination' is used as the equivalent of 'Kalpanā'. The English term is generally used to denote the mental construction of the individual soul or self. The Sanskrit term applies to both Iśwara (the Ātman) and the individual soul.

चित्तकाला हि भेदन्तस्तु द्वयकालात्वः ये बहि: •
कल्पिता एव ते सर्वे विशेषे नान्येतुतः • १४ •

14. Those that are cognized within only as long as the thought of them lasts, as well as those that are perceived by the senses and that conform to two points of time, are all mere imaginations. There is no other ground for differentiating the one from the other.

Śankara’s Commentary

A¹ doubt is raised as to the statement that everything is mere imagination of mind like the dream. For, the imagination of mind, such as desire, etc., determined² by mind, is different from objects³ perceived to exist outside, on account of the latter being determined by two points in time. This objection is not valid. Objects perceived to exist within, only as long as the thought about them lasts, signify those
(subjective) ideas which⁴ are only determined by mind; i.e., such objects have no other time to determine them except that wherein the idea in the mind exists (when imagining such ideas). The meaning is that such (subjective) ideas are experienced at the time when they are imagined. Objects related to two points of time signify those external objects which are cognizable by others at some other point of time and which cognize the latter in their turn. Therefore such objects are said to be mutually limited by one another. As for example, when it is said that he remains⁵ till the cow is milked, the statement means, "The cow is milked as long as he remains and he remains as long as the cow is milked." A⁶ similar instance is the following: "It is like that, that is like this." In this way, the objects perceived to exist outside mutually determine one another. Therefore they are known as "Dvayakalāḥ," that is, related to two points in time. Ideas perceived within and existing as long as the mind that cognizes them lasts, as well as the external objects related to two points in time, are all mere imaginations.⁷ The⁸ peculiar characteristic of being related to two points in time of the objects that are perceived to exist outside is not due to any other cause except their being imagined by the mind. Therefore the illustration of dream well applies here.

¹ A doubt—i.e., the imaginary objects exist only as long as the mind that imagines them lasts. They have no existence beyond that time. But the external objects that are perceived in the waking state exist at other times also even when the mind does not imagine them. Therefore external objects cannot be proved to be illusory by the mere illustration of dream experiences.

² Determined, etc.—The mental imagination has no corresponding reality existing outside. Such an idea, as the objective illusion of the snake in the rope, created within by the mind, is of the nature
of mind and is perceived to exist within the mind alone. Such ideas exist only as long as the perceiving mind exists. They cannot be proved to exist by any other instrument of knowledge.

3 *Objects, etc.—* But the different external objects are mutually cognized by one another from different points in time. The consciousness that such objects exist does not depend upon the perceiving mind alone. Therefore such objects cannot be of the same nature as dream or imaginary objects.

4 *Which are, etc.—* i.e., external objects are perceived by other minds existing previous to or subsequent to the present perceiving mind.

5 *He remains, etc.—* The two external objects of cognition, *e.g.*, the milking of a cow and the remaining of a man are mutually related to each other in respect of two points in time. The cow may be milked independently of a man's existence and a man may exist independently of the milking of the cow. Those objects that are in this manner mutually cognized are said to answer to two points in time.

6 *A similar instance—* As long as a pot serves a purpose, so long it is said to exist. Here also the time is the limiting factor. Thus all objects that are perceived to exist outside are determined by the present or any other time. They are independent of the mind of the perceiver. They are, rather, dependent upon the time in which they exist.

7 *Imagination—* That a thing exists independently of the perceiving mind is also an idea. That the world existed before I was born or will continue to exist after I die or that many things exist at present of which I am not conscious,—these are all mere ideas in the mind at the present time. Past, present and future are nothing but ideas present in the mind at the moment.

8 *The peculiar, etc—* This can be better understood from the analogy of the dream. A man may dream for five minutes in which time he may see objects existing during as many years. Different objects perceived in dream, answering to different points in time, are but the imagination of the dreamer who only dreams for a few moments. Similarly in the waking state a man, by mere force of imagination, sees objects conforming to different points in time extending over hundreds of years. Though from the waking.
standpoint dream objects are known to be illusory, yet they are perceived to be actually existing at the time of dream. Similarly it is quite reasonable to believe in the illusory nature of the waking experience from the standpoint of Truth. There is no difference between the objects perceived in dream and waking states on account of their possessing a common feature, namely, “capability of being seen”.

अव्यक्ता एवं येदन्तस्तु स्फुटा एवं च ये वहि: ।
कल्पिता एवं ते सर्वे विशेषस्तिविद्यान्नरे || १५ ||

15. Those that exist within the mind (as mere subjective imaginations) and are known as the unmanifested as well as those that exist without in a manifested form (as perceived objects),—all are mere imaginations, the difference lying only in the sense-organs (by means of which the latter are cognized).

SANKARA’S COMMENTARY

Though¹ the objects perceived within, as mere mental impressions, are unmanifested, and though² the objects perceived outside through the sense-organs such as eyes, etc., are known as manifested (gross entities), yet the distinction³ is not due to anything substantial in the nature of the (two kinds of) objects. For, such distinction is seen in dreams as well. What is, then, the cause of this distinction? It⁴ is only due to the difference in the use of sense-organs (by means of which these objects are perceived). Hence, it is established that the objects perceived in the waking state are as much imagination of the mind as those seen in the dream.

¹ Though, etc.—Objects perceived within the mind are mere products of imagination. The characteristic of such objects is their unmanifestedness. Therefore they are known as “ideas”. In contradistinction to “gross” objects perceived outside.
2 *Though, etc.*—Those perceived to exist outside and cognized by different sense-organs are known as gross manifested objects and as such they are distinguished from ideas in the mind.

3 *The distinction, etc.*—This distinction between the gross objects and the subtle ideas is not due to anything substantial or real in the very nature of the objects. They belong to one and the same class, *i.e.*, both these are mere forms of thought or the imagined ideas of the perceiver. Though there is this distinction of manifestedness and unmanifestedness, yet one cannot be less illusory than the other. For, we see the same distinction in dream experiences as well, yet the whole of dream is illusory or imagination of the mind.

4 *It is, etc.*—This distinction is due to the following reason. Ideas are cognised within the mind. External objects are perceived by sense-organs such as the eyes, etc. The distinction regarding the nature of perceived objects is due to the nature of the organs by means of which they are perceived. In spite of this difference, ideas and physical objects do not admit of any distinction as regards their real nature. In dreams also there are sense-organs of the dream. There is therefore no real difference.

"जीवं कल्पयते पूर्वं ततो भावान्युथविन्धानु ।
वाह्यानाथ्यात्मिकाशैव यथातिबिधस्तथास्मृति: ॥ १६ ॥"

16. *First of all, is imagined the Jīva (the embodied being) and then are imagined the various entities, objective and subjective, that are perceived. As is (one's) knowledge so is (one's) memory of it.*

**SANKARA'S COMMENTARY**

What is the source of the imagination of various objects, subjective¹ and objective² that are perceived and appear to be related to one another as cause and effect? It is thus explained:—The Jīva is of the nature of cause and effect and is further characterised by such ideas as “I do this, I am happy and miserable.” Such Jīva is, at first, imagined³ in the Ātman⁴ which is
pure and devoid of any such characteristics, like the imagination of a snake in a rope. Then for the knowledge of the Jīva are imagined various existent entities, both subjective and objective, such as Prāṇa, etc., constituting different ideas such as the agent, action and the result (of action). What is the cause of this imagination? It is thus explained:—It, the Jīva, who is the product of imagination and competent to effect further imagination, has its memory determined by its own inherent knowledge. That is to say, its knowledge is always followed by a memory, similar to that knowledge. Hence, from the knowledge of the idea of cause results the knowledge of the idea of the effect. Then follows the memory of both cause and effect. This memory is followed by its knowledge which results in the various states of knowledge characterised by action, actor and the effect. These are followed by their memory, which, in its turn, is followed by the states of knowledge. In this way are imagined various objects, subjective and objective, which are perceived and seen to be related to one another as cause and effect.

1 Subjective—Such as, pain and pleasure, knowledge, attachment, etc.

2 Objective—such as, various objects perceived outside of us. These objects appear to cause various subjective feelings in us, which, in their turn, seem to create external objects. Therefore, subjective and objective entities appear to be mutually related as cause and effect.

3 Imagined—The Ātman itself imagines the idea of a Jīva through the power of Māyā.

4 Ātman—Ātman, pure and unrelated, appears as the substratum of all ideas.

5 Like, etc.—No illusory superimposition is possible without a real substratum. This is the reply to the Buddhistic nihilism.
6 *Imagined*—That is to say, by the *Jīva* itself through the power of *Māyā* which is postulated from the causal standpoint.

7 *Hence, etc.*—It is seen from common experience that the idea of food and drink is followed by the idea of satisfaction. One is not possible in the absence of the other. Following this method of agreement and difference we imagine thus. From the idea of knowledge of food, etc., which is the cause, follows the idea of the knowledge of satisfaction which is the effect. Next day, we get the memory of this cause and effect experienced on the previous day. Then we have the idea of a duty which may be described as a result of the previous experience. Accordingly we begin the act of cooking, etc., with the help of rice, fuel, etc. After eating the food thus prepared, we derive certain definite states of knowledge characterised by the idea of satisfaction, etc. This satisfaction inheres in us as the memory which stimulates us, next day, to similar action. We perform the action which is followed by an identical result. Thus ideas succeed one another and appear to be related as cause and effect. That these ideas need not have any counterpart in the gross physical world of the waking state can be understood by the analysis of the dream experiences. As a matter of fact, it cannot be rationally proved that even in the waking state, an idea can produce a corresponding effect in the world perceived to exist outside of us.

अनिश्चिता यथा रुजुर्भकोरे विकलिपित।
सर्वधारादिरिभिर्वैस्तद्रुदात्मा विकलिपित: || १७ ||

17. *As the rope, whose nature is not really known, is imagined in the dark to be a snake, a water-line, etc., so also is the Ātman imagined (in various ways).*

**Sānkara’s Commentary**

It has been said that the imagination of *Jīva* (the *Jīva*-idea) is the source of all (other) imaginations (ideas). What is the cause of this *Jīva*-idea? It is thus explained by an illustration:—It is found in common experience that a rope, not known as such, is imagined, in hazy darkness, as snake, water-line, stick or any one of the
many similar things. All this is due to the previous absence of knowledge regarding the real nature of the rope. If previously the rope had been known in its real nature, then the imagination of snake, etc., would not have been possible, as in the case of one’s own fingers.

Similarly, Ātman has been variously imagined as Jiva, Prāṇa and so forth\(^1\) because it is not known in its own nature, i.e., pure\(^2\) essence of knowledge itself, the non-dual Ātman, quite distinct from such phenomenal characteristics indicated by the relation of cause and effect, etc., which are productive of misery. This is the unmistakable verdict of all the Upanishads.

\(^1\) So forth, etc.—e.g., the ideas of agent, enjoyer, etc.
\(^2\) Pure, etc.—i.e., without birth, death, form, etc.


\text{निष्ठिताय यथा रज्ज्वाः त्रिकल्पो विनिवृत्तिः} \| 18 \| 18.
\text{When the real nature of the rope is ascertained all illusions about it disappear and there arises the conviction that it is the one (unchanged) rope and nothing else; even so is the nature of the conviction regarding Ātman.}

\text{SANKARA’S COMMENTARY}

When it is determined that it is nothing but the rope alone, then all illusions regarding the rope disappear and the (non-dual) knowledge that there exists nothing else but the rope, becomes firmly established. Similar is the knowledge,—like the light of the sun—produced by the negative Scriptural statements which deny all phenomenal attributes (in Ātman),—statements like “Not this”, “Not this”, etc., leading to the knowledge of the real nature of Ātman, as: “All this is verily Ātman”, “(It is) without cause and effect, without
internality and externality”, “(It is) ever without and within and beginningless”, “(It is) without decay and death, immortal, fearless, one and without a second.”

19. *The Ātman is imagined as Prāṇa and other endless objects. This is due to Māyā (ignorance) of the luminous (Ātman itself) by which It is (as it were) deluded.*

**SANKARA’S COMMENTARY**

If it be definitely ascertained that Ātman is verily one, how could it be imagined as the endless objects like Prāṇa, etc., having the characteristics of the phenomenal experience? It is thus explained:—This is due to the Māyā (ignorance) inhering in the luminous Ātman. As the illusion conjured up by the juggler makes the very clear sky appear covered with trees blooming with flowers and leaves, so does this luminous Ātman become deluded, as it were, by his own Māyā. “My Māyā cannot be easily got over” declares the Gītā.

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1 *Makes, etc.—Even when under the influence of the juggler’s illusion, the sky appears to be filled with trees, etc., it does not, in reality, lose its natural clearness.*

2 *So, etc.—Māvā as the explanation of the manifold is from the causal standpoint. Even when the Ātman appears to be transformed into the universe, it does not, in reality, lose its non-dual character.*

20. *Those*¹ that know only Prāṇa,² call It (Ātman), Prāṇa, *those*³ that know Bhūtas call It Bhūtas,⁴ *those*⁵.
Knowing Gunaṣ call It Gunaṣ,7 those7 knowing Tattvas, call It Tattvas.8

1 Those—e.g., the Vaiśeshikas and the worshippers of Hiranyagarbha, etc.

2 Prāṇa—They hold Prāṇa, i.e., Hiranyagarbha or extra-cosmic God, to be the cause of the universe. This is mere imagination of the mind. There is no rational proof of the reality of an extra-cosmic God or Person as the cause of the world.

3 Those, etc.—e.g., the Chārvākas or the atheists.

4 Bhūtas—They designate the four elements, such as, earth, water, fire and air, which are directly perceived by them, as the cause of the universe. The insentient elements cannot be the cause of the sentient beings. Therefore, this theory also is an imagination.

5 Those, etc.—e.g., the Sāmkhyas.

6 Gunaṣ—According to the Śāmkhyas, the state of equilibrium of the three Gunaṣ, viz., Sattva, Rajas and Tamas, produces Mahat, etc., and through them the universe. This is also mere idea.

7 Those, etc.—i.e., the Śaivas.

8 Tattvas—The Śaivas enumerate three Tattvas or categories, viz., Ātmā, Avidyā and Śiva as the cause of the universe. This is also an imagination and hence untenable. For, Śiva being an entity separated from Ātman, becomes an object like a pot, etc.

पादा इति पादविदो विषया इति तद्विदः ।
ढोका इति ढोकविदो देवा इति च तद्विदः ॥ २१ ॥

21. Those acquainted with the quarters1 (Pādas) call It quarters; those2 with objects, the objects3; those4 with Lokas, the Lokas5; those6 with Devas, the Devas.7

These different conceptions of Ātman are nothing but imaginations of the mind.

1 Quarters—e.g., Viśwa, Taijasa and Prājna. Ātman, being without parts and also unrelated, cannot be really divided into quarters or parts.

2 Those, etc.—i.e., thinkers like Vātsyāyana, etc.
3. **Objects**—Such as, sound, colour, etc., *i.e.*, the objects perceived by the different sense-organs. The objects, on account of their changeable and negatable nature, cannot be the Ultimate Reality.

4. **Those, etc.**—*i.e.*, the Paurāṇikas or the believers in Mythology.

5. **Lokas**—Such as Bhūh, Bhuvah and Svah. These being three in number are limited.

6. **Those, etc.**—*i.e.*, the Karma Mimāṁsakas or the believers in the Karma portions of the Vedas.

7. **Devas**—Such as Agni (Fire), Indra, etc. According to this theory, Agni, Indra, etc., the various conscious deities, though not occupying the actual position of God (*Īśvara*), apportion the results of our various works. The conception of a separate God is not necessary. They cannot be the Ultimate Reality.

वेदा इति वेदविदो यज्ञा इति च तत्त्रिदः ||
भोज्यते च भोज्यविदो भोज्यमिति च तत्त्रिदः || २२ ||

22. Those knowing the Vedas call It the Vedas\(^1\); those\(^2\) acquainted with the sacrifices, call It the sacrifices\(^3\) (*Yagna*); those\(^4\) conversant with the enjoier, designate It as the enjoier\(^5\) and those\(^6\) with the object of enjoyment, call It such.

1. **Vedas**—*e.g.*, the four Vedas, Rig, Yajus, Sāma and Atharva. These Vedas cannot be the Ultimate Reality inasmuch as they are sounds.

2. **Those, etc.**—*i.e.*, sages such as Bodhāyana and others who are adept in the performance of sacrifices.

3. **Sacrifices**—The upholders of sacrifices and rituals like the *Yagnas* think that sacrifices, such as *Jyotishtoma*, etc., constitute the Highest Reality. But this is also an illusion. For, according to them, the sacrifice signifies the object (offered), the deity and the act of offering. Any one of these, *singly*, does not constitute sacrifice. Again three of them, combined together, do not constitute any real entity.

4. **Those, etc.**—*viz.*, the Śāmkhyas.

5. **Enjoier**—According to the Śāmkhyas the Ultimate Reality is the *Purusha* who is not the agent or doer but a mere enjoier. This
theory is not rational; for enjoyment means some change in the enjoyer which thus contradicts the idea of his being eternal and changeless. If enjoyment be predicated as the inherent nature of Purusha, then the conception of extraneous objects, conducive to its enjoyments, is inconsistent.

6 Those, etc.—That is, the cook, to whom the only reality appears to be delicious dishes.

23. The Knowers\(^1\) of the subtle designate It as the subtle,\(^2\) the Knowers\(^3\) of the gross call It the gross.\(^4\) Those\(^5\) that are familiar with a Personality (having form) call It a person,\(^6\) and those\(^7\) that do not believe in anything having a form call It a void.\(^8\)

1 Knowers—i.e., those who believe (or take) the Ātman to be subtle like an atom.

2 Subtle—This theory is irrational: for, we feel consciousness simultaneously all over the body.

3 Knowers—A sect of materialists who believe the gross body to be real.

4 Gross—The gross body cannot be the Ultimate Reality as a dead or sleeping man, in spite of the body being in existence, is unconscious. Any single limb of the body is insentient. Therefore even their aggregate cannot constitute the conscious Reality.

5 Those, etc.—i.e., the Āgamikas who believe a person, e.g., Śiva with a trident or Vishnu with a disc, to be the Ultimate Reality. These are also imaginary.

6 Person—This is also an illusion.

7 Those, etc.—i.e., The Buddhistic ritualists.

8 Void—The idea that the Ultimate Reality is an absolute void is also an illusion, as a void also should have a knower, and so cannot be the substratum of the positive fact of the empirical universe.
24. *The Knowers*¹ of time call It time²; the *Knowers* of space (ether) call It space (ether). Those versed in disputation call It the problem in dispute and the *Knowers* of the worlds call It the worlds.³

¹ *Knowers, etc.*—Such as the astrologers (astronomers).

² *Time*—This theory is also fallacious as time is divided into various parts as moment, minute, hour, etc. Time is also an object (thought) of the perceiving mind.

³ *Worlds*—This is also an illusory conception.

25. *The Cognizers*¹ of the mind call It the mind;² of the Buddhi (intellect) the Buddhi⁴; of the Chitta (mind-stuff), the Chitta⁵; and the *Knowers*⁶ of Dharma (righteousness) and Adharma (unrighteousness) call It the one⁷ or the other.

¹ *Cognizers, etc.*—*i.e.*, a sect of the materialists.

² *Mind*—This theory is also not tenable as mind is also an object, an instrument of the perceiving ego.

³ *Of, etc.*—They are a class of Buddhists.

⁴ *Buddhi*—This is also a wrong view of the Reality, as the functionings of Buddhi disappear at the time of deep sleep. Further Buddhi is also an object cognized by the perceiver.

⁵ *Chitta*—Chitta is an aspect of mind which has no particular external form. It cannot be Ātman for the reasons given regarding mind.

⁶ *Knowers, etc.*—*i.e.*, the *Mimāmsakas*.

⁷ *The one, etc.*—None of these can be the Ultimate Reality because one cannot be conceived without the other and they have no absolute standard. They vary with different conditions of time and country.
26. *Some* say that the *Reality* consists of twenty-five categories, *others* twenty-six, while there are *others* who conceive *It* as consisting of thirty-one categories and lastly people are not wanting who think such categories to be infinite.

1 *Some*—i.e., the *Sāmkhyas* according to whom the *Reality* consists of twenty-five categories, *viz.*. *Prakriti, Mahat, Āhamkāra*, five *Tanmātras* (subtle elements), five organs of perception, five organs of action, five objects, mind and the *Purusha*.

2 *Others*—i.e., the followers of *Patanjali* who add *Iswara* to the categories of the *Sāmkhyas*.

3 *Others*—i.e., the *Pāsapatas* who add to the categories of *Sāmkhyas* six more, *viz.*, *Rāga, Avidyā, Kāla, Kalā, Māyā* and *Niyati*.

The mutual contradictions among these different schools prove the fallacious character of their theories. The difference of opinion is due to the ignorance of the nature of *Reality*.

27. *Those* who know only to please others call *It* (*Reality*) such pleasure; *those* who are cognizant of the *Āśramas* call *It* the *Āśramas*; the grammarians call *It* the male, female or the neuter, and others know *It* as the *Parā* and *Aparā*.

1 *Those*, etc.—i.e., a sect of the atheists.

2 *Such*, etc.—This is also a delusion as it is impossible to please everybody on account of the different tastes of the people.

3 *Those*, etc.—i.e., men like Daksha, etc.

4 *Parā*, etc.—i.e., the Brahman who is regarded as high and low. An entity, subject to division of any sort, can never be the Supreme *Reality*. 7
28. The Knowers\(^1\) of creation call It creation; the Knowers of dissolution describe It as dissolution and the believers in subsistence believe It to be subsistence. Really speaking, all\(^2\) these ideas are always imagined\(^3\) in Ātman.

\(1\) Knowers, etc.—i.e., the Paurāṇikas (the believers in Mythology) who believe in the reality of creation, preservation and destruction.

\(2\) All these—i.e., those enumerated above and which may be enumerated by others in future.

\(3\) Imagined—So long as men are given to imagining, they have recourse to all such imaginations regarding Ātman. But Ātman, from its own standpoint, does not imagine anything. It is because all these ideas, described above, are mere imaginations, that they cannot be the underlying Reality.

ŚANKARA’S COMMENTARY

20–28. Prāṇa means Prājña (the Jīva associated with deep sleep) and Bījātmā (the causal self). All the entities from Prāṇa to the Sthiti (subsistence) are only various effects of Prāṇa. These and other popular ideas of their kind, imagined by all beings, are like the imaginations of the snake, etc., in the rope, etc. These are through ignorance imagined in Ātman which is free\(^4\) from all these distinctions. These fancies are due to the lack of determination of the real nature of the Self. This is the purport of these ślokas. No attempt is made to explain the meaning of each word in the texts beginning with Prāṇa, etc., on account of the futility of such effort and also on account of the clearness of the meaning of the terms.
Free from, etc.—Ātman is free from all these imaginations. It is because of the ignorance of the real nature of the Ātman that it is thought to be the substratum (another entity) of all imaginations.

No useful purpose can be served by the discussion of imaginations which are unreal and illusory.

29. *He (the inquirer) cognizes only that idea that is presented to him. It (Ātman) assumes the form (of what is cognized) and thus protects (the inquirer). Possessed by that (idea) he realises it (as the sole essence).*

**ŚANKARA’S COMMENTARY**

What more is to be gained (by this kind of endless discussion)? Whatever idea or interpretation of such things as Prāṇa, etc., narrated above or omitted, is shown to the inquirer by the teacher or other trustworthy person. He realises that as the sole essence (Ātman), i.e., he understands that as “I am that or that is mine”. Such conception about Ātman as is revealed to the inquirer, appears to him as the sole essence and protects him, i.e., keeps him away from all other ideas (because it appears to him as the highest ideal). On account of his devotion (attachment) to that ideal, he realises it as the sole essence in due course, i.e., attains his identity with it.

1 Prāṇa—All interpretations of Ātman must be included in the Prāṇa, as Prāṇa or the causal Self is the highest manifestation of Ātman in the relative plane.

2 Realises, etc.—It is because such inquirer, for want of proper discrimination, accepts the words of the teacher as the highest truth. The teacher also, realising the limited intellectual capacity of the student, teaches him, at first, only a partial view of truth.
3 On account, etc.—Such student only gets a partial view of Reality though he takes it as the sole essence. He shuts his eyes to other views. On account of his single-minded devotion to that ideal he becomes intolerant of other view-points. But he who takes a particular idea to be the Reality and condemns other ideas as untrue, has not realised the Highest Truth. For, to a knower of Reality, all imaginations are identical with Brahman and hence have the same value. This is the mistake generally committed by the mystics who, for want of the faculty of rational discrimination, do not see any truth in the views of others.

एत्येऽपि प्रथमः प्रथमवेती लक्षितः ।
एवं यो वेद तत्त्वेन कल्पेत्सोऽविशालितः ॥ ३० ॥

30. This Ātman, though non-separate from all these, appears, as it were, separate. One who knows this truly imagines (interprets) (the meaning of the Vedas) without hesitation.

SANKARA’S COMMENTARY

Though this Ātman is verily non-separate\(^1\) from these, the Prāṇa, etc.,—like the rope from such imaginary ideas as the snake, etc.,—it appears as separate to the ignorant persons. But to the Knower (of truth), the Prāṇa, etc., do not exist apart from Ātman, just as the snake, etc., falsely imagined in the rope, do not exist apart from the rope. For, the Šruti also says, “All that exists is verily Ātman.” One who thus knows truly, that is, from Scriptures as well as by reasoning\(^2\) that Prāṇa, etc., imagined in Ātman, do not exist separately from Ātman (as in the illustration) of the (illusory) snake and the rope, and further knows that Ātman is ever pure\(^3\) and free from all imaginations,—construes,\(^4\) without hesitation, the text of the Vedas according to its division.\(^5\) That is to say, he knows that the meaning of this passage is this and of that
passage is that. None but the Knower of Ātman is able to know truly the (meaning of the) Vedas. "None but the Knower of Ātman is able to derive any benefit from his actions," says Manu.

1 Non-separate—It is because that which is superimposed cannot exist apart from the substratum. Therefore the Prāṇa, etc., which are superimposed upon Ātman, are non-separate from Ātman from the standpoint of Reality.

2 Reasoning—that is, the reasoning stated in the fourth verse of this chapter. That which is accepted on the authority of the Śruti can also be demonstrated by reasoning.

3 Ever pure, etc.—Even while Ātman is imagined by the ignorant as Prāṇa, etc., it is known to the Jñāni (Knower of Truth) as pure and simple and free from all imaginations. For, to the Jñāni such imaginations as Prāṇa, etc., are identical with Ātman. For him Ātman never undergoes any modifications. He knows "All that exists is verily Ātman."

4 Construes—A Knower of Reality does not follow any fixed rule for the interpretation of the Vedas. "A Knower of Reality is never a slave to the Vedas. But whatever interpretation he gives of the Vedas is their real meaning" (Ānandagiri).

5 Division—that is to say, the Knowledge-portion of the Vedas, viz., the Upanishad, directly leads to the non-dual Brahman whereas the Works-portion (i.e., the Karma-kānda) explains Reality from the causal or relative standpoint and thus indirectly indicates it.

śvamāyē yathā ḍṛṣṭe gatiḥ prabhavānagāṃ yathā
tathā vishmīndā ḍṛṣṭe vedānteṣu vinachesvāṃ: || ३१ ||

31. As are dreams and illusions or a castle in the air seen in the sky, so is the universe viewed by the wise in the Vedānta.

Śankara’s Commentary

The unreality of duality has been demonstrated by
of Vedānta Scriptures. Therefore it is stated:—Dream objects and illusion, though unreal when their true nature is considered, are thought, in spite of their unreality, as real by the ignorant. As an imaginary city in the sky, filled with shops full of vendable articles, houses, palaces and villages frequented by men and women, though appearing real to us, is seen to vanish suddenly as dream and illusion, which are known to be unreal (though they appear to be real),—so also is perceived this entire duality of the universe to be unreal. Where is this taught? This is thus taught in the Vedānta Scriptures. "There is no multiplicity here." "Indra (assumed diverse forms) through the powers of Māyā." "In the beginning all this existed as Brahman." "Fear rises verily from duality." "That duality does never exist." "When all this has become Ātman then who can see whom and by what?" In these and other passages, the wise men, i.e., those who see the real nature of things, declare (the unreal nature of the universe). The Smṛiti of Vyāsa also supports this view in these words:—"This duality of the universe, perceived by the wise like a hole seen in darkness in the ground, is unstable like the bubbles that appear in rain-water, always undergoing destruction, ever devoid of bliss, and ceasing to exist, after dissolution."

1. *Reason*—It has been demonstrated at the beginning of this chapter that the illusion of duality can be established by reason independent of Scriptures.

2. *Evidence, etc.*—If a conclusion arrived at by reasoning and corroborated by actual experience is further supported by the words of the teacher and the Scriptures, then alone it can be accepted as true.
32. There is no dissolution, no birth, none in bondage, none aspiring for wisdom, no seeker of liberation and none liberated. This is the absolute truth.

SANKARA’S COMMENTARY

This verse sums up the meaning of the chapter. When duality is perceived to be illusory and Ātman alone is known as the sole Reality, then it is clearly established that all our experiences, ordinary or religious (Vedic), verily pertain to the domain of ignorance. Then one perceives that there is no dissolution, i.e., destruction (from the standpoint of Reality); no birth or creation, i.e., coming into existence; no one in bondage, i.e., no worldly being; no pupilage, i.e., no one adopting means for the attainment of liberation; no seeker after liberation, and no one free from bondage (as bondage does not exist). The Ultimate Truth is that the stage of bondage, etc., cannot exist in the absence of creation and destruction. How can it be said that there is neither creation nor destruction? It is thus replied:—There is no duality (at any time). The absence of duality is indicated by such Scriptural passages as, “When duality appears to exist....” “One who appears to see multiplicity....” “All this is verily Ātman.” “Ātman is one and without a second.” “All that exists is verily the Ātman,” etc. Birth¹ or death can be predicated only of that which exists and never of what does not exist, such as the horns of a hare, etc. That² which is non-dual (Advaita) can never be said to be born or destroyed. That it should be
non-dual and at the same time subject to birth and death, is a contradiction in terms. It has already been said that our dual experience characterised by (the activities of) Prāṇa, etc., is a mere illusion having Ātman for its substratum, like the snake imagined in the rope which is its substratum. The imagination characterised by the appearance of the snake in the rope cannot be produced from nor dissolved in the rope (i.e., in any external object), nor is produced from the imaginary snake or dissolved in the mind, nor even in both (i.e., the rope and the mind). Thus duality being non-different from mental (subjective) imagination (cannot have a beginning or an end). For, duality is not perceived when one's mental activities are controlled (as in Samādhi) or in deep sleep. Therefore it is established that duality is a mere illusion of the mind. Hence it is well said that the Ultimate Reality is the absence of destruction, etc., on account of the non-existence of duality (which exists only in the imagination of the mind).

(Objection)—If this be the case, the object of the teachings should be directed to prove the negation of duality and not to establish as a positive fact non-duality, inasmuch as there is a contradiction (in employing the same means for the refutation of one and the establishment of another). If this were admitted, then the conclusion will tend to become Nihilistic in the absence of evidence for the existence of non-duality as Reality; for, duality has already been said to be non-existent.

(Reply)—This contention is not consistent with reason. Why do you revive a point already established, viz., that it is unreasonable to conceive of such illusions as the snake in the rope, etc., without a substratum?
(Objection)—This analogy is not relevant as even the rope, which is the substratum of the imaginary snake, is also an imaginary entity.

(Reply)—It is not so. For, upon the disappearance of the imagination, the unimagined substratum can be reasonably said to exist on account of its unimagined character.

(Objection)—It may be contended that like the imagination of the snake in the rope, it (the unimaginary substratum) is also unreal.

(Reply)—It cannot be so. For, it (Brahman) is ever unimagined, because it is like the rope that is never the object of our imagination and is real even before the knowledge of the unreality of the snake. Further, the existence of the subject (knower or witness) of imagination must be admitted to be antecedent to the imagination. Therefore it is unreasonable to say that such subject is non-existent.

(Objection)—How can the Scripture, if it cannot make us understand the true nature of the Self (which is non-duality), free our mind from the idea of duality?

(Reply)—There is no difficulty. Duality is superimposed upon Ātman through ignorance, like the snake, etc., upon the rope. How is it so? I am happy, I am miserable, ignorant, born, dead, worn out, endowed with body, I see, I am manifested and unmanifested, the agent, the enjoyer, related and unrelated, decayed and old, this is mine,—these and such other ideas are superimposed upon Ātman. The notion of Ātman (Self) persists in all these, because no such idea can ever be conceived of without the notion of Ātman. It is like the notion of the rope which persists in (all superimposed ideas, such as) the snake, the water-line, etc. Such
being the case, the Scripture has no function with regard to the \textit{\textit{Atman}} which, being of the nature of the substantive, is ever self-evident. The function of the Scripture is to accomplish that which is not accomplished yet. It does not serve the purpose of evidence if it is to establish what has been already established. The \textit{\textit{Atman}} does not realise its own natural condition on account of such obstacles as the notion of happiness, etc., superimposed by ignorance; and the true nature is realised only when one knows it as such. It is therefore the Scripture, whose purpose is to remove the idea of happiness, etc. (associated with \textit{\textit{Atman}}) that produces the consciousness of the not-happy (i.e., attributeless) nature of \textit{\textit{Atman}} by such statements as "Not this" "Not this", "(It is) not gross," etc. Like the persistence of \textit{\textit{Atman}} (in all states of consciousness) the not-happy (attributeless) characteristic of \textit{\textit{Atman}} does not inhere in all ideas such as of being happy and the like. If it were so, then one would not have such specific experience as that of being happy, etc., superimposed upon \textit{\textit{Atman}}, in the same manner as coldness cannot be associated with fire whose specific characteristic is that of heat. It is, therefore, that such specific characteristics as that of being happy, etc., are imagined in \textit{\textit{Atman}} which is, undoubtedly, without any attributes. The Scriptural teachings which speak of \textit{\textit{Atman}} as being not-happy, etc., are meant for the purpose of removing the notion that \textit{\textit{Atman}} is associated with such specific attributes as happiness, etc. There is the following aphoristic statement by the knowers of the \textit{\textit{Agama}}. "The validity of Scripture is established by its negating all positive characteristics of \textit{\textit{Atman}} (which otherwise cannot be indicated by Scriptures)."
Birth, etc.—Birth or death can be imagined only in the realm of duality. But from the standpoint of the Ultimate Reality duality is as non-existent as the horns of a hare. Therefore, from the standpoint of Reality birth or death is inconceivable, as neither birth nor death can be imagined of the horns of a hare or the son of a barren woman.

That, etc.—Birth or death implying an antecedent or subsequent non-existence cannot be conceived of non-dual Atman which is ever-existent. Further, birth or death implying a change cannot be brought about except by another factor which brings about the change. This position is also untenable from the non-dual standpoint. Non-duality being the only Reality, there is neither birth nor death from the standpoint of Truth.

It, etc.—The dealings in the plane of duality, which is illusory, are also illusory from the standpoint of Truth. Therefore all dealings in the dual realm are mere imaginations like our dealings with the false snake perceived in the rope.

The rope, etc.—This is the refutation of the realistic contention. The illusion of the mind which perceived the snake in the rope does not exist in the rope. For, such illusion, in that case, would have been experienced by all. When an explanation is sought, from the empirical standpoint, of the illusion of the snake in the rope, it is, no doubt, said that the rope produces the illusion. This explanation may be justified when such illusion is admitted to be a fact. But from the standpoint of the Ultimate Reality, illusion does not exist; hence no birth and disappearance can be predicated of anything non-existent or illusory.

Mind—This is the refutation of the contention of the idealists. The illusion of the snake in the rope cannot be produced by the mind. That is because our subjective idea does not correspond to the objects perceived outside. Therefore the illusion cannot be produced by the mind alone. Further, from the standpoint of Truth, mind, associated with its dual functionings (sankalpa and vikalpa) does not exist—as a reality. Being non-existent in itself it cannot produce anything new.

Both—This may be taken as the refutation of the Kantian view that our perceptions in the dual world are caused both by mind and external objects (things-in-themselves). The contention
of Kant cannot also be correct, the thing-in-itself being unknown and unknowable and also being beyond the law of causation cannot produce anything. Again, from the non-dual standpoint both mind and the external object (the thing-in-itself) are known to be non-existent. Hence they cannot produce anything new.

7 Thus, etc.—Dual perception is totally non-different from subjective imagination which produces the illusion of the snake in the rope. All illusory objects being non-existent from the standpoint of Truth, the duality is also non-existent from the standpoint of the Ultimate Reality.

8 For, etc.—It is because in the state of trance or deep sleep, the mind, with its double aspects (of imagination and volition), does not exist. Therefore no duality can be perceived in the absence of the mind.

9 Therefore—It is because duality is perceived when mind functions and it is not perceived when mind does not function. Therefore the existence of duality depends entirely upon the imagination of the perceiving subject.

10 Nihilistic—This is the contention of the Buddhistic Nihilists who, after the negation of duality, find void as the only Reality.

11 Why, etc.—An illusion cannot exist without a substratum. The imagination or idea of the snake cannot be perceived without the substratum of the rope. Therefore the illusion of duality must have the non-dual Atman the Knower, as its substratum.

12 For, etc.—Unless one is aware of an unimagined factor (Atman), one cannot know that this or any object is unreal. We know of a thing as unreal only as distinguished from something which is real. The illustration of the snake and the rope is given only for the purpose of an analogy. No exact analogy can be given with regard to non-duality as it is one without a second. Analogy always belongs to the realm of duality.

18 Further—Without a perceiver, there cannot be any imagination. Even if our analysis of the dualistic world leads to the experience of the void or total negation, as the Buddhists contend, there must be an experiencer of this negation. If the mind always seeks the cause of the substratum, the discussion ends in a regressus. But even then there is a perceiver of that regressus without which the
argument of "regressus ad infinitum" is not possible. Therefore
no one can escape the "Perceiver" (Drk) which is the Ātman.

14 How, etc.—Scriptures can be applied only to the sphere of
duality. In the absence of duality, Scriptures cannot function.
In your opinion duality consisting of birth, death, etc., does not
exist. Therefore the Scripture is also an illusion. Hence the
Scripture cannot remove duality and lead to the realisation of
non-duality or Ātman.

16 There, etc.—From the standpoint of ignorance, duality
certainly exists as we see it. Therefore the Scripture is a means
to remove this illusion of duality.

16 Notion—The Ātman persists through all our experiences;
for at no time is it possible to conceive that Ātman, in the form
of the perceiver, (Drk) is absent or non-existent.

17 With regard, etc.—The Scripture cannot directly describe
the real nature of Ātman. It serves no purpose for the knower
of the Ultimate Reality.

18 It is, etc.—The Scripture serves a negative purpose, i.e.,
it helps us to remove all attributes, which are the ideations (vrittis)
of our mind, generally associated with Ātman. By associating
Ātman with any attribute such as the condition of being happy,
etc., we make it an object (vishaya). But Ātman is the eternal
subject—or witness of all ideas.

भवेसद्विरेवायमद्वैयन च कल्पितः ।
भवा अपयद्वैयनेत्र तस्मादद्वैयत्स शिवा ॥ ३२ ॥

33. This (the Ātman) is imagined both as unreal
objects that are perceived and as the non-duality. The
objects (Bhāvas) are imagined in the non-duality itself.
Therefore, non-duality (alone) is the (highest) bliss.

ŚANKARA’S COMMENTARY

The reason for the interpretation of the previous
verse is thus stated: Just as in a rope, an unreal snake,
streak of water or the like is imagined, which are non-
separate (non-dual) from the existing rope,—the same
(rope) being spoken of as this snake, this streak of water, this stick, or the like,—even so this \( \text{Atman} \) is imagined to be the innumerable objects such as \( \text{Prāṇa} \), etc., which are unreal\(^1\) and perceived only through ignorance, but not from the standpoint of the Ultimate Reality. For,\(^2\) unless the mind is active, nobody is ever able to perceive any object. But no action is possible for \( \text{Atman} \). Therefore the objects that are perceived to exist by the active mind can never be imagined to have existence from the standpoint of the Ultimate Reality. It is therefore this (non-dual) \( \text{Atman} \) which alone is imagined as such illusory objects as \( \text{Prāṇa} \), etc., which are perceived, as well as the\(^3\) non-dual and ultimately real \( \text{Atman} \) (which is the substratum of illusory ideas, such as \( \text{Prāṇa} \), etc.) in the same manner as the rope is imagined as the substratum of the illusion of the snake. Though\(^4\) always one and unique (\( i.e. \), of the nature of the \( \text{Atman} \)), the \( \text{Prāṇa} \), etc., the entities that are perceived, are imagined (from the standpoint of ignorance) as having the non-dual and ultimately real \( \text{Atman} \) as their substratum. For, no illusion is ever perceived without a substratum. As “non-duality” is the substratum of all illusions (from the standpoint of ignorance) and also as it is, in its \textit{real} nature, ever unchangeable, non-duality alone is (the highest) bliss even\(^5\) in the state of imagination, \( i.e. \), the empirical experiences. Imaginations alone (which make \( \text{Prāṇa} \), etc., appear as separate from \( \text{Atman} \)) are the cause of misery.\(^6\) These imaginations cause fear, etc., like the imaginations of the snake, etc., in the rope. Non-duality\(^7\) is free from fear and therefore it is the (highest) bliss.

\(^1\) \textit{Unreal}—It is because the one characteristic of these perceived forms of objects is their changeability.
2 For, etc.—From the standpoint of Ultimate Reality, there is no Kalpanā, or ideation which makes the Bhāvas or the perceived objects appear as separate from Brahman. From that standpoint Brahman is always everything and everywhere. This ideation is due to ignorance—an explanation which is given from the empirical standpoint.

3 The non-dual, etc.—This non-dual characteristic of the Ātman is a correlative of the duality. Hence this conception of non-duality is not free from ignorance. In contrast to the changeable Bhāvas, the Ātman is imagined as the non-dual entity. Hence they stand and fall together. Ātman is beyond all Kalpanā or mental activity. Therefore Ātman, from the highest standpoint, cannot be called one, if the term is used as a contrast to the many or duality. Non-duality is a negation of all thoughts of duality.

4 Though, etc.—Such entities as Prāṇa, etc., which are perceived to exist, are from the highest standpoint identical with Ātman. They are like the dream objects which are found, on waking up, to be identical with the mind. Only from the waking standpoint we know them as illusion; and seeking a cause for such illusion we point out Ātman as its substratum.

5 Even, etc.—Even when the mind moves in the empirical plane it attains peace when it discovers the unity underlying the variety. Non-duality alone dispels our doubts and makes us happy.

6 Misery, etc.—Kalpanā or imagination that makes the Bhāvas, or the objects that are perceived appear as separated from Brahman, is the cause of fear, as in that state of duality people are assailed with all kinds of fear arising from hatred, jealousy, animosity, etc. When the snake, imagined in the rope, is perceived to be other than the rope, it gives rise to all kinds of fear, etc.

7 Non-duality, etc.—When the student attains to the state of non-duality, he enjoys real bliss, as in that state there exists nothing of which he can be afraid.

This verse explains the previous one as well as the two other verses in the Āgama Prakaraṇa (17 and 18). The highest teaching of Vedānta is that Brahman alone is real. What are known as Bhāvas or multiple phenomena are nothing but Brahman. As the snake is identical with the rope from the standpoint of knowledge, or as the dream objects are nothing but the mind, so are the
various objects perceived by us nothing but Brahman. When one perceives the snake as other than the rope, he is afraid. This fear is based upon ignorance. Similarly, when one finds the objects as separate from Ātman he feels attached to or disgusted with them and suffers accordingly. But the highest bliss is realised when one finds everything as Brahman. From the standpoint of Truth, Prapancha or the phenomenal world or even the idea of perceiving them does not exist as separate from Brahman. Therefore no birth or death can be predicated of what exists ultimately. Therefore to a man of the highest wisdom there is nothing to be added to or subtracted from. All is non-dual Ātman. Even what appears as unreal Bhāvas to the ignorant is non-dual Ātman to the Jñāni.

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MĀNDŪKYOPANISHAD [II·34

34. This manifold does not exist as identical with Ātman nor does it ever stand independent by itself. It is neither separate from Brahman nor is it non-separate. This is the statement of the wise.

Sāṃkara’s Commentary

Why is non-duality called the highest bliss? One suffers from misery when one finds differences in the form of multiplicity, i.e., when one finds an object separate from another. For\(^1\) when this manifold of the universe with the entire relative phenomena consisting of Prāṇa, etc., imagined in the non-dual Ātman, the Ultimate Reality is realised to be identical with the Ātman, the Supreme Reality, then alone multiplicity ceases to exist, i.e., Prāṇa, etc., do not appear to be separate from Ātman. It\(^2\) is just like the snake that is imagined (to be separate from the rope) but that does no longer remain as such when its true nature is known with the help of a light to be nothing but the rope. This
manifold (Idam) does never really exist as it appears to be, that is to say, in the forms of Prāṇa, etc., because it is imaginary just like the snake seen in the place of the rope. Therefore different objects, such as Prāṇa, etc., do not exist as separate from one other as a buffalo appears to be separate from a horse. The idea of separation being unreal, there is nothing which exists as separate from an object of the same nature or from other objects (of different nature). The Brāhmanas, i.e., the Knowers of Self, know this to be the essence of the Ultimate Reality. Therefore the implication of the verse is that non-duality alone, on account of the absence of any cause that may bring about misery, is verily the (highest) bliss.

1 For, etc.—Does this insentient manifold exist as one with Ātman? This position is untenable as the sentient Ātman and insentient universe can never be identical. For, if it be admitted that the manifold is identical with Ātman which is one and without a second, then multiplicity cannot exist.

2 It is, etc.—The snake, which in the darkness appeared to be separate from the rope, is known with the help of a light, to be the same as the rope. The light does not show that the rope is identical with the snake, as such identity is an impossibility, but it reveals that the only thing that exists is the rope and even that which appeared as the snake in the dark was nothing but the rope. Similarly, Ātman alone exists and the phenomenon, which appears through ignorance to be separate from Ātman, is also Ātman from the standpoint of Truth.

3 Because—It is because the idea of separation is unreal. A pot is known only in relation to a cloth or another object. One cannot totally exclude another. Therefore the objects, that are perceived to exist, are not mutually independent from the standpoint of Truth. It is the non-dual Ātman alone which appears as multiple objects, having relations, through ignorance.

4 This—i.e., duality or multiplicity does never exist, as it cannot be demonstrated.
35. By the wise, who are free from attachment, fear and anger and who are well versed in the meaning of the Vedas, this (Ātman) has been verily realised as totally devoid of all imaginations (such as those of Prāṇa, etc.), free from the illusion of the manifold, and non-dual.

ŚANKARA’S COMMENTARY

The perfect knowledge as described above, is thus extolled. The sages who are always free from all blemishes such as attachment, fear, spite, anger, etc., who are given to contemplation, who can discriminate between the real and the unreal and who can grasp the essence of the meaning of the Vedas, i.e., who are well versed in the Vedānta (i.e., the Upanishads) do realise the real nature of this Ātman which is free from all imaginations and also free from this the illusion of the manifold. This Ātman is the total negation of the phenomena of duality and therefore it is non-dual. The intention of the Śruti passage is this: The Supreme Self can be realised only by the Sannyāsins (men of renunciation) who are free from all blemishes and who are enlightened regarding the essence of the Upanishads and never by others, i.e., those vain logicians whose mind is clouded by passion, etc., and who find truth only in their own creeds and opinions.

1 Extolled—The purpose of this praise is to attract the attention of the pupils towards the realisation of Truth.

2 Always—The student fails to realise Truth if his mind is, at any moment, clouded by passion, etc. It is therefore laid in the Vedānta that a student, before aspiring to realise Truth, must be
well established in the fourfold pre-requisites, such as, discrimination between the real and the unreal, renunciation of the unreal, total self-control and a strong hankering after realisation.

3 *Do realise*—This is to refer to the contention of the agnostics that Reality is ever unknown and unknowable. Reality can certainly be known and realised if the student has got the necessary equipments for such realisation.

4 *Only, etc.*—It is only the ignorant person who says that his vision of Reality is alone true. But to a wise man everything is Brahman. To him anything that may be called non-Brahman is ever non-existent.

	तस्मादेवं विदित्वेनं अदृश्यं योजयेत्समृद्धिम् ||

	अदृश्यं समुद्यपञ्च जडविह्वेकमाचरेत् || ३६ ||

36. Therefore knowing the Ātman to be such, fix your attention on non-duality. Having realised non-duality behave in the world like an insensible object.

**SANKARĀ’S COMMENTARY**

As non-duality, on account of its being the negation of all evils, is bliss and fearlessness, therefore knowing it to be such, direct your mind to the realisation of the non-dual Ātman. In other words, concentrate your memory on the realisation of non-duality alone. Having known this non-dual Brahman which is free from hunger, etc., unborn and directly perceptible as the Self and which transcends all codes\(^1\) of human conduct, *i.e.*, by attaining to the consciousness that ‘I am the Supreme Brahman,’ behave with others as one not knowing the Truth; that is to say, let\(^2\) not others know what you are and what you have become.

1 *Codes, etc.*—It is because the non-dual Brahman is beyond the duality of the manifested manifold.

2 *Let not, etc.*—A wise man does not broadcast his realisation before the world. The sentence may mean that a wise man, on
account of his being established in the non-dual Ātman, does not see others as separate from him; and therefore he does not assume consciously the role of a Knower (Jñāni).

निस्तुतितिर्निन्मस्कारो निःस्वधाकार एव च।
चढ़ाचढ़निकेलथ यतियोहिच्छिको भवेत् ॥ ३७ ॥

37. The man of self-restraint should be above all praise, salutation and all rites prescribed by the Smriti in connection with the departed ancestors. He should have this body and the Ātman as his support and depend upon chances, i.e., he should be satisfied with those things for his physical wants, that chance brings to him.

ŚANKARA’S COMMENTARY

What should be his code of conduct in the world? It is thus stated:—He\(^1\) should give up all such formalities as praise, salutation, etc., and be free\(^2\) from all desires for external objects. In other words, he should take up the life of a Paramahamsa Sannyāsin.\(^3\) The Śruti also supports this view in such passages as “knowing this Ātman……”, etc. This is further approved in such Smriti passages as, “With their consciousness in That (Brahman), their self being That, intent on That, with That for their Supreme Goal……” (Gītā), etc. The word “chalam” in the text signifying “changing” indicates the “body” because it changes every moment. The word “Achalam” signifying “unchanging” indicates the “Knowledge of Self”. He\(^4\) has the (changing) body for his support when he, for the purpose of such activities as eating, etc., forgets the Knowledge of the Self, the (real) support of Ātman, unchanging like the Ākāśa, (ether) and relates himself to egoism. Such\(^5\) a wise man never takes shelter under external objects. He entirely
depends upon circumstances, that is to say, he maintains his body with whatever food or strips of cloth, etc., are brought to him by mere chance.

1 *He, etc.*—No wise man recites any hymns to the deities or bows down before them, as he has no desires which can be fulfilled by their favour or grace. The word *swadha* in the text refers to the ceremonies known as *Sraddha*, a rite performed for the propitiation of the departed ancestors. Every offering in that ceremony is accompanied by the utterance of that word. The sense is that the wise man renounces even those actions connected with the dead which are obligatory for all people of the three higher castes. This is because the man of Knowledge, on account of his realisation of the non-dual *Atman*, does not find anything separate or different from his own self.

2 *Free, etc.*—It is because such objects do not exist for a Knower of Truth.

3 *Paranahamsa Sannyasin*—Such a man belongs to the highest order of monks and moves in the world like other men; only he does not declare that he is a Knower of the Highest Reality.

4 *He, etc.*—A wise man, in this text, is said to have both body and self for his abode. The meaning is this: When he meditates on the *Atman*, detaching his mind from all external desires, then he is said to have the *Atman* for his support and abode. But when his mind comes down to the consciousness of the body on account of his feeling the necessity for food, etc., he is said to have his body for his support and abode.

5 *Such, etc.*—The wise man, described in this verse, never takes the "external objects as real" like the ignorant persons. But the word "yati" (man of self-control) does not signify the man of the highest realisation, as it is not at all possible for the latter to forget at any time the Knowledge of Brahman. This verse refers to the student aspiring after the Highest Knowledge. The next verse indicates the condition of a *Jnâni*.

6 *By mere, etc.*—That is to say, such a man does not make any conscious effort to procure his food or clothing.
38. Having known the truth regarding what exists internally (i.e., within the body) as well as the truth regarding what exists externally (i.e., the earth, etc.) he becomes one with Reality, derives his pleasure from It and never deviates from the Real.

ŚANKARA’S COMMENTARY

The truth\(^1\) regarding external objects such as the earth, etc., and the truth regarding internal objects characterised by body, etc., is that these are as unreal as a snake seen in the rope, or objects seen in dream or magic. For, there are such Śruti passages as, “modification being only a name, arising from speech, etc.” The Śruti further declares, “Ātman is both within and without, birthless, causeless, having no within or without, entire, all-pervading like the Ākāśa (ether), subtle, unchanging, without attributes and parts, and without action. That is Truth, That is Ātman and That thou art.” Knowing it to be such from the point of view of Truth, he becomes one with Truth and derives his enjoyment\(^2\) from Truth and not from any external\(^3\) object. But a person\(^4\) ignorant of Truth, takes the mind to be the Self and believes the Ātman to be active like the mind, and becomes active. He thus thinks his self to be identified with the body, etc., and deviated from Ātman saying, “Oh, I am now fallen from the Knowledge of Self.” When his mind is concentrated he sometimes thinks that he is happy and one with the Self. He declares “Oh, I am now one with the essence of Truth.” But,\(^5\) the knower of Self never makes any such statement, as
Atman is ever one and changeless and as it is impossible for Atman to deviate from its own nature. The consciousness that "I am Brahman" never leaves him. In other words, he never loses the consciousness regarding the essence of the Self. The Smritis supports this view in such passages as "The wise man views equally a dog or an outcaste." "He sees who sees the Supreme Lord remaining the same, in all beings." (Gītā)

1 Truth, etc.—Body, mind, etc., and the earth, the sun, etc., when looked upon as separate from the self, are as illusory as the snake seen in the rope, etc. But every unreal superimposition, from the standpoint of Truth, is identical with the substratum as dream objects are one with the mind and the snake is one with the rope.

2 Enjoyment—There being no existing entity other than Atman, this thought makes a man happy.

3 External objects—It is because no objects external or separate from him exist.

4 Some person, etc.—This is the case with those yogis or mystics who think that the Atman can be realised only by withdrawing the mind from external objects and concentrating it on something within.

5 But, etc.—It is because even when the mind is active and creating ideas, the man of realisation knows it to be the Atman. If one sees multiplicity, this multiplicity is nothing really existent which can make the non-dual Atman become dual. The act of becoming, creation or manifestation is an illusion. The rope never becomes the snake.

6 The consciousness—Even when a Jñāni eats or drinks or does any other act he only sees the non-dual Brahman. He never deviates from the real. His condition has thus been described in the Gītā: "Brahman is the offering, Brahman the oblation, by Brahman is the oblation poured into the fire of Brahman; Brahman verily shall be reached by him who always sees Brahman in action." The state of a student has been described in the previous verse. A student, when urged by hunger and thirst, thinks himself as
something different from Reality. A mystic or a yogi thinks that he can realise Truth only by withdrawing his mind from the external objects. But a man of the highest realisation, who knows that he is the Supreme Reality, never loses that consciousness and even in the midst of the world keeps intact the Knowledge of his identity with the non-dual Brahman.

Here ends the Gauḍapāda Kārikā on Illusion and Śankara’s Commentary on the Chapter.
Aum Salutation to Brahman

CHAPTER III

ON ADVAITA

ॐ

उपासनाश्रितो धर्मों जाते ब्रह्माणि वर्त्ते ।
प्रागुप्तचर्जं सर्वं तेनासौ कृपणः स्मृतः ॥ १ ॥

1. The Jiva betaking itself to devotion (upāsanā) thinks itself to be related to the Brahman that is supposed to have manifested Himself. He is said to be of narrow intellect because he thinks that before creation all was of the nature of the unborn (Reality).

SANKARA'S COMMENTARY

While determining the meaning of Aum, it has been stated in the form of a proposition that “Ātman is the negation of phenomena, blissful and non-dual.” It has been further stated that “Duality does not exist when the reality is known.” Further, in the chapter on Illusion, that duality does not exist really has been established by the illustrations of dream, magic, castle-in-the-air, etc., and also by reasoning on the grounds of “the capability of being seen” and “the being finite,” etc. Now it is asked whether non-duality can be established only by scriptural evidence or whether it can be proved by reasoning as well. It is said in reply that it is possible to establish non-duality by reasoning¹ as well. How is it possible? This is shown in this chapter on Advaita.
It has been demonstrated in the last chapter that the entire realm of dualism including the object and the act of devotion is illusory, and the attributeless, non-dual Ātman alone is the Reality. The word "upāsanāsrita" in the text, meaning the one betaking himself to devotion, signifies him who has recourse to devotional exercises as means to the attainment of liberation and who further thinks that he is the devotee and Brahman is his object of worship. This Jīva or the embodied being further thinks that through devotional practices he, at present related to the evolved Brahman (Personal God), would attain to the ultimate Brahman after the dissolution of the body. Prior to the manifestation, according to this Jīva, everything including itself, was unborn. In other words he thinks, "I shall, through devotional practices, regain that which was my real nature before manifestation, though at present I subsist in the Brahman that appears in the form of the manifold." Such a Jīva, that is, the aspirant, betaking itself to devotion, inasmuch as it knows only a partial aspect of Brahman, is called of narrow or poor intellect by those who regard Brahman as eternal and unchanging. The Upanishad of the Talavakāra (Kena) supports this view in such statements as, "That which is not expressed (indicated) by speech and by which speech is expressed, That alone know as Brahman and not that which people here adore," etc.

1 *Reasoning*—The truth arrived at by reasoning may be corroborated by one's own experience and further supported by the Śruti.

2 *Illusory*—It is because these belong to the realm of duality.

3 *One, etc.*—One who does not know the eternal and unchanging nature of the Self, thinks of himself as separate or different from his real nature and has recourse to various spiritual practices in
order to regain his Brahmic nature, which he thinks he does, after death. Compare the Christian view of the “Fall of man”. These views are given in the Hindu scriptures also but refuted at the end from the standpoint of Truth, which is that even when a man thinks himself to be ignorant and tries to attain Knowledge by means of spiritual practices, he is Brahman. The nature of the non-dual Brahman never undergoes any change or transformation. There is no act of creation.

4 Evolved Brahman—The Jīva in his state of imaginary “fall” worships a Personal God or a Cosmic Soul. He cannot think of the non-dual Self; but he imagines the Sagunā Brahman to be Reality.

5 Prior—This ignorant Jīva thinks that only after death he will realise his eternal Brahmic nature, which was his real nature before he came into dual existence.

6 Narrow—It is because an ignorant person has no idea of the changeless non-dual Self. For, according to his view the non-dual Self is also limited by time and change which characterise the dual universe.

7 Eternal, etc.—According to the Knower of Truth, Brahman never undergoes any manifestation. The phenomena of birth and death are mere illusion.

अतो वक्ष्यामयकार्पण्यमजाति समतां गतम्।
यथा न जायते किंचित् जायमानं समन्तन: ॥ ॥

2. Therefore I shall now describe that (Brahman) which is free from limitations, unborn and which is the same throughout; and from this, one understands that it is not (in reality) born though it appears to be manifested everywhere.

SANKARA’S COMMENTARY

One unable to realise Ātman, which is both within and without and birthless, and therefore believing oneself to be helpless through Avidya, thinks, “I am born, I subsist in the Brahman with attributes (sagunā) and
through devotion to It I shall become Brahman," and thus becomes Kripaṇa (narrow-minded). Therefore, I shall describe Brahman which has never been subject to any limitation and which is birthless (changeless). The narrowness of mind has been described in such Śruti passages as, "When one sees another, hears another, knows another, then there is limitedness (liteness), mortality and unreality," "Modification is only a name arising from speech, but the truth is that all is clay," etc. But contrary to it is Brahman known as Bhuma (great) which is both within and without and which is free from all limitations. I shall now describe that Brahman, free from all limitations, by realising which one gets rid of all narrowness superimposed by ignorance. It (Brahman) is called Ajāti, birthless, inasmuch as none knows its birth or cause. It is the same always and everywhere. How is it so? It is so because there does not exist in it (Brahman) any inequality caused by the presence of parts or limbs. For, only that which is with parts may be said to be born (or to have taken new form) by a change of its parts. But as Ātman is without parts, it is always the same and even, that is to say, it does not manifest itself in any new form through a change of the parts. Therefore it is without birth and free from limitation. Now listen as to how1 Brahman is not born, how it does not undergo change by so much as a jot, but ever remains unborn, though it appears, through ignorance, to be born and to give birth to others, like the rope2 and the snake.

1 How, etc.—Brahman (Ātman) is always non-dual even during the perception of duality by the ignorant. Non-duality is the Reality and duality is illusion.

2 Rope—The truth is that the rope does not become or produce the snake. It is only through ignorance that one sees the snake
in the rope. Similarly Brahman which is birthless, causeless, changeless and attributeless is imagined by the ignorant as producing or becoming the universe.

अत्मा ब्रह्माशाश्ववज्ञीवर्त्ताकाशीर्विदितः ।
घटादिवच्च संधातैर्जातावेतनिदर्शनम् ॥ ३ ॥

3. Ātman may be said to be similar to Ākāśa (ether) manifested in the forms of the Jīvas (embodied selves) which may be compared to the ether enclosed in pots. Again, as pots, etc., are said to be produced from the Ākāśa (ether), similarly (gross) bodies are said to be evolved from the Ātman. This is the illustration of the manifestation (from Brahman, if any).

ŚANKARA’S COMMENTARY

It has been said in the previous text, “I shall now describe Brahman, birthless and free from all narrowness.” Now I shall give an illustration and a reason to substantiate the proposition. As the Supreme Ātman is like the Ākāśa, subtle, without parts and all-pervasive, it is compared to the Ākāśa. The Supreme Self again, who is likened to the Ākāśa, is said to be manifested as the embodied beings (Jīvas) or Kshetrajnas (Knowers of bodies), and are likened to the Ghatākāśas or the Ākāśa enclosed in jars. This is the Supreme Self which is like the Ākāśa. Or the sentence may be explained thus:—As the totality of the Ākāśa enclosed within the pots is said to constitute what is known as the Mahākāśa or the great expanse of ether, similarly the totality of the embodied beings (Jīvas) constitutes the Supreme Being. The creation or manifestation of the Jīvas (embodied beings) from the Supreme Self, as stated in the Vedānta, is like the creation or manifestation of the Ghatākāśa
(i.e., the ether enclosed in a jar) from the Mahākāśa (or the great and undifferentiated ether). That is to say, creation or manifestation is not real. As from that Ākāśa are produced such physical objects as the pot, etc., similarly from the Supreme Self which is like the Ākāśa, are produced the entire aggregate of material entities, such as the earth, etc., as well as the individual bodies, all characterised by causality, the entire production being nothing but mere imagination like that of the snake in the rope. Therefore it is said, “The aggregates (of the gross bodies) are produced like the pot, etc.” When the Śruti, with a view to the enlightenment of the ignorant, speaks of the creation or manifestation (of the Jīvas) from the Ātman, then such manifestation, being admitted as a fact, is explained with the help of the illustration of the creation of the pot, etc., from the Ākāśa.

1 Not real—As the Ākāśa does not really create the Ākāśa enclosed within the pot, etc., but appears as enclosed on account of the association of the upādhis of the pot, etc., similarly the Supreme Self does not manifest or create any Jīva but appears as Jīvas on account of its association with the upādhis of ignorance (Avidyā). This is an explanation of creation from the empirical standpoint when such creation is admitted as a fact. But from the standpoint of Reality there is no creation.

2 As, etc.—The pot, etc., cannot be produced without space. They exist in space. Similarly no physical body can exist without the substratum of Ātman. Therefore, Ātman is said to have created the physical bodies.

3 All, etc.—All phenomenal objects are characterised by the law of cause and effect.

4 Entire, etc.—Vedānta accepts both the theories of Vivarta and Parināma as explanation of the phenomenal universe. Brahman is imagined to manifest himself as the universe through Māyā, and then the universe follows the law of causation.
\textit{When, etc.—Creation through Māyā is only an explanation of the universe when one takes it to be real. It is not truth. Māyā is only a statement of fact, an explanation of the world we perceive in a state of ignorance. From the standpoint of Reality neither the universe nor Māyā exists. Brahman alone exists.}

\begin{quote}
घटादिषु प्रलीनेनु घटाकारादयो यथा ||
आकाशे संप्रतीयन्ते तद्वृज्जिवा इहासस्वमनि || ४ ||
\end{quote}

4. \textit{As on the destruction of the pot, etc., the ether enclosed in the pot, etc., merges in the Ākāśa (the great expanse of ether), similarly the Jīvas merge in the Ātman.}

\textbf{SANKARA’S COMMENTARY}

As the creation of ether enclosed within the pot, etc., follows the creation of the pot, etc., and as the merging of the same ether (in the \textit{Mahākāśa}) is consequent on the destruction of the pot, etc.; in the same manner the creation or manifestation of the \textit{Jīva} follows that of the aggregate of the body, etc., and the merging of the \textit{Jīva} in the Supreme Self follows in the wake of the destruction of the aggregate of the body, etc. The meaning is that neither the creation nor destruction is in itself real (from the standpoint of the Absolute).

Both the creation and destruction of the universe, and consequently its existence, are due to ignorance. In truth, there is neither creation, nor existence, nor destruction. Destruction is impossible in the absence of creation. Therefore, the \textit{Śruti} passages describing the process of creation and destruction do not antagonise the reality of the non-dual Ātman, as such fact is admitted by the \textit{Advaitin} to be possible in the realm of ignorance.

\begin{quote}
यथैक्स्मिन्वटाकाश्च रजोधूमादिभिः ||
न सर्वं संप्रवृज्जयन्ते तद्वृज्जिवा: सुखादिभः || ५ ||
\end{quote}
5. As any portion of Ākāśa enclosed in a pot being soiled by dust, smoke, etc., all such other portions of Ākāśa enclosed in other pots are not soiled, so is the happiness, etc., of the Jīvas, i.e., the happiness, misery, etc., of one Jīva do not affect other Jīvas.

ŚANKARA'S COMMENTARY

The dualists contend that if one Ātman exists in all bodies then the birth, death, happiness, etc., of one Ātman (as Jīva) must affect all and, further, there must follow a confusion regarding the results of the action (done by individuals). This contention is, thus refuted:—As the Ākāśa enclosed within one jar being soiled by dust, smoke, etc., does not make the Ākāśa enclosed in other jars soiled with the dust and the smoke, so all created beings are not affected by the happiness, etc. (of one Jīva).

(Objection) Is it not your contention that there is only one Ātman?

(Reply) Yes, we admit it. Have you not heard that there is only one Ātman like the all-pervading space, in all bodies?

(Objection) If there be only one Ātman then it must always and everywhere feel misery and happiness.

(Reply) This objection cannot be raised by the Sāmkhyas. For, the Sāmkhyas do not admit that misery, happiness, etc., ever cling to the Ātman; for they assert that happiness, misery, etc., belong inseparably to Buddhi. Further, there is no evidence for imagining multiplicity of Ātman which is of the very nature of knowledge.

(Objection) In the absence of the multiplicity of Ātman the theory that the Pradhāna or Prakriti acts for the sake of others does not hold good.
(Reply)—No, this argument is not valid; for whatever the Pradhāna or Prakriti may be supposed to accomplish by itself for another cannot inseparably inhere in Ātman. If bondage and liberation accomplished by the Pradhāna inseparably inhered in the multiple Purushas, then the theory that the Pradhāna (Prakriti) always acts for the sake of others would not be consistent with the unity of Ātman existing everywhere. And the theory of the Sāmkhyas regarding the multiplicity of Ātman would be reasonable. But the Sāmkhyas do not admit that the purpose of bondage or liberation can ever be inseparably associated with the Purusha. For, they admit that the Purushas are attributeless and are centres of Pure Consciousness. Therefore, the very existence of the Purusha is their support for the theory that the action of Pradhāna is directed to serve the purpose of others (the Purushas). But the supposition of the multiplicity of Purushas need not be made for this purpose. Therefore the theory of the Pradhāna seeking to serve the purpose of others cannot be an argument for the supposition of the multiplicity of Ātman. The Sāmkhyas have no other argument in support of their supposition regarding the multiplicity of Ātman. The Pradhāna takes upon itself bondage and liberation only through the instrumentality of the existence of the other (the Purusha). The Purusha which is of the very nature of knowledge, is the cause of the activity of the Pradhāna by the fact of its very existence and not on account of its any specific qualities. So it is through ignorance alone that people imagine the Purusha (Ātman) to be many and also thereby give up the real import of the Vedas.

The Vaiśeshikas and others assert that attributes such as desire, etc., are inseparably related to Ātman.
This view is also not correct. For, the Samskāras (the impressions) which are the cause of memory cannot have any inseparable relation with Ātman which has no parts. Further, if it be contended that the origin of memory lies in the contact of Ātman with the mind, we say that this contention is not valid; for, in that case there will be no principle regarding memory. Memory of all things will come simultaneously. Besides mind can never be related to the Ātman which is devoid of all sensations such as touch, etc., and which belongs to a class other than that of the mind. Further the Vaiśeshikas do not admit that the attributes (Guṇa) such as forms, etc. (Rūpas), action (Karma), generality (Sāmānya), particularity (Viśesha) and inherence (Samavāya), can exist independently of the substance (Dravya). If these are totally independent of one another, the contact between the Ātman and desire, etc., and also between the attributes (Guṇa) and the substance (Dravya) will be an absurdity.

(Objection)—The contact characterised by an inseparable inherence is possible in the case of entities where such relation is proved to be innate.

(Reply)—This objection is not valid; for such innate relationship cannot be reasonable, as the Ātman, the ever permanent, is antecedent to the desires, etc., which are transitory. And if desires, etc., be admitted to have inseparable innate relationship with Ātman, then the former would be as permanent as such innate attributes of Ātman as greatness, etc. That is not desirable, for then there would be no room for liberation of the Ātman. Further, if inseparable relationship (Samavāya) were something separate from the substance, then another factor must be stated which can bring about the relationship between Samavāya and the substance,—
as in the case of the substance and the attributes. Nor can it be stated that Samavāya is a constant inseparable relationship with Ātman; for, in that case, the Ātman and Samavāya on account of their constant and inseparable relationship can never be different from one another. If, on the other hand, the relationship of Samavāya be totally different from the Ātman, and the attributes also be different from the substance, then the possessive case cannot be used to indicate their mutual relation which is possible only when the two terms connected by the possessive are not totally different. If Ātman be inseparably connected with such categories as desires, etc., which have both “beginning” and “end,” then it would itself be impermanent. If Ātman be considered to have parts and undergo changes, like the body, etc., then, these two defects always associated with the body, etc., would be inevitable in the case of the Ātman. (Therefore the conclusion is that) as the Ākāśa (ether), on account of the superimposition of ignorance (Avidyā), is regarded as soiled by dust and smoke, in like manner, the Ātman also, on account of the limiting condition of the mind caused by the erroneous attribution of Avidyā, appears to be associated with the contamination of misery, happiness, etc. And such being the case, the idea of bondage and liberation, being empirical in nature, does not contradict (the permanent nature of Ātman from the standpoint of Truth). For, all the disputants admit the relative experience to be caused by Avidyā and deny its existence from the standpoint of the Supreme Reality. Hence it follows that the supposition of the multiplicity of Ātman made by the logicians is without basis and superfluous.

1 There—in the case of the unity of Ātman, the action of one individual must affect others who are not responsible for the action.
Then there cannot be any possible relation between action and the results of actions. The law of causality becomes futile.

2 *As*—The reply is that birth, death, misery, happiness, etc., are admitted to be facts experienced in the practical world. There the multiplicity of *Ātman* is also admitted. But this multiplicity of *Ātman* is due to the limitations of the (upādhi) of the mind caused by *Avidyā* (ignorance), which does not exist in the Supreme Reality.

3 *Objection*—This objection is supposed to be raised by the adherents of the *Sāmkhya* philosophy.

4 *If, etc.*—The contention of the *Sāmkhya* philosopher is that in case the unity of *Ātman* is upheld, one must always feel miserable or happy as the result of the good and the bad actions of others must affect him.

5 *For, etc.*—According to the *Sāmkhya* theory, the *Ātman* or the *Purusha* is without parts and attributes and is of the very nature of consciousness. *Prakriti* or *Pradhāna* is insentient, dull, and endowed with the qualities of misery, happiness, etc. All the activities of *Prakriti* are directed to serve the purpose of the conscious *Purusha*. *Prakriti*, being insentient, cannot enjoy the result of her own work. According to the *Sāmkhya* theory, *Prakriti* is one, but the *Purushas* are as numerous as there are bodies. Each *Purusha* by coming in contact with *Prakriti* catches the reflection of misery or happiness, which are the characteristics of the latter (*Prakriti*) and thinks itself as happy or miserable.

6 *Buddhi*—According to the *Sāmkhya* philosophy there are twenty-five categories. *Buddhi* is first evolved as the result of the contact of *Prakriti* with *Purusha*. The three qualities of *Sattva*, *Rajas* and *Tamas* which give rise to misery, happiness, etc., lie in an undifferentiated state in *Prakriti*. But when *Prakriti* evolves into *Buddhi*, these qualities become differentiated. Hence, misery, happiness, etc., have been stated as inseparably related to *Buddhi*.

7 *Others*—i.e., the *Purushas*. See note Ante 5.

8 *Bondage, etc.*—According to the *Sāmkhya* philosophy the contact of *Prakriti* with *Purusha* causes the latter to fall into bondage. But as soon as *Purusha* realises his independence, he is liberated. Therefore according to the *Sāmkhyas*, *Prakriti* is the cause of bondage and liberation and the *Purusha*, in itself, is of the very nature of knowledge. All the activities of *Prakriti*, which are
otherwise meaningless, are directed to make the Purusha realise his real nature.

9 Therefore, etc.—According to Vedānta, the ideas of both bondage and liberation belong to the world of relativity. It is due to ignorance. From the standpoint of Truth, there is neither bondage nor liberation; for the Ātman is always free.

10 Instrumentality, etc.—Vedānta does not disagree with this position. According to it, the fact of the multiplicity of relative phenomena is explained by the presence of the non-dual Ātman. Every illusion has its substratum.

11 Specific qualities—This is the view of Patanjali. According to his system, known as the philosophy of Yoṣa, there is an Īśwara or Personal God, possessed of attributes, who is the cause of the created universe.

12 Real import, etc.—i.e., the non-dual Ātman is the only Reality.

13 Vaiśeshikas.—The followers of the Vaiśeshika philosophy hold that there are six categories, viz., Dravya (substance), Guna (quality), Karma (activity), Sāmānya (generality), Viśeṣha (particularity), and Samavāya (inheritance). All these categories exist independently of one another. The Dravya or substance (Ātman) has nine special attributes, viz., Buddhi (intellect), Sukha (happiness), Duhkha (misery), Ichha (desire), Dveṣha (aversion), Prayaṭna (effort), Dharma (merit), Adharma (demerit) and Samskāra (impression).

14 This, etc.—If desire, etc., are inseparably connected with Ātman, then desire, misery, happiness, etc., of one being would imply those of another.

15 No parts—If it be contended that desire, etc., inhere in one part of the Ātman then the reply is that Ātman unlike the pot, etc., has no parts.

16 If, etc.—The opponent contends that the origin of memory is to be found in the contact of the mind with Ātman. But this argument is not valid. For, Ātman is ever present. In that case the mere effort of the mind to remember anything should bring its memory. But this does not happen. In spite of all our efforts we often fail to bring back the memory of many past events. Further, Ātman is indivisible and without parts. Therefore any impression that arises in the Ātman cannot be confined to any particular part of the Ātman. If such be the case, then all beings
should remember a thing at the same time. Still another difficulty of this theory is that, Ātman being without parts, one should remember all things at one and the same time. Hence no rule exists regarding memory.

17 Besides, etc.—Contact is possible between two things of the same species.

18 This objection, etc.—Śankara criticises this view of the relation between substance and quality. If the two are inseparably related, the inseparability must refer to space, time or nature. The two are not inseparable in space, since we see the redness of a red lotus disappearing. If inseparability in time is the essence of the Samavāya relation, then the right and the left horns of a cow would be related in that way. If it be inseparability in nature or character, then it would be impossible to make any further distinction between substance and quality, since the two are one.

19 Then, etc.—But we know that desires, etc., are impermanent.

रूपकार्यसमाल्याथ्र भिनन्ते तत्र तत्र वे ।
आकाशाय न भेदोऽस्ति तद्वज्जीविपुनिर्णय: || ६ ||

6. Though form, function and name are different here and there yet this does not imply any difference in the Ākāśa (which is one). The same is the conclusion (truth) with regard to the Jīvas.

ŚANKARA’S COMMENTARY

(Objection)—If Ātman be one then how is it possible to justify the variety of experiences pointing to the multiplicity of Ātman (which is explained as being) due to Avidyā (ignorance)?

(Reply)—This is thus explained: In our common experience with regard to this Ākāśa (which is really one), we find variety of forms, such as large, small, etc., in respect of the Ākāśa enclosed in a pot, a water-bowl and a cover. Similarly there are various functions (of the same Ākāśa) such as fetching water, preserving
water and sleeping. Lastly there are various names as the ether enclosed in a jar (ghata), the ether enclosed in a water-bowl (karaka), etc., caused by different upādhis. All these different forms, functions and names are matters of common experience. This variety of experience caused by different forms, etc., is not true from the standpoint of the ultimate Reality. For, in reality Ākāśa never admits of any variety. Our empirical activities based upon the difference in Ākāśa are not possible without the instrumentality of an adventitious upādhi. As in this illustration, the Jivas (embodied beings) which may be compared to the Ākāśa enclosed in a jar, are regarded as different, this difference being caused by the upādhis. This is the conclusion of the wise.

This text gives one of the explanations of the empirical world as stated by the wise.

1 If, etc.—The contention of the opponent is this: The variety of names, forms and functions is an indubitable experience of the relative world. This can be explained only if we admit the multiplicity of Ātman. Therefore there are infinite number of Ātmanas, each having a different name and form and each performing a different function. The unity of Ātman cannot explain this variety.

2 Upādhi—i.e., The form of a pot, water-bowl, etc.

3 Difference—The apparent difference in our empirical experience is caused by upādhis which are unreal. These upādhis are unreal on account of their changeable and negatable nature. Therefore from the standpoint of Reality, Ātman, like the Ākāśa, is only one and without a second.

This explanation that this apparent difference of the empirical experience is caused by Avidyā is given from the relative standpoint when such difference is admitted as a fact. But from the standpoint of the ultimate Reality, the difference does not exist.

नाशकारस्य घटाकाशो विकारावयवै यथा ।
नैवास्तमनः सदा जीवो विकारावयवै तथा ॥ ७ ॥
7. As the Ghatākāsa (i.e., the ether portioned off by the pot) is neither the (evolved) effect nor part of the Ākāsa (ether), so is the Jīva (the embodied being) neither the effect nor part of the Ātman.

ŚANKARA'S COMMENTARY

(Objection)—Our experience of the variety of forms, functions, etc., associated with the ether enclosed in the pot, etc., is true from the standpoint of the ultimate Reality (and not illusory, as you say).

(Reply)—No, this¹ cannot be so. For, the ether enclosed in the pot cannot be the evolved effect of the real ether in the same way as the ornament,² etc., are the effect of gold or the foam, bubble, moisture, etc., are the effect of water. Nor, again is the Ghatākāsa (the Ākāsa in the pot) similar to the branches and other parts of a tree. As Ghatākāsa is neither a part (limb) nor an evolved effect of the Ākāsa, so also the Jīva (the embodied being), compared to the Ākāsa enclosed in the pot, is neither, as in the illustrations given above, an effect nor part (limb) of the Ātman, the ultimate Reality, which may be compared to the Mahākāsa (i.e., the undifferentiated expanse of ether). Therefore the relative experience based upon the multiplicity of Ātman is an illusion (from the standpoint of the ultimate Reality).

¹ This, etc.—For, it is admitted by all that the ether is without parts and cannot undergo any modification.

² Ornament, etc.—We explain a necklace or foam, etc., as the modification of gold or water respectively. We also explain the branches or the leaves as the parts of the tree. But Jīva is neither modification, nor manifestation, nor part of the Ātman. Jīva is Ātman itself which never undergoes a change.
Yatha bhavati baḍāṁsā ganaṁ mahināḥ māḥ |
tatha' bhavacya-buddhāna-mātā-pāpi mahināḥ māḥ ||

8. *As the ether appears to the ignorant children to be soiled by dirt, similarly, the Ātman also is regarded by the ignorant as soiled.*

**Śāṅkara’s Commentary**

As¹ the diversity of experiences such as forms, functions, etc., is caused by the admitted differences of the Ghatākāsa, etc., so also is the experience of birth, death, etc., consequent on the perception of the different Jīvas, due to the limitations caused by Avidyā (ignorance). Therefore the contamination of misery, action and result (of action) caused by Avidyā does not really inhere in the Ātman. In order to establish this meaning by an illustration, the text says:—As in our ordinary experience it is found that the ignorant regard the Ākāsa (ether),—which, to those who know, the real nature of a thing by discrimination, is never soiled by any contamination—as soiled with cloud, dust and smoke, so also the Supreme Ātman, the Knower, the innermost Self directly perceived within, is regarded by those who do not know the real nature of the innermost Self, as affected by the evils of misery, action and result. But this is not the case with those who can discriminate. As in the desert are never found foam,² waves, etc., though thirsty creatures falsely attribute these things to it, similarly the Ātman also is never affected by the turbidity of misery,³ etc., falsely attributed to it by the ignorant.

The opponent may contend thus:—The statement that the Jīvas are neither an evolved effect nor a part of Brahman but identical with it is not correct. For, Brahman is ever pure and non-dual
whereas the Jivas are many and ever affected by the contamination of passion, attachment, etc. This text refutes this contention.

1 As, etc.—In our relative experience we make a distinction between the different forms of Akāśa enclosed by a jar, an eye of a needle, or an extensive field. This knowledge of distinction, caused by various upādhis, unreal from the standpoint of Truth, makes us associate the undifferentiated Akāśa with different forms, functions and names. In like manner, ignorant persons make a distinction of the Jivas by associating the Ātman with the attributes of different bodies, etc., and consequently think of the Ātman as suffering from the effects of birth, death, misery, etc. This distinction in the non-dual Ātman which gives rise to the notion of birth, death, etc., is due to Avidyā which is subjective or which proceeds from the perceiver. This distinction does not, in reality, exist; hence Ātman is ever uncontaminated by the evils of birth, death, etc.

2 Foam, etc.—The ignorant, subject to the illusion of the mirage, associate the desert with foam, waves, etc. All the waters of the mirage, taken as real by the ignorant, do not soak one grain of sand in the desert as this water is unreal. Similarly all the evils attributed falsely to the Ātman by undiscriminating persons do not make it lose its innate purity by so much as an iota.

8 Misery—Misery or Kleśā has been defined by Patanjali as that which causes misery to the Jivas. This Kleśa is of five kinds, viz., Avidyā (i.e., thinking the body which is non-self as the Self), Asmitā (i.e., regarding the Ātman as one with Buddhi or mind), Rāga (i.e., attachment), Dvesha (i.e., the anger which a man feels when his desire to attain a particular object is frustrated), Abhīnivesa (i.e., the fear of death, etc.).

मरणे संभवे चैव गत्यागमनयोरपि ।
स्थितै सर्वशारिरेषु आकाशोनाविर्लक्षणः || ९ ॥

9. Ātman, in regard to its birth, death, going and coming (i.e., transmigration) and its existing in different bodies, is not dissimilar to the Ākāśa (i.e., the Ghatākāśa or the ether portioned off by a jar).
The point which has been just stated is again thus developed:—Birth, death, etc., of the Ātman as seen in all bodies is like the creation, destruction, coming, going and existence of the Ghatākāśa (or ether enclosed within a jar).

It may be contended that the Jīva after death, as a result of the meritorious deeds done in this life, goes to heaven. If a sinner he is thrown into hell. After his enjoyment of happiness or misery in heaven or hell, he again takes birth. In due course he departs from this world. This theory of transmigration is inconsistent with that of the non-dual Ātman. The text refutes this contention. All these diverse experiences regarding Ātman are due to Avidyā and therefore not real. Like the ether, Ātman which is pure, undifferentiated and one, can never be subject to transmigration, etc., which are falsely superimposed upon it through Avidyā.

संप्रदात: खंभवतस्वे आत्ममायाविसारिताः ।
आधिक्ये सर्वसाम्ये वा नोपपत्तिहि विचिते || १० ॥

10. All aggregates (such as body, etc.) are produced by the illusion of the Ātman (i.e., the perceiver) as in a dream. No rational arguments can be adduced to establish their reality, whether they be equal or superior (to one another).

ŚANKARA’S COMMENTARY

The aggregates of body, etc., answering to the pots, etc., in the illustration, are produced,—like the body, etc., seen in dream or conjured up by the magician—by the illusion of the Ātman, i.e., the Avidyā (ignorance) which is in the perceiver. That is to say, they do not exist from the standpoint of the ultimate Reality. If it be argued, in order to establish their reality, that there is a superiority (among the created beings),—as in the
case of the aggregates of cause and effect constituting gods who are superior to lower beings, such as birds and beasts—or that there is an equality (of all created beings), yet no cause\(^4\) can be set forth regarding their creation or reality. As there is no cause therefore all these are due to Avidyā or ignorance; they have no real existence.

\[1\] Illusion, etc.—If one, subject to Avidyā, sees multiplicity, then this Avidyā is in the perceiver. Avidyā is not objective, \textit{i.e.}, it does not exist outside the perceiver.

\[2\] That is, etc.—As in the case of the dream objects, etc., which have no real existence.

\[3\] If, etc.—The opponents may argue that the bodies of gods, etc., on account of their superiority and adorability cannot be unreal. This is an argument of the ignorant, as all bodies, whether belonging to gods or lower animals, are constituted of five elements. Hence there is no intrinsic difference between gods and other beings. It is like the various objects seen in the dream, such as gods, birds, men, beasts, etc. They are made of the same thing, \textit{viz.}, the mind-stuff. Therefore, they are of the same nature and known to be unreal when the dream vanishes. Similarly a wise man knows all bodies from Brahma to the blade of grass to be unreal.

\[4\] Cause—The idea of creation or coming into existence is due to Avidyā. With the removal of Avidyā, the idea of creation also vanishes. This topic will be discussed at full length later on.

रसादयो हि ये कोशा व्याख्यातात्सत्तिर्तियके ।

तेषामात्मा परो जीवः सं यथा संप्रकाशितः ॥ ११ ॥

11. The \textit{Supreme Jīva} (\textit{i.e., the non-dual Brahman}) is the self of the (five) sheaths, such as the physical, etc., which have been explained in the Tāttvāntikā Upanishad. \textit{That the Supreme Jīva is like the Ākāsa has already been described by us} (in the third verse of this chapter).
Sankara's Commentary

Now statements are made in order to show that the existence of the essence of Ātman which is non-dual and without birth, etc., can⁴ as well be proved on the evidence of the Śruti. Rasa, etc., are the five⁵ sheaths such as the physical sheath (Annarasa-maya), the vital sheath (Prāṇamaya), etc. These are called "sheaths" (Kośa) because they³ are like the sheath of the sword, the previous⁴ sheaths being outer than the following ones. These have been clearly explained in the Taittirīyaka, i.e., in a chapter of the Taittirīyaka-śākhā Upanishad. It is the Self (Ātman) of these sheaths. By It, the innermost Self, the five sheaths are regarded as alive. It is again called Jīva as it is the cause of the life of all. What is It? It is the Supreme Self which has been described before as "Brahman which is Existence, Knowledge and Infinity." It has been further stated that from this Ātman the aggregates of the body known as Rasa, etc., having the characteristics of the sheath, have⁶ been created by its (Ātman's) power called ignorance, this creation being like the illusory creation of objects seen in a dream or in a performance of jugglery. We have described this Ātman as the ether (Ākāśa) in the text, "The Ātman is verily like the Ākāśa" (Gaud. Kārikā, 3. 3). This Ātman cannot be established by the reasoning⁶ of a man who follows the logician's method of arguments as the Ātman referred to by us is different from the Ātman of the logicians.

¹ Can, etc.—That Jīva is identical with non-dual Brahman has already been established through reason. Now the same is again proved by the evidence of the Vedas.

⁵ Five, etc.—The five sheaths are the Annamayakośa (the physical sheath), the Prāṇamayakośa (the vital sheath), the Manomayakośa
(the mental sheath), the Vijñānamayakośa (the sheath of intellect) and the Ānandamayakośa (the sheath of Bliss).

3 They, etc.—The kosas are compared to sheaths. As the sheath is external to the sword, so also the kosas are external to the Ātman which is the innermost Self of all.

4 Previous, etc.—The Annamayakośa is the sheath wherein is encased the Prāṇamayakośa, the Prāṇamayakośa is the sheath wherein is encased the Manomayakośa and so on. The Ānandamayakośa is encased in the Vijñānamayakośa.

5 Have been, etc.—This is no real creation. The phenomena of creation, which is illusory, are regarded as such from the empirical standpoint.

6 Reasoning.—The rational method of arriving at the Truth sought in the Vedānta philosophy is mainly described in the Kūrikā of Gauḍapāda. This consists of the analysis of the three states, known as the waking, the dream and the deep sleep and the co-ordination of the experiences of these states.

श्योद्वद्योभेतुज्ञाने परं भ्रम प्रकाशितम्
पुष्थिन्यायमुद्रे चैव यथासःकाशः प्रकाशितः ॥ १२ ॥

12. The description by pairs, as that of the Ākāśa, which is in the earth as also in the stomach (though referred to separately), applies equally to the Supreme Brahman described in the Madhu Brāhmaṇa (a chapter in the Brihadāraṇyaka Upanishad), as being both in the corporeal (Adhyātma) and in the celestial (Adhidaiva) regions.

ŚANKARA'S COMMENTARY

Moreover, in the words1 “All this is the Supreme Ātman, the Brahman, the bright, the immortal Person who is both the celestial (superphysical—Adhidaiva) and the corporeal (Adhyātma), who is in this earth as well as the Knower incorporated in the body,”—Brahman alone is described in order to indicate the limit at which duality vanishes. Where does this occur? It is thus
replied:—It occurs in the Madhu Brāhmaṇa chapter which is known as the chapter dealing with the Knowledge of Brahman. It is because therein is described the nectar (i.e., immortality) which is known as Madhu, i.e., honey, as it gives us the highest bliss. This Brahman is like the Ākāśa which is said to be the same or identical though separately indicated as existing in the earth and in the stomach.

1 Words, etc.—The text of the Brihadāranyaka Upanishad (2.5.1) referred to here begins thus: “This earth is the honey (Madhu, the effect) of all beings and all beings are honey (Madhu, the effect) of this earth. Likewise this bright, immortal person in this earth and that bright immortal person incorporated in the body (both are Madhu). He is indeed the same as that Self, that Immortal, that Brahman, that All”. The purport of this Śruti passage is this: The Supreme Brahman alone has been described as existing in all the pairs of the corporeal (Adhyātma) and the superphysical (Adhidaiva).

13. As the identity of Jīva and Ātman, through their non-dual character, is praised and multiplicity is condemned (in the scriptures), therefore, that (non-duality) alone is rational and correct.

Śankara’s Commentary

The Śāstras¹ as well as the sages like Vyāsa, etc., extol the identity of Jīva and the Supreme Self through the negation of all differences—the conclusion arrived at by reasoning and supported by the scriptures. Further, the experiences of multiplicity which are natural (to the ignorant) and common to all beings—the view propounded by those who do not understand the real import
of the Shāstras and who indulge in futile reasoning—have been condemned\(^1\) thus: “But there is certainly nothing corresponding to the dual existence,” “Fear arises from the consciousness of duality,” “If he sees the slightest difference (in Ātman) then he is overcome with fear,” “All this is verily Ātman,” “He goes from death to death who sees here (in this Ātman) multiplicity.” Other Knowers of Brahman as well as the scriptures (quoted above) extol identity (of Jīva and Brahman) and condemn multiplicity. Thus alone this praise and condemnation can easily be comprehended; in other words, it accords with reason. But the false views (vainly) advanced by the logicians,\(^3\) not easy of comprehension, cannot be accepted as facts (Truth).

\(^1\) *Shāstras*—Comp. “One who knows Brahman verily becomes Brahman.”

\(^2\) *Condemned*—That which is condemned cannot be Reality.

\(^3\) *Logicians*—This refers to the followers of the Vaiśeshika and other systems of thought.

There is no scriptural quotation which praises duality and condemns non-duality (Advaita).

\[\text{जीवात्मनोऽः प्रथमवं यत् मार्गुत्तप्तेः प्रकृतितिमौ} | \text{भविष्यद्वृत्त्या गौणं तन्मुख्यवं हि नयुपयते} \] \(14\)

14. The separateness of Jīva and Ātman which has been declared in (the ritual portion of the) Upanishad, dealing with the origin (of the universe), is only figurative, because this portion (of the Vedas) describes only what is to be. This statement regarding separateness can never have any meaning as truth.

**Śankara’s Commentary**

(Objection)—Even the Śruti has already declared the separateness of the Jīva and the Supreme Self
in that part of the Upanishad which describes the creation (of the universe), *i.e.*, in the ritual portion (*Karmakāṇḍa*) of the Vedas. The texts of the *Karmakāṇḍa*, referred to here, describe the Supreme *Purushā* who had multiple desire, in such words as, "desirous of this," "desirous of that," "He, the Highest, supported the heaven and the earth," etc. This being the case, how is it possible, when there is a conflict between the knowledge portion and the ritual portion of the Vedas, to conclude that the unity underlying the meaning of the knowledge portion (of the Vedas) is alone reasonable and accurate?

(Reply)—Our reply is as follows:—The separate-ness (of *Jīva* and *Paramātman*) described in the *Karmakāṇḍa* (ritual portion of the Vedas)—anterior to such Upanishadic statements dealing with the creation of the universe as "That from which all these beings emanate," "As small sparks (come out) from fire," "The Ākāśa has evolved from that which is this Ātman," "It created heat"—is not real from the absolute standpoint.

(Objection)—What is it then?

(Reply)—It has only a secondary meaning. The separate-ness (between *Jīva* and *Paramātman* implied in these passages) is like that between the undifferentiated ether (*Mahākāśa*) and the ether enclosed in the jar (*Ghatākāśa*). This statement is made with reference to a future happening as in the case of another statement we often make, "He is cooking rice." For, the words describing separate-ness (of *Jīva* and *Paramātman*) can never reasonably uphold such separate-ness as absolutely real, as the statements regarding the separate-ness of Ātman only reiterate the multiple experiences of those beings who are still under the spell of their inborn
Avidyā or ignorance. Here in the Upanishads, the texts regarding the creation, destruction, etc., of the universe are meant only to establish the identity of Jīva and the Supreme Self, as is known from the texts, “That thou art,” “He does not know who knows I am another and he is another.” In other words, in the Upanishads the purpose of the Šruti is to establish the identity (of Jīva and Brahman). Keeping in view this identity which is going to be established later on, the (dualistic) texts only reiterate the common experience of multiplicity (due to ignorance). Therefore these (dualistic) texts are only metaphorical. Or, the Kārikā may be explained thus:—The scriptural text, “He is one and without a second,” declares the (complete) identity of Jīva and Brahman even before creation, denoted by such passages as, “He saw,” “He created fire,” etc. The culmination is, again, that identity as is known from such Šruti passages as, “That is the Reality; He is the Ātman. That thou art”. Now, if keeping in view this future identity, the separateness of Jīva and Ātman has been declared in some texts, it must have been used in a metaphorical way as is the case with the statement “He is cooking rice”.

1 He—i.e., Hiranyagarbha or the cosmic soul.

2 Undifferentiated, etc.—The difference between the Ghatākāśa and the Mahākāśa is only due to the upādhi or the limiting adjunct of the ghata or the jar. In reality it is the identical Ākāśa that is perceived in the great expanse of the ether, as well as in the jar. Similarly, the Jīva is thought of as different from the Ātman when the former is limited by the upādhis of Antahkaraṇa and body.

3 Future, etc.—The Vedas make the statement regarding the separateness of Jīva and Brahman keeping in view the experience of multiplicity by the ignorant people. The idea of past, present and future is formed only in the realm of ignorance. When the grain (i.e., the uncooked rice) is boiled, people say that the rice
(cooked rice) is boiled. This sort of statement is common parlance. Here the present tense is used keeping in view a future happening. Similarly the scriptures speak of duality before creation with a view to indicating the future state of Knowledge when multiplicity is known to be unreal.

4 Inborn—It is because no cause can be traced of Avidyâ.

5 Here, etc.—The aim of the dualistic statements of the Śruti is to establish ultimately the identity of Jīva and Brahman. The Upanishads accept the empirical view of the world as it appears and explain it by saying that Brahman who is both the material and efficient cause of the universe, created the world with all its beings and then entered into all as the living Self. This explanation establishes the unity of Brahman and Jīva, the apparent difference being ascribed to ignorance. The import of the Śruti is this: The non-dual Brahman alone exists. He is birthless, causeless and changeless. If one sees multiplicity that is also Brahman. The experience of multiplicity in the non-dual Brahman is due to Avidyā.

6 Common, etc.—This is due to ignorance.

त्र्योहविस्तुटिक्ष्णाचै: सृष्टियों चोदितान्यथा ।
उपायः सोऽवत्ताराय नास्ति भेदः कथंचन || १५ ||

15. (The scriptural statements regarding) creation as illustrated by examples of earth, iron, sparks, etc., or otherwise, (only) serve the purpose of (ultimately) explaining the unity (of Jīva and Brahman). (Really speaking) multiplicity does not exist in any manner.

ŚANKARA’S COMMENTARY

(Objection)—Before creation all this might have been unborn, one and non-dual; but after creation, all this evolved world and the embodied beings (Jīvas) denote multiplicity.

(Reply)—No, it cannot be so. For, the scriptural passages dealing with creation have another meaning. This difficulty raised here has already been solved by
the statements that the aggregates (entities) of body, etc., like dream-objects, are produced through illusion of the subject (Ātman) and that creation and the differences of the Jīvas are like the creation and the differences of the Ghatākāsas, i.e., the bits of Ākāśa enclosed in different jars. The scriptural statements dealing with creation and differences (of the created beings), have again been referred to here in order to show that such statements regarding creation have the purpose of determining the unity of Jīva and Brahman. The (theory of) creation has been described in the scripture through the illustrations of earth, iron, sparks, etc., or otherwise; but all these modes of creation are meant for enlightening our intellect so that it may comprehend the identity of Jīva and Brahman. It is just like the story of the organs of speech (vāk), etc., being smitten with evil by the Asuras (demons) as described in the chapter on Prāṇa (vital breath), where the real purpose of the Šruti is to demonstrate the special importance of Prāṇa.

(Objection)—We do not accept this meaning as indicated.

(Reply)—Your contention is not correct. For this story about Prāṇa, etc., has been differently narrated in different recensions of the Vedas. If the story of Prāṇa were literally true, there should have been one version only in all recensions. Different versions of contradictory nature would not have been narrated. But we do come across such different versions in the Vedas. Therefore the scriptural passages recording stories of Prāṇa are not meant to serve any purpose of their own, i.e., they should not be taken literally. The scriptural statements regarding creation should also be understood in a similar manner.
(Objection)—There have been different creations in different cycles. Therefore, the scriptural statements regarding creations (of the universe) and stories (of Prāṇa) are different as they refer to the creations in different cycles.

(Reply)—This contention is not valid. For, they (the illustrations of earth, iron, etc., as well as the stories of Prāṇa) serve no other useful purpose than clearing our intellect as stated above. No one can imagine any other utility of the scriptural statements regarding creation and Prāṇa.

(Objection)—We⁹ contend that these are for the purpose of meditation so that one may ultimately attain to that end.

(Reply)—This is not correct either; for no one desires to attain his identity with the dispute (in the case of the Prāṇa narrative), or with the creation or destruction (in the case of the scriptural statements regarding creation, etc.). Therefore we have reasonably to conclude that the scriptural statements regarding creation, etc., are for the purpose of helping the mind to realise the oneness of Ātman, and for no other purpose whatsoever. Therefore, no multiplicity is brought about by creation, etc.

¹ Before, etc.—There are definite Scriptural statements regarding creation. These statements are literally true. Therefore multiplicity caused by creation is also true.

² That, etc.—In Kārikās 3 and 10 (Chapter III), it has been established that the perception of ego and non-ego as separate from Brahman is due to ignorance.

³ Scriptural, etc.—It has been explained in the previous text that the Scriptural statements regarding creation, etc., are for the purpose of explaining the illusory nature of the universe to those who take it as real. But the purpose of this Kārikā is to enable us to understand the identity of Jīva and Brahman.
4 The creation, etc.—The meaning is that we should not take these Scriptural statements in the literal sense but must get at their underlying significance.

5 Story, etc.—The reference is to the second part of the first chapter of the Chhāndogya Upanishad. This story cannot be accepted in a literal sense as the organs of speech, etc., being themselves unconscious, cannot quarrel with one another. The significance of the story is to demonstrate the superiority of Prāṇa over other Indriyas (organs). The story referred to here is as follows: The Devas and Asuras, both of the race of Prajāpati, fought with one another. The Devas (Gods) and the Asuras (Demons) are explained as good and evil inclinations of man. The Devas took the Udgīta, thinking that they would be able to vanquish the Asuras with it. The Udgīta stands for the sacrificial act to be performed by the Udgātri, the Sāmaveda priest, with the Udgīta hymns. They meditated on the Udgīta as the breath in the nostril, but the Asuras smote the breath with evil. Then they meditated on Udgīta as the speech, the eye, the ear, the mind; but all these sense organs were smitten with evil by the Asuras. Then they meditated on Udgīta as Prāṇa (vital breath) and the Asuras failed to smite it with evil. Therefore Prāṇa is superior to all sense-organs.

6 We, etc.—We do not accept your explanation, for, the organs of speech, etc., have been designated as gods. Therefore they cannot be insentient matter.

7 For, etc.—This story about Prāṇa has been differently stated in different Upanishads. This cannot happen if the story is to be accepted as literally true.

8 Scriptural, etc.—The story regarding creation, as in the case of Prāṇa, has been differently stated in different parts of the Upanishads. In some places we read that the Ākāśa was first evolved; again we find that the fire was first evolved and still in another place it is mentioned that Prāṇa was first evolved. Therefore, on account of the contradictory natures of these stories they should not be taken as true. They serve some other purpose, viz., the establishment of the absence of variety, or the oneness of Ātman (Brahman).

9 We contend, etc.—It is said in the Śruti that the worshipper ultimately realises the oneness of Ātman.
16. There are three stages of life corresponding to three,—the lower, the middle and the high—powers of comprehension. The Scripture, out of compassion, has taught this devotion (or discipline) for the benefit of those (who are not yet enlightened).

ŚANKARA’S COMMENTARY

(Objection)—If according to such Śruti passages as “Ātman is one and without a second”, etc., the Ātman alone, the one, the eternally pure,illumined and free, is the highest and the ultimate Reality and all else is unreal, what then is the purpose of the devotion and spiritual practices implied in such Śruti passages as “Oh dear, Ātman alone is to be seen”, “The Ātman who is free from...”, “He desired”, “It should be worshipped as Ātman”, etc.? Further, what is the utility of Karma (Vedic works) like Agnihotra, etc.?

(Reply)—Yes, listen to the reasons. Āśrama signifies those who are competent to follow the disciplines of life as prescribed for the different stages. The word (in the text) also includes those who belong to the (different) castes and therefore who observe the rites (prescribed for those castes). The application of the word “Āśrama” implies that these castes are also three in number. How? It is because they are endowed with three kinds of intellect, viz., low, middle and high. This discipline as well as the (various) Karmas (works) are prescribed for the Āśramis of low and average intellect, by the Śruti, out of compassion, so that they also, following the correct disciplines, may attain to the superior knowledge.
That this discipline is not for those who possess the right understanding, i.e., who are already endowed with the Knowledge of Ātman which is one and without a second, is supported by such Śruti passages as "That which cannot be known by the mind, but by which, they say, the mind is able to think, that alone know to be Brahman, and not that which people here adore", "That thou art", "All this is verily Ātman", etc.

In the previous Kārikās it has been proved that the Scriptural statements regarding creation, etc., do not conflict with the non-dual Ātman. This Kārikā states that the prescription of various disciplines associated with different Varṇas and Āśramas also does not contradict the view of the non-dual Ātman. The statements regarding creation, etc., as well as the various spiritual disciplines are only meant for the unenlightened in order to assist them to understand the oneness of Ātman.

1 Śruti passages—It is because all these Śruti passages require, on the part of the students, either meditation, or spiritual disciplines or devotion. This has no meaning if the non-dual Ātman alone is the Reality.

2 Stages—These are the orders of Brahmacharya, Gārhasṭhya, Vānaprastha and Sanyāsa.

3 Castes—The word Varṇa, here, implies the three castes, viz., the Brahmaṇa, Kṣatriya and Vaśya.

4 Low—Those who look upon the phenomenal universe (the Kārya Brahmaṇ) as real, are said to possess low intellect.

5 Middle—Those who worship the Kāraṇa Brahmaṇ, that is the Brahman as the cause of the universe, are said to possess mediocre intellect, because they still live on the causal plane.

6 High—Those who have realised the non-dual (Advaita) Ātman are said to possess superior power of understanding.

7 That, etc.—As the possessor of the knowledge of non-dual Ātman is free from all distinction of Āśrama and Varṇa, it is therefore not necessary for him to perform any Vedic work or practise any spiritual discipline.

The meaning of the Kārikā is this: The Āśramas and the Varṇas described in the Śruti, and the different functions ascribed to them
have only a disciplinary value; the main purpose is to train the student to understand the unity of Jīva and Brahmān.

śāścīdāntabhavasya dveśācente nityātāḥ dharmān
darśppar bhrūḥṇante tāreyam na bhrūḥṇante || 17 ||

17. The dualists obstinately cling to the conclusions arrived at by their own enquiries (as being the truth). So they contradict one another; whereas the Advaitin finds no conflict with them.

Śankara’s Commentary

The knowledge of the non-dual Self is established by both Scriptures and reasoning. Therefore, it is alone the perfect knowledge. Other views, on account of their being devoid of the bases of Scriptures and reasoning, lead to false systems. The views of the dualists are false on account of this additional reason, that they are the fruitful sources of the vices of attachment and hatred, etc. How is this? The dualists following the views of Kapila, Kanāda, Buddha and Jīna, etc., hold firmly to the conclusions as outlined and formulated by their respective schools. They\(^1\) think that the view they hold is alone the ultimate Reality, whereas other views are not so. Therefore they become attached to their own views and hate others whom they consider to be opposed to them. Thus being overcome with attachment and hatred, they contradict one another, the reason being the adherence to their own convictions as the only truth. But our view, viz., the unity of Ātman, based upon the identity of all, supported by the Vedas, does not conflict with others who find contradictions among themselves,—as\(^2\) one’s limbs such as hands, feet, etc., do not conflict with one another. Hence the purport of the Śruti is
that the knowledge of the oneness of Ātman, as it is free from the blemish of attachment and aversion, is the true knowledge.

This Karikā proves the superiority of the Advaita knowledge over other views as it does not contradict the Scriptural statements regarding creation and exercises (Upāsana), and also because it does not clash with other theories. Advaita alone harmonises all other doctrines and theories. It alone gives the rationale of other relative views regarding Truth.

1 They, etc.—It is because the dualists take the relative truth to be the ultimate view of Reality.

2 As, etc.—If in the course of physical movements, the hands or feet strike any part of the body, the body does not feel irritated as the body knows the limbs to be its own integral parts. Similarly the non-dualist, on account of his knowledge of identity with all created beings and thoughts, does not feel angered at the hostility of his opponents, as he knows his so-called opponents to be his own self. The Knower of Brahman realises the entire world as the projection of his thought (Kalpana). The thoughts are also identical with Brahman as the various dream-objects are identical with the mind. Therefore the theories of others are not in conflict with non-duality because they are also identical with Brahman. Comp. the Scriptural passage, “All this is verily Brahman.”

अद्वैतं परमाथो हि द्वैतं तत्प्रेतं उच्यते ।
तेषाःसमाब्यथा द्वैतं तेनायं न विरुध्यते ॥ १८ ॥

18. As non-duality is the ultimate Reality, therefore duality is said to be its effect (Kārya or Bheda). The dualists perceive duality either way (i.e., both in the Absolute and in the phenomena). Therefore the non-dual position does not conflict with the dualist’s position.

SANKARA’S COMMENTARY

How is it that the non-dualist does not conflict with the dualist? The reason is thus stated:—As¹ non-
duality is the ultimate Reality, therefore duality or multiplicity is only its effect. The Scriptural passages such as, "He is one and without a second", "He created fire", etc., support this view. It is further borne out by reason as duality is not perceived in the states of swoon, deep sleep or trance (samaadhi), in the absence of the activity of the mind. Therefore duality is said to be the effect of non-duality. But the dualists perceive duality alone either way, that is, from both the absolute and the relative standpoints. As duality is perceived only by the deluded and non-duality by us who are enlightened, therefore our view does not clash with their views. For, the Scripture also says, "Indra (the Supreme Lord) created all these diverse forms through Maya", "There exists nothing like duality". It is like the case of a man on a spirited elephant, who knows that none can oppose him, but who yet does not drive his beast upon a lunatic who though standing on the ground, shouts at the former, "I am also on an elephant, drive your beast on me". Therefore from the standpoint of Reality, the Knower of Brahman is the very self of (even) the dualists. Hence, our, viz., the non-dualistic view does not clash with other views.

It may be asked in view of the differences between the dualistic and the non-dualistic views, how it can be said that the latter does not find any contradiction with the former. The text of the Karika gives the reply. It says that the so-called duality does not exist at all. Whatever exists is non-dual Brahman alone. Therefore the non-dualist cannot quarrel with a thing which is ultimately non-existent.

1 As, etc.—We learn from Scriptural evidence that duality is the effect of the non-dual unity. The effect, relatively speaking, is other than the cause, otherwise, one cannot make a distinction between the cause and the effect. Again the Sruti says that all effects consisting of names are mere figures of speech, like the effects
of clay, and therefore unreal. The cause, like the clay, alone is real. Therefore effects, being unreal, cannot contradict the cause. Hence non-duality does not clash with duality. Here the word "Bheda," implying effect is not used in the Sāṃkhya sense of modification.

2 It is, etc.—One perceives duality on account of the activity of the mind. When the mind is at rest, duality is not perceived as in the case of deep sleep, swoon, or Samādhi. Therefore duality is the effect. The non-dualist admits the fact of duality during the state of ignorance. But he denies its reality. Therefore from the standpoint of Reality, non-duality does not contradict duality, as the latter is really non-existent.

3 Either way—That is to say, the dualist holds duality both as the highest Reality and as the relative Reality.

4 Enlightened—It is because our view is supported both by Scripture and reason.

5 It is, etc.—The dualist is self-deluded like the madman who, though standing on the earth, thinks that he is really on an elephant. The person who is driving the elephant does not listen to the foolish cry of the lunatic. Similarly the dualist possessed of a partial view of the truth, thinks of himself as having realised the ultimate Truth, and throws his challenge to the non-dualist, calling upon him to refute his position. But the non-dualist, secure in his position, laughs at this challenge and he bears no ill-will against the dualist as he is the very self of the dualist, his so-called opponent.

19. This unborn (changeless, non-dual Brahman) appears to undergo modification only on account of Māyā (illusion) and not otherwise. For, if this modification were real, the Immortal (Brahman) would become mortal.

ŚANKARA’S COMMENTARY

If duality¹ were the effect of non-duality, then it could be contended that duality also, like the Advaita,
is the Supreme Reality. In order to remove this doubt which may crop up in the minds of some, it is said that non-duality which is the Supreme Reality appears manifold through Māyā, like the one moon appearing as many to one with defective eye-sight and the rope appearing (to the deluded) as the snake, the water-line, etc. This manifold is not real, for Ātman is without any part. An object endowed with parts may be said to undergo modification by a change of its parts, as clay undergoes differentiation into pots, etc. Therefore the purport is that the changeless (unborn) Ātman which is without parts cannot, in any manner, admit of distinction excepting through Māyā or the illusion of the perceiver. If the appearance of manifoldness were real, then the Ātman, the ever-unborn and non-dual, which is, by its very nature, immortal would become mortal as though fire would become cold (which is an absurdity). The reversal of one’s own nature is not desired by any—as it is opposed to all means of proofs. Therefore the Reality—which is Ātman—changeless and unborn, appears to undergo a modification only through Māyā. Hence it follows that duality is not the ultimate Reality.

1 Duality, etc.—For, the effect always partakes of the nature of the cause.

2 Māyā—Māyā explains the appearance of the manifold consistently; not the Parināmavāda (or the theory of actual transformation) adumbrated by the Sāmkhyas.

3 If, etc.—For, by changing into the universe, the non-dual Ātman which is admitted to be immortal, would undergo destruction and become mortal. A thing cannot retain its own nature while undergoing a change.

4 The reversal, etc.—One of the tests of Reality is that it never admits of any change of its innate nature. The non-dual Ātman being the Reality, can never really change into the dual universe.
Therefore the act of creation or modification is an illusion. Hegel’s theory of logical necessity or Bradley’s Absolute somehow becoming the phenomena cannot be borne out by reason.

अजात्सैैह भावस्य जातिमिल्ल्छाति वादिनः ||
अजातो ह्वामृतो भावो मर्थेतां कथमेष्यति || २० ||

20. The disputants (i.e., the dualists) contend that the ever-unborn (changeless) entity (Ātman) undergoes a change. How could an entity which is changeless and immortal partake of the nature of the mortal?

ŚANKARA’S COMMENTARY

Some interpreters of the Upanishads, who¹ are garrulous and who put on the airs of the Knowers of Brahman, admit that the Reality—the Ātman—which is by nature ever-unborn (changeless) and immortal, really passes² into birth (i.e., becomes the universe). If,³ according to them, the Ātman really passes into birth it must undergo destruction. But,⁴ how is it possible for the Ātman which is, by its very nature, ever-unborn (changeless) and immortal to become mortal, i.e., to be subject to destruction? It can never become mortal which is contrary to its very nature.

¹ Who, etc.—i.e., who, in reality, do not know anything about Brahman.

² Passes, etc.—That is, it creates itself into the manifold universe.

³ If, etc.—For, destruction is the inevitable consequence of all objects that are born.

⁴ But, etc.—Birth means change of nature. An entity cannot be changeless while giving birth to other objects. Hence the theory that Ātman somehow changes into the universe is fallacious.
21. The immortal cannot become mortal, nor can
the mortal ever become immortal. For, it is never possible
for a thing to change its nature.

SANKARA'S COMMENTARY

As in common experience the immortal never be-
comes mortal, nor the mortal ever becomes immortal;
therefore it is, in no way, possible for a thing to reverse
its nature, i.e., to become otherwise than what it is.
Fire can never change its character of being hot.

22. How can he, who believes that the naturally
immortal entity becomes mortal, maintain that the
Immortal, after passing through change, retains its change-
less nature?

SANKARA'S COMMENTARY

The disputant who maintains that the naturally
immortal entity becomes mortal, i.e., really passes into
birth, makes\(^1\) the futile proposition that that entity before
creation is by its very nature, immortal. How can he
assert that the entity is of immortal nature if it be admitted
that it passes\(^2\) into birth? That is to say, how can the
immortal retain its immortal nature of changelessness if
it should undergo a change? It cannot, by any means, be
so. Those\(^3\) who hold that the \textit{Atman} passes into birth
(i.e., undergoes a change), cannot speak of the \textit{Atman} as
ever birthless. Everything, according to them, must be
mortal. Hence\(^4\) there cannot be a state called liberation.
It may be contended that Brahman, as the cause, is immortal before creation. But as effect, subsequent to the creation, it becomes mortal. Therefore there is no contradiction in associating with Brahman both immortal and mortal aspects which apply to its two states. This Kārikā refutes this contention.

1 *Makes, etc.*—For, according to these disputes, the cause (*i.e.*, Brahman), even before creation must contain within it the possibility of change; otherwise it cannot undergo a change. If this were admitted then the cause can no longer be called immortal.

2 *Passes, etc.*—If an entity undergoes a change, that shows its impermanent characteristic inasmuch as it admits of the destruction of its inherent nature.

3 *Those, etc.*—The so-called Absolute of the dualists is also a mortal entity. For, nothing that passes through birth, can be immortal.

4 *Hence, etc.*—That is to say, Mukti or liberation in the sense of an immutable and permanent condition becomes an absurdity.

मूतोऽभूतोऽ वाक्पि सुज्यमाने समा श्रुति: ।
निश्चितं युक्तियुक्तं च यतःद्ववति नेतरस् ॥ २३ ॥

23. The passing into birth may be real or illusory. Both these views are equally mentioned in the Śrutis. That which is supported by Śrutis and corroborated by reason, is alone true and not the other.

**Śankara's Commentary**

(Objection)—Those¹ who do not admit the change or the passing into birth of Brahman, cannot justify the Scriptural passages which support creation.

(Reply)—Yes, we also admit the existence of Scriptural texts supporting creation as actual, but such texts serve other purposes. Though the question has already been disposed of, the contention is here again made and refuted in order to allay all doubts regarding the applicability or otherwise of the Scriptural texts
to the subject-matter\(^2\) that is going to be dealt with. The Scriptural text regarding creation is the same, whether the creation of things is taken in the real sense or as a mere illusion produced by the juggler.

(Objection)—If words admit of metaphorical and direct meanings, it is reasonable to understand the world according to their direct meaning.

(Reply)—We do not admit it. For,\(^3\) creation, in any sense other than illusion, is unknown to us, and further, no purpose is served by admitting (the act of) creation. All\(^4\) creation, whether metaphorical or actual, refers to the apparent creation caused by Avidyā but not to any creation from the standpoint of Reality. For the Scripture\(^*\) says, “Though existing both within and without, he (the Ātman) is (really) changeless”. Therefore we have stated in the foregoing part of this work only what is supported by reason and determined by the Śruti such words as, “He is one and without a second and is free from birth and death”. That alone is the true import of the Scripture and not anything else.

1 Those, etc.—There are some Scriptural passages which state that the Ātman brings about the creation by following the law of causality.

2 Subject-matter—The purport of the Śruti is not to establish any act of creation, whether actual or illusory, but to prove the Ajāti or eternal changelessness of Brahman.

3 For, etc.—According to the Advaita philosophy, all creation, whether actual or metaphorical (secondary) whether in dream or in the waking state, is equally illusory from the standpoint of Reality. Further, if creation be admitted as real, no purpose whatsoever is served by creation. It does not help anyone to attain to liberation.

4 All, etc.—The creation of objects in dream is called metaphorical or secondary in comparison with the creation of objects such as pot, etc., in the waking state. As the dream objects become
unreal in the waking state, similarly the objects perceived in the waking state are known to be unreal when one attains to the knowledge of Ātman. Therefore from the standpoint of Ātman, all objects, perceived in dream or the waking state, are equally unreal.

نةה नानेति चास्स्रायार्दिन्द्रोमायाभिनिखि ।
अजायमानो बहुधा माया जायते तु सः || २४ ||

24. From such Scriptural passages as, “There is no multiplicity in Ātman”, “Indra through Māyā”, we know that the Ātman, though ever unborn, verily appears to have become many (only) through Māyā.

ŚANKARA’S COMMENTARY

It may be asked how the changelessness (Ajāti) of Ātman is the final conclusion of the Śruti. In reply it is said that if creation were real, then the existence of the variety of objects would be absolutely real. Consequently there ought not to be Scriptural texts implying their unreality. But there are such Scriptural texts as, “In this (Ātman) there is no multiplicity,” etc., which negate the existence of duality. Therefore creation (imaginary) has been imagined in order to help the understanding of the non-duality of Ātman. It¹ is like the story of Prāṇa. And this is further borne out by the use of the word, “Māyā,” denoting unreality (in connection with creation) in such Scriptural texts as “Indra³ through Māyā assumed diverse forms”.

(Objection)—The word denotes knowledge (Prajñā).

(Reply)—It is true, but sense-knowledge is illusory. The word³ “Māyā” is used to denote that (sense-) knowledge. Hence there is no blemish (in such use of the word). The word “Māyābhīḥ” (through Māyā) in the Scriptural text means through sense-knowledge, which
is illusory. For, the Scripture again says, “Though unborn he appears to be born in many ways.” Therefore Ātman passes into birth through Māyā alone. The word “Tu” (“verily”) in the text (of the Kārikā) denotes certainty, that is to say, it indicates that creation is possible only through Māyā or illusion and not in any real sense. For, birthlessness and birth in various forms cannot be predicated of the same object, as fire cannot be both hot and cold. Further, from such Śruti passages as “How can there be any delusion and any grief for him who sees unity,” etc., we know that the knowledge of the unity of Ātman is alone the conclusion of Śruti on account of the (good) result it brings to the knower. Again, the perception of differentiation implied by creation has been condemned in such Śruti passages as, “He goes from death to death (who sees here many)”.

1 It is, etc.—As the Śruti described the disputes of Prāna and the sense-organs in order to prove the superiority of the vital breath (Mukhya Prāna), so also creation has been described in order to help the understanding of the student to grasp the unity of Ātman. (See Kārikā 3-15).

2 Indra—The word is used here in the sense of the Supreme Lord.

3 The word, etc.—The word “Māyā” is sometimes used to denote empirical knowledge or the knowledge derived by the contact of the sense-organs with their objects. This knowledge does not indicate the Highest Consciousness or the knowledge of Reality. Hence creation through Māyā is necessarily illusory.

4 It, etc.—If one believes in creation then the only plausible explanation is that of the Vivartavāda and not any other theory such as Parināmavāda.
25. Again, by the negation of creation (Sambhūti) the passing into birth is refuted. Causality (in respect of Ātman) is denied by such a statement as, "who can cause it to pass into birth?"

ŚANKARA’S COMMENTARY

By the condemnation of Sambhūti¹ (i.e., Hiranya-garbha) as something fit to be meditated upon, in such Śruti² passage as, "They enter into blind darkness who worship Sambhūti," the whole³ creation (evolution) is negativized. For, if Sambhūti were absolutely real, then its condemnation, in such manner, would not be reasonable.

(Objection)—The⁴ condemnation of Sambhūti is meant here for co-ordinating Sambhūti with Vināśa⁵ as is the case with the Śruti passage,⁶ "They enter into blind darkness who worship Avidyā".

(Reply)—Yes, it is indeed true that the condemnation of the exclusive worship of Sambhūti is made for the purpose of co-ordinating the meditation regarding Sambhūti with the Karma (ritual) known as Vināśa. Still it should not be forgotten that as the purpose of the Karma known as Vināśa is to transcend death,—whose nature is the desire consequent upon the inborn ignorance of man—so also the aim⁷ of the co-ordination of the meditation on Devatā (i.e., Sambhūti or Hiranya-garbha) with the Karma (called Vināśa) undertaken for the purpose of the purification of the mind of man, is to transcend death,—which⁸ is of the nature of the attachment to ritual and its results characterised by the dual hankering after the end and the means. For, thus alone man becomes free from death which is of the nature of impurity and is characterised by the dual impulse of end and means. Therefore the co-ordination of the
meditation of Devātā and of Karma—which is Avidyā—leads to freedom from death. Thus⁹ the realisation of Vidyā (the highest knowledge), characterised by the identity of the Supreme Self and Jīva, is inevitable¹⁰ for one who has transcended death,—of the form of Avidyā and characterised by the dual impulses (of the means and the end),—and who is established in renunciation and also devoted to the meaning of the import of the Upanishad. It is therefore said thus¹¹: Brahmavidyā (i.e., the knowledge of Brahman—which is the means for the attainment of Immortality and which is (from the relative standpoint) subsequent to the state of the antecedent Avidyā (ignorance) being related to the same person (who is still in the state of ignorance), is said to be co-ordinated with Avidyā. Hence the negation of Sambhūti is for the purpose of condemnation as it serves a purpose other¹² than the knowledge of Brahman which (alone) is the means to the attainment of Immortality. Though it serves the purpose of removing impurity yet the devotion to Sambhūti does not enable one to realise (directly) immortality. (Therefore the condemnation of Sambhūti is reasonable.) Hence, Sambhūti, being thus negatived, it can be said to have only a relative existence. Having regard to the unity of Ātman, the ultimate Reality, creation (symbolised by Hiranyagarbha) which is known as immortal¹³ (only from the relative standpoint) is negated. Such¹⁴ being the case, who can bring into being the Jīva who is seen as created only through illusion (Māyā) and who exists only while ignorance (Avidyā) lasts? This Jīva reverts to its original nature (of Brahma) with the disappearance of Avidyā. For, no one can verily bring into being the snake (falsely) superimposed upon the rope through Avidyā and which disappears
when one knows (the true nature of the rope). Therefore no one can produce or create the Jīva. The words "Ko nu" ("who can?") in the text, being in the form of interrogation refute the idea of causality. The purport of the Kārikā is that there can be no cause for a thing which is seen to be born only through ignorance and which disappears with the destruction of the said ignorance. The Śruti also says, "This Ātman is not born from any cause nor is anything born from it."

2 Sambhūti—The word "Bhūti" means "Aiśvarya" (ईश्वर्य) i.e., power, and the word Sambhūti indicates one who possesses all powers. It is a deity known as Hiranyagarbha (The Golden Germ) who is the first of all the evolved effects and from whom, as the matrix, the whole evolution proceeds. It is described in the Vedāntic texts as the summation of all subtle bodies.

Śruti passage—This is a quotation from the Iṣa-Upanishad (12). This Kārikā is based on this text of the Upanishad.

3 Whole, etc.—By the condemnation of Hiranyagarbha from whom the entire creation is said to proceed, the whole of the subsequent effects is negated. Therefore the entire effect which is seen in the form of the manifold, is unreal.

4 The, etc.—The reference is to the text of the Iṣa-Upanishad (14) which runs thus: "Those who worship the unmanifested Prakṛiti and Hiranyagarbha (Destruction, Vināśa) together, get over death through the worship of Hiranyagarbha and attain immortality through the worship of Prakṛiti." The contention of the opponent is this: The condemnation of Sambhūti is not for the purpose of proving its unreality. Its purpose is to combine the worship of Prakṛiti and Hiranyagarbha. The exclusive worship of Hiranyagarbha is condemned. (See Śankara’s Commentary on verse 14 of the Iṣa-Upanishad.)

5 Vināśa—The word ‘Vināśa’ means that object whose characteristic attribute is destruction, the abstract being here used for the concrete. Vināśa means the worship of Hiranyagarbha. The contention of the opponent is that the purpose of the condemnation of the exclusive worship of Sambhūti is to prescribe the co-ordination
of its meditation with some ritualistic worship and not to imply the unreality of Sambhūti or the first cause.

6 Śruti, etc.—The reference is to the 9th verse of the Isa-Upanishad which condemns Vidyā (the exclusive meditation on the deities) and Avidyā (the exclusive ritualistic ceremonies without any meditation) and prescribes their co-ordination.

7 Aim, etc.—The purport of the 9th verse of the Isa-Upanishad is this:—Avidyā is something other than Vidyā or knowledge; hence it is Karma: for Karma is opposed to knowledge. Those who are continuously performing Agnihotra-sacrifice, etc., alone, fall into darkness. Those who having given up Karma, are always bent upon acquiring the knowledge of the deities, fall into greater darkness. Who knows that both these should simultaneously be followed by the same person, he alone, so combining the two, gradually secures the one desirable end. That is to say, his mind is purified of all impurities. The pure mind, then, is able to grasp the meaning of the Upanishad which alone enables the student to know the ultimate Reality. The aim of such Karma as the Agnihotra-sacrifice, etc., prescribed by the Scripture, is to turn the mind of the student away from the pursuit of worldly objects, not sanctioned by the Scriptures. By the co-ordination of Karma with meditation (on the deities) the student frees himself from all impulse of desires. Even then he has not realised the Highest Truth which is possible only through Jnānam or knowledge.

8 Which is, etc.—Death means the endless cycle of birth and death which is inevitable unless one has attained to the knowledge of Brahman. The endless chain is caused by the desire for relative objects.

9 Thus, etc.—The knowledge of Brahman can never be combined with the co-ordination of Karma and Upāsanā as the latter belongs to the realm of ignorance. Brahmavidyā and ignorance are as unrelated as light and darkness.

10 Inevitable—There is no other obstacle for the realisation of the Supreme Reality when all the impurities have been removed by the practice of Karma and Upāsanā.

11 Thus, etc.—No co-ordination is possible between the knowledge of Brahman and any other relative knowledge. Still it is found that the student, at first, through a process of relative knowledge gets his mind purified and then becomes fit for Brahma-Jnānam.
Thus from a relative standpoint it is seen that the knowledge of Brahman arises subsequent to the relative knowledge. Really speaking, the knowledge of Self is ever present and ignorance is non-existent. As from the relative standpoint it is seen that an ignorant person gradually attains to the highest knowledge, therefore from that standpoint Vidyā and Avidyā are said to be related to the same person.

18 Other than, etc.—That is to say, the purpose of the meditation on Sambhāti is the purification of the mind. As this is not the same as the knowledge of Brahman, therefore, Sambhāti is condemned.

18 Immortal—In comparison with the phenomenal Jīva, Sambhāti, or Hiranyagarbha is said to be immortal, as the cosmic soul exists even after the death of the Jīva. But from the standpoint of Brahman, Hiranyagarbha is also mortal and impermanent. Therefore it is condemned.

14 Such, etc.—There is no act of creation from the standpoint of Reality, because the very idea of creation is due to ignorance. Creation is but an idea of the mind and hence negated.

15 This, etc.—i.e., the idea of causality cannot apply to Brahman. It is only an explanation of things in the phenomenal world due to the ignorance of the real nature of Brahman.

स एष नेति नेतीति व्यास्क्यातं निहुते यतः ।
सर्वभ्रामाःभागवेन हेतुनाषजं प्रकाशते ॥ २६ ॥

26. As the Śruti passage, “It is not this, not this,” on account of the incomprehensibility of Ātman, negates all (dualistic) ideas described; (as the means for the attainment of Ātman), therefore the birthless (Ātman alone) exists (and not any duality).

ŚANKARA'S COMMENTARY

The Śruti¹ in such passage as, “This is the final instruction. It is not this, not this,” has determined the nature of Ātman by the refutation of all specific
characteristics. But knowing this Ātman to be incomprehensible the Śruti has again sought to establish the very same Ātman through other means and finally refuted what have been described (as the means for the attainment of Ātman). That is to say, the Śruti, in such passage as, "It is not this, not this," demonstrates the incomprehensibility of Ātman or in other words, refutes the idea that Ātman can be realised or understood. Those who do not understand that the means (suggested for the realisation of Ātman) have only one purpose, viz., the realisation of the end (i.e., the non-dual Ātman), make a mistake by thinking that what are suggested as the means have the same reality as the end. In order to remove this error, the Śruti negates the reality of the means by pointing out the incomprehensibility of Ātman, as its reason. Subsequently, the student knows that the means serve their purpose by pointing only to the end and the end itself is always one and changeless. To such a student the knowledge of the unborn Self which is both within and without reveals itself.

1 The Śruti—The reference is to the Brihadāranyaka Upanishad (2.3.1) which begins with the statement: "There are two forms of Brahman, the material and the immaterial, the mortal and the immortal, the solid and the fluid......" The chapter ends thus: "Next follows the teaching (of Brahman) by 'No, no'; for, there is nothing else higher than this (if one says): 'It is not so'......" Those who cannot meditate on Brahman, free from all attributes, are advised to concentrate on some characteristics (of Brahman) superimposed upon Brahman for the facility of meditation. Then the students are asked to negate those attributes also, because thus alone can they realise the undifferentiated Brahman which alone is the Supreme Reality.

2 Incomprehensible—It is because the knowledge of the Self is extremely subtle.
**MĀNDŪKYOPANISHAD**

3 Atman, etc.—That is to say, the Atman is never the effect of any thought or words. It is not an object of meditation or speech. For it is our very self. Thus the Shruti advises the students to dissociate from Atman all words, or thoughts which were at first accepted as means for its realisation. That which is thought by the mind is merely an idea. It is changeable and negatable. Hence it is not Reality. Therefore any idea associated with Atman is not the Atman itself.

4 Those, etc.—The unwaried students, unable to understand the real significance of Vedānta, make the mistake of thinking that the attributes which are superimposed upon Brahman are as real as Brahman itself. That is to say, they think that these attributes have an independent existence.

5 Reality—i.e., a reality independent of Brahman.

6 By pointing out—This is the Advaitic method of reasoning. Brahman or Atman, being beyond time, space and causality, is ever incomprehensible through any empirical means. It is the eternal subject having no object through which one can comprehend it. This incomprehensibility of Atman is the very reason for refuting any attribute that may be otherwise associated with it. If Atman can be known by any positive attribute, it no longer remains incomprehensible. It becomes an object of our thought like any other perceived object. Such Atman can never be the changeless Absolute.

7 Subsequently, etc.—The discriminating student, through his superior power of reasoning, refutes all attributes superimposed upon Atman. He realises that these attributes have no independent reality. Then he understands that all attributes are the same as the non-dual Brahman, as one who knows the true nature of the rope realises that what he formerly thought of as the snake is nothing but the rope. That which was superimposed upon the rope is identical with the substratum. Only the idea of the existence of the snake apart from the rope is illusion. Similarly all attributes of Atman, such as materiality or immateriality, etc., are, in reality, identical with Atman. To concede any separate existence to the attributes independent of Atman is illusion. Atman, the non-dual, changeless and causeless Reality, alone exists. All that exists is Atman. Even that which is imagined as means for the realisation of Atman is not separate from Atman.
8 Itself—i.e., the final revelation of Ātman does not depend upon Śruti or anything else. A knower of Ātman realises that Ātman always exists and is self-luminous; and needs no external means to illumine it.

सतो हि मायये जन्म युज्यते न तु तत्तवः ||
तत्त्वतो जायते यथं जातं तस्य हि जायते || २७ ||

* 27. That which is ever-existent appears to pass into birth through illusion (Māyā) and not from the standpoint of Reality. He who thinks that this passing into birth is real asserts, as a matter of fact, that what is born is born again (and so on without end).

ŚANKARA’S COMMENTARY

Thus hundreds of Scriptural passages conclude that the essence which is the non-dual and birthless Self, existing both within and without, is the only Reality, and that nothing else, besides the Self, exists. Now, in order to determine this very Reality through reason, again it is stated:—

(Objection)—It may also be true that if Reality be incomprehensible then the knowledge of Self would be unreal.

(Reply)—No, this cannot be, for¹ the effect is comprehended. As the effects, that is to say creation (of new things), come from a really existent magician through Māyā (magic), so also the comprehension of the effects, in the form of the creation of the universe, leads us to infer the existence of the Ātman, the Supreme Reality, who, like the magician, is, as it were, the substratum of the illusion which is seen in the form of the creation of the universe. For, the creation of the universe is possible only with a Reality, i.e., an existing cause, like the birth
of the effects, such as the elephant, etc., conjured up through illusion (by an existing magician); and this creation is never possible with a non-existing cause. It is not, however, possible for the unborn Ātman to really pass into birth. Or,² the first line of the text may be explained in another manner. As a really existing entity, such as the rope, etc., passes into such effects as the snake, etc., only through Māyā and not in reality, similarly, the real and the incomprehensible Ātman is seen to pass into birth, in the form of the universe, like the rope becoming the snake, only through illusion. The birthless Ātman cannot pass into birth from the standpoint of Reality. But the disputant who holds that the unborn Ātman, the Supreme Reality, is really born in the form of the universe, cannot assert that the unborn is born, as this implies a contradiction.³ In that case he must admit that, in fact, what is (already) born, again passes into birth. If, thus, birth is predicated of that which is already born, then the disputant is faced with what is known in logic as regressus ad infinitum. Therefore it is established that the Essence which is Ātman is ever unborn and non-dual.

It has already been established on Scriptural evidence that the Ātman which is the Supreme Reality is birthless and non-dual. All duality is mere imagination due to ignorance and hence unreal. This is now established independently by reason. Śankara always maintains a dual aspect. For those who believe in Scripture, Śankara quotes the Scripture to establish his point. Again for those who do not believe in the Vedas as the supreme authority but who depend upon reason alone, Śankara gives rational proof of his conclusion.

¹ For, etc.—The opponent believes in causality but denies Ātman. This is illogical. If one admits the creation of the universe then one must believe in its cause also. Every effect presupposes a cause. Even every illusion must have a substratum. A positive effect
cannot be produced from a non-existing cause. The position of the \textit{Advaitin} is this: If you believe in the universe as a created entity, you must admit its cause, namely, Brahman. The positive effect of the universe cannot come from a non-existing cause. Brahman or \textit{Atman}, however, does not really create the universe nor transform itself into the universe, as the rope does not really create the snake nor does it become the snake. The appearance of creation is due to ignorance. Therefore the theory of \textit{Māyā} or \textit{vivarta} which posits a real \textit{Atman} is the best explanation of the universe when such universe is recognised as a fact.

\textit{2 Or, etc.}—The first interpretation of the first line points to \textit{Atman} as the instrumental cause (\textit{Nimitta Kārāṇa}) of the universe, though the very perception of the creation is due to illusion. This interpretation stresses the \textit{Reality} of \textit{Atman}. The second interpretation stresses on the fact that the idea of the unborn \textit{Atman} passing into birth is due to ignorance. The process of creation and creation itself are illusory.

\textit{3 Contradiction}—It is because the unborn cannot give birth to a new thing. If this causality be admitted then the so-called unborn cause must itself come from another cause and so on \textit{ad infinitum}. Thus we never come across an \textit{unborn} cause. There will be thus an endless past in the case of causes and an equally endless future in the case of effects. If the cause produces an effect that effect, in its turn, must produce new effect and so on \textit{ad infinitum} (Hegel’s position). Thus there can be no \textit{mukti} or liberation which means freedom from the causal chain.

\begin{verse}
असनो मायया जनम तत्वतो नैव युज्यते \\
बन्ध्यापुत्रो न तत्रेन मायया वादपि जायते ॥ २८ ॥
\end{verse}

28. \textit{The unreal cannot be born either really or through Māyā. For the son of a barren woman is born neither in reality nor in illusion.}

\textbf{Śankara’s Commentary}

There are those who hold that all entities are unreal, that the non-existent produces this world. But production, by the non-existent, of any thing either in
reality or in illusion is not possible. For we know nothing like it in our experience. As the son of a barren woman is not seen to be born either really or through Māyā, the theory of the non-existence of things is in truth¹ untenable.

If the ultimate Reality be non-existent, then it cannot pass into birth. Again if what we perceive be unreal, its production is likewise impossible. In either case causality is unreal. We have seen from the previous Kārikā (27) that the Reality, which is the unborn Ātman, cannot be said to pass into birth, without our being forced into an infinite regress. This Kārikā shows that production is an impossibility if the ultimate Reality be non-existent, or if the thing we perceive be unreal. So, causality or production or passing into birth is an absurdity.

¹ In truth—In case the Ātman is a Reality, the passing into birth may be explained by Māyā; but in this case even that explanation cannot hold, for there is no evidence in our actual experience to justify the presumption that either something comes out of nothing or nothing comes out of something.

29. As in dream the mind acts through Māyā presenting the appearance of duality, so also in the waking state the mind acts, through Māyā, presenting the appearance of duality.

ŚANKARA’S COMMENTARY

How is it possible for the Reality to pass into birth through Māyā? It is thus replied:—As the snake imagined in the rope, is real¹ when seen as the rope, so also the mind,² from the standpoint of the knowledge of the ultimate Reality, is seen to be identical with Ātman. This mind, in dream, appears to us as dual in the forms of the cogniser and the cognised through³
Māyā, as the snake appears to be separate from the rope through ignorance. Similarly, indeed the mind acts (in a dual form) in the waking state through Māyā. That⁴ is to say, the mind appears to act.

¹ Real, etc.—The snake is unreal when we try to see it as separated from the rope. But when the real nature of the rope is known then it is realised that the snake, which appeared, is really identical with the rope. The substratum (Adhisthāna) is the same as that which is superimposed (Āropita) upon it.

² Mind—The mind as the substratum of the dream experiences, is identical with Reality or Ātman.

³ Through Māyā—In dream we have the experience of the separate existence of the perceiver, the object of perception and the act of perceiving. But in the waking state we know these three-fold experiences to be nothing but the mind so appearing. The idea that the dream experiences are different from the mind is due to the ignorance which exists in the dream state. The knower of the real nature of the rope finds it to be identical with the snake.

⁴ That, etc.—For, in reality Brahman does not act. The action of the mind is due to Māyā. The Śruti also says that mind in reality is Brahman.

अद्वैतं च द्वयाभासं मनः स्वप्ने न संशयः ||
अद्वैतं च द्वयाभासं तथा जागृतं संशयः || ३० ||

30. There is no doubt that the mind, which is, in fact, non-dual appears as dual in dream; in like manner undoubtedly that which is non-dual, appears as dual in the waking state also.

ŚANKARA'S COMMENTARY

Really speaking, the snake is identical with the rope. In like manner, the mind which is non-dual¹ as Ātman appears undoubtedly in dual forms in dreams. Verily in dream, such objects of perception as elephants, etc., or their perceivers such as eyes,
etc., have no existence independently of consciousness (mind). Similar is the case in the waking state as well. For (consciousness) mind, which is the highest Reality, is common to both.

The opponent may contend that the previous Kārikā admits duality. This Kārikā shows that the perception of duality is due to our ignorance. The only Reality, both in the dream and the waking states, is mind or consciousness which appears as dual, i.e., the perceiver and the perceived, on account of ignorance.

1 Non-dual, etc.—This is known in Sushupti or deep-sleep when the mind remains as pure and non-dual.

2 Have, etc.—That the perceiver and the perceived in the dream state have no existence independent of the mind is known in the waking state.

Similar, etc.—In the waking state also what is perceived is only the act of the mind. The same consciousness is common in both the states. The idea of a mind having the dual characteristics of determination and volition is superimposed upon the substratum, i.e., consciousness; and as a result, the phenomenal world is perceived. It should not be thought that there is any other cause for the appearance of duality excepting ignorance.

मनोदश्यमिदं द्वैतं यत्किचित्सचराचरम् ||
मनसो ह्यमनीभवेद्वैतं नैवोपरम्यते || 31 ||

31. All these dual objects, comprising everything that is movable and immovable, perceived by the mind (are mind alone). For, duality is never experienced when the mind ceases to act.

SANKARA’S COMMENTARY

It has been said that it is the mind alone which appears as dual (objects) like the appearance of the snake in the rope. But what is its proof? Our answer is this: We make the statement on the strength of an inference following the method of agreement and
difference. The proposition is that all this duality perceived as such by the imagination of the mind is, in reality, nothing but the mind. The reason for such inference is that duality is perceived when the mind acts and it vanishes when the mind ceases to act; that is to say, when the (activity, i.e., the Vrittis of the) mind is withdrawn¹ unto itself by the knowledge got through discrimination, repeated practice and renunciation,—like the disappearance of the snake in the rope—or during deep sleep.² Hence on account of the disappearance of duality it is established that duality is unreal or illusory. That the perception of duality is due to the action of the mind is further proved in this Kārikā.

¹ Withdrawn, etc.—This may be called Samādhi. But Vedānta does not prescribe any mechanical method for the attainment of this state. The Vedāntic method for the control of the mind is the discrimination between the real and the unreal (repeated discrimination), all based upon reasoning.

² Deep sleep—Although there is a difference, Sushupti has often been pointed out by the Vedāntic Seers as similar to the state of Nirvikalpa Samādhi. Sushupti is the state when the mind ceases to act. Consequently in it duality is not perceived.

आत्मसत्यानुवृत्तोत्ते यदा ।
अमनस्तः तदा याति ग्राह्याभिवे तदाधिष्ठ ॥ ३२ ॥

32. When the mind does not imagine on account of the knowledge of the Truth which is Ātman, then it ceases to be mind and becomes free from all idea of cognition, for want of objects to be cognised.

SANKARA’S COMMENTARY

How does the mind become naught? It is thus replied:—The Ātman alone is the Reality like¹ the clay; as in the Śruti passage, “All modifications are
mere names arising from efforts of speech. The clay alone is real." That knowledge of the reality of Ātman comes through the Scripture\(^2\) and the teacher. The mind having attained to that knowledge does not imagine, as\(^3\) there remains nothing to be imagined. The mind then is like fire when there is no fuel to burn. When the mind thus does no longer imagine, it ceases to be mind, that is, the mind, for want of any object to be cognised, becomes free from all cognition.

\(^1\) *Like, etc.*—The only reality in the pots, jars, plates, etc., (made of clay) is the clay. The names and forms, on account of their changeability and negatability, are unreal. Similarly the only reality in this universe is Ātman; all other objects which are mere acts of mind, being changeable and negatable, are unreal.

\(^2\) *Scripture, etc.*—The Scripture and the teacher only tell the student what is not Ātman. They follow the negative method for pointing out the Reality, which is the rational method pursued in philosophy proper.

\(^3\) *As, etc.*—The acts of mind which conjure up the world of duality belong to the empirical realm, *i.e.*, to the realm wherein the duality of the subject and the object is recognised. But such action becomes impossible in the absolute state where there is no consciousness of subject and object. In that state Brahman alone is realised and hence the mind, consisting of determination and volition, ceases to exist. Then mind becomes identical with Brahman which is free from all duality of cognition.

अक्लपकमजं ज्ञानं ढेरायभिन्नं प्रचक्षते ।
ब्रह्मज्ञेयमजं नित्यमजेनाजं विचुभ्यते ॥ ३३ ॥

33. The knowledge (Jnānam) which is unborn and free from all imaginations is ever inseparable from the knowable. The immutable and birthless Brahman is the sole object of knowledge. The birthless is known by the birthless.
ON ADVAITA

ŚANKĀRA’S COMMENTARY

If all this duality be illusory, how is the knowledge of the Self to be realised? It is thus replied:—The Knowers of Brahman describe knowledge, i.e., the mere essence of thought, which is unborn and free from all imaginations as\(^1\) non-different from Brahman, the ultimate Reality, which is also the object of knowledge. This is supported by such Scriptural passages as, “Like heat from fire, knowledge (Jñānam) is never absent from the knower (Ātman),” “Brahman is Knowledge and Bliss,” “Brahman is Reality, Knowledge and Infinity,” etc. The knowledge of which Brahman is the object, is non-different from (the knowable) Brahman, as is the heat from the fire. The Essence of the Self, which is the object of knowledge, verily knows itself by means of unborn knowledge, which is of the very nature of Ātman. Brahman which is of the nature of one homogeneous mass of eternal consciousness, does not depend upon another\(^2\) instrument of knowledge (for its illumination), as is the case with the sun, which being of the nature of continuous light (does not require any instrument to illumine itself).

1 As non-different, etc.—The Jñānam or knowledge is the same as Brahman; otherwise no knowledge would be able to tell us what Brahman is. Darkness cannot illumine the sun. Only the light of the sun which is the sun itself, can illumine the sun.

2 Another instrument—Such as scripture, etc., which only tell us what is not self.

To the Jñāni, even when he acts in this empirical world, the knower, the knowledge and the object of knowledge are all Brahman. And yet all these, being of the nature of Brahman, are without birth (Aja).
34. The behaviour of the mind that is under control, i.e., which is free from all imaginations and that is endowed with discrimination, should be known. The condition of the mind in deep sleep is of another sort and not like that.

ŚANKARA’S COMMENTARY

It has been stated before that the mind, free from imagination on account of the knowledge¹ of Truth, which is Ātman, becomes tranquil for want of external objects, like the fire not fed by fuel. Such mind may be said to be under control. It has been further stated that duality disappears when the mind thus ceases to act. The Yogis should particularly know the behaviour² of the mind which is thus brought under discipline, which is free from all imaginations and which is possessed of discrimination.

(Objection)—In³ the absence of all specific consciousness the mind, in the state of deep sleep, behaves exactly in the same manner as does the mind under control. What is there to be known in the absence of all specific knowledge?

(Reply)—To this objection we reply thus:—Your objection is not valid. For, the behaviour of the mind in deep sleep, overcome by the darkness of delusion caused by ignorance, and still full of many potential desires which are the seeds of numerous future undesirable activities, is quite different from the behaviour of the mind well under control and free from the ignorance which produces activities that give rise to
numerous afflictions, and from which has been burnt away by the fire of self-knowledge the ignorance which contains the harmful seed of all potential tendencies to act. The behaviour of the latter kind of mind is quite different. Therefore it is not like the mind in deep sleep. Hence the behaviour of such mind should be known. This is the purport.

1 Knowledge, etc.—This implies the discrimination between real and unreal.

2 Behaviour—The word "Prachāra" in the text implying behaviour or activity shows that by "Nigraha" or discipline is not meant the Yogic discipline leading to Nirvikalpa Samādhi; for, in that state the mind loses all activity and movement. To a Jñāni the Prachāra or the ideation of the mind is also Brahman. Therefore these ideations should be examined or analysed.

3 In the, etc.—The opponent evidently mistakes the Vedāntic tranquillity of mind arrived at by discrimination, etc., for the Yogic Samādhi which is cultivated by controlling the activities of the mind. Hence his objection to Yogic trance, like deep sleep, is associated with absence of mental ideation. Śankara in his commentary on the Brāhmaṇa (2. 1. 9) and in various other places puts Yogic Samādhi and deep sleep under the same category.

4 Different.—It is because the mind of the Jñāni is always established in Brahman.

5 This, etc.—The purport is that the mind of a man, who has not known the Truth of Self, becomes absorbed in Avidyā at the time of deep sleep or Samādhi. Such mind is free from all activities and remains in a motionless, i.e., inactive condition, concealing within it all the seeds of future dual activities. But the mind of a Jñāni is well under discipline by the constant practice of discrimination. That mind is always saturated with the thought of Brahman. Hence the mind of a Jñāni does not lose its activities which are identical with the non-dual Brahman itself.
35. As the mind is withdrawn at the time of deep sleep and not so in the case of the (Vedantic) discipline, (therefore there is a difference between the condition of the mind of a sleeper and that of a Jnâni). That (mind of a Jnâni) becomes identical with fearless Brahman whose all-round illumination is consciousnes alone.

ŚANKARA'S COMMENTARY

Now is stated the reason for the distinction between the behaviour (of the mind of a sleeper and that of a Jnâni). The mind in deep sleep, with the desires which are the cause of all experiences during the state of ignorance, goes\(^1\) back to the seed-like condition of potentiality characterised by the undifferentiated\(^2\) feature of darkness; but the\(^3\) mind (of a Jnâni) which is disciplined by discrimination is not so withdrawn, that is to say, does not go back to the seed-like state of darkness. Therefore is made the distinction between the behaviour of the mind in deep sleep and that of a Jnâni whose mind is under control. When the mind becomes free from all ideas of the perceiver and the perceived—the dual evils caused by ignorance—it verily becomes one with the Supreme and the non-dual Brahman. Therefore the mind becomes free from all fear; for, in that state, the perception of duality, which is the cause of fear, is absent. Brahman is peace and fearlessness. Having realised Brahman, the Jnâni is not afraid of anything. This is thus further amplified: Jnânam means the essence of Knowledge, \(i.e.,\) the consciousness which is the very nature of \(Ātman\) or the Self. Brahman is that whose expression is the Knowledge thus described. In other words, Brahman is the one mass of sentiency. The word, "all-round" in the text, implies that this knowledge
of Brahman is without break and all-pervading like the ether.

It is implied in the previous text of the Kārikā that there is a difference between the mind of a Jnāni and that of a deep sleeper. The reason for this difference is stated in this Kārikā.

1 Goes back, etc.—For, an ignorant man, when he wakes up from deep sleep, again experiences these desires. Therefore the desires are said to remain in a potential state in deep sleep.

2 Undifferentiated, etc.—It is because the experience of deep sleep is characterised by the absence of all that is known. The man describing the condition of deep sleep says, “I know nothing during that state.”

3 The mind, etc.—But the case of a Jnāni is quite different. By the practice of discrimination, he can distinguish reality from unreality. All objects of cognition, being changeable and negatable, are known to the Jnāni as unreal. Therefore the knowledge of Brahman does not denote a state in which the desires remain in potential condition. For, the desires of a Jnāni are destroyed for ever by the knowledge of the non-dual Brahman. Hence, a man having attained to the knowledge of Brahman does not experience any desire, which implies cogniser and cognised. The Jnāni knows the activities of his mind as identical with the non-dual Brahman.

4 Without break, etc.—That is to say, the Jnāni may be engaged in any activity, but in everything he realises Brahman alone. The experiences of a Jnāni have thus been described in the Gīta (4.24): “Brahman is the offering, Brahman is the oblation poured into the fire of Brahman. Brahman verily shall be reached by him who always sees Brahman in action.”

अजमनिद्रम्स्मप्रमनामकमकपकम् ।
सकृद्विभां सर्वेऽनोपचार: कथंचन: || ३६ ||

36. (This Brahman is) birthless, free from sleep and dream, without name and form, ever-effulgent and omniscient. Nothing has to be done in any way (with respect to Brahman).
Brahman is both within and without as well as unborn, as there is no cause for its passing into birth. For, we have already stated that (the phenomenon of) birth is seen on account of the ignorance (of the real nature of a thing), as is the case with the rope giving birth to the (illusion of the) snake. It is birthless because all ignorance is destroyed by the knowledge of Truth which is the Ātman. Hence it is free from sleep; for, Ātman, which is, by nature, non-dual, is always free from sleep the nature of which is that of beginningless delusion characterised by ignorance. Therefore it is free from dream. Names and forms which are ascribed to it are due to the ignorance of its real nature. These names and forms are destroyed by Knowledge. It is like the (destruction of the illusion of the) snake seen in the rope. Hence Brahman cannot be described by any name, nor can it be in any manner described to be of any form. To support this, there are such Śruti passages as, “From which words come back,” etc. Moreover, it is ever effulgent or it is of the very nature of effulgence. For, it is free from (the ideas of) manifestation and non-manifestation characterised by wrong apprehension and non-apprehension. Apprehension and non-apprehension are (as inseparable) as day and night. Darkness is the characteristic of ignorance. These are the causes of the non-manifestation (of the real nature of Ātman). These are absent in Ātman. Moreover, Ātman is always of the nature of consciousness and effulgence. Therefore it is reasonable to speak of Ātman as ever-effulgent. It is all-knowing, that is to say, Ātman is all that exists and Ātman is consciousness (awareness) itself. As regards such Brahman (i.e., the one that knows such
Brahman) no action can be enjoined, as may be in the case of others, who (on account of their ignorance of the real nature of Brahman) are asked to practise concentration, etc., on the nature of Ātman. The purport is that besides the destruction of ignorance it is not possible to prescribe any disciplinary action (for the knowledge of Brahman), as Brahman is always of the nature of purity, knowledge and freedom.

The nature of Brahman, which is the subject-matter under discussion is thus described in other ways. The purport of the Kārikā is that apart from the realisation of one's identity with the attributeless Brahman no effort is to be made by him. The categorical imperative of Kant has no meaning for a knower of Ātman. Yogic Samādhi is not the same as the goal of Jñāna Yoga as described in the philosophy of Advaita Vedānta or the Kārikā.

1 *As, etc.*—The phenomenon of the rope producing the snake is due to ignorance of the real nature of the rope.

2 *Sleep*—Sleep or Nidrā means the non-apprehension of objects, as is the characteristic of the mind in deep sleep. In the causal world this Nidrā or ignorance is known to be beginningless, as no beginning of it can be found.

3 *Dream*—The dream or Svapna is characterised by wrong apprehension of objects. This is not possible in the case of Ātman which is of the nature of eternal purity, knowledge and illumination.

4 *It is, etc.*—The Ātman is that which gives us the idea of light. It is not itself what is described as light in the waking state.

5 *For, etc.*—The ideas of non-apprehension and wrong apprehension are correlative. The one implies the other. Similarly the ideas of manifestation and non-manifestation are correlative. When an empirical Jīva becomes oblivious of himself, as in deep sleep, he is said to be in a state of non-manifestation characterised by the non-perception of objects. Similarly, the empirical Jīva is said to be manifested, as in dream or waking state, when he apprehends objects in a wrong way, *i.e.*., not as they are in their true character which is the non-dual Brahman. But Brahman cannot be identified with the dualistic concepts of non-apprehension or
wrong apprehension and non-manifestation or manifestation, as it is the witness of all these conditions.

6 *These are, etc.*—The ideas of manifestation and non-manifestation cannot inhere in *Ātman* from the standpoint of Reality. These are attributed to *Ātman*, as one says that *Ātman* is unmanifested to us previous to the realisation of knowledge and it is manifested to us subsequent to that realisation. These statements are made from the empirical standpoint. But Brahman is always of the nature of illumination which never decreases or increases under any circumstances. In common parlance the advent of day and night is associated with the rising and the setting of the sun. But the sun neither rises nor sets. It is always bright and effulgent. If one takes his stand in the sun he sees neither the night nor its correlative the day. But if a man is away from the sun, he imagines the rising and setting of the sun and consequently experiences day and night which have no meaning from the standpoint of the sun.

7 *The purport, etc.*—All imaginations regarding *Samādhi*, etc., may have their application in the state of ignorance when one does not realise the ever-illumined nature of his self.

Translate your text into English.

37. *(This *Ātman* is) beyond all expression by words beyond all acts of mind; *(It is) all peace, eternal effulgence free from activity and fear and attainable by concentrated understanding (of the Jiva).*

**Śankara’s Commentary**

Now is explained the reason for indicating Brahman as without name, etc., as stated above. The word *Abhilāpa*, meaning expression, denotes here the instrument of sound by which all sounds are expressed. Brahman is beyond speech. The instrument of sound is used in the sense of metonymy, *i.e.*, it also implies other instruments of sense-knowledge. The purport is that the *Ātman* is beyond all external sense-organs.
Similarly, it is beyond all activities of the mind. The word "Chintā" in the text stands for "mind" (or the internal organ of thought). For, the Śruti says, "It is verily without Prāṇa and without mind", "It is higher than the imperishable Supreme." It is all peace as it is free from all distinctions. The Ātman is ever-effulgent, that is to say, being of the nature of self-consciousness which is its very essence. It is eternal light. The Ātman is denoted by the word Samādhi as it can be realised only by the knowledge arising out of the deepest concentration (on its essence) or, the Ātman is denoted by Samādhi because the Jīva concentrates his mind on Ātman. It is immovable, i.e., beyond change. Hence, it is fearless as it is free from change.

1 Samādhi—This state of complete identity with non-dual Brahman, arrived at as a result of discrimination and negation of phenomena, is the Vedāntic conception of Samādhi (which is quite different from any mystical or mechanical state described as Samādhi in the Yoga system).

ग्रहे न तत्र नोत्सर्गिष्ठिन्ता यत्र न विचिते ।
आत्मसंस्ख्य तदा ज्ञानमजाति समतं गतम् || ३८ ||

38. In that Brahman which is free from all acts of mind there is neither any idea of acceptance nor any idea of giving up (of anything). Established in the Ātman (Self), knowledge attains to the state of birthlessness and sameness, that is to say, changelessness.

ŚANKARA’S COMMENTARY

As Brahman alone has been described in the previous text as Samādhi (i.e., the sole object of concentration) and as free from activity and fear, therefore in that Brahman there¹ is nothing to accept nor is there anything
to give up. For, acceptance or abandonment is possible only where there is change or the possibility of change. But both these are inconsistent with Brahman—as nothing else exists which can cause a change in Brahman, and further because Brahman is without parts. Therefore, the meaning is that in Brahman there is no possibility of either accepting or giving up anything. The purpose of the Kārikā is this: How can there be any acceptance or abandonment (in Brahman) where, in the absence of the mind, no mentionation whatsoever is possible? When the knowledge of Reality which is the Self, ensues, then Knowledge, for want of any object to rest upon, becomes established in Ātman, like the heat of fire (in the absence of fuel). Ajāti, i.e., free from birth. It attains to the state of supreme non-duality. Thus is concluded, by means of reasoning and Scriptural authority what was stated before as a proposition in the following words: “Now I shall describe the non-dual Brahman which is free from limitation and birth and which is the same everywhere.” Everything else, other than the knowledge of Reality which is the Self, birthless and homogeneous, implies limitation. The Śruti also says, “O Gārgi, he who departs from this world without knowing that Imperishable One, is, indeed, narrow-minded.” The purpose is that everyone, realising this knowledge, becomes established in Brahman and attains to the fulfilment of all desires.

This Kārikā tells us that the changeless non-dual Brahman is beyond all injunctions, mandatory or prohibitory, as enjoined by Scriptures or society. These injunctions apply only to the realm of ignorance.

1 There is, etc.—All ethics, prescribing moral codes to be followed or immoral acts to be shunned, apply to the dual world. They have no meaning in respect of Brahman or the Knower of Brahman, which are identical.
8 No mentation—For, it is the activities of the mind alone which conjure up the phenomena of a dual world with all its injunctions, prohibitory or mandatory.

8 Becomes, etc.—Knowledge of Brahman is the same as Brahman.

अस्पर्श्योगो वै नाम दुर्दंशः सत्ययोगिंसि:।
योगिनो विभ्यति शास्मादभये भयदर्शिन्॥ ३९ ॥

39. This Yoga, which is not in touch with anything, is hard to be attained by all Yogis (in general). The Yogis are afraid of it, for they see fear in it where there is really fearlessness.

SANKARA’S COMMENTARY

Though¹ such is the nature of the knowledge of the Supreme Reality, yet it is described in the Upanishads² as Yoga not in touch with anything; for, it is free from all touch implying relations (with objects). It is hard to be attained by the Yogis³ who are devoid of the knowledge taught in the Vedānta philosophy. In other words, this truth can be realised only by the efforts culminating in the knowledge of Ātmā as the Sole Reality. The Yogis shrink from it, which is free from all fear, for⁴ they think that this Yoga brings about the annihilation of their self. In other words, the Yogis, being devoid of discrimination, who, through fear, apprehend the destruction of their self, are afraid of it which is, in reality, fearlessness.⁵

¹ Though, etc.—The word “Yoga” signifying union, generally means contact between two. But derivatively Jñāna-Yoga is not in touch with any idea or object, as there exists nothing else but the non-dual Brahman. Therefore it is called the Asparśa-Yoga, i.e., a spiritual discipline which does not admit of relation or touch with anything else.
3 Upanishads—The Upanishad says that the knowledge of Ātman is ever uncontaminated by any touch of action sinful or virtuous.

3 Yogis—That is to say, those who are called Yogis according to Patanjali. Their aim is to attain to the trance-condition by some mystical or mechanical means and thereby become oblivious of the miseries of the world. But Vedānta says that the world as it is, if seen in its true character, is Brahman.

4 For, etc.—The Yogis are afraid of losing their individual consciousness which is the pivot of enjoyments in the world. But Vedānta says that the true nature of an individual is his identity with the non-dual Brahman. The idea of individual existence is due to the ignorance of one’s own nature.

5 Fearlessness—Brahman is fearless because it is ever-free, ever-illumined and ever-pure. There is nothing else of which it can be afraid. Fear comes from the sense of duality.

曼सो निःग्रहायत्तमभं सत्रंयोगिनाणाम ।
दुःखश्च देहोद्रह्मण्यस्या शान्तिरेव च ॥ ४० ॥

40. The Yogis (who do not follow the method of Jnāna-Yoga as described in the Kārikā) depend on the control of their mind for fearlessness, destruction of misery, the knowledge of self and eternal peace.

ŚANKARA’S COMMENTARY

Those1 who regard mind and the sense-organs, when seen apart from their identity with the very nature of Brahman, as mere imagination,—like that of the snake when seen apart from its identity with the rope—and who thus deny the sole reality of the mind and the sense-organs (independent of Brahman), i.e., those who look upon themselves as of the very nature of Brahman, spontaneously enjoy, as quite natural to them, fearlessness and eternal peace known as Freedom, (perfect knowledge) for which they (the Jnānis) do not depend upon any
We have already stated that no duty (effort), whatsoever, exist for the Jñāni. But those other Yogis who are also traversing the path (leading to Truth), but who possess inferior\(^2\) or middling understanding and who\(^3\) look upon the mind as separate from but related to Ātman, and who\(^4\) are ignorant of the knowledge regarding the reality of Ātman—the Yogis belonging to this class can experience fearlessness as a result of the discipline of the mind. To them\(^5\) the destruction of misery is also dependent upon mental control. The ignorant can never experience the cessation of misery, if the mind, (considered) related to Ātman, becomes active. Besides, their knowledge of self is dependent on their control of the mind. And similarly, eternal peace, known as Moksha (or liberation), in their case, depends upon the mental discipline.

This Kārikā applies to those who look upon the mind as separate from Ātman and think that peace, knowledge, etc., depend upon its control.

1. Those, etc.—The Jñāni knows the mind and sense-organs to be identical with the non-dual Brahman. It is like the identity of the snake with the rope. As the snake in the illusion of the snake in the rope has no existence apart from the rope, similarly, the mind has no existence separate from Brahman. To see the mind as separate from Brahman is a freak of imagination. They, the Jñānīs knowing this truth, do not care for the control of the mind. For, the mind, as such, does not exist for them. One who realises mind as Brahman, finds spontaneously, peace, fearlessness, etc. Fear, misery, etc., are the outcome of duality. Duality is seen on account of the activity of the mind. But the Jñāni sees the identity of the mind and Brahman. Therefore duality does not exist for him. Hence he does not experience any fear, misery, etc. Therefore, peace, fearlessness, etc., in his case are natural.

2. Inferior, etc.—That is to say, they do not possess the sharp intellect that can distinguish the real from the unreal. For them the Yogic practices are recommended.
Who, etc.—It is because they find the mind as separate from Brahman that they try to keep it under control. According to them, the mind is acted upon by Ātman.

Who are, etc.—For they see a duality of the Ātman and the mind.

To them, etc.—The Yogis think that misery is caused by the activities of the mind. Hence they direct all their energy to the suppression of the Vrittis of the mind. But the Vrittis reappear if the attempt is slightly relaxed. The Yogis, on account of their ignorance of the real nature of the mind, fight with their own shadows. The Jnāni, on the other hand, realises the mind as well as all its activities as identical with the non-dual Brahman. Hence, the activities of mind do not stand in the way of his eternal happiness.

उत्सेक उद्वेगेऽद्वाकाशाध्येकातिनियतं

मनसो निग्रहस्तद्वैद्वेदपरिखेतः ||४१||

41. The mind can be brought under control only by an unrelenting effort like that which is required to empty an ocean, drop by drop, with the help of a (blade of) Kuśa-grass.

ŚANKARA’S COMMENTARY

As one may try to empty the ocean, by draining off its water drop by drop, with the help of a (blade of) Kuśa-grass, even so may one control the mind by making the same effort with a heart which becomes neither depressed nor tired.

This Kārikā gives us an idea of the effort that a Yogi should make to control his mind completely. But it appears that the complete suppression of the mental Vrittis is impossible in this way. And as the happiness of a Yogi is dependent upon such suppression, he can never attain to eternal Truth by the Yogic method. Jnāna-yoga is the royal road for the attainment of eternal Truth and peace.

Neither depressed, etc.—The Yogi at every step meets with defeat. While closing the eyes, he sees no object; with the eyes
open, he perceives the phenomenal world. In either case, he does not realise Brahman. But these must not depress his heart.

उपायेन निग्रहीयाद्विक्षितं कामभोग्योऽः |
सुप्रसन्नं चेत्य चैव यथा कामो लघस्तथा || ४२ ||

42. The mind distracted by desires and enjoyments as also the mind enjoying pleasure in oblivion (trance-like condition) should be brought under discipline by the pursuit of proper means. For, the state of oblivion is as harmful as desires.

SANKARA'S COMMENTARY

Is untiring effort the only way for bringing the mind under discipline? We say, in reply, no. One should, with untiring effort, follow the means, to be stated presently, in order to bring the mind under discipline, that is to say, bring it back to Atman,¹ when the mind turns towards objects of desires and enjoyments. The word “Laya”² in the text indicates Sushupti, i.e., deep sleep in which state one becomes oblivious of all things. The³ (injunction implied in the) words “should be brought under discipline”, should also be applied in the case of the mind when it feels happy, that is to say free from all worries in the state of Laya or oblivion. Why should it be further brought under discipline if it feels pleasure (in that state)? It is thus replied: Because the state of oblivion is as⁴ harmful as desire, the mind should be withdrawn from the state of oblivion as it should be withdrawn from objects of enjoyment.

One practising Yoga meets with four kinds of obstacles which are in his way of realising the Highest Reality. They are known as Laya (a state of oblivion analogous to Yogic Samādhi or deep sleep), Vikshepa (distraction), Sukha (happiness in temporary success) and Rāga (attachment to any particular phase of realisation). The
mind should be trained to keep away from these obstacles. The means are described in the next Kārikā.

1 Ātman—It is because the ultimate aim of all spiritual practices is the realisation of Ātman or the true nature of the Self.

2 Laya—The state of Laya realised by the Yogi in Samādhi is non-different from the state of Sushupti or deep sleep. Both are characterised by the absence of subject-object relationship. Again in both these states, the student is not aware of the real nature of his self. The difference between the two states is this: The Yogi can induce Samādhi at his mere will, but Sushupti, for an ordinary man, is not under his control.

3 The words, etc.—The state of Samādhi induced by Yoga should not be considered as the goal. No doubt, one feels a sort of pleasure in such Samādhi on account of the absence of worries consequent on the withdrawal of the mind from external objects, but this does not indicate that the Yogi has realised the Supreme Truth. Seeking after pleasure or the avoidance of misery indicates the exhaustion of the inquiring mind. The real seeker after Truth cannot rest satisfied till he has attained to it.

4 As harmful, etc.—It is because both these states are characterised by the absence of the knowledge of Ātman. Thirst for external objects and attachment to the pleasure one feels in Samādhi are equally harmful for the realisation of Truth. A Yogi can realise Truth if he supplements his own method by the Vedāntic discipline of discrimination between the real and the unreal, and meditation on the nature of Ātman.

43. The mind should be turned back from the enjoyment of pleasures, remembering that all this is attended with misery. If it be remembered that everything is the unborn (Brahman), the born (duality) will not be seen.

ŚANKARA’S COMMENTARY

What is the way of disciplining the mind? It is thus replied: Remember that all\textsuperscript{1} duality is caused by Avidyā
or illusion and therefore afflicted with misery. Thereby dissuade the mind from seeking enjoyments produced by desires. In other words, withdraw the mind from all dual objects by impressing upon it the idea of complete non-attachment. Realise from the teachings of the Scriptures and the Āchāryās that all this is verily the changeless Brahman. Then you will not see anything to the contrary, viz., duality; for it does not exist.

It has been said in the previous Kārikā that the mind should be disciplined by following the right method. This verse of the Kārikā points out complete detachment to be the right method.

1 All duality, etc.—All dual objects, on account of their changeable and negatable nature, are attended with misery.

2 Non-attachment—It implies the spirit of dispassion for all dual objects, because they are always associated with misery.

वहे संत्बोध्येष्चिच्चि विक्षितं शम्येत्पुनः ।
सक्षायं विज्ञानीयात्समप्रांतं न चाल्येत। ॥ ४४ ॥

44. If the mind becomes inactive in a state of oblivion awaken it again. If it is distracted, bring it back to the state of tranquillity. (In the intermediary state) know the mind containing within it desires in potential form. If the mind has attained to the state of equilibrium, then do not disturb it again.

ŚANKARA’S COMMENTARY

When1 the mind is immersed in oblivion, i.e., in Sushupti, then rouse it up by means of knowledge and by detachment. That is to say, turn the mind to the exercise of discrimination which leads to the knowledge of the Self. The word “Chitta” in the text bears the same meaning as “Manas” or mind. Bring2 the mind back to the state of tranquillity if it is distracted by the
various objects of desires. When the mind is thus, by constant practice, awakened from the state of inactivity and also turned back from all objects, but not yet established in equilibrium, that is to say, when the mind still dwells in an intermediary state,—then know the mind to be possessed of attachment. Then the mind contains within it the seeds of desires for enjoyment and inactivity. From that state also, bring the mind, with care, to the realisation of equilibrium. Once the mind has realised the state of equilibrium, that is, when it is on the way to realise that state, then do not disturb it again. In other words, do not turn it to (by attachment) external objects.

1 When the, etc.—This is the warning given against pursuing the Yogic Samādhi as the state of the highest spiritual realisation. The mind seeking Truth and frightened at the immensity of effort necessary for its realisation often seeks relief in Samādhi. The commentator exhorts us to practise discrimination even when the mind passes into the passivity of Samādhi and to extricate it from that state by cultivating the spirit of non-attachment to any pleasure experienced in the state of Samādhi. The object of life is not to enjoy any bliss arising out of inactivity as one experiences in Samādhi or deep sleep, but to know the real nature of the Self.

2 Bring, etc.—The Yogic method may be followed with certain advantages by the student of mediocre intellect who wants to turn his turbulent mind from the pursuit of external objects. The Yogic method gives him control over his mind. But even in such a case, Yoga serves only a temporary or subordinate purpose.

3 Equilibrium—The non-dual Brahman which is characterised by sameness throughout.

4 Know, etc.—This is another state of the mind. In this state the mind is roused from the state of inactivity. It is also withdrawn from objects. But it has not yet realised its identity with the non-dual Brahman. In this intermediary state, the mind contains, in potential form, the desires for the enjoyment of external objects or the bliss in a state of inactivity.
From, etc.—This intermediary state also should not be taken as the state of Ultimate Realisation.

नास्तिकाद्येत्स्वं तत्त्व निःस्कृतः प्रभृतया भवेत्।

निश्चलं निश्चर्चितमेकाकुर्यत्वाद्। ॥ ४५ ॥

45. (The mind) should not be allowed to enjoy the bliss that arises out of the condition of Samādhi. It should be freed from attachment to such happiness through the exercise of discrimination. If the mind, once attaining to the state of steadiness seeks externality, then it should be unified with the Ātman, again, with effort.

Sankara's Commentary

The seeker should not taste that happiness that is experienced by the Yogis seeking1 after Samādhi. In other words, he is not to be attached to that happiness. What then should be done by the student? He should be unattached to such happiness, by gaining knowledge through discrimination, and think that whatever happiness is experienced is false2 and conjured up by ignorance. The mind should be turned back from such happiness. When, however, having been once withdrawn from happiness and fixed on the state of steadiness, the mind again manifests its outgoing propensities, then control it by adopting the above-mentioned3 means; and with great care, make it one4 with Ātman; that is, make the mind attain to the condition of pure existence and thought.

The purpose of this Kārikā is to dissuade the mind from enjoying the happiness that the Yogis experience in the state of Samādhi.

1 Seeking, etc.—That is in the state of Samādhi, the Yogi fails to see that the non-dual Brahman alone exists. He seeks Samādhi because he believes in the existence of the mind as separate from Ātman, and therefore tries to control it. By some mechanical
means he brings the mind to a state of inactivity and thus makes himself free from all worries. But this is not the Vedântic goal of Truth.

2 *False*—All objects which are experienced by us are changeable and negatable. Therefore they are unreal.

3 *Above-mentioned*—*i.e.*, discrimination, etc.

4 *One, etc.*—The truth is that the mind is identical with Ātman. Mind is Ātman. It is only through ignorance that we separate the mind from Ātman.

यदा न जीयते चित्तं न च विक्षिप्त्यते पुनः ||
अनिश्चितमनाभासं निर्पृहं ब्रह्म तत्तदा || ४६ ||

46. *When the mind does not merge in the inactivity of oblivion, or become distracted by desires, that is to say, when the mind becomes quiescent and does not give rise to appearances, it verily becomes Brahman.*

**Sâṅkara’s Commentary**

When the mind brought under discipline by the above-mentioned¹ methods, does not fall into the oblivion of deep sleep, nor is distracted by external objects, that is to say, when the mind becomes quiescent² like the flame of a light kept in a windless place; or when³ the mind does not appear in the form of an object,—when the mind is endowed with these characteristics, it verily becomes one⁴ with Brahman.

¹ *Above-mentioned, etc.*—*i.e.*, the practice of knowledge and discrimination.

² *Quiescent*—This steadiness is quite different from the condition of Samādhi. In this steady condition the mind realizes the non-dual Brahman alone everywhere.

³ *When, etc.*—The external objects are nothing but the activities of the mind itself. Comp. Kārikā 3. 31.

⁴ *One, etc.*—Then the mind realises its real nature.
47. *This highest bliss is based upon the realisation of Self, it is peace, identical with liberation, indescribable and unborn. It is further described as the omniscient Brahman, because it is one with the unborn Self which is the object sought by Knowledge.*

ŚANKARA’S COMMENTARY

The above-mentioned bliss which is the highest\(^1\) Reality and which is characterised by the knowledge of the Ātmān is\(^2\) centred in the Self. It is all peace, characterised by the cessation of all evils. It is the same as liberation.\(^3\) It is indescribable as\(^4\) nobody is able to describe it; for, it is totally different from all objects. This ultimate bliss is directly realized by the Yogi.\(^5\) It is unborn because it is not produced like anything resulting from empirical perceptions. It is identical with the Unborn which is the object sought by Knowledge. The Knowers of Brahman describe this bliss verily as the omniscient Brahman, as it is identical with that Reality which is omniscient.

Now is described the nature of the mind in the state of the highest realisation.

1 *Highest*—It is distinguished from the happiness described in Karikā 45, which is of the same class as relative bliss.

2 *Is centred, etc.*—This is to show that Self-realisation does not depend upon anything external to itself.

3 *Liberation*—The state of liberation, on account of its identity with Truth, is characterised by the attainment of all-absorbing happiness and cessation of all miseries.

4 *As, etc.*—It is because this happiness transcends all subject-object relationship.
8 Yogis—These Yogis are not like the ordinary ones. The nature of their Yoga has been described as the Asparśa Yoga in Kārikā 3. 39.

न कथितजायते जीवः संभवंस्य न विचारते ।
एतत्तदृष्टम् सल्ल यत्र किचिद् जायते ॥ ४८ ॥

48. No Jīva is ever born. There does not exist any cause which can produce it. This is the highest Truth that nothing is ever born.

ŚANKARA’S COMMENTARY

All these ideas regarding the discipline of the mind, evolution resembling the creation of forms from iron and clay, as well as the ideas regarding devotional exercises, are given as means to the realisation of the nature of the Ultimate Reality. They have, in themselves, no meaning whatsoever. The truth regarding the Ultimate Reality is that no Jīva is ever born. The Jīva whom one knows as the agent and the enjoyer is not born in any way whatsoever. Therefore, no cause can ever exist which may produce the Ātman which is, by nature, unborn and non-dual. In other words, no Jīva can ever be born, as the cause which may produce it does not exist. Of all the (relative) truths described above as means (for the realisation of the Ultimate Reality), this alone is the Supreme Truth that nothing whatsoever is ever born in or of that Brahman which is of the nature of the Ultimate Reality.

Various empirical means such as the practice of Yoga, etc., have been suggested above. If these means which naturally are related to the dual realm be true, then the position of the non-dual Brahman cannot be maintained. If these means be untrue, then they cannot serve any purpose. To remove this difficulty this Kārikā suggests
that these means help us to realise Brahman; but they do not reveal Brahman.

1 Means—These means have their applicability only in the realm of duality where a man, through ignorance, does not know his real nature.

2 The truth, etc.—The Ultimate Truth is that there is only one entity which may be called either Jīva or Brahman. The Jīva as separate from Brahman, does never exist.

Here ends the third chapter, on Advaita, of the Kārikā of Gauḍapāda with the Commentary of Śri Śankara.
Aum Salutation to Brahman

CHAPTER IV

QUENCHING OF FIRE-BRAND

ज्ञानेनास्सकाशाकल्पेन धर्मान्यो गगनोपमानः।
श्लेष्याभिनेन संबुद्धस्तं बन्दे द्विपदा वरसः॥ १ ॥

1. I bow to that best among men who by means of knowledge, which is like Ākāśa and non-different from the object of knowledge (i.e., the Dharma), realised the nature of the Dharmas (i.e., the Jīvas) which are, again, like the Ākāśa.

SANKARA’S COMMENTARY

The proposition regarding Advaita (as the Supreme Truth) has been based upon scriptural evidence, by1 determining the nature of Aum. That proposition has been established by proving2 the unreality of the distinction implied by the external objects (of experience). Again the third chapter dealing with Advaita has directly established the proposition on the authority of scripture and reason with the concluding statement3 that “This alone is the Ultimate Truth”. At the end of the previous chapter it has been hinted that the opinions of the dualists and the nihilists, who are opposed to the philosophy of Advaita which gives the true import of the scriptures, bear the name of true philosophy. But that is not true because of their mutual contradictions and also because of their being vitiated by attachment to their own opinions and aversion to those of others. The philosophy of Advaita has been extolled as the true
philosophy on account of its being free from any vitiation (referred to above regarding the theories of the dualists and nihilists). Now is undertaken the chapter styled Alātasānti (i.e., on the quenching of the fire-brand) in order to conclude the final examination for the establishment of the philosophy of Advaita, by following the process known as the method of disagreement, which is done by showing here in detail that other systems cannot be said to be true philosophy. For there are mutual contradictions implied in them. The first verse has for its purpose the salutation to the promulgator of the philosophy of Advaita, conceiving him as identical with the Advaita Truth. The salutation to the teacher is made in commencing a scripture in order to bring the undertaking to a successful end. The word “Ākāśakalpa” in the text means resembling Ākāśa, that is to say, slightly different from Ākāśa. What is the purpose of such knowledge which resembles Ākāśa? By such Knowledge is known the nature of the Dharmas (i.e., the attributes of Ātman). The attributes are the same as the substance. What is the nature of these Dharmas? They also can be known by the analogy of Ākāśa, that is to say, these Dharmas also resemble Ākāśa. The word “Jneyābhinna” in the text is another attribute of ‘Jnānam’ or Knowledge and means that this knowledge is not separate from the Ātmans (Jīvas) which are the objects of knowledge. This identity of the knowledge and the knowable is like the identity of fire and heat and the sun and its light. I bow to the God, known as Nārāyaṇa, who by knowledge, non-different from the nature of Ātman (the object of knowledge) and which resembles Ākāśa, knew the Dharmas which, again, may be compared to Ākāśa. The import of the words “Dvipadām Varam” (Supreme
among the bipeds), is that Nārāyaṇa is the greatest of all men, characterised by two legs, that is to say, He is the "Purushottama", the best of all men. By the adoration of the teacher it is implied that the purpose of this chapter is to establish, by the refutation of the opposite views, Advaita which gives the philosophy of the Ultimate Reality, characterised by the identity of the knower, knowledge and the object of knowledge.

1 By the, etc.—This has been done in the first chapter of the book, viz., the Āgama Prakaraṇa which deals with the subject-matter from the scriptural standpoint.

2 Proving, etc.—This has been done in the second chapter.

3 Statement—Comp. the 48th verse of the Kārikā of the third chapter.

4 On account, etc.—One of the tests of Truth is that it does not contradict anything. The Ultimate Truth is that by knowing which everything else becomes known. The fact of non-duality satisfies this condition and therefore it is called the Ultimate Truth or Reality.

5 Method of, etc.—This is one of the processes of inference; the other is known as the method of agreement. It has been shown in the second chapter that what is caused or what comes into being is unreal. Here it is shown that what is not untruth is not caused also. That is to say, the Kārikā will show in this chapter the absence of causality in Ātman and thus establish the Ultimate Reality of Self.

6 Promulgator, etc.—Nārāyaṇa or the Lord Himselp is said to be the promulgator of this philosophy which was handed down to Gauḍapāda. The salutation is made to Nārāyaṇa at the commencement of the chapter.

7 Slightly, etc.—Ākāśa or ether contains within it elements of inert matter. Therefore it is slightly different from knowledge which is all sentiency. The analogy is made with reference to the all-pervading characteristic of Ākāśa which is similar to Jñānam or knowledge.

8 Dharmas—The word "Dharma" literally means "attribute". Attribute, according to Vedānta, is non-different from substance.
Hence "Dharma" also is non-different from Brahman. The word Dharma is, in the texts, synonymous with knowledge or Jnānam. The word "Dharma" is used by Gauḍapāda to mean "Jīva" or embodied being. "Jīva" is identical with "knowledge", "Brahman". The plural number is used on account of the plurality of "Jīvas", which is admitted from the empirical standpoint.

9 Analogy, etc.—The Jīva is, as Brahman is, in reality, as all-pervading as the Ākāśa (or Jnānam).

10 Not separate, etc.—If knowledge is intrinsically separate from its object, i.e., the Jīva or the Brahman, then one can never know, by such knowledge, the nature of Jīva or Brahman. The knower, knowledge and the object of knowledge are really identical and denote the same Reality.

11 Fire, etc.—That is to say, from the standpoints of the fire and the sun, the heat and the light are identical with the fire and the sun.

12 Nārāyaṇa—The story runs thus:—In ancient times Gauḍapāda retired to Badarikāśrama, in the interior of the Himalayas, and there worshipped with great austerity the human figure of the Almighty Lord.

अस्पर्शीयोऽवै नाम सर्वसत्त्वत्त्विहि हितः ।
अविवादोऽविरूद्धः देशितस्तं नमाम्यहम् ॥ २ ॥

2. I salute this Yoga known as the Asparśa (i.e., free from all touch which implies duality), taught through the scripture,—the Yoga which promotes the happiness of all beings and conduces to the well-being of all and which is free from strife and contradictions.

ŚANKARA’S COMMENTARY

Now salutation is made to the Yoga taught by the Advaita Philosophy, in order to extol it. The word Asparśayoga¹ in the text means the Yoga which is always and in all respects free from sparśa or relationship with anything and which is of the same² nature as Brahman. This Yoga is well known as the Asparśayoga to all
Knowers of Brahman. This Yoga is conducive\(^3\) to the happiness of all beings. There are certain forms of Yoga such as Tapas or austerity, which though conducive to the supreme happiness, are associated with misery. But this is not of that kind. Then what is its nature? It tends to the happiness of all beings. It may however be contended that the enjoyment of certain desires gives pleasure but certainly does not tend to one’s well-being. But this Asparśayoga conduces to both\(^4\) happiness and well-being. For,\(^6\) it never changes its nature. Moreover, this\(^8\) Yoga is free from strife, that is to say, in it there is no room for any passage-at-words, which is inevitable in all disputes consisting of two opposite sides. Why so? For, it is non-contradictory\(^7\) in nature. To this kind of Yoga, taught in the scripture, I bow.\(^8\)

\(^1\) Asparśayoga—As a matter of fact there is a contradiction involved in this word. For, the word “Asparśa”, meaning freedom from relation, indicates only non-duality which by its very nature has no contact with any other thing, as such a thing is ever non-existent. The word Yoga, ‘meaning contact’ implies more than one. Gauḍapāda names the path of knowledge as Asparśayoga, as the word Yoga was used in his time also to denote the method for realising the Ultimate Truth.

\(^2\) Same nature, etc.—The Jñānam through which the aspirant realises Brahman is identical with Brahman itself.

\(^3\) Conducive, etc.—Because Jñāna Yoga is the surest and most direct method for the realisation of the highest Truth.

\(^4\) Both, etc.—It is because the aim of this Yoga is the realisation of Self which is of the nature of Existence-Knowledge-Bliss-Absolute.

\(^5\) For, etc.—The idea of duality and change, implying loss, is at the root of all miseries. This Yoga enables us to realise the Self which is free from all ideas of change.

\(^6\) This yoga, etc.—The non-dualist knows that even those who come to quarrel with him are, in reality, his own self. Therefore he does not look upon any one as his opponent.
7 Non-contradictory—One who knows everything as his own self does not contradict others. For, one cannot contradict his own self.

8 Bow—The salutation is meant to direct the attention of the students to this most valuable and easy way of realising the Truth.

मूलस्य जातिमिच्छत्नि वादिनः केचिदेव हि ।
अभूतस्यापे धीरा विचिन्ति: परस्परम्।। ॥ ३ ॥

3. Quarrelling among themselves, some disputants postulate that an existing entity undergoes evolution, whereas other disputants, proud of their understanding, maintain that evolution proceeds from a non-existing entity.

Sankara’s Commentary

How do the dualists quarrel with one another? It is thus replied:1 Some disputants, such as the followers of the Sāmkhya system, admit production as the effect of an entity that is already existent. But this is not the view of all the dualists. For the intelligent followers of the Nyāya and the Vaiśeshika systems, that is to say, those who believe that they possess wisdom, maintain that evolution proceeds from a non-existing cause. The meaning is that these disputants, quarrelling among themselves, claim victory over their respective opponents.

1 The disputation among the dualists is mentioned here in order to make clear the non-contradictory nature of the non-dualists. All the dualists believe in the act of creation or evolution.

भूतं न जायते किचिदभूतं नैव जायते ।
विचिन्तो द्रव्यो होमजाति रुपयापन्ति ते || ४ ॥

4. The existent cannot (again) pass into (birth) existence. Nor can the non-existent be born or come
into being as existent. Thus disputing among themselves, they, as a matter of fact, tend to establish the Advaita view and support the Ajāti or the absolute non-evolution (of what exists).

ŚANKARA’S COMMENTARY

What do they, by refuting each other’s conclusions and quarrelling among themselves, really establish? It is thus replied:—No$^1$ entity which is already in existence can again pass into birth. The reason is that as entity, it already exists. It is just like the Ātman, which already being in existence, cannot be born again as a new entity. Thus argues the supporter of evolution from non-ens (i.e., from a non-existing cause) and refutes the Sāmkhya theory that an existing cause is born again as an effect. Similarly, the follower of the Sāmkhya theory refutes the supporter of the non-ens view regarding creation by a non-existing cause. He declares that a non-existing$^2$ cause, on account of its very non-existence, cannot, like the horns of a hare, produce an effect. Thus$^3$ quarrelling among themselves, by supporting “existent” and “non-existent” causes, they refute their respective opponent’s views and declare, in effect, the truth that there is no creation at all.

$^1$ No, etc.—This is the view of the followers of the Naiyāyika and Vaiśeshika systems. According to them, an existing entity cannot be born as an effect. If an entity already exists, it is not said to be produced again. This view can be stated thus:—A cannot produce B, as A is always A and B is always B. It may be contended that A + C may produce B. Therefore C is something which does not exist in the cause A. Therefore the effect B does not come out of the cause A.

$^2$ Non-existing, etc.—This is the view of the followers of the Sāmkhya system. According to them, the existing entity cannot
undergo any annihilation; nor can the non-existing entity pass into existence. The existing entity is existent in times, past, present and future. A non-existing entity, such as the child of a barren woman, is always non-existent. By "birth", the Sāmkhyas mean manifestation and by "death", they understand the return of the effect into the cause. The sesame seed produces oil. It means that oil, already existent in the seed, manifests itself in the form of the effect when the seed (the cause) is pressed. But one cannot get oil by pressing sand, as oil is never present in the sand. The clay which contains in potential form the pot, manifests the pot. Again the destruction of the pot means its going back to the original cause, viz., the clay. There is no absolute destruction of the pot.

3 Thus, etc.—Both the theories are based upon causality. But by refuting each other, they, in fact, refute causality itself. For, if an existing thing is produced from an existing cause (as the Sāmkhyas profess) then there cannot be, in truth, any causal relation. Similarly, it is absurd to say that a positive thing can be produced by a non-existing cause. Thus the entire theory of causality is refuted. This only establishes the Advaita position of Ajāti which means that there is no act of creation or manifestation.

ह्याप्रभमानामजाति तैरतुलोदामहे वयम्।
विवदामो न तैः साधर्मविव्रां निव्रोधत ॥ ५ ॥

5. We approve the Ajāti or non-creation declared by them. We do not quarrel with them. Now, hear from us (the Ultimate Reality) which is free from all disputations.

SANKARA'S COMMENTARY

We simply accept the view of the Ajāti or the absolute non-causation declared by them¹ and say, "Let it be so". We do not quarrel with them by taking either side in the disputation. In other words, like them, we do not quarrel with each other. Hence Oh ye pupils, know from us the Ultimate Reality as taught by us, which is free from dispute.
1. The followers of the Sāmkhya as well as the Nyāya and the Vaiśeshika systems.

Both schools by finding fault with each other's views regarding 'causal' relation tend to establish the truth of Ājāti or the absolute non-manifestation of Ātman. With regard to causality, we accept that theory that is not refuted by any party, but which must be admitted by all, viz., Ājāti.

अजातसैवधमर्मश्च जातिमिच्छतिः वादिते।
अजातो गृहृतो धर्मोऽमर्यते कथमेवति॥ ६ ॥

6. The disputants (i.e., the dualists) contend that the ever-unborn (changeless) entity (Ātman) undergoes a change. How does an entity which is changeless and immortal partake of the nature of the mortal?

SANKARA'S COMMENTARY

The word “disputant” in the text includes all the dualists, viz., those who believe that evolution proceeds from an existing cause, as well as those who believe its opposite. This verse has already been commented upon.

For the commentary and the note of this Kārikā see Kārikā 20 of the previous chapter.

न भवत्वेवृत्तं मर्यः न मर्यमृत्तं तथा।
प्रकृतेर्न्यथामावो न कथं चिद्विषयति॥ ७ ॥

7. The immortal cannot become mortal, nor can the mortal ever become immortal. For, it is never possible for a thing to change its nature.

स्मात्वेवनामृत्तम् यथः धर्मोऽमर्यति मर्यत्तम्।
कृत्तेवनामृत्तस्तस्य कथं स्थायति निष्कृतः॥ ८ ॥

8. How can he, who believes that the naturally immortal entity becomes mortal, maintain that the
immortal, after passing through birth, retains its changeless nature?

ŚANKARA’S COMMENTARY

These verses have already been explained. They are repeated here in order to justify our view that the disputants mentioned above only contradict each other.

See Kārikās 21 and 22 of the previous chapter.

9. By prakriti or the inherent nature of a thing is understood that which, when acquired, becomes completely part and parcel of the thing, that which is its very characteristic quality, that which is part of it from its very birth, that which does not depend upon anything extraneous for its origin and that which never ceases to be itself.

ŚANKARA’S COMMENTARY

Even the nature of a thing in ordinary experience does not undergo any reversal. What is meant by the nature of a thing? This is thus replied:—The word “samsiddhi” means “complete attainment”. The nature of a thing is formed by such complete attainment as in the case of the perfected Yogis who attain to such superhuman powers as Aṇimā, etc. These powers thus acquired by the Yogis never undergo any transformation in the past and future. Therefore these constitute the very nature of the Yogis. Similarly, the characteristic quality of a thing, such as heat or light of fire and the like, never undergoes any change either in time or space. So also the nature of a thing which is part of it from its very birth, as the flying power of the bird, etc., through the sky, is called its prakriti. Anything else which is not
produced by any other cause (except the thing itself), such as the running downwards of water is also called prakriti. And lastly, anything which does not cease to be itself is known popularly to be its prakriti. The purport of the Kārikā is that if in the case of empirical entities, which are only imagined, their nature or prakriti does not undergo any change, then how should it be otherwise in the case of the immortal or unchanging nature regarding the Ultimate Reality, whose very Prakriti is Ajāti or absolute non-manifestation.

1 Even, etc.—The purport is that if the unchangeability of the nature of a thing is noticed in ordinary experiences, then it applies with greater force to Brahman whose changeless and immortal nature can never undergo any transformation.

2 Animal—There are eight superhuman powers which the Yogis can attain to as the result of their yogic perfection. The word ‘Animal’ means the power of becoming as small as an atom.

3 Which, etc.—As the characteristics of a jar or the jariness of it which depends entirely upon the jar and not upon anything else.

4 Imagined—According to Advaita Vedānta the characteristics of entities of ordinary experience which are thought of as unchanging by the dualists, are mere imagination.

जरामरणनिर्मुक्ता: सर्वे धर्म: स्वभावत: ।
जरामरणमिच्छन्तिर्यवन्ते तन्मनीषया || १० ॥

10. *All the Jivas are, by their very nature, free from senility and death. They think, as it were, that they are subject to these and thus by this very thought they appear to deviate from their very nature.*

ŚANKARA’S COMMENTARY

What is the basis of that Prakriti whose change is imagined by the disputants? What, again, is the defect in such imagination? This is thus replied:—The words
“Free from senility and death,” in the text signify freedom from all changes characterised by senility, death, etc. Who are thus free (from all changes)? These are all the Jīvas, who are, by their very nature, free from all changes. Though the Jīvas are such by their very nature, yet they think, as it were, that they are subject to senility and death. By such imagination about their selves, like the imagination of the snake in the rope, they (appear to) deviate from their nature. This happens on account of their identification, through thinking, with senility and death. That is to say, they (appear to) fall from their real nature by this defect in their thought.

1 Changes—There are six changes associated with objects in nature. They are birth, existence, growth, maturity, decay and death.

2 Imagination—That the Jīvas are subject to birth and death is a mere imagination. These states do not exist except in the thought of the thinker. Even when the Jīva thinks himself to be subject to birth and death, he is, in reality, free from these changes. Such imagination cannot affect his real nature as all the water of the mirage cannot soak a grain of sand in the desert. There is no change of Reality in Prakṛiti. If one sees any change it is due to his Kalpanā. The rope never becomes the snake.

कारणं यथे कार्यं कारणं तस्य जायते ।
जायामानं कथमानं भिन्नं निलं कथं च तत् || ११ ||

11. The disputant, according to whom the cause itself is the effect, maintains that the cause itself is born as the effect. How is it possible for the cause to be unborn if it be said to be born (as the effect)? How, again, is it said to be eternal if it be subject to modification (i.e., birth)?

ŚANKARA’S COMMENTARY

How is it that the Sāmkhyas, who believe in the evolution of an existing cause, maintain a view which
is irrational? It is thus replied by the followers of the Vaiśeshika system: Those who say that the cause, that is to say, such material cause as clay, is, in itself, the effect; or in other words those disputants who assert that the cause itself changes into the effect, maintain, as a matter of fact, that the ever-existent and unborn cause, namely the Pradhāna, etc., is born again as the effect, such as Mahat, etc. If Pradhāna be born in the form of Mahat, etc., then how can it be designated as birthless? To say that it is unborn, i.e., immutable and at the same time born, i.e., passing into change, involves a contradiction. Further, the Sāmkhyas designate Pradhāna as eternal. How is it possible for Pradhāna to be eternal if even a part of it be affected by change? In other words, ordinary experience does not furnish us with the instance of a jar, composed of parts, which, if broken in any part, can still be called permanent or immutable. The purport is that a contradiction is obvious in the statement that it is affected partly by change and at the same time it is unborn and eternal.

1 Eternal—According to the Sāmkhya theory, the Pradhāna or Prakriti is composed of three parts, viz., Sattva, Rajas and Tamas. An entity composed of parts can never be termed eternal or permanent. That which is composed of parts, must, in course of time, undergo decomposition.

Kāraṇāvadana-nyutvam: kāraṇāṁ yadī

Jāyāmaṇāndī vā kāraṇātāraṇāṁ te kathāḥ dhruvam || 12 ||

12. If, as you say, the cause is non-different from the effect, then the effect also must be unborn. Further, how can the cause be permanent if it be non-different from the effect which is born?
This verse is meant to make the meaning of the previous one clearer. If your object be to maintain that the unborn cause is identical with the effect, then it necessarily follows that the effect also becomes equally unborn. But it\(^1\) is certainly a contradiction to say that a thing is an effect and at the same time unborn. There is a further difficulty. In the case of identity\(^2\) of the cause and the effect, how can, according to you, the cause, which\(^3\) is non-different from the born effect, be permanent and immutable? It is not possible to imagine that a part of a hen is being cooked and that another part is laying eggs.

If the identity of cause and effect be maintained then it may be asked if the cause be identical with the effect or if the effect be identical with the cause. In the former case of identity, the effect becomes unborn and in the latter case the cause becomes something born and loses its immutable and permanent character.

\(^1\) *It, etc.*—For, an effect is that which is born out of a cause.

\(^2\) *Identity, etc.*—If cause and effect be identical then how can one distinguish between the cause and the effect?

\(^3\) *Which is, etc.*—If the cause be identical with the born effect then the cause cannot be called permanent and immutable, as birth means change.

This view avoids this difficulty by denying any act of birth in the cause. There is only one existence, *viz., Brahman*, which is called the cause by ignorant people whose mind is still moving in the causal plane.

अजाठृ जायते यस्य द्यान्तस्य नासि वै |
जातात जायमानस्य न ह्यत्स्था प्रसञ्ज्ये || १३ ॥

13. *There is no illustration to support the view of him who says that the effect is born from the unborn cause. Again, if it be said that the effect is produced from a cause*
which is itself born then it leads to a regressus ad infinitum.

**ŚANKARA’S COMMENTARY**

Moreover, the disputant¹ who says that the effect is produced from an unborn cause, cannot furnish an illustration to support his view. In other words, it is consequently established that nothing is born from an unborn cause as there is no illustration to support this view. If,² on the other hand, it be contended that the effect is born from a born cause, then that cause must be born from some other born cause and so on, which position never enables us to reach a cause which is, in itself, unborn. In other words, we are faced with an infinite regress.

¹ *Disputant*—The follower of the Sāmkhya system contends that such effects as Mahat, etc., are evolved from the unborn Pradhāna, the cause being non-different from the effect. The Kārikā disproves this theory of the Sāmkhyas as well as the creation theory of some Vedāntists. This theory is a matter of inference. But there is no illustration to draw the inference.

² *If, etc.*—If the effect be produced from a born cause (*i.e.*, a cause which is the effect of some other cause), then there will be an endless regress and we shall never arrive at a cause which is, itself, unborn.

**Heteorādi:** फलं येषामादिहेतु: फलस्य च।

**Heteo:** फलस्य चानादिर: कथं तैरप्रवर्णिम॥ १४ ॥

14. How can they, who assert that the effect is the cause of the cause and the cause is the cause of the effect maintain the beginninglessness of both the cause and the effect?

**ŚANKARA’S COMMENTARY**

The *Śruti*, in the passage, ‘’When all this has, verily, become his *Ātman’’ declares, from the standpoint of the
Ultimate Reality, the absence of duality. From this standpoint of the Scriptural text, it is said: The cause, \( i.e. \), the merit (Dharma) and the demerit (Adharma), etc., has, for its cause, the effect, \( viz. \), the aggregate of the body, etc. Similarly, the cause, \( viz. \), merit and demerit, etc., is the cause of the effect, \( viz. \), the aggregate of the body, etc. How can disputants who maintain this view, \( viz. \), that both the cause and the effect are with beginning on account of mutual interdependence of the cause and the effect, assert that both the cause and the effect are without beginning? In other words, this position implies an inherent contradiction. The Ātman, \( viz. \), which is eternal and immutable, can never become either the cause or the effect.

1 \( Cause, etc. \)—The birth in a body produces the effect, \( viz. \), the merit and the demerit.

2 \( Cause, etc. \)—The merit and the demerit determine the birth in a body. Thus it is seen, according to this view, the cause produces the effect and the effect, in its turn, produces the cause.

3 \( Disputants \)—This is the view held by the Mīmāṃsakas. They maintain that the endless chain of life and death, consisting of the cause and the effect, is without beginning. It is just like the beginninglessness of the hen and the egg. This view is true from the relative standpoint.

4 \( With beginning \)—It is because the cause has its beginning in the effect and the effect has its beginning in the cause.

5 \( Contradiction \)—It is because the Mīmāṃsakas admitting the beginning of the cause and the effect, again assert that both are without beginning.

6 \( Ātman, etc. \)—The opponent may contend that the Ātman has become both the cause and the effect. The cause and the effect may have a beginning because both are the modifications of Ātman. But from the standpoint of their substratum, \( viz. \), the Ātman, they are without beginning. This contention is baseless as the Ātman which is immutable, eternal and without parts cannot undergo any modification in the forms of cause and effect.
15. Those who maintain that the effect is the cause of the cause and the cause is the cause of the effect, describe, as a matter of fact, the evolution after the manner of the birth of the father from the son.

SANKARA’S COMMENTARY

How does the contention of the opponent imply a contradiction? It is thus replied:—The admission that the cause is produced from an effect, which is itself born of a cause, carries with it the contradiction which may be stated to be like the birth of the father from the son.

16. In case causality be still maintained, the order in which cause and effect succeed each other must be stated. If it be said that they appear simultaneously, then they being like the two horns of an animal, cannot be mutually related to each other.

SANKARA’S COMMENTARY

If it be contended that the contradiction, pointed out above, cannot be valid, then the opponent should determine the order in which cause and effect succeed each other. The opponent has to show that the “cause” which is antecedent, produces the “effect” which is subsequent. For the following reason also, the order of “cause” and “effect” must be shown. For, if cause and effect arise simultaneously, then they cannot be related as the cause and the effect, as it is impossible to
establish the causal relation between the two horns of a cow produced simultaneously.

This Kārikā refutes causality from the point of time.

फलादुत्पादमानस्सन ते हेतु: प्रमिध्यति ।
अपासिद्ध: कथं हेतु: फलादुपाददिध्यति || १७ ||

17. Your cause cannot be established if it be produced from the effect. How can the cause, which is itself not established, give birth to the effect?

ŚANKARA'S COMMENTARY

How can there be no causal relation? It is thus replied:—The cause cannot have a definite existence if it is to be born of an effect which is, itself, yet unborn, and therefore which is non-existent like the horns of a hare. How can the cause contemplated by you, which is, itself, indefinite and which is non-existent like the horns of a hare, produce an effect? Two things which are mutually dependent upon each other for their production and which are like the horns of a hare, cannot be related as cause and effect or in any other way.

This Kārika proves that the very idea of the causal relation involves an absurdity. The contention of the opponent is this:—The cause and the effect are dependent upon each other for their mutual production. A house is built for the purpose of living. The thought of living results in the building of the house. The absurdity of this contention is thus shown:—The general law of causality is that the cause is antecedent and the effect is subsequent to and dependent upon a cause. If the effect be the cause of a cause, then the cause is said to be born from something which is not yet in existence. If the cause is to be produced from a non-existent effect, then the cause itself becomes non-existent. And the cause, being itself non-existent, can but produce an effect which also is non-existent. Thus both cause and effect become non-existent like the
horns of a hare. Therefore they cannot be related as cause and effect, which relation can subsist only between two existing entities.

1 *Cause, etc.*—If you say that the cause is produced from the effect (which, itself, on account of its appearing after cause, is yet non-existent), then cause cannot be established. For, in that case it is also non-existent, as it is admitted to be the product of an effect which is, itself, non-existent.

2 *How can, etc.*—If the cause itself be thus proved to be non-existent, how can it, then, produce an effect? If it cannot produce an effect, how do you call it the cause?

3 *Like, etc.*—It is because both the cause and the effect have been proved to be non-existent.

4 *In any, etc.*—Any other relation, such as that of the container and the contained, between two things which are non-existent becomes an absurdity.

\[\text{यदि हेतुः फलासिद्धः फलसिद्धिश्च हेतुतः।}
\text{कतर्पूर्वनिष्पन्नं यस्य सिद्धिरपेक्षया॥ १८॥}
\]

18. *If the cause is produced from the effect and if the effect is, again, produced from the cause, which of the two is born first upon which depends the birth of the other?*

**Śankara’s Commentary**

Though any relation between cause and effect has been found to be an impossibility, yet it may be contended by the opponent that the cause and the effect, though not causally related, yet depend upon each other for their mutual existence. As a reply to this contention we ask: Which of the two, the cause and the effect, is antecedent to the other, upon the previous existence of which, the subsequent existence of the other is dependent?

If both the cause and the effect are mutually dependent, then how can we say that one is prior to the other? If the priority of one cannot be established, then it cannot be proved that one is dependent upon the other for its existence.
19. *The inability (to reply), the ignorance (about the matter) and the impossibility of (establishing) the order of succession (of the cause and the effect) clearly lead the wise to stick to their theory of absolute non-evolution (Ajāti).*

**ŚANKARA’S COMMENTARY**

If you think that this\(^1\) cannot be explained then this inability shows your ignorance, that is to say, it demonstrates that you are deluded regarding the Knowledge of Reality. Again, the order of succession, pointed out by you—that the effect comes from the cause and the cause comes from the effect—is also inconsistent.\(^2\) Thus is shown the impropriety of the causal relation between the cause and the effect. This\(^3\) leads the wise among the disputants, by showing the fallacy in each other’s arguments, to declare, in effect, the non-evolution of things (which is our opinion).

\(^1\) *This, etc.—*That is to say, which one of the cause and the effect is antecedent and which is subsequent. It is because both are mutually dependent.

\(^2\) *Inconsistent—*See the previous Kārikā.

\(^3\) *This, etc.—*The followers of the Sāmkhya as well as of the Nyāya and Vaiśeshika systems, supporting respectively the evolution of things from an existing and non-existing cause, indicate the fallacy in each other’s arguments. It has also been demonstrated that there cannot be any order of succession of cause and effect in the evolution. Thus the disputants ultimately support the view of Ajāti or non-evolution of things as stated by us.
20. *The illustration of the seed and the sprout is itself a matter which is yet to be proved. The middle term (that is, the illustration) which is itself yet to be proved (to be true) cannot be used for establishing a proposition to be proved.*

**ŚANKARA’S COMMENTARY**

(Objection)—We have asserted the causal relation between the cause and the effect. But you have raised mere verbal\(^1\) difficulties to show the inconsistency in our statement and made a caricature of our standpoint by pointing out its absurdity like the birth of the father from the son or a causal relation between the two horns (of a bull), etc. We do not, for a moment, admit the production of an effect from a cause not already existent or of a cause from an effect not established.

(Reply)—What is, then, your contention?

(Objection)—We admit the causal relation as\(^2\) in the case of the seed and the sprout.

(Reply)—To this we reply as follows:—The illustration of the causal relation existing between the seed and the sprout is itself the same as the major term in my syllogism, that is to say, the \(^3\) illustration itself is to be proved.

(Objection)—It is apparent that the causal relation of the seed and the sprout is without beginning.

(Reply)—It is not so. The beginning of all antecedents must be admitted, as is the case with the consequences. As\(^4\) a sprout just produced from a seed is with beginning, similarly the seed also, produced from another sprout (existing in the past), by the very succession implied in the act of production, is with beginning. Therefore all antecedent sprouts as well as seeds are with beginning.
As every seed and every sprout, among the seeds and the sprouts, are with beginning, so it is unreasonable to say that any one of these is without beginning. This is also equally applicable to the argument of the cause and the effect.

(Objection)—Each⁵ of the series of the seeds and the sprouts is without beginning.

(Reply)—No. The unity or oneness of such series cannot be justified. Even those who maintain the beginninglessness of the seed and the sprout, do not admit the existence of a thing known as the series of the seed and the sprout apart from the seed and the sprout. Nor do they admit such a series in the case of the cause and the effect. Therefore it has been rightly asked, "How do you assert the beginninglessness of the cause and the effect?" Other explanations being unreasonable, we have not raised any verbal difficulty. Even⁶ in our ordinary experience expert logicians do not use anything, which is yet to be established, as the middle term or illustration in order to establish relation between the major and the minor terms of a syllogism. The word Hetu or the middle term is used here in the sense of illustration, as it is the illustration which leads to the establishment of a proposition. In the context illustration is meant and not reason.

¹Verbal, etc.—The opponent contends that the difficulties raised are merely verbal.
²As in, etc.—It is like the production of the seed from the sprout and vice versa.
³The illustration, etc.—Śankara contends that it is to be proved that the seed is produced from a beginningless sprout or the sprout is produced from a beginningless seed.
⁴As a sprout, etc.—The opponent contends that the bija (seed or cause) is without beginning (Anādi) because he wants to make
it Ajā or beginningless. But Śankara says that every bija or seed is produced and therefore every bija is with beginning. Hence the cause cannot be Ajā or birthless.

Each, etc.—The opponent contends that there is a series of seed and there is another series of sprout. From the 'seed series' is produced the 'sprout series' and vice versa. Similarly, from the 'cause series' is produced the 'effect series' and vice versa.

Even, etc.—The illustration of the seed and the sprout has been given by the opponent to prove the beginninglessness of the cause and the effect. But Śankara contends that the beginninglessness of the seed and the sprout in the illustration has not yet been proved. As a matter of fact it has been shown that both the seed and the sprout are with beginning. Hence this illustration which is itself not proved, cannot be admitted in support of the contention.

21. The ignorance regarding the antecedence and the subsequence of the cause and the effect clearly proves the absence of evolution or creation. If the effect (Dharma, i.e., the Jīva) has really been produced from a cause, then why can you not point out the antecedent cause?

ŚANKARA'S COMMENTARY

How do the wise assert the view of Ajāti or absolute non-evolution? It is thus replied:—The very fact that one does not know the antecedence and the subsequence of the cause and the effect is, in itself, the clearest indication of absolute non-evolution. If the effect (Dharma, i.e., the Jīva) be taken as produced (from a cause) then why cannot its antecedent cause be pointed out? It goes without saying that one who accepts birth as a fact must also know its antecedent cause. For, the relationship of the cause and the effect is inseparable and therefore
cannot be given up. Therefore the absence of knowledge (regarding the cause) clearly indicates the fact of absolute non-evolution.

1 The very, etc.—The fact of birth can be said to be established if the order of the succession of cause and effect be established. In the absence of such order there cannot be any birth or evolution.

2 If, etc.—The idea of ‘cause’ cannot be thought of without the idea of ‘effect’ and vice-versa. Therefore we cannot say which one is antecedent. Hence the idea of evolution (Janma), i.e., an antecedent cause giving birth to a subsequent effect, is due to ignorance or Avidyā.

Śvātoṣa बा परतो वादपि न किचिद्रस्तु जायते ।
सदसक्षसदस्तादपि न किचिद्रस्तु जायते ॥ २२ ॥

22. Nothing, whatsoever, is born either of itself or of another. Nothing is ever produced whether it be being or non-being or both being and non-being.

ŚANKARA’S COMMENTARY

For this reason, also, nothing whatsoever is born. That 1 which is (supposed to be) born cannot be born of itself, of another or of both. Nothing, 2 whether it be existing or non-existing, or both, is ever born. Of such an entity, birth is not possible in any manner whatsoever. Nothing 3 is born out of itself, i.e., from its own form which in itself has not yet come into existence. A jar cannot be produced from the self-same jar. A thing cannot be born from another thing, which is other than itself, as a jar cannot be produced from another jar, or a piece of cloth from another piece of cloth. Similarly, a thing cannot be born both out of itself and another, as that involves a contradiction. 4 A 5 jar or a piece of cloth cannot be produced by both a jar and a piece of cloth.
(Objection)—A jar is produced from clay, and a son is born of a father.

(Reply)—Yes, the deluded use a word like “birth” and have a notion corresponding to the word. Both the word and the notion are examined by men of discrimination who wish to ascertain whether these are true or not. After examination they come to the conclusion that things, such as a jar or a son, etc., denoted by the words and signified by the notions, or mere verbal expressions. The Scripture also corroborates it, saying, “All effects are mere names and figures of speech.” If the thing is ever-existent, then it cannot be born again. The very existence is the reason for non-evolution. A father or clay is the illustration to support the contention. If these objects, on the other hand, be non-existent, even then they cannot be said to be produced. The very non-existence is the reason. The horns of a hare are an illustration. If things be both existent and non-existent, then also, it cannot be born. For, such contradictory ideas cannot be associated with a thing. Therefore it is established that nothing whatsoever is born. Those who, again, assert that the very fact of birth is born again, that the cause, the effect and the act of birth form one unity, and also that all objects have only momentary existence, maintain a view which is very far from reason. For a thing immediately after being pointed out as “It is this,” ceases to exist and consequently no memory of the thing is possible in the absence of such cognition.

There are six possible alternatives in the case of the birth of a thing. It is either born of itself, or of another, or of both. That which is born is either existing or non-existing or both. This Kārikā shows the absurdity of all these positions and conclusively establishes the theory of absolute non-evolution.
That, etc.—That is to say, the three alternatives are denied regarding the cause.

Nothing, etc.—In other words the three alternatives are denied regarding the effect.

Nothing, etc.—Both always means change. If a thing produces another thing, it cannot do so without a change in itself. If it undergoes a change, it ceases to be the thing itself. Therefore a thing cannot be the cause of the same thing. A jar cannot be the cause of the very same jar.

Contradiction—For, a cause cannot, at the same time, combine within it two contradictory aspects.

A jar, etc.—Therefore an object which is supposed to be born cannot be born from a cause which is both existing and non-existing.

Verbal, etc.—It is because the birth of a son or the production of a jar cannot be proved.

The very, etc.—Birth signifying a change would indicate that the thing, before it was born, had been non-existent. This previous non-existence cannot be reconciled with the idea of its being ever-existent.

Father, etc.—If the son or the jar be ever-existent, then they cannot be born from a father or clay.

Horns, etc.—Horns of a hare are ever non-existent. Hence no birth can be predicated of them.

Those, etc.—This is the view of the Buddhist idealists. According to them, no external objects, corresponding to our idea of them, exist. Idea alone is real. One idea gives birth to another idea. These ideas are momentary. The moment an idea is cognised as such, it vanishes giving birth to another idea. All our notions regarding the cause, the effect and the act of birth form only one unit idea. But this position is absolutely untenable. If one idea be immediately succeeded by another idea, then the antecedent idea is no longer cognised by us. In the absence of such cognition, no memory is possible. If an idea has only a momentary existence, then our very possibility of experience becomes an absurdity. If there cannot be any memory of the antecedent idea, then it is not possible to establish a causal relation between the antecedent and the subsequent ideas.
23. The cause cannot be produced from an effect which is without beginning, nor is the effect born of its own nature (itself). That which is without beginning is necessarily free from birth.

SANKARA’S COMMENTARY

In accepting the beginninglessness of the cause and the effect you are forced to admit the absence of birth regarding them. How is it so? The cause cannot be produced from an effect, which is without beginning. In other words, you do not certainly mean that the cause is produced from an effect which is, itself, without beginning and free from birth. Nor do you admit that the effect, by following its own inherent nature, (i.e., without any extraneous cause) is produced from a cause which is unborn and without beginning. Therefore by admitting the beginninglessness of the cause and the effect, you, verily, accept the fact of their being never produced. It is because we know from common experience that what is without beginning is also free from birth which means a beginning. Beginning is admitted of a thing which has birth, and not of a thing which has none.

1 The cause, etc.—The beginningless effect cannot produce a cause. For, otherwise it cannot be itself an effect. An effect signifying birth, must have a beginning. Again, if the cause be produced from an effect, then the cause, itself, cannot be without beginning.

2 You, etc.—It is because if the effect be produced from a cause, it cannot be beginningless.

3 Therefore, etc.—If the cause and the effect, on account of their being never born, be ever free from birth, they cannot be cause:
and effect. For, the words are always associated with birth. Hence the opponent by admitting the beginninglessness of cause and effect accepts, as a matter of fact, the theory of Ajāti or he stultifies himself.

24. Subjective knowledge must have an objective cause; otherwise both must be non-existent. For this reason as well as that of the experience of pain, the existence of external objects, accepted by other thinkers, should be admitted.

ŚANKARA’S COMMENTARY

An objection is raised in order to strengthen the meaning already stated. The word Prajnapti in the text signifies “knowledge”, i.e., the experience of such notions as that of sound, etc. This (subjective) knowledge has a cause, i.e., an (external) agent or object corresponding to it. In other words, we premise that knowledge is not merely subjective but has an object outside the perceiving subject. Cognition of sound, etc., is not possible without objects. For, such experience is always produced by a cause. In the absence of such (external) object, the variety and multiplicity of experiences such as sound, touch, colour, viz., blue, yellow, red, etc., would not have existed. But the varieties are not non-existent, for these are directly perceived by all. Hence, because the variety of manifold experiences exist, it is necessary to admit the existence—as supported by the system of the opposite school—of external objects which are outside the ideas of the perceiving subject. The subjective knowledge has one characteristic alone, i.e., it is of the very nature of illumination. It does not admit of any variety within itself. The variety of experiences of colour,
such as blueness, yellowness, etc., cannot possibly be explained, by merely imagining a variety in the subjective knowledge, without admitting variety of external objects which are the substratum of these multiple colours. In other words, no variety of colour is possible in a (white) crystal without its coming in contact with such adjuncts as the external objects which possess such colours as blueness, etc. For this additional reason also one is forced to admit the existence of external object,—supported by the Scripture of the opposite school,—an object which is external to the knowledge (of the perceiving subject): Misery⁶ caused by burns, etc., is experienced by all. Such pain as is caused by burns, etc., would not have been felt in the absence of the fire, etc., which is the cause of the burns and which exists independent of the knowledge (of the perceiving subject). But such pain is experienced by all. Hence,⁷ we think that external objects do exist. It is not reasonable to conclude that such pain is caused by mere subjective knowledge. For,⁸ such misery is not found elsewhere.

This Kārikā gives the views of the dualists who believe in the reality of external objects. They argue thus:—Knowledge is not possible without the contact with an external object. Mental impressions are always created by our coming into contact with objects that lie outside of us. Besides, no variety is possible in the knowledge of the perceiving subject without a corresponding variety existing outside of it. From the experience of such knowledge as that of colour, form, etc., one must admit the existence of objects outside the perceiving mind corresponding to the subjective impressions. Again, different experiences give rise to different feelings, such as pleasant or otherwise, which also are impossible in the absence of external objects. All these arguments compel one to believe in the reality of external objects.

¹ In, etc.—Otherwise there would be no idea of variety and objects corresponding to such ideas.
2 Misery, etc.—A man may create ideas, but he cannot create pain. Therefore, the pain must have an external cause.

3 Hence, etc.—The contention of the opponent is that there must exist causal relation between objects and our knowledge of them.

4 For—that is to say, that the pain of burn is experienced only when the limb comes in contact with fire and not when it is besmeared with sandal-paste, etc. Therefore, misery, pain, etc., are not possible in the absence of a cause.

25. From the point of view of logical reason a cause for the subjective impression must be assigned. But from the standpoint of the highest Reality or the true nature of things, we find that the (so-called) cause (of the subjective impression) is, after all, no cause.

SANKARA’S COMMENTARY

To this objection, we reply as follows:—We admit that you posit a cause of the subjective experience on account of such arguments as the existence of the variety (in the objective world) and because of the experience of pain. Stick for a while to your argument that reason demands that an external object should exist to produce a subjective impression.

(The opponent)—Please let us know what you (Advaitin) are going to say next.

(Reply)—Yes, the jar, etc., posited by you as the cause, that is to say, the cause of the subjective impression, are not, according to us, the external cause, the substratum (of the impression); nor are they the cause for our experiences of variety.
(Objection)—How?

(Reply)—We say so from the standpoint of the true nature of Reality. When the true nature of clay is known a jar does not exist apart from the clay as exists a buffalo in entire independence of a horse. Nor does cloth exist apart from the thread in it. Similarly the threads have no existence apart from the fibres. If we thus proceed to find out the true nature of the thing, by going from one cause to another, till language or the object denoted by the language fails us, we do not still find any (final) cause.

"Bhūtadrarṣanāt" (from the true nature of the thing) may be "Abhūtadrarṣanāt" (from the unreality of the experiences). According to this interpretation, the meaning of the Kārikā is that we do not admit external objects as the cause on account of the unreality of these (external) objects, which are as unreal as the snake seen instead of the rope. The (so-called) cause ceases to be the cause as the former is due to the illusory perception of the perceiver. For, it (the external world) disappears in the absence of such illusory knowledge. The man in dreamless sleep and trance (Samādhi) and he who has attained the highest knowledge do not experience any object outside their self as they are free from such illusory cognition. An object which is cognised by a lunatic is never known as such by a sane man. Thus is answered the contention regarding the causality based upon the arguments of the perception of variety and the existence of pain.

Realism which is always associated with causality is now refuted by idealism.

1 To, etc.—That is to say, that objection as set forth in the previous Kārikā.

2 The jar, etc.—The external jar is not the cause of our mental impression (idea) of the jar. Nor is the external jar the substratum upon which the idea of the jar is superposed.
3 From the, etc.—It is, because from the standpoint of Ultimate Truth the external jar does not, as such, exist. That which really exists is clay (without form) which, being associated with name and form, appears as the jar. Name and form, being mere ideas of the mind, are illusory. Therefore, the jar has no real existence independent of the clay. If the opponent contends that the external objects create the subjective ideas, we ask for a cause for the external objects. The opponent cannot point out such a cause. Hence the argument of causality fails.

4 On account of, etc.—That is to say, no external object exists as such. What is taken as the external object is merely the idea of the perceiver. When the snake is perceived in the rope, that perception, being illusory, cannot be called the knowledge of any independent reality called snake. Similarly, the perception of the external object, being illusory, cannot point to the existence of any such object as an independent reality.

5 Cause, etc.—Seeking a cause for subjective ideas is due to ignorance (Avidyā).

6 For, etc.—When this ignorance, i.e., the belief in causality, disappears the external world itself disappears.

7 Free, etc.—That is to say, they are no longer subject to the law of causality. Hence they do not see any external world as an independent reality.

8 Thus, etc.—The opponent contends that external objects must exist as we are conscious of the variety of subjective impressions. Another reason for the existence of the external object is our experience of pain. The mind may create an idea, but it will not cause pain to itself. To this contention the following reply is given:—We may have consciousness of variety or pain in the absence of external objects. One is conscious of the variety of objects in dream. He feels pain in dream. But the dream experiences are only the subjective impressions in the mind of the dreamer. No external object exists, at that time, which corresponds to the dream experiences. Therefore subjective impressions need not be necessarily produced by a really existing external object. There is no proof that external objects independently of the mind exist. The subjective impression of the snake in place of the rope is produced in the absence of an external snake. From the standpoint of reality, nothing exists but the Self or Ātman. Perception
of any other existence is due to illusion. The mind, in ignorance, seeks a cause, and thereby infers an external world.

चिं न संस्थालयं नार्थभासं तथैव च।
अभूतो हि यत्तथायं नार्थभासस्तरः पृथक् ॥ २६ ॥

26. The mind is not related to the (external) objects. Nor are the ideas which appear as external objects, reflections upon the mind. It is so because the objects are non-existent and the ideas (which appear as external objects) are not separate from the mind.

SANKARA'S COMMENTARY

Because there are no external objects as cause, the mind does not relate itself to external objects which are supposed to be the cause of the subjective impression. Nor is the mind related to the ideas which appear as external objects, as the mind, like¹ the dream-mind, is identical with such ideas. It² is because the external objects such as sound, etc., perceived in the waking state, are as unreal as dream-objects, for³ reasons stated already. Another reason is that the ideas appearing as external objects are not different from the mind. It⁴ is the mind alone which, as in dream, appears as external objects such as the jar, etc.

¹ Like, etc.—In dream one experiences various external objects. But it is found in the waking state that it is mind alone which appears as objects seen in dream. The mind is identical with these ideas. Therefore there cannot be any causal relation between the mind and the ideas.

² It is, etc.—Therefore there cannot be any causal relation between the mind and the non-existing external objects.

³ For reasons, etc.—This has been treated in the second chapter of the Kārikā and in other places of the Kārikā.
4 It is, etc.—It is Self alone which exists. All that are perceived by the deluded as external objects are nothing but the Self. There is only non-dual Atman. The duality is due to illusion.

निमित्तं न सदा चिन्तं संस्पृश्यन्त्यवस्तु त्रिषु ।
अनिमित्तो विचयों तथं तस्य भविष्यति ॥ २७ ॥

27. The mind does not enter into causal relation in any of the three periods of time. How can the mind be ever subject to delusion, as there is no cause for any such delusion?

SANKARA'S COMMENTARY

(Objection)—The mind appears as the jar, etc., though such objects are non-existent. Therefore there¹ must exist false knowledge. Such being the case, there must be right knowledge somewhere (in relation to, or as distinguished from, false knowledge which we point out).

(Reply)—Our reply to this contention is as follows:—The mind certainly does not come in contact with a cause—an external object—in any of the three periods of time, past, present or future. If the mind had ever truly come in contact with such objects then such relation would give us an idea of true knowledge from the standpoint of Reality. And in relation to that knowledge the appearance of the jar, etc., in the mind, in the absence of the jar, etc., could have been termed as false knowledge. But never does the mind come in contact with an external object (which does not in reality exist). Hence how is it possible for the mind to fall into error when there is no cause for such an assumption? In other words, the mind is never subject to false knowledge. This² is, indeed, the very nature of the mind that it takes the forms of the jar, etc., though in reality, such jar, etc., which may cause the mental forms, do not at all exist.
There must, etc.—Otherwise one could not be aware of the external jar, etc., which do not really exist. One cannot be aware of wrong knowledge unless one knows what right knowledge is. The opponent intends to prove the positive existence of Avidyā which causes illusory knowledge.

This is, etc.—This is what is known as Avidyā or the ignorance of the true nature of Reality. On account of this ignorance the mind, which is the same as the non-dual Ātman, appears to take the form of the external objects. This false knowledge is not a correlative of true knowledge. This false knowledge regarding the existence of the external objects is due to the ignorance of the nature of Reality. Seeking after the cause of Avidyā is itself the characteristic of the ignorant mind which has not yet been able to free itself from the delusion of causality.

28. Therefore neither the mind nor the objects perceived by the mind are ever born. Those who perceive such birth may as well discover the foot-prints (of the birds) in the sky.

Śankara’s Commentary

The verses of the Kārikā from 25 to 27 give the views of a class of Buddhistic thinkers, known as the Vijñānavādins (the subjective idealists) who thus refute the views of those who maintain the reality of external objects. The Advaitic teacher (Gauḍapāda) approves of these arguments. Now he makes use of these very arguments of the Vijñānavādins as the ground (middle term) for refuting the conclusions of the subjective idealists. The Kārikā has this end in view. The subjective idealist admits that the mind, even in the absence of the (external) jar, etc., takes the form of the jar, etc. We also agree with this conclusion because this is in conformity with
the real nature of things. In like manner, the mind, though never produced, appears to be produced and cognised as such. Therefore the mind is never produced, as is the case with the object cognised by it. The Vijnānavādins who affirm the production of the mind and also assert that the mind is momentary, full of pain, non-Self in nature, etc., forget that the real\(^1\) nature of the mind can never be understood by the mind (as described by them). Thus the Vijnānavādins who see the production of the mind resemble those who (profess to) see in the sky foot-prints left by birds, etc. In other words, the Vijnānavādins are more audacious than the others, viz., the dualists. And the Nihilists\(^4\) who, in spite of the perception of the visible world, assert the absolute non-existence of everything including their own experiences, are even more audacious than the Vijnānavādins. These Nihilists take the position of those who claim to compress the whole sky in the palms of their hands.

The three Kārikās, viz., 25, 26 and 27, give the views of the Buddhist idealist who refutes those that believe in the reality of the external objects. This Kārikā refutes the position of the Vijnānavādin.

\(^1\) Vijnānavādins—They belong to the school of subjective idealism in the Buddhistic system of thought. According to this school, all objects are pre-existent in the subject in the form of Vāsanās (ideas). Cause is only a subjective idea. It does not exist as external object with which we associate it. Further, according to this school, all ideas are momentary.

\(^2\) The Advaita, etc.—Gauḍapāda accepts the views of the Vijnānavādins only in respect of the non-existence of external objects. He also agrees with the Vijnānavādins that the so-called external objects are nothing but the state of the mind (chittaspadanam).

\(^3\) Real nature, etc.—It is because the mind, according to the Vijnānavādins, is momentary. The consciousness of one moment is unrelated to that of the next moment. Such being the case, in
the absence of an unchanging entity it is not possible to know the-
change of consciousness from one moment to another. Therefore
it is absurd to assert that the mind is born every moment and that
it is full of misery, etc. For, there is no perceiver according to the
Vijnānavādins, which can cognize this momentary change of
consciousness as well as its painful and non-Ātman character.

4 Nihilists—The position of the Nihilists who affirm the non-
existence of everything, including the perceiver, is even more
untenable. If all that exists is really a void, then there must be
a perceiver of this void. Otherwise who will assert that everything,
is void?

अजातं जायते यस्मात् अजाति: प्रकृतिस्तिदः ।
प्रकृतेतर्यथाभावो न कथंचिन्द्रविष्ण्यति ॥ २९ ॥

29. (In the opinion of the disputants) that which is:
unborn is said to be born. For, its very nature is to be
ever unborn. It is never possible for a thing to be other
than what it is.

ŚANKARA’S COMMENTARY

For reasons already stated it is established that
Brahman is one and unborn. This verse summarises
the conclusion of what has already been stated in the
form of proposition. The unborn mind, which1 is verily
Brahman, is imagined by the disputants to be born.
Therefore (according to them) the ever-unborn is said to
be born. For, it is unborn by its very nature. It2 is
simply impossible for a thing, which is ever unborn by
nature, to be anyhow born, that is to say, to be anyhow
otherwise than what it is.

1 Which, etc.—It has been already seen that the mind is never
born. Therefore the mind is Brahma, non-dual and immutable.
The disputants, on account of ignorance, see the modifications and
change in the mind. The very nature of the mind is that it is one
and without a second, and free from change or birth.
2 It is, etc.—The absolute mind does not in any way undergo any change. Even through delusion the mind cannot be said to pass into birth. If it were so then it cannot be said to be unborn and unchanging in nature.

अनादेरृतव्यं च संसार्य न सेत्यति ॥
अनन्तता चाः दिमतो मोक्ष्या न भविष्यति ॥ ३० ॥

30. If the world be admitted to be beginningless (as some disputants assert), then it cannot be non-eternal. Moksha or liberation cannot have a beginning and be eternal.

SANKARA’S COMMENTARY

Here is another defect in the arguments of those who maintain that the Ātman is, in reality, subject² to both bondage and liberation. If the world (i.e., the state of bondage of the Ātman) be without beginning or a definite past, then its end cannot be established by any logical reasoning. In ordinary experience, there is no instance of an object which has no beginning but has an end.

(Objection)—We² see a break in the beginningless continuity of the relation of the seed and the sprout.

(Reply)—This illustration has no validity; for,³ the seed and the sprout do not constitute a single entity. In like manner, liberation cannot be said to have no end if it be asserted that liberation which is attained by acquisition of knowledge has a (definite) beginning. For, the jar, etc., which have a beginning have also an end.

(Objection)—There⁴ is no defect in our argument as liberation, not being any substance, may be like the destruction of a jar, etc.

(Reply)—In that case it will contradict your proposition that liberation has a positive existence from the
standpoint of the Ultimate Reality. Further, liberation being a non-entity, like the horn of a hare cannot ever have a beginning.

This Kārikā gives us the reason for the statement that Ātman is ever-pure, ever-free and ever-existent. Ātman, conceived as such, is not a theological dogma, nor is it based upon the intuition of the mystic, but it is a metaphysical fact.

1 Subject, etc.—That is to say, the Ātman is bound during the state of ignorance and it becomes free with the acquisition of knowledge. Those who make this contention accept the bondage of Ātman as a fact.

2 We see, etc.—The opponent contends that the relation of a seed and a tree, though without beginning, is seen to come to an end when the tree dies without leaving a seed.

3 For the seed, etc.—The seed and sprout do not constitute a single series. Every time a new seed and a new sprout are seen to be produced. Therefore both the seed and the tree have definite beginning.

4 There is, etc.—The opponent contends that a non-entity results from the breaking of a jar. This non-entity has a beginning (in the breaking of the jar) but it is eternal. Liberation (Moksha) in the form of the destruction of the bondage (bandha), not being any substance, can be eternal like the destruction of a jar which, though not a substance and though with beginning, is without end. This is the contention of the opponent.

आदाबन्ते च यत्नाति वर्तमानेऽसि ततथा ।
वित्तेऽः सद्यः सन्तोधितथा इत्र लक्षिता: ॥ ३१ ॥

31. That which is non-existent at the beginning and in the end, is necessarily so (non-existent) in the middle. The objects we see are illusions, still they are regarded as if real.

सप्रयोजनता तेषां खचने विप्रतिपङ्खिते ।
तस्मादाश्चत्रवचेन मिथ्येऽव खचदु ते स्पृता: ॥ ३२ ॥
32. The serving of some purpose by them (i.e., the objects of waking experience) is contradicted in dream. Therefore they are doubtlessly recognised to be illusory (by the wise) on account of their having a beginning and an end.

SANKARA'S COMMENTARY

These two verses have been explained before in the chapter on Illusion (Chapter II. 6, 7). They are quoted here again in connection with the topics which are discussed in relation to the unreality of the universe and liberation.

The opponent may contend thus:—Let the state of liberation have a beginning and an end. What is the harm in thus conceiving the state of liberation? The reply is that if a thing has a beginning and an end, it does not exist in the middle also. That is to say, it has no existence whatsoever. That we see its existence is due to our ignorance. The familiar instance is that of the mirage. The mirage has no existence prior to its vision by the deluded and it does not exist when the illusion vanishes. That we see the mirage at all is due to our ignorance. Therefore if we accept the idea of liberation as conceived by the opponent then it would be non-existent. The opponent may again contend that one cannot quench his thirst with the water of the mirage. But liberation is conducive to our infinite happiness. The reply to this contention is that liberation as conceived by the opponent, being illusory, serves no purpose whatsoever. If liberation should have both beginning and end, then it would be like our dreams or waking experiences. In the waking state a man may feel that he has enjoyed a hearty feast, but immediately after going to sleep he may experience in dream ravenous hunger. In that case the waking experiences do not serve him a lasting purpose. Any experience which has a beginning or an end is illusory from the standpoint of Reality.
33. All objects cognised in dream are unreal, because they are seen within the body. How is it possible for things, that are perceived to exist, to be really in Brahman which is indivisible and homogeneous.

ŚANKARA’S COMMENTARY

This and the following verses are meant to explain in detail one of the previous Kārikās which states that the (so-called) cause (of the opponent) is, really speaking, no cause at all. (Ref. Verse 25, Chapt. IV.)

The purpose of the Kārikā is to show that Brahman, birthless and non-dual, is alone existent; for, the waking experiences, on account of their having a beginning and an end, are unreal like the dream ones. Therefore what is seen is Brahman alone. The dream objects are seen within the body; hence they are unreal as things like a mountain, etc., cannot exist within the body. Similarly, all our waking experiences are supposed to be within the body (of the Virāt). Hence they are also illusory from the standpoint of Reality. The Virāt itself is in the Self (Ātman) which cannot, in reality, contain multiplicity. Therefore waking experiences are illusory. The dream experiences are considered illusory as time and space corresponding to such experiences do not conform to the time and space of the dreamer. In like manner waking experiences are also illusory as they, really speaking, cannot exist in the Self (Ātman) which is one, non-dual and homogeneous and which cannot contain any space for the existence of alien objects.

न युक्तं दर्शनं गतः काल्यानिनयमाद्रत्वः ।
प्रतिवदवद्ध वै सर्वस्मिन्देशे न विचारे ॥ ३४ ॥

34. It is not possible for a dreamer to go out in order to experience the (dream) objects on account of the discrepancy of the time involved in such journey. Again, on being awake, the dreamer does not find himself in the place (where he dreamed himself to be).
QUENCHING OF FIRE-BRAND

Sankara's Commentary

The time and space involved in undertaking a journey and in coming back, have a definite and fixed standard in the waking state. These are seen to be reversed in dream. On account of this inconsistency it can be positively said that the dreamer does not actually go out to another place during his dream experiences.

Reversed—In dream which may last for a few minutes, a man may have experience of events which may take years to happen. Therefore the idea of time and space experienced in dream is illusory.

मित्राश्रः सह समयं संबुद्धो न प्रपन्धते ||
गृहीतं चापि यात्किंचित्र प्रतिबुद्धो न पश्यति || ३५ ||

35. The dreamer on being awake, realises as illusory all the conversation he had had with friends, etc., during the dream state. Further, he does not possess, in the waking state, anything which he had acquired in dream.

Sankara's Commentary

A man, in dream, holds conversation with his friends, etc. But, on being awake, he finds it all as unreal. Further, he possesses in dream gold, etc., but, in the awakened state he realises all these possessions to be unreal. Though he goes to other countries in dream, he does not, in reality, make any such journey.

The conversations, etc., held in dream, become unreal in the waking state. Similarly, Scriptural discussions, etc., with the sages held in the waking state, are known to be illusory when one attains the Ultimate Reality. For, all beings are ever free. There is no bondage or ignorance, really speaking, which requires to be removed by religious practices. The wise man knows the study of the Scriptures, etc., undertaken for the attainment of knowledge, as illusory, as dream experiences: for, Ātman is ever free, pure and illumined. Even eating, drinking, etc., which a knower of Truth
performs, are dissociated from all ideas of subject-object relationship. Even while talking, doing, etc., he is conscious of the non-dual Brahman alone. The aim of the Scriptural study, religious practices, etc., is to de-hypnotise us from the hypnotic idea that we are not Brahman.

36. *The body active in dream is unreal as the other body, quite distinct from it, is perceived. Like the body, everything, cognised by the mind, is unreal.*

**ŚANKARA’S COMMENTARY**

The body, which appears to be wandering in the dream, is unreal; for, another body, quite different from it, is seen in the spot where the dreamer lies. As the body perceived in the dream is unreal, so also all that is cognised by the mind, even in the waking state, is unreal; for, all these perceived objects are mere different states of the mind. The significance of this chapter is that even the waking experiences, on account of their being similar to the dream experiences, are unreal.

The body which is active in the waking state lies motionless in the bed when the dreamer perceives that he is wandering at various places. Therefore from the standpoint of the waking state, this dream body is unreal. Similarly, from the standpoint of the Ultimate Reality the body perceived in the waking state—the body which is felt to be honoured or insulted by the friends or enemies—is also unreal. It is because this body is also an idea in the mind of the perceiver. As dream objects are unreal on account of their being perceived by the mind, so also the objects of the waking experience are unreal for the very same reason. Being perceived by the mind is the common factor in both waking and dream states. Therefore the experiences of both the states bear with them the stamp of unreality.
37. As the experience (of objects) in dream is similar to the experience (of objects) in the waking state, therefore it is thought that the waking experiences are the cause of the dream-experiences. On account of this reason, the waking experiences (supposed to be the cause of the dream) appear as real to the dreamer alone (but not to others).

Śankara's Commentary

For this reason also, the objects experienced in the waking state are unreal. The dream experiences, like the waking ones, are characterised by the subject-object relationship. On account of this similarity of perception, the waking state is said to be the cause of the dream state. In other words, it is contended that the dream state is the effect of the waking one which is the cause. If that be the case, i.e., if the dream be the effect of waking experiences, then the waking experiences are real to the perceiver of the dream alone (i.e., who takes the dream to be real) and to no one else. The purport of this Kārikā is that the dream appears to us real, that is to say, dream objects appear as objects of common experience and therefore real to the dreamer alone. So also the experiences of the waking state, being the cause of the dream, appear as if they were within the common experience of all and therefore real. But the objects perceived in the waking state are not the same to all. Waking experiences are verily like the dream ones.

1 On account, etc.—In the dream state, dream objects appear as real. To the dreamer, the dream state is the waking state. One knows the dream state to be unreal only from the waking state. As a matter of fact, we are aware of a succession of waking states
alone. When we know a previous waking state to be unreal, we call it dream state. Without dream one could not know the waking state to be real. Similarly one could not know the waking state as real without the unreal dream state. We speak of the waking state as the cause of the dream state on account of the cognition of the subject-object idea present in both the states. But, really speaking, there is no causal relation between the two states. The waking state appears real only to him who looks upon dream also as real and who seeking a cause for the dream, takes the waking state as the cause of the dream.

2 The purport, etc.—It may be contended that dream experience is private, its objects and actions being cognised by the dreamer and none else. But the waking experience is not private. It is universal. But this is not a fact. The dream universe has not only its suns, moons, and stars, but also its human denizens who perceive them as our fellow-beings of the waking universe do in the waking world. The distinction of private and public to mark the objects of one state from those of the other is futile. The truth is that as in the dream, the action of the mind creates the idea of a universe with the sun, the moon, friends and foes, etc., similarly in the waking state also the mind creates the idea of a universe with all its contents.

उत्पादायप्रासिद्धाद्वाद्दं सर्वंःसाधार्तं

न च भूतादभूत्तय संभ्रोटस्ति कथंचन || ३८ ||

38. All these are known as unborn, as their creation or evolution cannot be established as a fact. It is ever impossible for the unreal to be born of the real.

ŚANKARA’S COMMENTARY

(Objection)—Though the waking experiences are the cause of the dream ones, still the former cannot be unreal like the latter. The dream is extremely evanescent whereas the waking experiences are seen to be permanent.

(Reply)—This⁴ is true with regard to the people who do not possess discrimination. Men of discrimination,
do not see the production\(^2\) or the birth of anything, as creation or evolution cannot be established as a fact. Hence all this is known in the Vedāntic books as unborn\(^3\) (i.e., non-dual Brahman). For the Śruti declares, “He (the Ātman) is both within and without and is, at the same time, unborn.” If you contend that the illusory dream is the effect of the real waking state, we say that your contention is untenable. In our common experience, we never see a non-existing thing produced from an existing one. Such non-existing thing as the horn of a hare is never seen to be produced from any other object.

1 *This, etc.*—It is true that the time standard of the waking state does not apply to the dream state. But the standard with which the dreamer measures the time of his dream experiences seems to him perfectly consistent in the dream state.

2 *Production, etc.*—That is to say, wise men do not believe in causality.

3 *Unborn*—That is to say, wise men see everywhere the non-dual Brahman alone which has no birth or change.

असज्जागरिते दृष्टिः खपने पद्यति तनमयः ||
असत्खपनेनापि दृष्टिः च प्रतिवुद्ध्रो न पद्यति || ३९ ||

39. *Being deeply impressed with the (reality of the) unreal objects which a man sees in the waking state, he sees those very things in dream as well. Moreover the unreal objects cognised in the dream are not seen again in the waking state.*

**Sankara’s Commentary**

(Objection)—It is you who stated that the dream is the effect of the waking experience. That being the case, how do you refute causality?

(Reply)—Listen to our explanation of the causality, referred to in that instance. One perceives in the waking
state objects which are unreal like the snake imagined in the rope. Being deeply impressed by such (illusory) perception, he imagines in the dream, as in the waking state, the subject-object relationship and thereby perceives (dream) objects. But though full of the unreal seen in the dream, he does not see those (unreal) objects, over again, in the waking state. The reason is the absence of the imaginary subject-object relationship (one experiences in dream). The word "cha," "moreover" in the text denotes that the causal relationship between the waking and the dream states is not always observed. Similarly, things seen in the waking state are not, sometimes, cognised in dream. Therefore the statement that the waking condition is the cause of the dream is not made from the standpoint of the Ultimate Reality.

1 *Does not, etc.*—This shows that the causal relation is not seen between the waking and the dream states.

2 *Similarly, etc.*—This is another reason to show that the causal relation does not exist between the waking and the dream states.

3 *Is not made, etc.*—Waking state is said to be the cause of the dream only from the empirical standpoint.

From the subsequent waking standpoint we call the antecedent dream state unreal. But we do not find a causal relation between the antecedent dream state and the subsequent waking one because we view it from the waking standpoint—when the dream is over. Objects seen in dream could have been seen even now in the waking state if the waking state were a part or continuation of the previous dream state.

नाभ्यस्त्रेतुकमसतो सदस्त्रेतुकं तथा ||
सच स्त्रेतुकं नापि स्त्रेतुकमस्तुः || ४० ||

40. The unreal cannot have the unreal as its cause, nor can the real be produced from the unreal. The real cannot be the cause of the real. And it is much more impossible for the real to be the cause of the unreal.
SANKARA'S COMMENTARY

From the standpoint of the Ultimate Reality, things can, in no way, enter into causal relation. How? An unreal cannot be the cause of another unreal. An unreal entity such as the horns of a hare, which may be said to be the cause of another unreal entity such as a castle in the air, has no existence whatsoever. Similarly, an object like a jar, which is perceived and which is the effect of an unreal object like the horns of the hare, is never existent. In like manner, a jar which is perceived and which is the effect of another jar that also is perceived to exist, is, in itself, non-existent. And lastly, how is existence possible of a real object as the cause of an unreal one? No other causal relation is possible nor can be conceived of. Hence men of knowledge find that the causal relation between any objects whatsoever is not capable of being proved.

The causal relation between the waking and the dream states has been stated from the empirical standpoint alone. But it cannot be established from the standpoint of Truth. Further, no causal relation, whatsoever, is admissible.

1 An unreal, etc.—This refutes the contention of the Buddhist nihilists.

2 Similarly, etc.—This is the refutation of the Nyāya school.

3 In like, etc.—This refutes the Sāmkhya school of causality.

4 And lastly, etc.—A class of Vedāntists hold that the ever-existent Brahman is the cause of these illusory phenomena. This is the refutation of that school of thought.

All the four systems of thought refuted above believe in causality in some form or other.

विपर्यासाध्य जाम्रदिन्यान्यासूत्तवत्सृशोत्
तथा खपे विपर्यासात् धर्मस्त्रैव पत्यति

41. As one in the waking state, through false knowledge, handles, as real, objects whose nature cannot
be described; similarly, in dream also, one perceives, through false knowledge, objects whose existence is possible in that condition alone.

SANKARA'S COMMENTARY

This verse intends to remove the slightest possibility of the causal relation between the waking and the dream states, though both are unreal. As in the waking state, one, through want of proper discrimination, imagines the snake seen in place of the rope as real—the nature of which, in fact, cannot be really determined,—so also in dream, one, through want of discrimination, imagines as if one really perceives such objects as elephant, etc. These dream objects, such as elephants, etc., are peculiar to the dream condition alone; they are not the effect of the waking experiences.

The nature, etc.—The snake seen in place of the rope cannot be called either existent or non-existent. If it be really existent then it cannot cease to exist. And if it be really non-existent then it cannot appear as existing. This is called Anirvachaniya or the indescribable nature of the sense-objects.

उपःम्भात्समाचारात् अस्तित्वस्तुत्ववादिनाम् ।
जातिस्तु देशिता बुद्धिः अजातेखसतं सदा ॥ ४२ ॥

42. Wise men support causality only for the sake of those who, being afraid of absolute non-manifestation (of things), stick to the (apparent) reality of (external) objects on account of their perception (of such objects) and their faith in religious observances.

SANKARA’S COMMENTARY

Wise men, i.e., the exponents of Advaita Philosophy, have, no doubt, supported causality. But they have done so only for those who have little discrimination
but who are eager (to know the Truth) and who are endowed with faith. These people assert that external objects exist as real because they perceive them, and also because they cling to the observances of various duties associated with the different Varnās\(^1\) and Āśramas.\(^2\) Instructions regarding causality are only meant for them as a means to (some) end. Let them hold on to the idea of causality. But the students who practise disciplines in accordance with Vedānta Philosophy will, without such belief in causality, spontaneously get the knowledge of Self, unborn and non-dual. Causality is declared not from the standpoint of the Ultimate Reality. These students, who believe in Scriptures, and who are devoid of discrimination, fear the idea of absolute non-manifestation on account of their gross intellect, as they are afraid of the annihilation of their selves. It has also been stated before that these Scriptural statements regarding creation are meant as a help to our higher understanding of Reality. (In Reality, there is no multiplicity.)

If causality be a fiction, then, it may be asked, why the Scriptures speak of Brahman as the cause of the universe. This Kārikā gives a reply to this question. The aim of the Scripture is to enable the students of mediocre or dull intellect to know the Supreme Reality with the help of causal arguments.

\(^1\) Varnās—That is, the four castes, viz., the Brāhmin, the Kshatriya, the Vaiśya and the Śūdra.

\(^2\) Āśramas—The four stages of life, viz., Brahmacharya (student period), Gārhasthya (the householder's stage), Vānaprastha (the period of retirement from the active duties of life) and Sanyāsa (the monastic stage).

\(^3\) As a means, etc.—The ordinary people on account of the perception of the apparent objects as real and also on account of their attachment to life, cannot understand the truth regarding the non-dual and changeless Brahman. They believe in the illusory idea
of causality. For the benefit of such people, the wise men admit that Brahman is the cause of creation (vide Vedānta Śūtra, 1st chapter, second aphorism). But as the cause is identical with the effect, therefore the universe is identical with Brahman. In this way, the students are taught that all that exists is Brahman. Thus by the constant study and meditation on the Scriptures, the students gradually realise the nature of Supreme Reality which is free from all change and evolution. Duality cannot be established as the Supreme Reality either by logic or Scripture. The apparent duality is admitted from the relative standpoint.

6 Knowledge, etc.—This knowledge can be directly obtained by students of clear perception, following the methods given in this Upanishad and the Kārikā.

5 Who believe, etc.—That is to say, those who accept the literal meaning of the scriptural statements regarding creation, etc.

6 It has, etc.—Vide Kārikā 3, 15.

अजातेष्वरसतां तेषामुपलब्धियत्थिन्ति ये ॥
जातिदोषा न सेत्यतन्ति दोषोपप्यल्पो भविष्यति ॥ ४३ ॥

43. Those who, being afraid of the truth of absolute non-manifestation, and also on account of their perception (of phenomenal objects), do not admit Ajāti (absolute non-creation), are not much affected by the evil consequent on the belief in causality. The evil effect, if any, is rather insignificant.

ŚANKARA’S COMMENTARY

Those who on account of their perception (of the phenomenal objects) and attachment to the various duties of caste and other stages of life, shrink from the non-dual and unborn Ātman, and believing in the existence of dual objects, go away from the Self, that is to say, pin their faith to duality,—these people who are thus afraid of the truth of absolute non-manifestation, but who are endowed with faith and who stick to the path
of righteousness, are not much affected by the evil results consequent on such belief in causality. For, they also try to follow the path of discrimination. Even if a little blemish attaches to such persons, it is insignificant, being due to their not having realised the Supreme Truth.

This shows the catholicity of Advaita Vedānta which is a sharp contrast to the narrowness of the theologians. Advaita Philosophy recognises the value of different religious practices suited to diverse temperaments. The Kārikā further admonishes us not to find fault with others.

1 Attachment, etc.—See the previous Kārikā.

2 Path, etc.—That is to say, those who strictly observe the formal injunctions of religion. These people also, at last, acquire the virtue of discrimination which alone enables one to realise Truth.

3 Not much, etc.—The Gita also says that a sincere soul which is anxious to realise Truth, surmounts all difficulties. The adherents of religions, if they are sincere and earnest, ultimately acquire those virtues which enable them to realise Truth.

उपलभ्धात्समाचारण्मायाहस्ती यथोच्यते ।
उपलभ्धात्समाचारादत्ति वस्तु तथोथ्यते ॥ ४४ ॥

44. As an elephant conjured up by the magician, on account of its being perceived and also on account of its answering to the behaviours (of a real animal), is said to exist, so also are objects said to exist, on account of their being perceived and also on account of their answering to our dealings with them. (In truth, the objects of sense perception are as unreal as the magician’s elephant.)

ŚANKARA’S COMMENTARY

(Objection)—Objects answering to the features of duality do exist, on account of such evidence as our (direct) perception of them and also on account of the possibility of our dealings with them.
(Reply)—No, this objection is not valid. For, direct perception and the possibility of dealing practically with objects do not always prove the existence of objects.

(Objection)—How do you say that our contention admits of irregularity?

(Reply)—It is thus stated: The elephant conjured up by a magician, is, verily, perceived as the real elephant. Though unreal, it (the magic elephant) is called the (real) elephant, on account of its being endowed with such attributes of an elephant as the possibility of its being tied up with a rope or being climbed upon, etc. Though unreal, the magic elephant is looked upon as (a real) one. In like manner, it is said that multiple objects, pointing to duality, exist on account of their being perceived and also on account of the possibility of our dealing practically with them. Hence the two grounds, adduced above, cannot prove the existence of (external) objects establishing the fact of duality.

45. Consciousness which appears to be born or to move or to take the form of matter, is really ever unborn, immovable and free from the character of materiality; it is all peace and non-dual.

ŚAṆKARA'S COMMENTARY

What is that entity—the Ultimate Reality—which is the substratum of all false cognitions as causality (creation), etc.? It is thus replied:—Though unborn it appears to be born. As for example, we say that Devadatta is born. Again it appears to move (though it is free from all motion): as we say, “That Devadatta
is going”. Further, “it appears as an object in which inhere certain qualities.” For instance, we say “That Devadatta is fair and tall”. Though from the standpoint of the Ultimate Reality, Consciousness is ever unborn, immovable, and not of the character of material objects, yet it appears as a Devadatta who is born, who moves and who is known to be fair and tall. What is that entity which answers to these descriptions? It is Consciousness which, being free from birth, change, etc., is all peace and therefore non-dual.

1 Substratum—From the standpoint of Reality, the Ātman is not even a substratum; for, nothing whatsoever exists, in relation to which the Self can be called the substratum. The term “Substratum” is used in connection with Ātman only from the relative standpoint.

2 Consciousness—That is, Ātman.

एवं न जायेते चित्तमेवं धर्मं अजाः स्मृताः। एवेव विज्ञानतो न पतति विपर्यये || ४६ ||

46. Thus the mind is never subject to birth or change. All beings are, thus, free from birth. Those who know (the Truth) are never subject to false knowledge.

SANKARA’S COMMENTARY

Thus, that is to say, for the reasons stated above, the mind is free from birth. Similarly the Dharmas, that is, the Jivas, are also unborn. This is the statement of the Knowers of Brahman. The1 word “Dharmāk” (i.e., “Selves”) is metaphorically used in the plural sense, in consequence of our perception of variety which is, in reality, the appearance of the non-dual Ātman as different corporeal beings. Those who know the consciousness,2 stated above, which is the essence of the Self, non-dual.
and free from birth, etc., and, accordingly, renounce the
hankering after all external objects,—they do not fall
any more into this ocean of the darkness of Avidyā. The
Śruti also says, “Where is grief or delusion for the one
that realises non-duality?”

1 The word, etc.—The Ultimate Reality cannot be said to be
one or many. For, these predicates, being correlative, apply to
the relative world. The word “Dharmāḥ” has been used in the
plural number to indicate that all that exists is Ātmā. If one sees
multiplicity, it is also the non-dual Ātmā. The reflections of the
sun, caught in the millions of waves and bubbles, are nothing but
the reflection of the self-same sun. Similarly the same Ātmā alone
is perceived whether as objects of our waking state, or the ideas of
dream or the undifferentiated consciousness of dreamless sleep.

Consciousness—That is, Brahman or Ātmā.

ऋजुरक्राक्षदिकाभासमलकात्मस्पन्दितं यथा ।
ग्रहणाराहकामां दिग्नानस्पन्दितं तथा || ४७ ||

47. As a fire-brand, when set in motion, appears as
straight, crooked, etc., so also Consciousness, when set in
motion, appears as the perceiver, the perceived, and
the like.

ŚANKARA’S COMMENTARY

In order to explain the truth regarding the Ultimate
Reality already stated, it is thus said:—As in common
experience it is noticed that a fire-brand1 when moved,
appears straight, crooked, etc., so does Consciousness
appear as the perceiver, the perceived, and the like.
What is that which appears as the perceiver, the perceived,
etc.? It2 is Consciousness set in motion. There is no
motion in Consciousness. It only appears to be moving.
This appearance is due to Avidyā or ignorance. No
motion is possible in Consciousness which is ever
immovable. It has already been stated that Consciousness is unborn and immovable.

1 Fire-brand, etc.—If a fire-brand be moved swiftly it makes a circle, a straight line, or a crooked line according to the movement. When the fire-brand is moved, it does not really make any figure. In reality, there is only a point which appears as various figures.

2 It is, etc.—Consciousness only exists. It is ever undifferentiated. Motion in Consciousness makes it appear as the perceiver, the perceived, etc. There is no motion, really speaking, in Consciousness. The ignorant only imagine illusory subjects and objects which are the basis of our sense-perception.

अस्पन्दमानमञ्जरतमनाभासमजं यथा ||
अस्पन्दमानं विज्ञानमनाभासमजं तथा || ४८ ||

48. As the fire-brand, when not in motion, is free from all appearances and remains changeless, similarly, Consciousness, when not in motion (imaginary action), is free from all appearances and remains changeless.

SANKARA’S COMMENTARY

As that very fire-brand, when not in motion, does not take any form, straight or crooked, etc., becomes free from all appearances and remains changeless, so also the consciousness, which appears as moving through ignorance, when dissociated from the idea of motion on the disappearance of ignorance, becomes free from all appearances, as those of birth, etc., and remains unborn and motionless.

1 Through, etc.—The appearance of forms in Consciousness is due to the projecting power (Vikshepa Śakti) of Avidyā.

2 Becomes, etc.—That is to say, the Consciousness (i.e., Ātman) is seen as it really is. The fire-brand, when at rest, has no figure, as it is a point only. Even when moved, the fire-brand is, really,
nothing but a point. It only appears as a circle or straight line. Similarly, even during the state of ignorance, Consciousness always remains what it is, viz., changeless and motionless. It appears to be changing and possessing forms only on account of the ignorance of the perceiving mind.

अङ्गाते स्पन्दनमाने वै नास्तभासा अन्यतोऽभ्यः ।
न ततोऽन्यत्र निस्पन्द्वाशाहातं प्रविष्टान्ति ते ॥ ४९ ॥

49. *When the fire-brand is in motion, the appearances (that are seen in it) do not come from elsewhere. When the fire-brand is not moved, the appearances do not go elsewhere from the motionless fire-brand. Further, the appearances, when the fire-brand is not moved, do not enter into the fire-brand itself.*

**ŚANKARA’S COMMENTARY**

Moreover, when that very fire-brand is in motion, the appearances, straight or crooked, etc., do not come to it from anywhere else outside the fire-brand. Nor do the appearances go elsewhere from the fire-brand when it is motionless. Nor, again, do the appearances enter into the fire-brand when it is motionless.

What actually exists is a point. But the mind, on account of its ignorance, sees it in various forms.

न निर्गता अङ्गात्रे द्रव्यत्वाभावयेगतः ।
विश्वानेवपि तथैव स्यावभास्त्याविशेषतः ॥ ५० ॥

50. *The appearances do not emerge from the fire-brand because they are not of the nature of a substance. This also applies to Consciousness on account of the similarity of appearances (in both cases).*

**ŚANKARA’S COMMENTARY**

Moreover, those appearances do not emerge from the fire-brand as something that comes out of a house.
The reason is that appearances are not of the nature of substance. The appearances have no reality. Entrance, etc., can be said of a real thing but not of anything unreal. The appearance of birth, etc., in the case of consciousness is exactly similar, for,\(^1\) appearances are of the same nature in both the cases.

\(^1\) For, etc.—In both cases, appearances are due to the ignorance of the perceiver. Birth, death, etc., are, really speaking, illusory. They have no real existence. Therefore these are called mere appearances.

51-52. When Consciousness is associated with the idea of activity (as in the dream and waking states), the appearances (that are seen in it) do not come from elsewhere. When Consciousness is inactive (as in deep sleep) appearances do not go elsewhere from the inactive Consciousness. Further, appearances do not enter into it. The appearances do not emerge from Consciousness because they are not of the nature of a substance. These are always beyond our comprehension on account of their not being subject to the relation of cause and effect.

\textbf{\textit{Ś}ankara's Commentary}

How are the two appearances similar? It is thus replied:—The fire-brand and Consciousness are alike in all respects. The only special feature of Consciousness is that it always remains immutable.\(^1\) What is the cause of such appearances as birth, etc., in Consciousness
which is ever immutable? In² the absence of causality, it is not reasonable to establish the relationship of the producer and the produced (between Consciousness and appearances). The appearances, being illusory, are ever unthinkable.³ The purport of the whole thing is this:—As the fire-brand (which is merely a point) is associated with forms straight, crooked, etc., though, in reality, such crooked or straight forms are ever non-existent, so also, pure Consciousness is associated with the ideas of birth, etc., though such ideas as birth, etc., are ever non-existent. Hence these ideas of birth, etc., associated with Consciousness are illusory.

When Consciousness is said to be active as in the waking and the dream states, the forms of birth, etc., that are cognised in those states do not come from elsewhere outside Consciousness. For, such forms are not seen to exist elsewhere outside one's own consciousness. Again, when, as in deep sleep, Consciousness remains inactive, the forms of birth, death, etc., do not go elsewhere from the Consciousness in which they were perceived during the waking and the dream states. For, no one is conscious of such a happening. No one ever knows the existence of anything outside one's own consciousness. Further, when Consciousness remains inactive, as in deep sleep, the forms, etc., perceived in the waking and the dream states, do not seem to merge in Consciousness. For Consciousness which is non-dual and beyond the ideas of time, space, etc., cannot be the cause of multiple objects existing in time and space. The objects seen in the dream and the waking states, being ever unreal, cannot be said to emerge from or merge in Consciousness.

¹Immutable—Consciousness is called immutable as it is free from the idea of space and time.

² In the, etc.—The idea of causality is due to Avidyā.

³ Ever unthinkable—The ideas seen in the dream and the waking states cannot be said to be non-existent because they are perceived. Nor can they be said to exist because they are not perceived in deep sleep. Therefore it is impossible to determine their real nature. Hence they are as illusory as the snake seen in the rope.
53. Substance may be the cause of another substance. That which is not substance may be the cause of another which is not substance. But the Jīvas (or beings) cannot be possibly anything like substance or other than substance.

ŚANKARA’S COMMENTARY

It has already been established that the essence of Self is one and unborn. Those who imagine causal relation in Ātman must admit that substance may be the cause of another substance and that which is other than substance may be the cause of something else which is also other than substance. But a thing itself cannot be the cause of itself. Further, we do not find in common experience a non-substance which is independently the cause of something. The selves (i.e., the Jīvas or beings) can be called neither substance nor other than substance. Hence the Jīvas or selves cannot be the cause or effect of anything. Therefore Ātman, being neither substance nor other than substance, is neither the cause nor the effect of anything.

1 One—That is, Ātman which is free from any attribute.
2 Unborn—i.e., Ātman being without parts, is not a substance.
3 That which, etc.—That is, an attribute such as colour or form.
4 Substance—It is because a substance has always parts.
5 Other than, etc.—It is because a non-substance (i.e., an attribute) cannot be conceived of independently of a substance.
54. Thus (external) appearances (objects) are not caused by the mind nor is the mind produced by them. Hence men of discrimination hold the principle of the absolute non-evolution or negation of causality.

ŚANKARA’S COMMENTARY

Thus, for reasons already stated, the mind is verily of the nature of the essence of the Self. External objects are not caused by the mind nor is the mind the product of the external objects. That is because all (external) entities are mere appearances in Consciousness. Thus neither the (so-called) effect comes from the (so-called) cause nor the cause from the effect. In this way is reiterated the absolute non-evolution of causality. In other words, the knowers of Brahman declare the absence of causality with regard to Ātman.

1 For, etc.—The reason is that the real nature of Ātman is free from all modifications and not of the nature of an empirical substance.

2 External, etc.—The popular belief that the thought of the pot in the potter’s mind is the cause of the pot and that the external pot gives rise to the idea of the pot in the mind is entirely erroneous. For the idea of causality has been proved to be an illusion.

यात्रेतुफलवेशस्तात्र्येतुफलोऽवः ||
क्षणे हेतुफलवेशे नास्ति हेतुफलोऽवः || ५५ ||

55. As long as a man persists in the belief in causality he will find the working of cause and effect. But when attachment to causality vanishes, cause and effect become non-existent.

ŚANKARA’S COMMENTARY

What happens with regard to those who cling to the belief in cause and effect? In reply, it is said:—As long
as there is faith in causality, as long as a man thinks, "I am the agent; these virtuous and vicious deeds belong to me. I shall enjoy the results of these actions, being born in course of time, as some being," in other words, as long as a man falsely attributes causality to Ātman and devotes his mind to it, cause and effect must operate for him; that is to say, the man must without intermission be subject to birth and death, which are the result of his attachment to the belief in causality. But when attachment to causality, due to ignorance, is destroyed by the knowledge of non-duality as described above,—like the destruction of the possession of a ghost through the power of incantation, medicinal herb, etc.—then on account of the wearing away of the illusion of causality, do cause and effect cease to exist.

This Kārikā tells us that the chief duty of the student is to analyse the law of causality and find its illusory nature. The attainment of true knowledge solely depends upon this understanding of the causal law.

यावद्देतुर्मावेश: संसारस्तावदायतः ।
क्षीणे हेतुर्मावेशे संसारं न प्रपचते || ५६ ॥

56. As long as there is faith in causality, the (endless) chain of birth and death will be there. When that faith is destroyed (by knowledge) birth and death become non-existent.

SANKARA’S COMMENTARY

What is the harm if the law of cause and effect continues to operate? In reply we say:—As long as faith in causality is not destroyed by right knowledge, our course (of birth and death) in this world will continue. But when that faith is destroyed (by right knowledge) the
world also ceases to exist for want of any other cause for its existence.

संज्ञात्या जायते सवे शास्त्रं नात्ति तेन वै ।
सद्राबेन हाजं सर्वमुच्छेदस्तेन नात्ति वै || ५७ ||

57. All this is seen to be born on account of the illusion of experience (due to Avidyā); therefore nothing is permanent. All, again, as one with the Ultimate Reality is unborn. And therefore there is nothing like destruction.

ŚANKARA’S COMMENTARY

(Objection)—Nothing else verily exists except the unborn Ātman. Then how can you speak of the origin and destruction of the cause and the effect as well as of (the chain of birth and death constituting) the world?

(Reply)—Listen. The word Samvriti in the text signifies the (illusory) experiences of the empirical world which are caused by ignorance. All this is born of this power of ignorance which brings into existence the illusory experiences of the world. For this reason, nothing is permanent in the realm of ignorance. Therefore it is said that the world, having the characteristics of origination and destruction, is spread before us (i.e., the ignorant persons). But as one with the Ultimate Reality, all this is nothing but the unborn Ātman. Therefore, in the absence of birth, there cannot be any destruction, viz., the destruction of cause or effect.

The opponent contends that if nothing but birthless and non-dual Ātman exists, then the statements regarding the origin and the destruction of the universe as stated in the previous Kārikā become irrelevant and contradictory. The reply is that there is no contradiction as the two statements are made from two different standpoints. From the standpoint of the Ultimate Reality there is neither birth nor death. But from the relative standpoint, which
conjures up before our vision the world of name and form, there are birth and death. Imagine a rope lying on the road. The wise man knows it as the rope alone. But the deluded person sees it as the snake and being afraid of it, takes to his heels in spite of the assurance of the wise man that it is the rope and not the snake. Now the rope and the snake are both facts from the two standpoints. The wise man sees the rope and the ignorant person sees the snake. Therefore the statement of the ignorant man does not contradict the statement of the wise one.

The ideas of birth and death are possible only from the relative standpoint. The wise man sees everything as the non-dual Ātman. Therefore he cannot see the possibility of destruction of anything. Comp. Kārikā 1.17 and 1, 18.

58. Those Jīvas (entities) or beings are said to be born. But that birth is never possible from the standpoint of Reality. Their birth is like that of an illusory object. That illusion, again, is non-existent.

ŚANKARA’S COMMENTARY

Those, again, who imagine the birth of the Jīvas and other entities, do so only through Samvriti or the power of ignorance as stated in the preceding Kārikā. The Jīvas are seen to be born only through ignorance. But from the standpoint of the Supreme Reality no such birth is possible. This¹ (supposed) birth of the Jīvas through ignorance, described above, is like the birth of objects through illusion (Māyā).

(Opponent)—Then there must be something real known as Māyā or illusion?

(Reply)—It is not so. That Māyā or illusion is never existent. Māyā or illusion is the name we give to some-
thing which² does not (really) exist (but which is perceived).

¹ This, etc.—The birth of Jīvas is exactly like the production of things by a Juggler. These things such as a mango tree or the hare produced by the Juggler do not exist. Similarly, the Jīvas, etc., whose birth and death are seen by us in ignorance, do not exist, when the Truth is known.

² Which, etc.—That is to say, Māyā or illusion does not exist from the standpoint of Reality.

यथा मायामयाद्रव्याज्ञायते तन्मयोङ्कुरः।
नाती नियो न चोच्छेदी तद्धूर्मेत्य योजना॥ ५९ ॥

59. The illusory sprout comes forth from the illusory seed. This illusory sprout is neither permanent nor destructible. The same applies to Jīvas.

ŚANKARA’S COMMENTARY

Now, is the birth of Jīvas, that are seen to exist, illusory? To this question, our reply is as follows:—From¹ an illusory mango seed is born a mango sprout which is equally illusory. This sprout² is neither permanent nor destructible, simply because it does not exist. In³ the like manner, ideas of birth and death are applied to the Jīvas. The purport is that from the standpoint of the Ultimate Reality, neither birth nor death is applicable to Jīvas.

¹ From, etc.—This is a familiar illustration often used by the Vedāntic writers. In India, certain jugglers produce from illusory seeds illusory trees full of illusory fruits.

² This sprout, etc.—Birth and death can be predicated of objects that exist. But the mango tree produced by a juggler is non-existent. Hence neither birth nor death is possible for such a mango tree.
3 In the, etc.—The Jivas, endowed with birth and death, are seen on account of our ignorance. From the standpoint of Truth, such Jivas do not exist. Hence birth and death are unreal from the standpoint of Truth. But birth and death are true, as in the case of the illusory mango tree, from the standpoint of ignorance.

60. The epithets of permanence or impermanence cannot be applied to unborn Jivas. That which is indescribable by words cannot be discriminated (as real or unreal).

SANKARA'S COMMENTARY

From the standpoint of the Ultimate Reality, no epithet such as permanence or impermanence, nor any sound corresponding to such names, can be applied to Jivas (selves or beings) which are eternal, birthless, and which are always of the nature of a homogeneous consciousness. That by which an object is designated is known as “Varna” or name associated with a sound. The words fail to denote the nature of Ātman. It cannot be discriminated as this or that, permanent or impermanent. The Śruti also says, “Whence words fall back,” etc.

1 Permanence, etc.—Such epithets as permanence or impermanence which are correlatives, are applied to the objects of the relative world.
61–62. As in dream, the mind is seen to act through Māyā manifesting the appearance of duality, so also in the waking state the mind is seen to act, through Māyā, producing the appearance of duality.

There is no doubt that the mind which is, in fact, non-dual, appears as dual in dream; in like manner, undoubtedly, the waking state, which is non-dual, appears as dual.

Śaṅkara’s Commentary

That pure consciousness which is non-dual (from the standpoint of the Supreme Reality) is sought to be described by words, is due to the active condition of the mind (which is due to Āvidyā). This description (of the non-dual Ātman by words) has no meaning from the standpoint of the Ultimate Truth. These1 verses have already been explained.

It may be contended that if Ātman cannot be described by words, why then should the scholars have taken the pains to use words to denote Ātman. In reply it is said that what is described by words by scholars is not the non-dual Ātman but a duality, perceived on account of the activity of the mind, associated with the subject-object relationship which is the characteristic of the relative plane of existence. The Ultimate Reality is the essence of everything, including ideas or descriptions.

1 The verses, etc.—Vide Chapter III, 29-30.

63. The whole variety of Jīvas, born of eggs, moisture, etc., always seen by the dreamer when he goes about (in his dream) in all ten directions (have no existence apart from the mind of the dreamer).
Śaṅkara’s Commentary

Here is another reason which also shows us that duality describable by words, does not exist. The beings or Jīvas, born\(^1\) of eggs or moisture, which a dreamer going about in all ten directions perceives in his dream condition as existing, (have, as a matter of fact, no existence apart from the mind of the dreamer).

(Objection)—Suppose we admit this. What are you driving at?

(Reply)—Our reply is as follows:—

1 Born of, etc.—The beings that are perceived to exist may be divided into four classes, e.g., those that are born of the womb, the egg, the moisture and the soil.

क्षमद्विक्षर्द्वशास्ते न विचारेण तत: पृथक् ।
तथा तद्वशयस्वेवं क्षमद्विक्षर्द्वभिष्यते ॥ ६४ ॥

64. These (beings) which are objects of the mind of the dreamer have no existence apart from his mind. Similarly, this mind of the dreamer is admitted to be the object of perception of the dreamer only. (Therefore the mind of the dreamer is not separate from the dreamer himself.)

Śaṅkara’s Commentary

Those\(^1\) beings perceived by the mind of the dreamer have no existence outside the mind of the person who dreams about them. It\(^2\) is the mind alone which imagines itself to have assumed the forms of many diversified beings. Similarly,\(^3\) that mind of the dreamer is, again, perceived by the dreamer alone. Therefore there is no separate thing called mind which is apart from the dreamer himself.

1 Those, etc.—The truth about this statement is clearly understood in the waking state.
2 It is, etc.—In the dream, the mind alone objectifies itself into the perceiver and the perceived.

3 Similarly, etc.—The mind of a man is not cognized by any other being excepting himself. The cognizing ego is also created by the mind. The ego and the non-ego come into existence together. Therefore, the charge of solipsism cannot be levelled against the Vedântist.

65–66. The whole variety of Jīvas, born of eggs, moisture, etc., always seen by the waking man when he goes about (in his waking condition) in all ten directions, is only the object of the mind of the waking man. These Jīvas are in no way apart from the waking mind. Similarly, the mind of the waking man is admitted to be the object of perception of the waking person only. (Therefore the mind is not separate from the perceiver.)

SANKARA’S COMMENTARY

The Jīvas, perceived in the waking state, do not exist anywhere except in the mind of the perceiver, for, they are not seen independent of the mind. These Jīvas are similar to the Jīvas, perceived in the dream, which are cognized by the mind of the dreaming person alone. That mind again, having the characteristic of perception of Jīvas is non-different from the perceiver of the waking condition, because it is seen by the perceiver, as is the case with the mind which perceives the dream. The rest has already been interpreted (in the previous verses).
1 Because, etc.—Mind is identical with the Reality or \( \text{Atman} \). When the Reality is characterised by the perception of the subject-object idea (through ignorance), it is called the mind. And when it remains free from any such idea, it is called \( \text{Atman} \). From the standpoint of Reality, the perceiver, the object and the instrument of perception are one. The causal relation, like the external objects, is in the mind of the perceiver.

2 As is the case, etc.—In dream, the dream-mind which sees objects (non-different from itself) is identical with the dreamer.

उभे ध्यानोन्यद्यें ते किं तदस्तीति नोष्यते ।
लक्षणाश्वत्सुनभयं तन्मतेनैव गुद्धाते॥ ६७ ॥

67. Both (the mind and the Jīva) are objects of perception to each other. Which then can be said to exist independent of the other? (The reply of the wise is in the negative). Both are devoid of the marks by which they could be distinguished. For, either can be cognized only through the other.

ŚANKARA’S COMMENTARY

Both the mind and the Jīvas,\(^1\) or in other words, the mind and its modifications (which are seen as external objects) are each an object of perception to the other. In other words, one is perceived only through the other. The mind exists only in relation to the Jīva, etc., and the Jīva and objects exist only in relation to the mind. Therefore they are each an object of perception to the other. Hence\(^2\) wise men assert that nothing whatsoever, neither the mind nor its object, can be said to have any existence (if either be considered by itself)—(from the standpoint of either the idealist or the realist). As in the dream the elephant as well as the mind that perceives the elephant, are not really existent, so also is the case with the mind and its objects of the waking condition. How
is it so? For, both the mind and its objects have no-proof of their existence (independent of each other). They are each an object of perception to the other. One cannot cognize a jar without the cognition of a jar; nor can one have a cognition of a jar without a jar. In the case of the jar and the cognition of the jar it is not possible to conceive the distinction between the instrument of knowledge and the object of knowledge.

This verse refutes the contention of the school of thought which asserts that the ego creates the non-ego.

1 Jivas.—They include all objects perceived by the mind.

2 Hence, etc.—They exist, with relation to one another, only in the relative plane of consciousness.

The existence of the variety of objects is possible only when one object is perceived in relation to the other. Therefore the triad of "Knower", "Known" and "Knowledge," mutually dependent upon one another, is possible only in the realm of ignorance.

68-70. As the dream-Jiva comes into being and disappears, so also all Jivas (perceived in the waking condition) appear and disappear.

As the magician’s Jiva comes into being and passes away, so also all Jivas (perceived in the waking condition) appear and disappear.
As the artificial Jīva (brought into existence by incantation, medicinal herb, etc.) comes into being and passes away, so also all the Jīvas (perceived in the waking condition) appear and disappear.

ŚANKARA’S COMMENTARY

The “magician’s Jīva” means that which is conjured up before our vision by the feat of a magician. The “artificial Jīva” is that which is brought into existence by means of incantation, medicinal herb, etc.

As the Jīvas born of egg, etc., and created in dream, are seen to come into existence and then to pass away, so also the Jīvas such as human beings, etc., seen in the waking state, though really non-existent (appear to come into existence and then pass away). These¹ are merely the imagination of the mind.

It may be contended that if the Jīvas perceived in the waking state be unreal, then their birth and death, which are objects of common experience, become an impossibility. This Kārikā says in reply that as in the case of dream-beings, etc., really non-existent birth and death are possible, so also the appearance of birth, etc., is possible in the case of beings that are perceived in the waking state.

¹ There are, etc.—In other words, the Jīvas, perceived in the waking state, with all concomitantly appearing birth, death etc., are mere results of the objectifying tendency of the mind, and nothing more.

न कक्षिजायते जीवः सम्भवस्य न विचि ते ।
एतत्तुतमसं सत्यं यत्र किंचित्र जायते ॥ ७१ ॥

71. No kind of Jīva is ever born nor is there any cause for any such birth. The Ultimate Truth is that nothing whatsoever is born.
ŚANKARA’S COMMENTARY

It has already been stated that the appearances of birth, death, etc., of the Jivas are possible only in the empirical plane, as is the case with the dream-beings. But the Ultimate Truth is that no Jiva is ever born. The rest has already been stated.

This is the repetition of the last verse of the third chapter of the Kārikā.

\[72. \text{This perceived world of duality, characterised by the subject-object relationship, is verily an act of the mind. The mind, again, (from the standpoint of Reality) is without touch with any object (as it is of the nature of Ātmān). Hence it is declared to be eternal and unattached.}\]

ŚANKARA’S COMMENTARY

The whole world of duality consisting of the subject and the object is, verily, an act of the mind. But from the standpoint of the Ultimate Reality, the mind, which is verily Ātmān, is unrelated to any object. On account of the absence of relation (with any object), the mind is declared as eternal and unattached. The Śruti also says, “The Purusha is always free from relation.” That which perceives objects outside of it, is related to such objects. But the mind, having no such external object, is free from all relations.

\[1 \text{Is unrelated, etc.—The objects and their relation with the mind are perceived only in the state of ignorance. Even when the ignorant person perceives the mind to be associated with the subject-object relationship, the mind, truly speaking, is non-dual, unattached and absolute.}\]
The mind is, in reality, free from all ideas of the subject-object relationship. The idea of the object is superimposed upon the mind through ignorance. These objects have no existence apart from the mind. This has been already established by the dream-analogy. Therefore from the standpoint of the Ultimate Reality, the mind is ever unrelated to objects, as such objects do not exist. Hence mind is Atman or Reality.

73. That which exists on the strength of the illusory experiences does not, really speaking, exist. That which, again, is said to exist on the strength of the views supported by the other schools of thought, does not, really speaking, exist.

SANKARA’S COMMENTARY

(Objection)—It has been said that the mind is free from the relation with any objects, as such objects do not exist. But this non-attachment regarding the mind cannot be maintained inasmuch as objects in the forms of the teacher, the Scripture and the pupil exist.

(Reply)—There is no such defect in our contention.

(Objection)—How?

(Reply)—The¹ existence of such objects as Scripture, etc., is due to the empirical experience which is illusory. The empirical knowledge in respect of Scripture, teacher and taught is illusory and imagined only as a means to the realisation of the Ultimate Reality. Therefore Scripture, etc., which exist only on the strength of illusory empirical experiences, have no real existence. It has already been said that duality vanishes when the Ultimate Reality is known. Again, the² objects (which appear to come into existence through the illusory
experiences), supported by other schools of thought as existent, do not, when analysed from the standpoint of the Ultimate Reality, verily exist. Hence it has been rightly said in the previous Kārikā that the mind is unattached.

1 The existence, etc.—That is to say, the Scripture, the teacher and the taught have meaning only in the state of ignorance. The purpose of these ideas is to help the ignorant person to realize Truth. Compare with the Kārikā 28 in the Āgama Prakaraṇa.

2 The objects, etc.—The Vaiśeṣika school of thought maintains the existence of Six Categories. But these Categories are nonexistent from the standpoint of the Ultimate Reality. These are perceived to exist only in the plane of our empirical experiences.

अजः कालिपतस्त्रावुष्या परमार्थेन नाप्यजः ।
परत्नान्नाभिनिष्पत्या संद्रुष्या जायते तु सः ॥ ७४ ॥

74. Ātman is called unborn (Aja) from the standpoint of the illusory empirical experiences. It is, truly speaking, not even unborn. That unborn Ātman appears to be born from the standpoint of the belief of the other schools of thought.

ŚANKARA’S COMMENTARY

(Objection)—If Scriptural teaching, etc., were illusory, then the birthlessness of Ātman, as taught by Scripture, is also due to illusory imagination.

(Reply)—This is, indeed, true. Ātman is said to be unborn only in relation to illusory empirical experiences which comprehend ideas of Scripture, teacher and taught. From1 the standpoint of the Ultimate Reality, Ātman cannot be said to be even unborn. Ātman2 which is said to be unborn only as against the conclusion of those schools (which maintain that Ātman comes into
existence), appears to be born to the ignorant. Therefore, the notion (based upon illusion) that Ātman is unborn has no bearing on the Ultimate Reality.

1 From, etc.—The idea of birthlessness is the correlative of the idea of birth. Hence both the ideas belong to the realm of ignorance. Ātman, as it really is, cannot be described either as born or unborn. Nothing can be predicated of Ātman from the standpoint of the Ultimate Reality.

2 Ātman, etc.—The Sāmkhya School of Thought, believing in causality, asserts the birth of Ātman. As against this conclusion, it is maintained that Ātman is unborn (Aja). This assertion regarding the birthlessness of Ātman is also due to Avidyā inasmuch as it aims at the refutation of the opposite theory. This theory of Ātman being ever unborn is based upon the illusory idea regarding its birth. It may be contended that the birthlessness of Ātman is not an illusory idea but truth. In reply it is said that the predicate of birthlessness cannot have any application with regard to the Ultimate Reality. Ātman is considered to be unborn only from the standpoint of an illusion that it is born. Hence, being correlative of an illusion, the birthlessness of Ātman also becomes illusory. The real nature of Ātman cannot be determined by any instrument of knowledge which has its applicability only in the relative plane.

अभूताभिनिर्विशेषोऽस्ति द्वयं तत्र न विचयते।
द्वयाभावं स बुद्धिः निर्याप्तिः न जायते॥ ७५ ॥

75. Man has mere persistent belief in the reality of the unreal (which is duality). There is no duality (corresponding to such belief). One who has realised the absence of duality is never born again as there remains, no longer, any cause (for such birth).

ŚANKARA'S COMMENTARY

As objects are, really speaking, non-existent, therefore people who believe in their existence have, in fact, attachment for duality which is unreal. It is a mere
belief in the (existence of) objects which (really speaking) do not exist. There is no duality. The cause of birth is this attachment. Therefore, one who has realised the unreality of duality is never born again as he is free from the cause (of birth), viz., attachment to the illusory duality.

यदा न लभते हेतुनृतमाथममध्यमान् ।
तदा न जायते चित्रं हेतुमानेन फलं कुत: || ७६ ||

76. When the mind does not find any cause superior, inferior or middling, it becomes free from birth. How can there be an effect without a cause?

SANKARA’S COMMENTARY

The superior cause consists of those Dharmas (i.e., duties of life), wholly virtuous, which are prescribed according to different castes and stages of life, and which when performed without any attachment to the result, enable one to attain to the position of gods, etc. The middling cause consists of those duties, mixed with certain irreligious practices the observance of which enables one to attain to the position of man, etc. The inferior cause consists of those particular tendencies, characterised by irreligious practices alone, which lead one to the position of lower creatures, such as beasts, birds, etc. When the mind realising the essence of Self which is one and without a second and which is free from all (illusory) imaginations, does not find the existence of any of the causes, superior, inferior or middling, all imagined through ignorance,—like a man of discrimination not seeing any dirt which a child sees in the sky—then it does not undergo any birth, i.e., it does not objectify itself as god, man or beast, which are the effects
of their respective causes (enumerated above). No effect can be produced in the absence of a cause, as sprouts cannot come forth in the absence of the seed.

1 All, etc.—All beings from the angel to the beast and the bird belong to the realm of ignorance.

अनिविभुस्य चित्तव्य यासुतपति: समासहया ।
अजात्स्येष सर्वस्य चित्तव्यं हि तथत: ॥ ७७ ॥

77. The non-evolution (i.e., the state of knowledge) of the mind, which is unborn and free from causal relation, is absolute and constant. Everything else is also equally unborn. (So what is true of the mind is true of everything else as well.) For, all duality is merely an objectification of the mind.

SANKARA'S COMMENTARY

It has already been stated that in the absence of a cause, the mind is not subject to birth. But what is the nature of that non-evolution of the mind? It is thus replied:—The causes of birth are meritorious actions and their opposite. The state of absolute non-manifestation of the mind,—known as liberation (knowledge) and free from causality¹ on account of the realisation of the Supreme,—is² always constant under all conditions and absolute, that is, ever non-dual. Even³ before the attainment of knowledge, the mind always remains non-manifest and non-dual. Even prior to the realisation of the highest knowledge the idea of duality (i.e., the subject and the object) and the idea of birth are merely an objectification of the mind. Hence the non-evolution of the mind which is always⁴ free from change or birth is constant and absolute. In other words, it cannot be said that this non-evolution or liberation sometimes
exists and sometimes disappears. It is always the same and changeless.

It may be contended from the previous Kārikā that liberation depends upon the external factor of time. This contention is answered in this verse.

1 Which, etc.—The causes of birth, in the form of meritorious and vicious deeds, are seen to exist only during the state of ignorance.

2 Is always, etc.—All duality, due to the objectification of the mind, is unreal. There is no cause for the mind which is absolute, eternal, immutable and all-sufficient, to pass into birth. Therefore from the standpoint of Reality, the mind or Jīva is always liberated. He is ever free from bondage which is non-existent.

3 Even before, etc.—It may be objected that liberation is possible only during the state of knowledge, while the Jīva is bound during the state of ignorance. In reply it is said that from the standpoint of Reality ignorance does not exist. Even when a man looks upon himself as subject to birth and death and living in the plane of ignorance, he is, really speaking, Ātman free and non-dual. Even when the rope is seen to be the snake by the ignorant mind, it is nothing but the rope. Similarly Ātman never deviates from his real nature though he appears as Jīva during ignorance. The idea of birth, death, etc., is mere unreal imagination.

4 Always—That is to say, the mind is really free from birth, etc., even when the ignorant persons see it coming into existence and again disappearing.

बुद्धवाकनिमित्तां सत्यं हेतु पृथगनास्पुतनः ||
बीतशोकं तथा काममभं पदमस्तुते || ७८ ||

78. Having (thus) realised the absence of causality as the Ultimate Truth, and also not finding any other cause (for birth), one attains to that (the state of liberation) which is free from grief, desire and fear.

Śanksara’s Commentary

Through1 the reasoning indicated above, one knows the absence of duality, which is the cause of birth and
thus realises absolute non-causation as the Ultimate Truth. Further, he does not see the reality of anything else as cause, such as religious merit, etc., which may enable one to attain to the position of gods, etc. Thus freeing himself from all desires, he attains to the highest state, i.e., liberation (knowledge) which is free from desire, grief, ignorance and fear. That is to say, he no longer becomes subject to birth and death.

1 Through, etc.—All dual objects are illusory like dream objects on account of their being perceived. See Kārikā 4, Chapter II.

2 He, etc.—The meritorious or vicious deeds as well as gods, men or birds and beasts which are the results of these actions, belong to the realm of ignorance.

अभूताभिनिवेशाद्दि सदृशे तत्प्रवर्तते ||
वस्त्यभावं स बुद्धेत्रव निषंगं विनिवर्तते || ७९ ||

79. On account of attachment to the unreal objects, the mind runs after such objects. But it comes back (to its own pure state) when it becomes unattached (to objects) realising their unreality.

SĀNKARA’S COMMENTARY

Attachment to the unreal (objects) is due to the firm belief that duality exists, though in reality such duality is ever non-existent. On account of such attachment which is of the nature of delusion caused by ignorance, the mind runs after objects corresponding to those desires. But when a man knows the unreality of all duality of objects, then he becomes indifferent to them and turns away his mind from the unreal (objects) to which he feels attached.

1 On account, etc.—It is desire, due to ignorance, that creates objects around us.
3. Unreality, etc.—The only way to become detached from the world is to know its unreal nature by following the Vedantic method of reasoning. The Yogic method of mechanical concentration may make the mind oblivious of the world for the time being, but when that concentration is relaxed, the world with its objects again appears as before. Vedantic Knowledge alone convinces one of the illusory nature of the world.

नित्यत्वायप्रत्यत्त्वयं निश्चलं हि तद् स्थिति: ।
विषयः स हि बुद्धानां तत्सांम्यमजम्मत्र्यम् ॥ ८० ॥

80. The mind, thus freed from attachment (to all external objects) and undistracted (by fresh objects) attains to its state of Immutability. Being actually realised by the wise, it is undifferentiated, birthless and non-dual.

Sankara’s Commentary

When the mind is withdrawn from all duality of objects, and when it does not attach itself to any objects,—as no objects exist—then the mind attains to the state of immutability which is of the same nature as Brahman. This realisation of the mind as Brahman is characterised by the mass of unique non-dual consciousness. As that condition of the mind is known, (only) by the wise who have known the Ultimate Reality, that state is supreme and undifferentiated, birthless and non-dual.

1. Which is, etc.—The mind free from relativity and objectification is Brahman.

3. This, etc.—The mind free from the subject-object relationship has the same characteristic as Brahman.

3. Is known, etc.—This state of the mind, which is the highest Reality, can be known with the help of reasoning. Scripture, which also belongs to the realm of relativity, cannot describe Brahman or the Supreme Reality.
81. (Reality which is) free from birth, and (which is) free from sleep and dream, reveals itself by itself. For, this Dharma (i.e., Ātman) is from its very nature ever-luminous.

ŚAṆKARA'S COMMENTARY

The nature of that which is realisable by the wise is again described:—It (Ātman) reveals itself by itself. It does not depend for its revelation upon any external\(^1\) light, such as the sun, etc. Self-luminosity\(^2\) is its very nature. It is ever-luminous. This is the inherent characteristic of the Dharma, known as Ātman.

\(^1\) External, etc.—Ātman itself is the substratum of everything. Therefore it cannot be dependent upon anything else.

\(^2\) Self-luminosity—Ātman is called self-luminous as, in the state of deep sleep, the real nature of Ātman is revealed though all external instruments such as the sense-organs, the mind, etc., then remain inactive.

The text characterises Ātman as free from dream and sleep. Dream indicates the wrong apprehension of truth while sleep stands for its non-apprehension. The waking state is omitted as because either it is included in the dream state or it stands for the state of knowledge.

82. On account of the mind apprehending single objects, the Bliss (i.e., the real essence of the Self) always remains concealed and misery comes to the surface. Therefore the ever-effulgent Lord (is not realised though taught again and again by Scriptures and teachers).
How is it that the people, at large, do not realise Ātman, which is the Supreme Reality, though It is again and again thus explained? To this the following reply is given:—On account of the mind apprehending through attachment, single objects of the world of duality, the blissful nature of Ātman is easily covered. The reason for this concealment is only the perception of duality. There is no other cause for it. Moreover, misery is brought to the surface. The knowledge of the Supreme Reality is extremely hard to attain. The Lord, the non-dual Ātman, the effulgent Being, though again and again taught by the Vedānta Scriptures and the teachers, is not therefore comprehended. The Śruti also says, “One who speaks of Ātman is looked upon with wonder and he who has attained and who has realised it, is equally an object of wonder.”

1 On account of, etc.—That is to say, people on account of their prejudices associate Ātman with various illusory ideas. Ātman is free from all ideas (Kalpanā). See next Kārikā.

2 Misery—In reality there is no misery. Bliss alone, which is the characteristic of Ātman, exists. But misery is experienced when the Blissful Ātman is not known.

अस्ति नास्त्यस्ति नास्त्यति नास्त्यति वा पुनः ।
चतुष्यिथरोभयाभावेऽराऔणोथ्येव बाधिते ॥ ८३ ॥

83. Childish persons verily cover It (fail to know It) by predicking of It such attributes as existence, non-existence, existence and non-existence and absolute non-existence, derived respectively from their notion of change, immovability, combination of both and absolute negation.
Attachment of the learned to such predicates as existence, non-existence, etc., serves verily as a veil between them and the Supreme Reality. What wonder is there that childish persons on account of their undeveloped intellect are unable to grasp Ātman! This Kārikā brings out the aforesaid idea. Some disputant asserts that Ātman exists. Another disputant, viz., the Buddhist, says that it is non-existent. A third disputant, the Jaina, who is a pseudo-nihilist, believing in both the existence and non-existence of Self, proclaims that Ātman both exist and does not exist. The absolute nihilist says that nothing exists at all. He who predicates existence of Ātman associates it with changeability in order to make it distinct from such impermanent objects as a jar, etc. The theory that Ātman is non-existent, i.e., inactive, is held on account of its undifferentiated nature. It is called both existent and non-existent on account of its being subject to both changeability and immutability. Non-existence is predicated of Ātman on account of everything ending in absolute negation or void. All the four classes of disputants, mentioned above, asserting existence, non-existence, existence and non-existence, and total non-existence (about Ātman), derived respectively from their notion of changeability, immutability, combination of both and total negation, reduce themselves to the position of the childish, devoid of all discrimination; and by associating Ātman with all these illusory ideas (Kalpanā) cover Its real nature. If these (so-called) learned men act as veritable children on account of their ignorance of Ultimate Reality, what is to be said regarding those who are, by nature, unenlightened!
1 *Predicates, etc.*—These predicates of Ātman are due to illusory ideas (Kalpanā) regarding its real nature.

2 *Some disputant*—This refers to the follower of the Vaiśeshika theory. He asserts that there is an Ātman which is separate from the body, sense-organ, Prāṇa, etc. It is the knower and enjoyer of misery and happiness.

3 *Another, etc.*—This refers to the followers of Subjective idealism among the Buddhists known as Kshanika Vignānavādins. According to them Ātman, though separate from body, etc., is identical with Buddhi or intellect. It is not permanent. Our consciousness which disappears after only a moment’s existence is the only reality. Any reality, in the sense of a permanent entity, is non-existent.

4 *The third, etc.*—This refers to the followers of the Jaina school of thought. According to this school, Ātman is both existent and non-existent. Though Ātman is separate from the body, yet it has the same size as the body. It exists as long as the body exists and it is destroyed with the destruction of the body.

5 *The Absolute, etc.*—This refers to the extreme school of Buddhism known as the Nihilistic school. According to the follower of this theory, there is no permanent Reality like Ātman. All things end in destruction. Therefore absolute negation is the Highest Truth. The word “non-existence” has been repeated in the verse in order to show the determined belief of the nihilist in his own opinion.

6 *He who, etc.*—According to the Vaiśeshika theory the nature of Ātman is changeable as it, at different times, becomes subject to happiness, misery, desire, knowledge, etc. Ātman is designated as existent in order to distinguish it from all objects of an impermanent nature, such as a pot, etc.

7 *The theory, etc.*—The Subjective idealist asserts that Ātman has a momentary existence, and as having existed only for a moment, it cannot be subject to any change or modification.

8 *It is, etc.*—The Jaina school predicates both existence and non-existence of Ātman as it partakes of the nature of both.

9 *Its real nature.*—The real nature of Ātman is that it is free from all ideas or Kalpanā. People clinging to their pet theories, on account of their false attachment, cannot know the real nature of Ātman.
84. These are the four alternative theories regarding (the nature of) Ātman, on account of attachment to which it always remains covered (from one's view). He who has known that Ātman is ever-untouched by any of these (predicates) indeed sees all.

ŚANKARA’S COMMENTARY

What is the nature of the essence, i.e., the Ultimate Reality, by knowing which people are purged of their stupidity and are really made to attain to wisdom? It is thus replied:—There are four alternate theories regarding Ātman such as, It exists, It does not exist, etc., mentioned in the works of those who are fond of disputations. The Ātman always remains covered and hidden from these vain talkers on account of their attachment to their theories. The thoughtful person who has realised the Ātman, known only by the (correct understanding of) Upanishads, as ever-untouched by any of the four alternative predicates such as It exists, It does not exist, etc., is the seer\(^1\) of all, the omniscient and the real knower of the Ultimate Reality.

\(^1\) Seer of all—All that exists is Ātman. Therefore one who knows Ātman knows all. There remains nothing else to be known by him.

85. What else remains for him to be desired when he has attained to the state of the Brāhmaṇa—a state of
COMPLETE OMNISCIENCE, NON-DUALITY AND A STATE WHICH IS WITHOUT BEGINNING, END OR MIDDLE?

ŚANKARA’S COMMENTARY

The state of the Brāhmaṇa signifies the state in which one is established in Brahman. The Śruti says, “This is the eternal glory of the Brāhmaṇa.” That state of Brāhmaṇa is free from beginning, end or middle. That is to say, that state of non-duality is free from the (illusory ideas of) creation, preservation and destruction. Having obtained the whole of omniscience, described above, i.e., the state of Brāhmaṇa, a non-dual state without beginning, end or middle, which is the same as the realisation of Self, the summum bonum of existence—what else remains for him to be desired? In other words, all other strivings become useless for him. It is thus said in Gītā, “He has nothing to gain by the activities (of the relative world).”

The contention of the opponent that even a Knower of Brahman should observe the ritualistic duties of daily life is refuted by this Kārikā.

1 The state, etc.—He alone is the real Brāhmaṇa who has directly realised himself as Brahman.

2 Eternal glory—That is to say, this state is free from all modifications and changes, such as birth, death, etc.

3 Whole, etc.—Having realised that state one becomes totally omniscient. There is nothing else for him to know. It is because that state is the very essence of knowledge itself.

4 Described above—That is to say, Brahman is free from the four attributes or predicates referred to in Kārikā 83.
(of mind) is also declared to be spontaneous (by men of discrimination). They are said to have attained to the state of sense-control (not through any artificial method as it comes quite natural to them. He who thus realises Brahman which is all-peace, himself becomes peaceful and tranquil.

ŚANKARA’S COMMENTARY

The humility of the Brāhmaṇas which is due to their realisation of their identity with the Self, is quite natural. This is (the real significance of) his humility. The tranquillity (of the mind which the Knowers of Brahman enjoy) is also natural and not induced by any artificial means. Brahman is all-peace and tranquility. Hence the Brāhmaṇas are said to have controlled their sense-organs (from pursuing the external objects). This is also the cause of the tranquillity of their nature. Having realised Brahman which is, by nature, all-peace the wise man attains to peace which is the characteristic of Brahman. That is to say, he becomes identical with Brahman.

It has been stated in the previous Kārikā that the Knower of Brahman need no longer perform the daily ritualistic duties which are obligatory for ignorant persons. This Kārikā states that he need not undergo any Yogic or other practices in order to acquire humility, control of the senses and tranquillity of the mind. One who is established in Brahman, non-dual and all-peace, naturally and spontaneously acquires these virtues. The wise man realises that Brahman alone exists. Therefore his mind does not run after external objects, simply because they are non-existent for him. Realising Brahman everywhere, he does not show arrogance. Peace and tranquillity are quite natural for him. Yoga prescribes various artificial disciplines for acquiring these virtues. But he who clings to the Yogic practices, must be always on the alert lest his mind should be diverted to external objects. The Vedāntic method,
depending upon discrimination, reveals everything as Brahman. Therefore for a Jñāni these virtues are quite spontaneous.

1 Artificial, etc.—That is to say, the Yogic methods.

87. (Vedānta) recognises the ordinary (empirical) state of waking in which duality, consisting of objects and ideas of coming in contact with them, is known. It further recognises another more subtle state (i.e., the dream common to all) in which is experienced duality, consisting of the idea of coming in contact with the objects, though such objects do not exist.

SANKARA’S COMMENTARY

We have so far, come to the following conclusions: The theories of mere disputants contradicting one another, are the causes of our existence in the relative (Samsāra) world. Further these theories are characterised by partiality and aversion. Therefore these are merely false, as already shown by reasoning. On the other hand the philosophy of Advaita alone gives us true knowledge, as,—being free from the four alternative predicates referred to above,—it is untouched by partiality and aversion and is all-peace by its very nature.

Now the following topic is introduced as an explanation of the Vedāntic method of arriving at truth. The word “Savastu” in the text implies objects that are perceived in our empirical experiences. Similarly, the word “Sopalamhha” in the text implies the idea of one’s coming in contact with such objects. This constitutes the world of duality, common to all human beings and known as the waking state which is characterised by the
subject-object relationship and which alone is the sphere of all our dealings including the Scriptural, etc. The waking state, thus characterised, is admitted in the Vedānta Scriptures. There is another state which lacks the experiences (of the waking state) caused by external sense-organs. But there exists in that state the idea of coming in contact with objects, though such objects are absent. This is admitted (in the Vedāntas) as the dream state, which is again common to all, and different from and subtler than the gross state of waking.

The nature of Ultimate Reality has been hinted at by the refutation of the theories hostile to the Advaita Philosophy. Now is given the Advaita method of arriving at Truth which consists in the analysis and co-ordination of the experiences of the three states, viz., waking, dream and deep sleep.

1 Including, etc.—The Scriptures, limited to the sphere of duality, have no application to Ātman.

2 The waking, etc.—Vedānta admits the waking state as real so long as ignorance lasts, and further points out that the analysis of the experiences of this state together with those of the two other states leads us, indirectly, to the realisation of Ātman.

3 But, etc.—Though the objects experienced in dream exist so long as the dream lasts, they are found to be non-existing from the waking standpoint. The internality and the externality of perceptions in the dream and the waking states are mere creations of the mind.

When we look at the objects from the waking standpoint alone we think them to be real. When the same objects seen in the dream are judged from the waking standpoint we know them to be mere ideas of the mind. And analysis of deep sleep, in co-ordination with the experiences of the dream and the waking states, convinces us that everything is mind or Brahman. This is the Vedāntic method. The following verse gives a fuller explanation.

अवस्त्यनुपथम् च लोकोत्तरमिति स्पृतेम्।

ज्ञानं हेयं च विज्ञायं सदा बुद्धेऽ प्रकर्तितेतम्। ॥ ८॥

13a
There is another state (admitted by the wise) which is free from contact with (external) objects and altogether free from the idea of coming in contact with objects. This state is beyond all empirical experiences. The wise always describe the three, viz., Knowledge, Knowledge of objects and the Knowable as the Supreme Reality (which is ultimately knowable).

**Sankara's Commentary**

The state in which one neither perceives any object nor possesses the idea of coming in contact with such object—a state free from the relationship of subject and object—is called the highest state, which is beyond all empirical experiences. All empirical experiences consist of the subject-object relationship. This state is free from all such relationship and is the seed of future experiences. This is known as the state of deep sleep. That alone is called knowledge which is the realisation of essence, i.e., the Supreme Reality, as well as the means to do so, viz., the analysis of the states of gross experience, subtle experience and the condition beyond all experiences. The three states, mentioned above, are the objects of knowledge; for, there cannot be anything knowable besides these three states. All entities falsely imagined by the different schools of the disputants are included in these three states. That which is to be ultimately known is the truth regarding the Supreme Reality, known as Turīya, i.e., the knowledge of Self, non-dual and unborn. The illumined ones, i.e., those who have seen the Supreme Reality have described these features (topics) ranging from the objects of gross experience to the Supremely Knowable Self.
1. Object, etc.—That is to say, the waking state.

2. The idea, etc.—i.e., the dream state in which one, in the absence of external objects, seems to perceive such objects.

3. This is etc.—In deep sleep one does not perceive any object, gross or subtle. There is no experience in deep sleep which when judged from the causal standpoint, consists of mental modification—as in the dream,—due to the perception of external objects in the waking state. Deep sleep is further characterised by the total absence of the subject-object relationship. In deep sleep there exists one's real self. It has been characterised as containing the seeds of the two other states, only from the causal standpoint. Again it is from the relative standpoint that Turiya, the witness of the three states, is mentioned as the state of the Ultimate Knowledge.

4. The three, etc.—All experiences are limited to the three states. Therefore the Truth discovered by the study of the three states is the Supreme Reality.

Therefore the Vedantic method of arriving at Reality is the co-ordinated study of the three states. All experiences are confined to the limits of the three states.

89. Knowledge and the three fold knowable being known, one after another, the knower possessed of the highest reason spontaneously attains to the state of knowledge everywhere and in all things in this very life.

SANKARA’S COMMENTARY

The word Jnānam signifies knowledge by which one grasps the significance of the three states. The word “Jneya” or knowable, signifies the three states which should be known. The first (knowable) consists of the gross state\(^1\) of empirical experience. Then comes the state of subtle\(^2\) experience in which the first state loses
itself, i.e., merges. And last comes deep sleep which is beyond all empirical experiences (gross or subtle) which results in the absence of the two previous states, i.e., in which the two previous states merge. By the knowledge of these three, one after the other, and consequently, by the negation of the three states the Turiya, non-dual, birthless and fearless, which alone is the Supreme Reality, is realised. Thus the knower (possessed of the highest power of discrimination) attains in this very life the state of omniscience which is identical with the knowledge of Self. He is called Mahādhīḥ or the man of the highest intellect as he has understood that which transcends all human experiences. His omniscience is constant and remains undiminished. For, the knowledge of Self once realised remains as such for ever. This is because the knowledge of the knower of the Supreme Reality does not appear and disappear like that of mere vain disputants.

The scriptural statements that the Ātman being known, everything else is known, is explained in the Kārikā.

1 Gross state, etc.—That is, the waking state.

2 Subtle, etc.—That is, the dream state.

3 One after, etc.—That is to say, by knowing that the waking state merges in the dream, and both the states merge in deep sleep.

4 Turiya—Turiya is conceived to be transcendent from the relative standpoint.

5 In this, etc.—One need not wait for death or the other world for the realisation of the Ultimate Truth.

6 Omniscience—It is Ātman alone which appears as the three states. Therefore when Ātman is realised, all objects included in the three states are known.

7 Mahādhīḥ—The Knower of Truth is designated as the possessor of the highest intellect (buddhi): for, the keenest intellect alone can know Ātman.
This is, etc.—The appearance and disappearance of knowledge, often noticed in our empirical experience, is due to the ignorance of the real nature of the Self. As the Jñāni is free from ignorance, his knowledge is constant.

This Kārikā further elaborates the Advaita method of realising the Self. To the man of the grossest intellect the object appears to be extraordinary. To the man of better discrimination, the object appears to be a mere idea or modification of the mind. The Jñāni sees only the mind, undifferentiated, changeless and non-dual in whatever manner the objects appear. That which appears as ideas, associated with the relationship of subject and object, is known to the Jñāni as mere non-dual mind or Ātman. This is better explained in the light of the three states. The gross external objects perceived in the waking state are known to be ideas—as in dream. And the ideas of dream are known to be pure mind, non-dual and unchanging, as in deep sleep ideas disappear in the mind. This is the meaning of the merging of the previous state of waking in the subsequent state of dream and the ultimate merging of both states in deep sleep, which includes all the states. This method has been explained in the second Mantra of the Upanishad with reference to AUM. “A” which stands for the waking experiences as merged in “U” which signifies dream state. “A” and “U” are merged into “M” which indicate deep sleep. All the three states merge in Turiya which is Ātman. From the absolute standpoint the undifferentiated mind, free from the subject-object relationship, is the Highest Reality. One who knows these becomes omniscient. He sees everywhere the non-dual Ātman alone. That which appears to others as name, form, object or idea, is realised by a Jñāni to be Self alone. Ātman alone exists.

हेयज्ञेयाप्याक्यानि विज्ञेयान्यमयाणि: ||
तेषामन्यन्त्र विज्ञेयादुपल्लभिक्षु स्मृति: || ९० ||

90. The four things to be known first are: the thing to be avoided, the objects to be realised, the things to be attained (by practice) and the thoughts to be rendered ineffective. Among these four, the three things, excepting
what is to be realised, viz., the Supreme Reality, exist only as imaginations.

ŚANKARA'S COMMENTARY

There may arise a doubt that the three states of empirical experience may constitute the Ultimate Reality on account of their being pointed out as things to be gradually known. In order to remove this doubt it is said, the "Heyas" or things to be avoided are the three states of empirical experience, viz., the waking, the dream and the deep sleep. These do not exist in Ātman just as the snake is not present in the rope. Therefore they should be avoided. The word Jneya, i.e., the thing to be known, in this text refers to the knowledge of the Ultimate Reality, free from the four alternative theories described before. The things to be acquired are the accessories of spiritual realisation, viz., wisdom, childlike innocence and silence. These virtues are practised by the sages after they have renounced the threefold desires. The word "Pākyāni" in the text signifies the latent impressions which in due course attain maturity, viz., such blemishes as attachment, aversion, delusion, etc. These are known as Kashāya or the passions that hide the real nature of the soul. As a means to their realisation of the Supreme Reality, sages should first of all be acquainted with these four things, viz., the thing to be avoided, the thing to be realised, the thing to be acquired and the thing to be rendered ineffective. These, however, with the exception of the thing to be known—that is to say, with the exception of the non-dual Brahman alone, the essence of the Ultimate Reality, that should be realised—are perceived on account of our imagination. This is the conclusion of the Knowers of Brahman with regard to the three things, viz., those to be avoided,
acquired, and those that are (awaiting maturity and therefore) to be made ineffective. In other words, these three do not exist from the standpoint of the Ultimate Reality.

¹ Pointed out, etc.—Compare Kārikās 88 and 89 (Chapter 4).
² Four, etc.—Compare Kārikā 83 (Chapter 4).
³ Wisdom—This wisdom consists of the intellectual capacity to know that the non-dual Brahman alone is the objective of the Vedānta Scriptures.
⁴ Childlike, etc.—That is to say, freedom from egoism, vanity, etc.
⁵ Silence—It means that intense concentration on Brahman which makes one avoid all vain talk.
⁶ Threefold, etc.—That is, the desires for children, for wealth and for heavenly felicity.
⁷ Latent, etc.—An ignorant man cherishes many vices, such as attachment, hatred, delusion, etc. These are known in Vedānta as Kashāya. Among those vices, the effect of past work and thought, some are bearing fruits which are seen in our daily activities. But others are mere tendencies and latent impressions waiting for favourable conditions to manifest themselves. These latent impressions are known as “Pākyā”. These should be destroyed by discrimination.
⁸ As a means, etc.—The seeker after Truth should know the nature of the three things to be avoided, etc., because it helps him in his spiritual progress.
⁹ Are perceived—From the standpoint of the Ultimate Reality, Brahman alone exists. Duality is perceived on account of illusion. Therefore these three things are perceived to exist only on the plane of ignorance. And this is due to ignorance. On the acquisition of knowledge one understands that there is nothing to be avoided or shunned as Brahman alone exists (everywhere).
91. All Dharmās (entities) are, by their very nature, beginningless and unattached like the Ākāśa. There is not the slightest variety in them, in any way, at any time.

ŚANKARA’S COMMENTARY

Those who seek liberation should regard, from the standpoint of the Ultimate Reality, all Jīvas, as by their very nature without beginning, i.e., eternal, and, like Ākāśa, subtle, free from all blemish and all-pervading. The plural number used with regard to the ‘Jīvas’ may suggest multiplicity. The second line of the Kārikā is meant to remove\(^1\) any such apprehension. There is no multiplicity in the Jīvas even\(^2\) in the slightest degree and under any condition.

\(^1\) To remove, etc.—The plural number is used in consideration of the multiplicity of Jīvas seen from the empirical standpoint. Even though an ignorant person sees multiplicity of embodied beings yet, in reality, there exists nothing but non-dual Ātman.

\(^2\) Even, etc.—It is because the apparent multiplicity is due to the obsession of the imaginary time and space as well as causal relation. As Ātman is ever free from time, space and causal relation, therefore no idea of multiplicity can ever be applied to Ātman.

आदिबुद्धा: प्रकृत्येव सर्वेः धर्मः सुनिन्धितः ॥
यथैवं भवति क्षांति: सोडग्नतवाय कल्पते ॥ ९२ ॥

92. All Jīvas are, by their very nature, illumined from the very beginning and they are ever immutable in their nature. He who, having known this rests without (sees the needlessness of) seeking further knowledge, is alone capable of realising the Highest Truth.

ŚANKARA’S COMMENTARY

Even the knowableness attributed to the Jīvas is also due to the illusion of empirical experiences. It cannot be
applied from the standpoint of the Supreme Reality. This idea is explained in this text. The Jivas are illumined, by their very nature, from the very beginning. That is to say, all the Jivas, like the sun which is of the very nature of eternal light, are ever illumined. No effort need be made to define their nature, as the nature of the Jiva is, from the very beginning, well determined.\(^1\) It cannot be subject to any such doubt as, “The Jiva may be like this or like that”. The seeker of liberation who in the manner above described, does not stand in need of anything else to make this knowledge certain to himself or others,—just as the sun, by nature ever illumined, is never in need of any light from itself or others—who thus always rests\(^2\) without forming ideas of duality regarding any further knowledge of his own self, becomes capable of realising the Ultimate Reality.

\(^1\) Well determined—i.e., all Jivas are, by their very nature, ever free, pure and illumined.

\(^2\) Rests, etc.—That is to say, no duty nor any moral imperative can be applied to the non-dual Ātman.

93. All Dharmās or Jivas are from the very beginning and by their very nature, all peace, unborn and completely free. They are characterised by sameness and are non-separate from one another. Therefore the Jivas are Ātman unborn, always established in “sameness” and “purity” itself.

**Śankara’s Commentary**

Similarly, there is no room for any effort to make Ātman peaceful, for, all Jivas are, by their very nature,
eternally peaceful, unborn and of the nature of eternal freedom. All Jīvas are further of the same nature and non-separate from one another. They being Ātman in their very essence, ever pure, unborn and established in sameness, therefore the effort of attaining to liberation is meaningless. For, if something is accomplished with regard to an entity which is always of the same nature, it does not make any change in the thing itself.

The previous Kārikā stated the condition which alone makes one capable of attaining to liberation. But this liberation is not something external or foreign to be achieved or acquired. The Self is, by its very nature, ever free and illumined. It has never been covered with a veil. Therefore one who understands the real import of Advaita Vedānta, realises himself as ever pure, free and illumined and automatically ceases from making efforts at gaining further knowledge.

वैशारदं तु वै नास्ति भेदे विचरतां सदा ।
भेदनिम्नानु पुष्पग्राहात् स्मृतां क्रपणा: स्मृताः || ९४ ||

94. *Those who always rely on (attach themselves to) separateness can never realise the innate purity of the Self. Therefore those who are drowned in the idea of separateness and who assert the separateness of (entities) are called narrow-minded.*

SANKARA'S COMMENTARY

Those who have realised the truth regarding the Ultimate Reality as described above, are alone free from narrowness. Others are verily narrow-minded. This is thus described in this verse. "Drowned in the idea of separation" means those who stick to the idea of separation, that is to say, those who confine themselves to the multiplicity of phenomenal experiences. Who are they? They are those who assert that the multiplicity of objects
exists, i.e., the dualists. They are called “narrow-minded” as they never realise the natural purity of \( \textit{Atman} \) on account of their ever-dwelling on the thought of multiplicity, i.e., on account of their taking as real the duality of experiences imagined through ignorance. Therefore it has been truly said that these people are narrow-minded.

Compare “Who ever, O Gārgī, without knowing that \( \textit{Akshara} \) (the Imperishable), offers oblations in this world, sacrifices, and performs penance for a thousand years, his work will have an end. Whosoever, O Gārgī, without knowing this \( \textit{Akshara} \), departs this world, he is narrow-minded. But he, O Gārgī, who departs this world, knowing this \( \textit{Akshara} \), is a \( \textit{Brāhmaṇa}. \)” (Br. Up., 3. 8. 10.)

अजे साम्ये तु ये केरिक्रृतविष्यन्ति सुनिष्टिता: ।
ते हि जोके महाजनास्तस्त्व जोको न गाहते \| ९५ ||

95. They alone are said to be of the highest wisdom who are firm in their conviction of the Self, unborn and ever the same. This, ordinary men cannot understand.

\( \textit{Śaṅkara’s Commentary} \)

That this knowledge of the Supreme Reality is incapable of being understood by the poor intellect, by the unwise,\(^1\) i.e., by persons of small intellect who are\(^2\) outside the knowledge of Vedānta,—is thus explained in this verse. Those few, even though\(^3\) they may be women or others, who are firm in their conviction of the nature of Ultimate Reality, unborn and undivided, are alone possessors of the highest wisdom. They alone know the essence of Reality. Others,\(^4\) i.e., persons of ordinary intellect, cannot understand their ways, that is to say, the Supreme Reality realised by the wise. It is said in the Smrti:—“Even the gods\(^5\) feel puzzled while trying to follow in the footsteps of those who leave no
track behind, of those who realise themselves in all beings and who are always devoted to the welfare of all. "They leave no track behind like the birds flying through the sky."

1 The unwise—that is, men devoid of discrimination.

2 Who are, etc.—The Vedānta Scriptures alone can illumine us regarding the real nature of the Self. But the real meaning of the Vedānta can be understood only through reason.

3 Even though—Women and Sudrās were interdicted from the study of the Upanishads though it was conceded that they could attain to the highest knowledge through Smriti. This was the tradition in India during post-Upanishadic age. But in the age of the Upanishads, women were certainly not precluded from seeking or attaining the highest knowledge. Many inspiring portions of the Vedas were composed by women.

4 Others, etc.—Ordinary people cannot appreciate the life and activities of the truly wise because the former do not understand the truth about, and believe in Brahman and the phenomenal world.

5 Gods—that is to say, the beings that are said to move in a higher plane of existence. They also stand stupefied before the Knowers of Brahman as the former have not yet transcended the realm of duality.

6 They leave, etc.—The wise, on account of their realisation of the non-dual Ātman, never manifest by way of advertisement, any supernatural characteristics by which the ordinary men could mark their greatness. The life of the truly wise is perfectly natural though their angle of vision is totally different from that of the ordinary folk. Hence no one except those who have similar wisdom can understand the nature of the wise.

अजेष्ठजसंस्कान्तं धर्मेणु ज्ञानमिष्यते ।
यतो न कमते ज्ञानसंसं तेन कृतितत्म ॥ ९६ ॥

96. Knowledge (consciousness), the essence of the Jīvas (who are unborn), is admitted to be itself unborn and unrelated (to any external object). This knowledge
is proclaimed to be unconditioned as it is not related to any other object (which, really speaking, does not exist).

\textbf{ŚANKARA'S COMMENTARY}

What constitutes the highest wisdom (\textit{i.e.}, the wisdom of the knower of the non-dual \textit{Ātman})? This is thus explained: Knowledge which constitutes the essence of the Dharmas (\textit{Jīvas}), unborn, immutable and identical with \textit{Ātman}, is also admitted to be unborn\textsuperscript{1} and immutable. It is just like the light and the heat belonging to the sun. Knowledge, being ever unrelated to other\textsuperscript{2} objects, is said to be unborn. As knowledge is, thus, unrelated to other objects, it is like the \textit{Ākāśa}, called unconditioned or absolute.

\textsuperscript{1} \textit{Unborn, etc.—}This refutes the theory of the Nyāya realists who say that knowledge is an attribute of \textit{Ātman} and arises only by the contact of the mind with an external object. It has already been pointed out that the appearance of external objects is due to illusion. But consciousness (\textit{Ātman}) does not cease to exist in the absence of objects as in \textit{Yoga Samādhi} or deep-sleep. Therefore the real nature of knowledge is that it is unborn and unattached. From the standpoint of Reality the \textit{Jīva} is identical with consciousness like the identity of the sun with its heat and light.

\textsuperscript{2} \textit{Other objects—}It is because such objects do not, from the standpoint of Reality, exist.

\begin{quote}
\textit{अणुमात्रेशपि बैधमये जायमानेिविपश्चितः} ।
\textit{असंगता सदा नास्ति किमुताक्षशवणच्युतः} ॥ ९७ ॥
\end{quote}

97. The slightest idea of variety (in \textit{Ātman}) entertained by the ignorant bars their approach to the unconditioned. The destruction of the veil (covering the real nature of \textit{Ātman}) is out of the question.
ŚANKARA’S COMMENTARY

If persons, through ignorance, think,—as those who differ from us assert—that an entity (i.e., Jīva or Ātman) does undergo the slightest change, either subjectively or objectively, then such ignorant persons can never realise the ever-unrelatedness (of Ātman).\(^1\) Therefore\(^2\) it goes without saying that there cannot be any destruction of bondage (that is supposed to keep the Jīva bound to the world).

Accordingly the Ultimate Reality is immutable and non-dual Self. Knowledge is ever unrelated to objects as they do not, as such, exist. The view of the opponent regarding the separate existence of objects cannot be upheld as it contradicts the unrelated nature of Ātman which is admitted by all schools of thought.

\(^1\) Ātman, etc.—If the birth or production of an object be admitted, knowledge must be related to it. Otherwise one cannot know its birth. In that case the absolute and unrelated nature of knowledge cannot be maintained.

\(^2\) Therefore, etc.—If it be contended that knowledge is produced or if it be said that knowledge (Consciousness or Ātman) is not birthless by nature, then one cannot speak of liberation or the destruction of bondage, as there is no guarantee of the liberation being permanent.

अत्वधारणा: सर्वं धर्मं: प्रकृतिनिर्मितः ।
आदौ बुद्धास्तथा मुक्ता बुद्ध्यं इति नायकः ॥ ९८ ॥

98. All Dharmas (i.e., Jīvas) are ever free from bondage and pure by nature. They are ever illumined and liberated from the very beginning. Still the wise speak of the Jīvas as capable of knowing (‘the Ultimate Truth’).

ŚANKARA’S COMMENTARY

(Objection)—It has been stated in the previous Kārikā that (according to the view of the ignorant) the
destruction of the veil covering the real nature of Ātman is not possible. This is a (tacit) admission by the Vedāntist that the (real) nature of the Jīvas is covered by a veil.

(Reply)—It is not so. The Jīvas are never subject to any veil or bondage imposed by ignorance. That is to say, they are ever free from any bondage (which does not at all exist). They are pure by nature; illumined and free from the very beginning as it is said that they are of the nature of eternal purity, knowledge and freedom. If so, why are Jīvas described as capable of knowing (the Ultimate Reality) by teachers who are competent to know the Truth, i.e., those who are endowed with the power of discrimination? The reply is that it is like speaking about the sun as shining though the very nature of the sun is all-light, or speaking about the hill, which is ever free from any motion, as always standing.

1 It, etc.—People imagine that they can remove the veil of Ātman by knowledge. This is also due to Avidyā or ignorance.

2 The Jīvas, etc.—If a man has got the idea of veil or impurity, then he is bound. But in the absence of such idea he is free. Ātman has no veil. One speaks of veil, bondage, etc., only from the causal standpoint. This position is the most difficult to be correctly understood inasmuch as for the generality of men, causation is a fact, therefore the veil or bondage of Ātman is also a fact. But from the standpoint of the Ultimate Truth, there is no causality and therefore no veil, bondage or ignorance.

3 It is like, etc.—One speaks of the rising and the shining of the sun though the sun, inasmuch as it is always of the nature of light, cannot be said to rise or shine at any particular moment. Similarly one describes the hill as standing, which correctly speaking is only a correlative of motion. Nevertheless, though the hill never moves, yet it is described as standing. As the ideas of rising, shining, etc., associated with the sun or the ideas of standing, etc., attributed to the hill do not affect their real nature, so also the idea
of “knowability” ascribed to the Jīva, which is all-knowledge by nature, does not affect it in any way.

99. The knowledge of the wise one, who is all-light, is ever untouched by objects. All the entities as well as knowledge (which are non-different) are also ever-untouched by any object. This is not the view of the Buddha.

ŚANKARA’S COMMENTARY

The knowledge of the wise man, that is to say, of the one who has attained to the Supreme Reality, is ever unrelated to other objects or Jīvas. This knowledge is always centred in or is identical with Jīva (i.e., Ātman) like the sun and its light. The word “Tāyee”, “All-light”, in the text signifies that which is all-pervasive like Ākāśa or, it may mean that which is adorable or all-knowledge. All entities, i.e., Jīvas (beings like so many Ātmans) are as unattached as the Ākāśa, and ever-unrelated to anything else. Knowledge (Jnāna) which has been compared to Ākāśa in the beginning of this chapter is non-different from the knowledge of the wise one who is all-light. Therefore the Ākāśa like knowledge of the wise does not relate itself to any other object. This is also the essence of the Dharmas or all entities. The essence of all the entities is the essence of Brahman, and is, like Ākāśa, immutable, changeless, free from parts, permanent, one and without a second, unattached, non-cognizable, unthinkable and beyond hunger and thirst. The Śruti also says, “The knowledge (characteristic) of the seer is never absent.” This knowledge regarding the Ultimate Reality, non-dual and characterised by the
absence of perceiver, perception and the perceived, is not the same as that declared by the Buddha. The view of the Buddha, which rejects the existence of external objects and asserts the existence of ideas alone, is said to be similar to or very near the truth of non-dual \textit{Atman}. But this knowledge of non-duality which is the Ultimate Reality can be attained through Vedānta alone.

\footnote{Other, etc.—It is because objects or \textit{Jivas}, different from knowledge or \textit{Atman}, do not exist.}

\footnote{Beginning, etc.—Compare the first verse of the fourth chapter.}

\footnote{Buddha.—The reference is to the views held by the Buddhist idealists.}

\footnote{The view, etc.—Metaphysically speaking, Buddhistic philosophy is nearest to Advaita Vedānta in its dialectics.}

\textit{\textbf{100. Having realised that condition (i.e., the knowledge of the Supreme Reality) which is extremely difficult to be grasped, profound, birthless, always the same, all-light, and free from multiplicity, we salute It as best as we can.}}

\textit{\textbf{ŚANKARA'S COMMENTARY}}

The treatise is now completed. This Salutation is made with a view to extol the knowledge of the Supreme Reality. It is extremely difficult to understand it. In other words, it is difficult of comprehension as it is not related to any of the four possible predicates, such as existence, non-existence, etc. It is profound, that is, very deep like a great ocean. People devoid of discrimination cannot fathom it. This knowledge (\textit{Jnāna}) is, further, birthless, always the same and all-light. Having
attained this knowledge which is free from multiplicity, having become one with it, we salute it. Though this absolute knowledge cannot be subjected to any relative treatment (such as, Salutation, etc.) yet we view it from the relative standpoint and adore it to the best of our ability.

1 It is, etc.—It is because the knowledge of the non-dual Ātman is not possible by direct perception through the instrumentality of the sense-organs.

2 Four, etc.—Reference—Kārikā 83, Chapter IV.

3 People, etc.—This knowledge of Ātman can be attained only through discrimination by which one can negate what is ignorance. Then the knowledge of Self reveals itself.

4 Having, etc.—The knowledge of Ātman enables one to realise one’s identity with It.

5 Though, etc.—Salutation always implies duality and is possible only from the relative standpoint. The author, being full of human love and gratitude to the knowledge that enabled him to realise the Supreme Reality, drags it, as it were, to the relative plane by imagining it as a Person or Teacher and then adores it by saluting it, to set an example to the ignorant.

6 To the best, etc.—No salutation is possible with regard to the non-dual Ātman because the knower of Ātman is one with Ātman Itself. This salutation is made from the relative standpoint.

Here ends Śri Gauḍapāda’s Māṇḍūkyya Upanishad Kārikā with the Commentary of Śri Śankara.

Aum Peace! Peace! Peace!
I bow to that Brahman, the destroyer of all fear of those who take shelter under It,—which, though unborn, appears to be associated with birth through Its (inscrutable and indescribable) power (of knowledge and activity); which, though ever at rest, appears to be moving; and which, though non-dual, appears to have assumed multifarious forms to those whose vision is deluded by the perception of endless objects and their attributes.

I prostrate to the feet of that Great Teacher, the most adored among the adorable, who,—out of sheer compassion for the beings drowned in the deep ocean of the world, infested with the terrible sharks of incessant births (and deaths),—rescued, for the benefit of all, this nectar, hardly obtainable even by the gods, from the innermost depths of the ocean of the Vedas by churning it with the (churning) rod of his illumined reason.
I make obeisance with my whole being to those holy feet—the dispellers of the fear of this chain of births and deaths—of my great teacher who, through the light of his illumined reason, destroyed the darkness of delusion enveloping my mind; who destroyed for ever my (notions of) appearance and disappearance in this terrible ocean of innumerable births and deaths; and who makes all others also that take shelter at his feet, attain to the unfailing knowledge of Scriptures, peace and the state of perfect non-differentiation.

Aum Peace! Peace! Peace!
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